

THE  
FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR.





M. 174.

THE  
FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR:

ITS CAUSES, INCIDENTS, AND CONSEQUENCES.

EDITED BY  
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
WITH THE  
TOPOGRAPHY AND HISTORY OF THE RHINE VALLEY,

By W. H. DAVENPORT ADAMS,  
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*United Service Institution  
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
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MARSHAL MACMAHON.





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
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CROWN PRINCE OF PRUSSIA.












# BATTLE OF COURCELLES.

August 14th 1870.

FRENCH PRUSSIANS

Metres 1000 500 0 1 2 3 4 Kilometres  
English Miles 0 1 2 3 Miles








FIG. 5.—SECTIONAL PLAN OF FRENCH MITRAILLEUSE.  
(WITH THE CARTRIDGES IN THE BARRELS AND THE CLOSER SCREWED HOME).

FIG. 2.




FIG. 3.






FIG. 1.



THE GATLING MITRAILLEUSE.








FIG. 1.—PRUSSIAN NEEDLE-GUN (BREECH OPEN).




FIG. 2.—SECTION OF THE PRUSSIAN NEEDLE GUN.




FIG. 3.




FIG. 4.




FIG. 5.

CHASSEPOT BREECH-LOADER.—FIG. 3, ELEVATION; FIG. 4, LONGITUDINAL VERTICAL SECTION; FIG. 5, LONGITUDINAL SECTION OF CARTRIDGE.

## SMALL ARMS.



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of Prussia. Under these circumstances they had nothing to gain by the additional formation of a southern bund.

The arguments used by Prussian diplomatists to persuade Bavaria, Württemberg, and Baden to sign the treaties just mentioned, brought forcibly into relief the danger to which they were exposed from the probable demands of France for compensation and rectification of the frontier on the Rhine, in consequence of the unification and aggrandisement of North Germany. France, tormented by envy at the steady growth of German power, might any day fall upon Germany in the midst of peace on the flimsiest pretext. In such case, it was but too evident that Prussia would rather let her neighbours be sacrificed than pay the required compensation with her own territory. Looking forward, however, with some confidence to the result of a struggle if it should come, the Prussian minister had secured a reservation in the objectionable clause of the treaty of Prague, which he hoped would one day subserve the great interests of German unity. Though north and south were only to be at liberty each to form a separate union, they were at the same time allowed the benefit of "national ties" to bind them together. This is one of those convenient phrases in a treaty, which are found to yield the interpretation most agreeable to the strongest party in any controversy about it. Yet the relations between the North German Confederation and Austria and the South Germans were not very satisfactory during the three years that followed the treaty of Prague. There was a strong party in the minor states that dreaded absorption by Prussia, and looked to France for succour. Saxony had profited considerably by French interference, retaining her king and court and the management of her domestic affairs. Her contribution to Prussia for the expenses of the war was but 10,000,000 thalers (£1,500,000), while that of Bavaria was 30,000,000 florins (£3,000,000). Württemberg had to pay 8,000,000 florins; Baden, 6,000,000; and Hesse, 3,000,000. Bavaria had also to cede territory—two districts near Orb and Karlsdorf, containing 34,000 souls. Hesse-Darmstadt gave up the landgraviate of Hesse-Homburg, with some other fragments of territory, and as far as concerned her possessions north of the Maine, she entered into the confederation of North Germany. True, she acquired in return some portions of Upper Hesse.

One feeble attempt at united action was made by the southern states in 1868, at the meeting at Nordlingen, and it ended in a lamentable failure. The question was how the old Federal fortresses situated in Southern Germany were to be managed in future. There was Ingolstadt in Bavaria, Ulm in Würtemberg, Rastadt in Baden, and in part Mayence, where Electoral Hesse was obliged to furnish a part of the garrison. Both Ulm and Rastadt are more expensive than Ingolstadt; the tendency, therefore, of both Baden and Würtemberg was to keep the right of garrisoning these fortresses within their territory, and get Bavaria, which is the largest, to pay a part of the expenses of keeping them up. Bavaria objected to this unless it was allowed a corresponding influence in the management of these fortresses, to which the others objected. A most original expedient, which well characterizes the whole spirit of this conference, was proposed; namely, to call on Prussia, who contributed most to the garrison of Mayence, to take a share in the expense of maintaining the other fortresses likewise, but without having any voice in the management of the fortresses themselves. All the fortresses in Germany were thus to have been kept up by common expense, to which naturally the North would have contributed most; but all the southern fortresses were to have remained in the hands of the sovereign in whose territory they were situated. This liberal offer was gratefully declined by Prussia; and the only result of the conference of Nördlingen was to prove that it was a hopeless task to try and bring about an understanding between the southern states of Germany on any point whatever.

It was the old story of family feuds and family jealousies, which are invariably more bitter than those with strangers. Bavaria, which is larger in territory and population than all the other three taken together, claimed naturally more or less the position which Prussia held in North Germany, and the others, if they could not maintain their entire independence, would rather make an arrangement with the Northern Confederation than allow Bavaria the precedence. Thus, the project for a Southern Confederation suggested by the fourth article of the treaty of Prague proved still-born; for Hesse could not bring it into being, Baden would not, and Würtemberg and Bavaria would never agree. The idea of such a confederation was nothing more than a sort of political

plaster to soothe the wounds of Austria and of the southern states.

While Prussia brooded over the new state of things resulting from her successful war, uncertain whether she should absorb the neighbouring states into her own system, or herself sink into the vast hegemony of a new German empire, Austria patiently and prudently observed a pacific, if not a friendly, line of conduct towards her recent and powerful antagonist. The revelation of the secret military treaties between Prussia and the southern states did not rouse her. Prussia's disregard of the treaty of Prague relating to North Schleswig did not provoke her. In the Luxemburg difficulty she sided neither with France nor Prussia. She made friendly advances to the king and government of Italy, and while anxious for the inviolability of Rome and the pope, would do nothing for his holiness in the way of armed intervention. Indeed, the new laws passed by the legislature at Vienna, on marriage and on education, withdrawing them both from ecclesiastical jurisdiction, did virtually abolish the concordat, and establish religious freedom in Austria. That the Prussian victories should result in substantial benefit to Austria is a fact that, whether foreseen or not by the cabinet of Berlin, is an additional justification of the policy by which they revolutionized Germany.

The great changes that ensued could not but excite fears and apprehensions in other neighbouring states of smaller dimensions. Upon former occasions, the slightest concussion of arms on the Danube or the Rhine was the signal for a general appeal to the sword throughout Europe. No sooner did warriors of Saxony measure swords with Tilly and Wallenstein, than France, Sweden, Spain, and Savoy rushed to the encounter, thinking to make some profit out of the transaction. It was the same when Daun and the great Frederick were pitted against each other; the Czar and Louis XIV. took part, and ultimately changed sides, in the quarrel. In fact, when a musket was fired on the Rhine, the quarrel went on multiplying itself, until the whole world was involved in it. Happily for the rest of Europe, the general conflagration which one spark of war could formerly excite, was not brought on by the very fiery brand of the Bohemian war. Governments had other occupations besides intrigue and war; commerce opened a new sphere for their energies, which were greatly influenced also by

the advanced education of the people, and the public opinion that makes itself felt through the press, as well as through representative institutions. Both rulers and the ruled have come to consider it the wisest policy to leave foreign nations to settle their own disputes among themselves, and to adopt whatever institutions are congenial to their tastes, provided these do not become an offence to their neighbours. The peculiar situation of the great powers favoured these views. Spain weakened; Britain pacific; Russia too glad to have a strong barrier against France, in Prussia, and a weak barrier, in Austria, against her own aggressions in the East; Italy only interfering in the dispute to secure Venice as a copestone to the edifice of her own country—all these things gave uncontrolled action to the principles of international policy.

France alone, at the threshold of the dispute, with her hand on the sword, spoke about the necessity of a rectification of frontiers in the event of an aggrandized Prussia. But the French emperor, isolated, felt too weak to struggle alone with the law of inevitable necessity. Outwitted by Cavour in Italy, and foiled by Bismarck in Germany, he was, by the moral forces which those ministers arrayed against him, incapacitated from preventing the universal rally round a national banner of either Germans or Italians. The spirit of nationality, which he was the first to raise effectually, became too mighty for his exorcism when he sought to allay it. For a time, indeed, it was feared that the changes in the political relation and geographical boundaries of the chief continental powers would bear injuriously on the smaller neutral powers, one of which, Switzerland, lies in the midst of three great continental nations, and has a share in the speech and nationality of all three. Germany and Italy might think of claiming the annexation of the German and Italian cantons, while France, it was thought, would hardly be prevented from making attempts on Switzerland or Belgium. But Germany and Italy better understood the teaching of past history, of international law, and of national interest in the higher and wider sense. No design against Switzerland seems to have been entertained by either of these governments. On the ground of nationality France could not claim a single Swiss canton. The small, ancient, conservative republic, in no way threatened the neigh-



bouring monarchies, the republican propaganda forming no part of its policy. For centuries it had ceased to be proselytizing or conquering, and aimed only at preserving its own boundaries and its own liberties. Experience shows that Switzerland can, as a republic, live on the best terms with the neighbouring monarchies. Princes who rooted up commonwealths everywhere else, have shown Switzerland special favour. The elder Bonaparte, who overthrew republics of every variety, from France to Ragusa, showed a real regard for Switzerland, gave her a constitution which was at least an improvement on the previously existing state of things, and inflicted less damage on her than on any other of his dependencies. So, the allied princes who overthrew him showed no jealousy of the republican state, but enlarged its borders and guaranteed its independence and neutrality. Should monarchical Prussia feel jealous of the little state, let her call to mind that the republican spirit which exists in Germany alongside of the monarchic spirit, and which in times past produced German commonwealths and leagues, needs an expression somewhere, and that expression is now found in the Swiss republic. Switzerland has often proved, not only a safe refuge, but a useful school for German democrats. Those who had been dreaming extravagant republican dreams, have gone back to their own country a great deal wiser for their experience of an established and rational republican government, following not the dictates of theory, but those of common sense. It is well for many reasons that Switzerland should remain a neutral ground for all nations, and to this end she must carefully guard the neutrality which she has guarded so long, and which, among other advantages, saved her from the horrors of the Thirty Years' War. "She must stand," says the writer from whom we have quoted, "ready to repel, whether by arms or by diplomacy, any encroachment on her own rights; she must not, whether by arms or by diplomacy, meddle in any way in any possible quarrels of her mightier neighbours."

The fate of another small state locked in between two of the great powers became, in 1867, the cause of great commotion in the cabinets of Europe, and excited very general apprehensions of war between Prussia and France. To Count von Bismarck's firmness and moderation at that time, is probably due the maintenance of peace for three years more.

At his dinner-table, a short time after Luxemburg had been declared neutral, a learned man gave an opinion, that Prussia ought to have made the question a *casus belli* with France. Bismarck answered very seriously:—"My dear professor, such a war would have cost us at least 30,000 brave soldiers, and in the best event would have brought us no gain. Whoever has once looked into the breaking eye of a dying warrior on the battle-field, will pause ere he begins a war." And, after dinner, when he was walking in the garden with some guests, he stopped on a lawn, and related how he had paced to and fro upon this place in disquiet and deep emotion, in those momentous days of June, 1867, when he awaited the royal decision in an anguish of fear. When he came indoors again, his wife asked what had happened that he looked so overcome. "I am excited," he replied, "for the very reason that nothing has happened."

The history of the Luxemburg question was briefly as follows:—By the treaties of 1815 the whole of Luxemburg was assigned to the king of the Netherlands, while at the same time the grand duchy was included in the German Confederation. After the secession of Belgium from the Netherlands, it was provided by the treaty of London in 1831, that the western portion of Luxemburg should be assigned to the king of the Belgians in full sovereignty, the federal relations of that part of the duchy being transferred to Limburg, which, together with Eastern Luxemburg, was secured to the king of the Netherlands. The refusal of Holland to accede to the treaty caused the French siege of Antwerp, and the blockade of the Scheldt: and after the termination of hostilities, the whole of Luxemburg remained provisionally in possession of Belgium. In 1839 negotiations for a definite peace were renewed, and Austria and Prussia, on behalf of the confederation, required Belgium to comply with the stipulations of 1831. The western part of Luxemburg was accordingly detached from the confederation, while the remaining portion continued to form a German state under the sovereignty of the house of Orange. The town of Luxemburg, from 1815 to 1866, was a Federal fortress occupied by a Prussian garrison. The plenipotentiary of the grand-duke voted for the motion which provoked from Prussia, in 1866, the declaration that the Bund was dissolved, but no hostile measures were taken on either side; and at the close of the war the Prussian government abstained from

including the grand-duchy in the Northern Confederation. The garrison still occupied the fortress, and the king of Holland seemed to take possession of the vacant sovereignty as of a derelict without a claimant. After assuming the right of succession to this member of the defunct confederacy, the king seemed to infer that he had a selling as well as a holding title; and through the medium, it is said, of a lady residing at Paris, he proposed to transfer Luxemburg to the Emperor Napoleon, who was willing, if not anxious, to make the bargain. But the defence of the fortress of Luxemburg had for half a century been intrusted to Prussia, who could scarcely abandon the place in deference to the demand of France.

The Emperor Napoleon committed an error in demanding a concession which could not be granted by Prussia, except at the cost of wounding the national feeling of Germany; while Count von Bismarck, on his side, had been guilty of an oversight in allowing Dutch Luxemburg to remain, even for a time, outside the confederacy. War seemed imminent, for the French emperor having once stated his willingness to bargain for the duchy could not recede without seeming to fear Prussia, and grievously wounding the sensitiveness of the French nation. In order, however, to give him the means of drawing back without discredit, a conference, proposed by the king of the Netherlands, was sanctioned by the neutral powers, and assembled in London, under the presidency of Lord Stanley, the minister for Foreign Affairs. The conference ended in a compromise, in which Prussia conceded something. The duchy was declared neutral, with the guarantee of all the powers represented at the conference. Prussia withdrew her troops from the fortress, and the fortifications were demolished. Thus the crisis was tided over, and hopes began to be once more entertained that Europe was entering upon a long term of peace.

Meanwhile, by a curious coincidence, a prince of a junior branch of the house of Hohenzollern had been raised from comparative obscurity to sovereign power, in the early part of that year which had proved so eventful to the royal family of Prussia. Prince Charles of Hohenzollern Sigmaringen was elected reigning Prince of Roumania in March, 1866, in the twenty-seventh year of his age. He was installed in May, and recognized by the Turkish government in July.

Roumania is the name that was given to the two principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia when they were united by a firman of the Sultan, in December, 1861, under Colonel Couza, who had been hospodar of both principalities and assumed the style and title of Prince Alexander John I. With a constitutional form of government, an annual revenue of nearly £3,000,000, a population of about 4,000,000 spread over an area of 45,000 English square miles, Roumania contains the elements of prosperity which wise government may develop and confirm. The reign of Prince Alexander, however, was not a happy one. His government and the popular assembly fell into a state of chronic antagonism on the subject of finance, parliamentary representation, and legislation in general. In May, 1864, the prince issued a decree, proclaiming a new electoral law and certain changes in the constitutional charter. His conduct was approved by a *plebiscitum*, or vote of the people, and the prince began to rule as a dictator, to the depletion of the treasury and the misery of his subjects. In the month of February, 1866, a general insurrection broke out, and the prince, abandoned by the army, was compelled to abdicate and surrender himself a prisoner. After a brief detention, he was allowed to leave the country. The Chambers then proclaimed the Count of Flanders, brother of the king of the Belgians, as prince of Roumania; but the count declined the uneasy throne. The lot then fell upon Prince Charles, whose brother, Prince Leopold, was destined to make so great a commotion in Europe four years later, by his acceptance of the offer of the crown of Spain.

It did not at the time appear that the susceptibilities of either the Russian or the Turkish governments were excited by the apparent extension of Prussian influence to the region where the "Eastern Question" might become the object of renewed complications. Russia, indeed, had her own cares in rebuilding the fabric of her society, which had been seriously dislocated by the humane, but somewhat hasty, scheme of emancipating the serfs. The reckless and profuse members of the upper classes suddenly found themselves brought to the verge of pauperism, their vast estates deprived of labourers, their serfs converted into small landowners, with no capitalists at hand to undertake the farming of the masters' land. The peasantry, however, with few exceptions,

used their newly-acquired freedom wisely and moderately. In the communal assemblies they quietly voted for the abolition of all class privileges that pressed unequally on local taxation, and they were generally victorious. By degrees the landholders grew reconciled to the new state of things, finding that with good management their position was materially as well as morally improved by the independence of their peasantry. For awhile the career of reform which the czar had pursued since his accession to the throne was threatened with interruption in 1866, when his majesty's life was attempted by a wild fanatic imbued with the notions of a party styled "the Nihilists," a party that aimed at destroying all existing social differences and distinctions, church and state together, by physical force. The emperor dismissed his reforming ministers, and called conservatives and reactionists to his council. A curb was put on the public press, and governors with repressive tendencies were appointed to all the northern and western provinces, save Poland, which was indulged with a liberal secretary of state. Public opinion, however, reasserted itself ere long, and a vigorous effort was made to reform the military administration and reorganize the army. The old lengthened service of twenty-five years, by which a soldier, before the emancipation, had been able to earn freedom for himself and his posterity, was abolished, and a short term adopted. Corporal punishment was abandoned; new arms of precision were introduced, and improved artillery adopted; the militia was reconstituted on a more popular basis; the cadet schools were reformed, and a more scientific training afforded to the youths destined to become officers. Nor were the Cossacks overlooked; but certain ameliorations in discipline, and improvement in supplies at the military colonies, served to reconcile them to the hardships of their service.

A signal mark of the high position as humanitarians of the leading men in Russia, is to be found in the fact that the "Explosive Bullet Treaty" was signed at St. Petersburg in November by the representatives of Bavaria, Belgium, Denmark, England, France, Greece, Holland, Italy, Persia, Portugal, Austria, Prussia, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and Württemberg. The document thus drawn up with a view to mitigate the horrors of war, marks an epoch in civilization and merits record. It is to the following effect:—

"Considering that the progress of civilization ought to result in diminishing as much as possible the sufferings inseparable from war; that the only legitimate object pursued in war is to weaken the force of the enemy; that to attain this it suffices to place as many men as possible '*hors de combat*;' that to make use of expedients which will unnecessarily enlarge the wounds of the men placed *hors de combat*, or entail inevitable death, is incompatible with the before-mentioned object; that to make use of such expedients would, moreover, be contrary to the teachings of humanity; the undersigned, in virtue of the instructions given them by their governments, are authorized to declare as follows:—

"1st. The contracting parties engage, in the event of war between any of them, to abstain from the use of missiles of any description possessing explosive power, or filled with explosive or inflammable material, weighing less than 400 grammes. This restriction to apply to the army and navy alike.

"2nd. They likewise invite all those states not represented at the deliberations of the military commission assembled at St. Petersburg, to subscribe to this mutual engagement.

"3rd. In the event of war this engagement is to be observed only towards the contracting parties, and those that may subsequently subscribe to it. It need not be observed towards any who have not signified their assent to the above stipulations.

"4th. The above engagement likewise ceases to be valid if a state that has not signed it takes part in a war between parties that have signed it.

"5th. Whenever the progress of science results in any new definite proposals being made for improving the equipment of the troops, the contracting parties, as well as those who have subsequently joined this engagement, will assemble to maintain the principles laid down to reconcile the acquirements of war with the demands of humanity."

Turkey, who had not been unprosperous since the Crimean war, not only held Egypt well in check, but showed signs of weariness of her protectors, the western powers. The peace of Paris, in 1856, in laying heavy conditions on Russia with regard to the Black Sea, imposed disabilities on Turkey also. The Sublime Porte did not like its men-of-war to be kept out of the Euxine, nor that the mouths of the Danube and the navigation of that river should be under the control of a European

commission. Rather let us have the old state of things back again, muttered the Divan, we have a good army and a good fleet, and Russia will not be in a hurry to quarrel with us. As the government of the czar feels the resentment of that treaty even still more keenly, it is not impossible that the long pending Eastern Question may find a peaceful solution. The war of 1866, though in strengthening Prussia it crippled Austria on the west, yet left the latter power strong on the east, and with a fresh stimulus for extending its influence in that direction, to the detriment of Russian influence in the same quarter. Forces round the Euxine being thus rendered more equal, the temptation to any one of the powers to make a war of conquest is proportionately diminished.

One most unfortunate popular error has been dangerously encouraged by politicians in Russia, who have more zeal for their "nationality" than discretion. It is the prejudice of race against the Germans. The exclusion of Germans from offices of trust has become a popular cry, the fulfilment of which would give a most injurious, if not a fatal check, to the progress of culture and civilization in Russia. How much the development of Russia's power and enlightenment is due to foreigners, and especially to Germans, every student of her history must know. The attempt to develop a Slavonic culture, unsustained by the vigorous qualities of German thought and learning, cannot but end in ridiculous or disastrous failure. In this respect the brotherhood of nations will assert itself; and the Russian, who by nature is volatile and superficial, has more need than other Europeans of the compensating ballast which the deep, meditative character of the German alone can give.

To turn our view homewards, the German war of 1866, fortunately, did not in any way involve the British government in its toils. Occupied by a lively discussion on the domestic question of parliamentary reform, the country paid little more attention to the politics of Germany than that of spectators of the war. Mr. Gladstone, leader of the House of Commons in the ministry of Earl Russell, introduced on the 12th of March a reform bill, which was vigorously opposed, not only by the Conservatives, but by the more timid Whigs, as represented by Mr. Horsman, Mr. Lowe, and Earl Grosvenor. Ministers being defeated on a division by 315 votes against 304, resigned on the 26th of June, not without an effort on the part of the queen to retain

them. The earl of Derby became prime minister, with Mr. Disraeli for chancellor of the Exchequer and leader of the House of Commons, the cabinet being completed a few days after the battle of Sadowa. The defeat of the reform bill produced some excitement among the working classes, who felt that they were unjustly deprived of the right of voting for members of Parliament. By way of demonstrating the popular feeling, the Reform League organized a long procession of trades' unions and other societies of working men, to march into Hyde Park. Some foolish writers in the newspapers raised a cry against this meeting, as an improper interference with the comfort of pleasure-seekers in the park. The government ordered the park gates to be shut, and sent a posse of policemen to protect them. The crowd waited patiently outside, until, finding the exclusion continued, they pressed against the feebly rooted iron railings and swayed them from their fastenings. Entrance thus obtained on one side of the park, the railings were uprooted in other quarters, and with little resistance from the police the whole crowd entered the park and held their meeting. Every advantage was sought to be taken by the reactionary press of this scene of violence, such as it was; the Reform League, Mr. Bright, and the Russell ministry incurred much obloquy. Meanwhile the Fenians began to break the peace in Ireland, and a bill was passed for the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act. A tremendous commercial crisis, too, commenced with the failure, on the 10th of May, 1867, of the celebrated discounting firm, Overend, Gurney, and Co. The widespread ruin that followed penetrated, with various degrees of intensity, to nearly every family in the British islands. Early in the parliamentary session of 1867 Mr. Disraeli introduced a reform bill so very liberal in its principles that three of his most conservative colleagues resigned office. The rest of his party he had "educated," as he said, up to a point that lowered the suffrage to a degree far beyond anything attempted by the Liberals in the previous session. Of this the Liberals could not complain, and they helped the Conservative ministry to pass a measure that practically led to household and lodger suffrage. The result was seen after the dissolution of Parliament, in the return to the House of Commons of a large majority of Liberals, which in the session of 1868 displaced Mr. Disraeli and his friends, and restored to power the liberal leaders.



The reform agitation, the commercial panic, and the Fenian insurrection, diverted the attention which might possibly have otherwise been given to German affairs. Neither the traditional friendship with Austria, nor the dynastic connection with Hanover, served to rouse England from the policy of non-intervention that she had learnt from Mr. Cobden; Whig and Tory, Liberal and Conservative, when in office, alike observed this attitude of abstention. The English government, indeed, offered its services to the belligerents in the interests of peace, and supported France both in the proposal of a conference before the war, and in suggesting an armistice soon after the battle of Sadowa. In the Luxemburg question, which seemed likely to lead to a war between Prussia and France, the British cabinet intervened with effect. The conference proposed by the king of Holland was, as before stated, held in London, and by the treaty then and there signed England, in common with the other powers represented, engaged to guarantee the neutrality of Luxemburg. Favoured the change that had taken place in the Roumanian provinces, yet not encouraging the revolt of the Cretans, England pursued with regard to the Ottoman empire her traditional policy of upholding the strength of Turkey while promoting the improvement of her administration. Crete was not to be made independent, while Moldavia and Wallachia were placed on a vantage ground by the government of Prince Charles, under the nominal suzerainty of the sultan. The relations between Great Britain and France continued very friendly, as did those we had with all the European powers; but there was a coolness in the official intercourse of the United States with the British government, on account of what are called the "Alabama claims." These claims arose out of the depredations committed during the American civil war by the Confederate cruiser, the *Alabama*, which having been built in England, had sailed away before the government in London knew for certain her character and destination. She was far away from England when she received a warlike armament and crew, and commenced a cruise that was fatal to many merchantmen belonging to the Northerners of America. The owners of the merchantmen demanded compensation from the British government, on the ground that it was their duty to prevent the *Alabama* from quitting the English

shores. In consequence of this soreness of the Americans, the insurrection of the Fenians was not heartily discouraged in the United States. Raids into Canada were winked at, and the annexation of that colony became a subject of public talk. The subsequent welding together of all the British provinces of North America into one dominion, did much to avert a danger that might have become threatening.

In one memorable instance, England broke through her resolution to maintain peace, and showed to the world how well she could conduct an arduous expedition, when the safety and freedom of her citizens were at stake. The Abyssinian expedition, from its inception to its successful conclusion, is a signal proof that the much decried military administration of Great Britain is quite capable of planning with skill, and executing with vigorous courage, great and warlike enterprises. For four years Theodore, king or negus of Abyssinia, had held in captivity certain British subjects, including an envoy from the queen. Every means of reconciliation were tried with him in vain, and that respect paid to Englishmen in various parts of the world, which is the security for her commercial transactions, was in danger of being forfeited in the East. In the summer, therefore, of 1867, it was resolved that an expedition should be sent from India into Abyssinia, under the able guidance of Sir Robert Napier; and a special session of Parliament was held in November, to vote the sums necessary for the conduct of the war. An additional penny in the pound income-tax was agreed to, which produced £1,500,000. There was also a surplus in the treasury, and the Indian government had to pay a large part of the cost. The estimate that £3,500,000 would suffice proved delusive.

The merit of the expedition lay in the completeness of its organization, not in any brilliancy of action. A force of some twelve thousand men, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, with followers at least equally numerous in the transport, commissariat, and kindred services, were conveyed by ships from Bombay to Annesley Bay, and thence marched across the rugged highlands of Abyssinia to Magdala, the mountain fortress of King Theodore, which was stormed and taken without the loss of a man, and with only thirty wounded. Theodore having shot himself rather than be taken prisoner, General Napier returned to the sea-coast with the

rescued British subjects, after burning down Magdala and its fortifications, lest it should become a nest of tyranny in the hands of some chieftain of the neighbouring tribes. So well satisfied was England with the completeness of the achievement, and with the respect it procured her among foreign powers, that there was much less murmuring than might have been expected at the undue measure in which the cost of the expedition exceeded the estimate. The total amount of outlay was fully three times as much as the three millions first voted by Parliament. The pasha of Egypt was perhaps not sorry to see this formidable expedition leave the African shore. His relations with the sultan his suzerain were not very cordial, and an old ally of the Ottoman Porte might mean mischief to the commander of the Red Sea. Nothing happened, however, to justify these suspicions.

If the effect produced by the Prussian triumphs was not very distinctly marked in Great Britain, Russia, or Turkey, the Latin race inhabiting Europe was strangely influenced by this new development of Teutonic power. Italy, as we have seen, was a gainer by the defeat of Austria; France, as we shall see, was strangely moved by the same series of events; and Spain, dissevered as she seemed from German interests, became in a singular manner entangled in the mesh of intrigues which rival politicians were weaving. The kingdom of Spain has during these latter years undergone many trials, much suffering, and one great and wholesome change wrought, not by the hands of a foreign enemy or interfering neighbour, but by her native population. The people, spontaneously breaking through the bonds and fetters that held them, hurled the last of the Bourbons from a throne which she had in every sense disgraced. The age of revolt had afflicted this magnificent country at pretty regular intervals for many years with no positive results, until in April, 1868, an insurrection broke out in Catalonia, and that province was placed in a state of siege. On the 23rd of the month Marshal Narvaez, the prime minister of Queen Isabella Maria, died. In consequence of this event, the ministry resigned and were replaced by a new cabinet under Gonzalez Bravo, whose first important act was to banish the chiefs of the army, and to send them, without trial or notice of any kind, across the sea to the Canary Islands. At

the same time her most Catholic Majesty's sister, with her husband the Duc de Montpensier, were ordered to leave Spain. On their refusal to comply with the ministerial order, on the ground that an Infanta of Spain could receive orders only from the sovereign, the queen signed a decree exiling the royal pair, who were conveyed in a Spanish man-of-war, the *Ville de Madrid*, to Lisbon. Some idea of the feeling existing in the navy, and indeed through the entire country, in consequence of the arbitrary proceedings of the new ministry, may be formed from what occurred on board the *Ville de Madrid*. The captain-general of Andalusia was ordered to accompany the royal exiles to the ship, the commander of which, on receiving them, whispered to the duke, "Say but one word, and the captain-general shall remain a prisoner on board, while we sail to the Canaries and bring back the banished generals." The duke declined to utter this word, and lost the crown of Spain, as his father by a similar tenderness of conscience had lost the crown of France. Not long after the perpetration of this arbitrary act, in the month of September, a revolution broke out. The exiled generals were summoned home from the Canaries by the revolutionary leaders, and General Prim, who had escaped to England, returned to his native country. When the latter reached Cadiz the Spanish fleet lying in that port, under the command of Admiral Topete, and the troops of the garrison, declared for the revolution. A proclamation was issued by General Prim in which he said, "Yesterday you were groaning under the yoke of a despotic government; to-day the flag of liberty waves over your walls. Until the moment arrives when Spain, freely convoked, shall decide upon her destinies, it is incumbent upon us to organize ourselves to carry on the struggle, and to save the people from being bereft of all law and authority." A prominent leader of the revolutionary movement was Marshal Serrano, duke de la Torre.

When the province of Andalusia pronounced against the government, the ministry under Gonzalez resigned, and General Concha was appointed by the queen to the presidency of the council. The royal army under the command of the marquis de Novaliches marched upon Cordova, where the insurgents were in force. Upon the issue of this movement depended the future of Spain, and the most strenuous exertions

were made by both parties in preparing for action. A severe skirmish occurred at Burgos, at the close of which the royal troops fraternized with the people, a circumstance by no means inspiring to the gallant and loyal marquis in command, whose fate was worthy of a better cause. Before the end of the month he had reached the river Guadalquivir, and found the insurgents posted at the bridge of Alcolea, about fifteen miles from Cordova, under the command of General Serrano. In the action which ensued the royalist troops were defeated, and their gallant commander fell mortally wounded. The army of the queen broke up and dispersed, while its royal mistress fled from Spain across the Pyrenees into France, reaching Biarritz on the 30th of September. Here she met the Emperor Napoleon, and after a short interview with him proceeded on her journey to Bayonne. On the 20th October a manifesto was issued by the Provisional Government established on the departure of the queen, explaining to the people the necessity which had forced them to rise and expel the Bourbon dynasty. "The people," it said, "must now regain the time which it has lost; the principle of popular sovereignty which is now naturalized in Spain is the principle of national life, and the ideal type of the nation's operations." The document also expressed the desire of the government to keep on good terms with foreign powers, "but if even the example of America in recognizing the revolution were not followed, Spanish independence was not threatened, and there was no foreign intervention to fear."

In another manifesto the government said they should quietly proceed to choose a form of government, without pretending to prejudice such serious questions; though they noticed as very significant the silence maintained by the Juntas respecting monarchical institutions: "if the popular decision should be against a monarchy, the provisional government will respect the will of the national sovereignty." On the 3rd October, Marshal Serrano entered Madrid at the head of the revolutionary army, and was received with enthusiasm by the people, to whom he announced, that after communications with General Espartero, he had been authorized to exercise supreme power and to appoint a ministry provisionally until a constituent assembly should meet. "Let tranquillity," he said, "continue to prevail, and do not allow your con-

fidence in the issue of our efforts to diminish; the unity and discipline of the army, its fraternization with the people, and the patriotism of all, will accomplish the work of the revolution, avoiding equally the impulse of reaction and the discredit of disorder." The affairs of the country were now carried on by a provisional government, a government, as its name implies, existing from hand to mouth, ruling much by circulars and manifestoes. In one of these it was said, "The government has taken in hand the reins of the state, in order to lead the nation to liberty, and not allow it to perish in anarchy." A protest issued by the queen from her asylum in France, met with the following comment:—"Queen Isabella has addressed a manifesto to the Spaniards. The Junta refrains from making any criticism on it. The people have passed their judgment on the acts of the queen, and can now pass their verdict on her words." Meanwhile the Society of Jesuits was suppressed throughout the kingdom and colonies; their colleges and institutions were ordered to be closed within three days, and their property sequestrated to the state. The censorship on literary publications was also suppressed, and the absolute liberty of the press proclaimed.

The ministers of France, Prussia, Portugal, and Great Britain, forwarded despatches recognizing the provisional government. Prim, the guiding spirit of the revolution, was appointed commander-in-chief of the army, and immediately issued an order, forbidding soldiers to interfere in politics, or to attend meetings connected with political objects. A reform bill, or electoral law, was passed by the government, entitling every citizen of twenty-five years to vote at municipal elections, and at elections for the Cortes. An electoral committee, formed to carry out the provisions of the bill, pointed out in a manifesto the form and shape of the future government. "The monarchical form," it said, "is imposed upon us by the exigencies of the revolution, and the necessity of consolidating the liberties we have acquired. Monarchy, by divine right, is for ever dead. Our future monarchy, in deriving its origin from popular rights, will be a consecration of universal suffrage. It will symbolize the national sovereignty and consolidate public liberty, the right of the people being superior to all institutions and powers. This monarchy, surrounded by democratic institutions, cannot fail to be popular."



When the provisional government had, as they believed, finally decided on the permanent form of government under which Spain could flourish, the difficulty was to find a man of noble blood, possessing the qualities necessary for a ruler of Spaniards—one who would be acceptable to the Spanish nation, and who would be acceptable also to the various governments of the Old and New World; one who could steer himself and the country through the crooked intrigues and diplomacies continually in action at the European courts, and who could strengthen and consolidate the power of Spain before the eyes of Europe.

At the general election in January, 1869, the monarchical party obtained a large majority of votes in the Cortes, a majority, however, which was divided into two parties—the Unionists, quondam followers of O'Donnell, and the Progressistas, who were attached to Espartero. At the end of this month the governor of Burgos was murdered in the cathedral by some priests, to the great scandal of the church; the pope's nuncio narrowly escaped death by the mob in consequence, and great excitement prevailed. The occasion was not lost by the liberal party, some of whom stimulated the passions of the people against the clergy. Order was at length restored by the trial of the assassins by court-martial, and by the execution of one who was found guilty. On opening the Cortes on the 11th February, Marshal Serrano, the president, invited the representatives of the nation, now that the obstacles to progress were removed, to construct a new edifice, of which the provisional government had prepared the foundations and designed the plan. It proclaimed with enthusiasm the essential principles of the most radical liberalism, namely, liberty of worship, of the press, of public education, of public meeting and association. On the 25th February the marshal announced his assumption of the executive power, simply from patriotic motives and utterly without selfishness; it was impossible, he said, for him to abuse his power, as neither the right of veto or the power of making peace or war had been given to him, so that he had very little power to abuse had he wished to do so. The government, it was said, would endeavour to disarm the republican party by a most liberal policy; yet Senor Castelar's proposal for an amnesty for political offences was opposed by the government and lost by a large majority.

Questions arose from the republican ranks as to the right of the Duc de Montpensier to hold the position of captain-general of Spain, he being brother-in-law of the late queen and son of Louis Philippe, a Bourbon by birth. Prim answered that the appointment was made by the late dynasty, and that the provisional government had no right to interfere. Admiral Topete declared that he would rather have Montpensier as king than a republic. Subsequently when the articles of the new constitution were carried, the minister for the colonies declared that the authors of the revolution would never have undertaken the task, had they suspected that the result would have been the establishment of a republic. In reply to Senor Castelar, Admiral Topete, minister of marine, declared the Duc de Montpensier to be the most eligible candidate for the throne; a monarchy, a regency, or a republic, he said, seemed equally impossible. "Beware," said he, "lest if you make every solution impossible, some insolent daring man undertake to cut the knot you are unable to solve. You will not applaud me now, but you will understand me." This remarkably strong hint had an effect, and on the 6th June Marshal Serrano was elected by a large majority regent of the kingdom. The Cortes with much noise and ceremony swore to support him, and Prim his prime minister. This state of things did not last long; the old difficulty as to who should be king continually cropped up until, on the 28th September, it was resolved to propose the young duke of Genoa as a candidate for the vacant throne. The young gentleman was at this time a student at Harrow school, in Middlesex. His father, the brother of King Victor Emmanuel, died in 1855. His mother was a daughter of John, king of Saxony, and his sister was wife to the heir apparent of the Italian crown. Neither the prince, however, or his relatives would have anything to do at this time with the Spanish crown. His refusal of the proffered dignity occasioned a split in the ministry of General Prim, and the republicans throughout the country, taking advantage of the unsettled state of things, broke out into open insurrection. The regular troops marched against the disaffected, who being once more overthrown, all moderate men became convinced of the necessity of a governing head, capable of wielding supreme power. Prim advised delay, but professed himself a monarchist; "such I was, such I am, and such I will continue



to be. The country requires a dynasty." Senor Castelar, professor of history, and leader of the republican party, made a powerful speech, historically memorable, showing that the soil of Spain had never been favourable to dynasties, and that the ancient system of monarchies having died out, nothing was left by which men could enjoy their right of freedom but a republic. In consequence of these cabals and discussions, the year 1869 passed away without giving Spain a king. Matters were, however, rapidly approaching a crisis.

In July, 1870, a deputation was sent from the Spanish Cortes through the prime minister, General Prim, offering the crown to Prince Leopold Hohenzollern Sigmaringen, a very distant relative of the king of Prussia, with, as Prim had every reason to believe, the concurrence of the emperor of the French; this belief is supported by the statement that the prince had offered to communicate his nomination to the court of the Tuileries in person. There had been satisfactory communications with the Spanish minister on the subject, but it has been whispered that, at the last moment, the Empress Eugenie determined to support the pretensions of the ex-Queen Isabella, and of her son. The deplorable result of this most unfortunate determination is before us. M. Benedetti, the French ambassador at Berlin, informed the king of Prussia that his master, Louis Napoleon, would not permit the candidature of Prince Leopold Hohenzollern Sigmaringen to the crown of Spain, and would hold the Prussian government responsible for the consequences if it was persisted in. Prince Leopold, through his father, withdrew as a candidate for the crown of Spain, to the annoyance of the monarchical party in Madrid and the surprise of Europe; but so determined was the Napoleon party in the French government to pick a quarrel, that King William of Prussia had to give a rebuff to the French ambassador in the public gardens of Ems. The ambassadors returned to their respective courts, and in a few days it was known throughout Europe that France had declared war upon Prussia. The powers of Europe stood aloof, as it were, until the fierce onset of the belligerents had shown by its result how greatly the prowess of France had been over-estimated, and the Spanish government being freed from any further dictation from Louis Napoleon, brought their own affairs to a crisis by electing Prince Amadeus of Savoy, duke

of Aosta, and younger son of Victor Emanuel, king of Italy, to the crown of Spain. He had been proposed by General Prim in 1868; the offer was then declined by the Italian government in consequence, partly, of the disordered state of Spain at that time, and partly by his position as heir presumptive to the crown of Italy. These difficulties no longer exist. Spain is reduced into order by the energy and patience of General Prim's government, and the crown of Italy is provided for by the birth of a son and heir to the prince's elder brother. We may therefore look forward with hope to an era of increasing power and prosperity to Spain, under the guidance of a prince of the house of Savoy.

General Prim has unfortunately fallen a victim to his fidelity to the cause of monarchy, having been assassinated by political enemies in Madrid, on the very day before the landing of King Amadeus at Carthagen. He was a man holding one of the most exceptional positions known to the students of modern history—that of ruler during an interregnum; a king who was not a king, and never meant to be a king. He ruled a great country with success for two years, yet never looked upon himself as a possible candidate for the permanent sovereignty. He was born in December, 1814, at Reuss in Catalonia, not far from Tarragona, the son of a colonel who had grown old in the Spanish service. With a strong inclination for a soldier's career, Prim at an early period enlisted in the Spanish service as a cadet. Scarcely had he entered the service when the war of the Spanish succession broke out, which lasted from the death of King Ferdinand, in 1833, down to the peace of Bergara, in 1839. In this struggle Prim ranged himself under the constitutional standard, against Don Carlos. He first distinguished himself, not in the regular army, but in one of the free corps. He came to Madrid at the head of one of those wild and lawless bands, the "Marseillais of Spain," which astonished the more sober Castilians by their fierceness of look and bearing, no less than by the strangeness of their attire. Before his twenty-second year he gained his promotion to the rank of captain, and three years later that of colonel, with other military distinctions.

At the end of the civil war, Prim began to devote himself to politics, and was elected a deputy in several successive parliaments. In this capacity he was busy, active, and intelligent, and took a very

prominent part in the organization and management of political clubs. He gained rapid promotion, both professional and political, being advanced to the rank of brigadier-general and to the dignity of Comte de Reuss. The year 1844 found him implicated in a conspiracy against Narvaez, then at the head of the Spanish government, who escaped assassination at the cost of his aide-de-camp Rasetti's life. Prim was convicted of participation in the murder, but his sentence was revoked by the queen, and he was afterwards appointed captain-general and governor of Porto Rico. On the breaking out of a negro insurrection at Santa Cruz, he went at once to the rescue of the Danes, and was mainly instrumental in the subjugation of the rebels. His conduct, however, was not satisfactory to the colonial minister at home, who recalled him because he had removed the garrison, and exposed Porto Rico to the attacks of the negroes there, who were as ready for a revolt as their brethren in the Danish colony. Prim's next step was to become involved in a conspiracy against Bravo Murillo, by whom he was banished. However, after a short absence he returned, and in 1854 was sent as Spanish military commissioner to the camp of the allies during the Crimean war. On his return from the East he passed through Paris, where, in 1856, he married a Mexican lady, Senora Echevarria; the marriage was solemnized under the auspices and in the presence of Queen Christina.

On the 31st of January of that year Prim was promoted to the rank of lieutenant-general, and in 1858 he was raised to the senate, where he soon distinguished himself by a very remarkable speech on the Mexican question. The war of Morocco broke out soon afterwards, and Prim, who commanded, attained a high reputation by a variety of exploits, which were crowned by the battle of Castillejos, near Melilla, where, seeing the regiment of Cordova broken and turned to flight, he threw himself on the path of the fugitives, rallied them, and, with their colours in his hand, led them with such impetuosity against the enemy that he secured the victory for the Spanish arms. This heroic deed was rewarded with the title of marquis de los Castillejos, and the rank of grandee of Spain of the first class. In 1861 the joint expedition to Mexico of England, France, and Spain was projected, and Prim was sent out in command of the Spanish contingent, being charged at the same time with the duties of a minister plenipotentiary.

How Prim proceeded to Mexico with the French and English contingents, and came back with the latter, leaving to the former alone the task of a complete subjugation of Mexico, and the instalment of an Austrian dynasty there, is related elsewhere. Prim's conduct at this juncture, however severely censured by some of his countrymen, received the fullest sanction of the Cortes. We have not space to follow the career of Prim under the ministry of Senor Mon, or under the Narvaez and O'Donnell administrations. Soon after O'Donnell's accession to power, Prim seemed to recall to memory his former political predilections. He leagued himself with Espartero, and threw himself with all his influence into the interests of the Progressistas. In January, 1866, several regiments in various parts of Spain made demonstrations against the government. Placing himself at the head of the revolted regiments, Prim succeeded in reaching the mountains of Toledo. The royal power, however, was at that time too strong to be overcome. The people failed to respond to the movement; and finding himself unable to cope with the forces brought against him, the leader of the insurrection retreated into Portugal with the bulk of his followers. Prim afterwards repaired to London, where he remained in seclusion until the organization of a counter-movement afforded him the opportunity of re-entering Spain.

After the insurrection which drove Queen Isabella from the Spanish throne, Prim had the singular honour of offering the Spanish crown to some half dozen "eligible candidates," and the mortification of meeting with refusals from all, except Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern (who withdrew his acceptance almost as soon as he had notified it), and Prince Amadeus, the present king of Spain. During these twenty-seven months of difficulty and danger, when a sound head and nerve were required, Marshal Prim was not found wanting in tact and administrative talent. Indeed, it may be safely said that to his firm hand, in a very great measure, Spain owed such tranquillity, as, in spite of at least one insurrection, fell to her lot during the long abeyance of regal authority. In Spain it is as indispensable for every political party to have a military champion, as for a troop of bullfighters to have its own matador. Espartero once held that place among the old Progressistas, Narvaez among the Moderados, and O'Donnell among those who would call themselves Liberal

Conservatives, or moderate Liberals. The more advanced Liberals always claimed Prim as their typical hero, and such in reality he was, though some men accused him of inconsistency for accepting the title of Count, while he professed ultra-democratic opinions. The marshal was very strongly addicted to the pleasures of the chase, for the gratification of which taste he kept up a magnificent house and establishment.

In person he was considerably below the middle size, with a small and slender, but wiry and active frame, a lively intelligent countenance, with a very bad complexion. His eyes were large and expressive, his features tolerably regular, with no other marked peculiarity than the high cheekbones. His manners were courteous and winning; his speech fluent, forcible, and not inelegant, both in his native language and in French. He was not a great genius, yet occupied a position very remarkable for a man of ordinary capacity. He was a good officer, possessing that valuable quality of bravery that increases as danger grows more imminent. His idea of government was to maintain military order, and to leave the rest to his colleagues. The wants and grievances of Spain seemed to trouble him but little. He knew the limit of his own powers, and his ambition led him to make a king rather than be a king. His assassination was due, perhaps, as much to the popular hatred of a foreign monarch as to republican hatred of royalty. Anyhow it was a dastardly deed, disgraceful to the party by whom it was instigated or permitted.

Meanwhile France, the greatest power among the Latin races, was successfully developing her material prosperity, if not her political institutions, under the rule of Napoleon III. We resume the thread of her history where we left it in Chapter III., namely, in the year 1860. The alliance of France and England continued to grow more close and friendly. The treaty of commerce successfully negotiated by Mr. Cobden gave the two nations a community of interests, and the feeling of amity was strengthened by certain joint expeditions of a warlike nature. In 1860 public attention in France was, for a time, diverted from the Italian question to events in the remote East. Notwithstanding the great distance of China from the West, that country has long enjoyed the advantages, or disadvantages, of foreign intervention. Unlike Mexico, it has no powerful and civilized neighbour

jealous of European interference. Both China and Japan are in an unfortunate position in this respect. Possessing no effective means of resistance against the improved appliances of war and the training of the West, they have been unable to withstand the imposition of treaties of trade, and have been compelled, in spite of themselves, to abandon their seclusion and open their ports to foreign commerce. Whatever good may eventually accrue by the opening of the country to Europeans, it is surely the right of the Chinese government to determine whether or not it is for the advantage of their country to open their doors to other nations. Before commercial interests, however, many scruples have to give way. The conduct of Europeans in China, and not least that of the English, cannot be regarded as free from violence and wrong.

When a ratification of the treaty of Tientsin was refused, and the Chinese treacherously opened fire upon the English forces in time of peace, war was again declared by England and France against the government at Peking. Two separate expeditions were organized without delay, General Montauban, afterwards created Comte de Palikao, commanding the French, and General Sir Hope Grant the English contingent. Baron Gros and Lord Elgin, the English and French ambassadors, suffered shipwreck on their voyage to China, and narrowly escaped with their lives. The allied forces opened the campaign with an attack on a fort at Tangku, which, after an assault, was entered by both armies at the same time. The Taku forts gallantly withstood an assault made by the French, and only yielded to a combined attack of both French and English, leaving the whole of their war material in the hands of the allies. The Chinese government then, as a pretext for delay, entered into negotiations for peace, but faithlessly seized the English commissioners, together with some other gentlemen, and subjected them to many indignities and cruelties. All negotiations were at once broken off, and the allied forces advanced into the country, overcoming all opposition, until they reached the neighbourhood of Peking, which Lord Elgin threatened to storm unless his terms were acceded to. The Chinese evaded these demands, and the armies advanced, the French making their entry into the emperor's summer palace. The conquerors did not show the virtues of their superior civilization in the face of a semi-barbarous

enemy. The acts of the French troops recall the depredations of the early English navigators on the Spanish coast of America. The pillage was wholesale, the destruction most wanton. The public reception hall, the state and private bedrooms, ante-rooms, boudoirs, and every other apartment, were ransacked; articles of vertu, of native and foreign workmanship, taken or broken, if too large to be carried away; ornamental lattice-work, screens, jade-stone ornaments, jars, clocks, watches, and other pieces of mechanism, curtains and furniture—none escaped destruction. There were extensive wardrobes of every article of dress; coats richly embroidered in silk and gold thread, in the imperial dragon pattern, boots, head-dresses, fans, &c., in fact, rooms all but filled with them, store-rooms of manufactured silk in rolls, all destroyed.

The English followed the French, and in order to intimidate the Chinese, and to make it plain to them that their semi-barbarism gave them no advantage in the face of Western civilization, burnt the palace to the ground. The Chinese government, now convinced, against their will, of the uselessness of further resistance, accepted the conditions offered by the allies.

It deserves notice that the Emperor Napoleon, in his speech on the opening of the French Chambers in March, 1860, vindicated himself against the charge of meanness in exacting Nice and Savoy as the price of his aid to Italy. "Looking at the transformation of North Italy, which gives to a powerful state all the passes of the Alps, it was my duty, for the security of our frontiers, to claim the French slopes of the mountains. The re-assertion of a claim to a territory of small extent has nothing in it to alarm Europe, and give a denial to the policy of disinterestedness which I have proclaimed more than once; for France does not wish to proceed to this aggrandizement, however small it may be, either by military occupation, or by provoking insurrections, or by under-hand manoeuvres, but by frankly explaining the question to the great powers. They will doubtless understand in their equity, as France would certainly understand it for each of them under similar circumstances, that the important territorial re-arrangement which is about to take place, gives us a right to a guarantee indicated by nature herself."

Neighbouring nations did not take the view of the annexation which the emperor would have had them take. But what could they say when

an appeal to universal suffrage among the natives confirmed the annexation?

Switzerland raised a feeble protest against the absorption of these provinces into the empire of France; but she met with a response due to her weakness. About this time the massacre of Christians in Syria by the Mohammedans called the attention of the Western powers to that part of the world. Armed intervention was acknowledged to be the only effective means to quell the disturbances; and a convention was signed by England and France, in virtue of which France, with the consent of Turkey, sent a brigade, under the command of General de Beaufort d'Hautpool, to the scene of disorder, in August, 1860. The appearance of the French flag speedily put an end to the evils under which the Christians were suffering. By the terms of the convention the time of the French occupation had been fixed for six months. During this time it had been arranged, that a commission made up of representatives of France and England was to meet at Beyrout, and to concert measures for the maintenance of order, and the safety of the Christian inhabitants of Lebanon. The six months expired on the 3rd March, 1861, and in February the commissioners had not completed their labours. The English government was little disposed to favour an extension of the stay of the French brigade, but consented to a limited delay of four months. On the 5th July the French troops evacuated Syria. A good deal of ill-feeling was excited in France by the conduct of England in this matter. The French could not understand the jealousy with which their sole interference in the affairs of the East was regarded by English politicians.

The French troops had hardly returned from Syria, when fresh employment was found for them in the Western hemisphere. For some years the internal affairs in Mexico had presented nothing but a scene of confusion. Revolution succeeded revolution. Anarchy alone seemed to possess any stability. This state of things finally called for the intervention of those governments whose subjects had been the chief victims of the exactions of the various Mexican rulers. On the 10th November, 1861, a convention was signed by France, Spain, and England, by which these powers agreed to demand by force of arms redress for their injured countrymen. This undertaking by no means met with universal approval in France. The French



people had grown tired of distant campaigns, and showed small desire to have in America a pendant to the wars in Asia. The successes of the French army in Cochin China, where some few thousand men strove bravely against superior numbers and the dangers of the climate, for the sake of establishing a French colony, had not been received with general approbation. It was felt that the losses and the expenses of the expedition would far exceed any substantial gain, and the imperial government was accused of being swayed too easily by the national taste for military affairs. It was thought, moreover, unwise to create complications in America, when so many beset the very borders of France.

At the time the allied expedition set out, Juarez, the chief of the liberal party, held the reins of power. The intentions of the European governments, as officially declared, were "to compel Mexico to fulfil the obligations already solemnly contracted, and to give a guarantee of a more efficient protection for the persons and property of their respective countrymen;" but the allied powers declined any intervention in the domestic affairs of the country, and especially any exercise of pressure on the will of the population with regard to their choice of a government. The first act of the allies was to sign a convention with Juarez at La Soledad, confirming the president's authority. The allied forces were allowed, during the progress of negotiations, to occupy the towns of Cordova, Orizaba, and Tehuacan, places favourable to the health of the soldiers, while the Mexican flag, which had been lowered at the approach of the allies, was allowed to float over Vera Cruz. England, abandoning all intention of advancing into the country, ratified the signature of its plenipotentiary. Spain, though not giving up the enterprise so readily, did not disavow the signature of General Prim. France, however, declared boldly that she could not accept the convention of La Soledad, which was "counter to the national dignity."

This step of the French government at once roused the suspicion that its interference in Mexican affairs was prompted by other considerations than the simple interests of Frenchmen residing in Mexico. As soon as the Spanish and English realized the awkwardness of their position, their only anxiety was not to let slip any opportunity of breaking with their ally. A pretext soon came. Among the French staff had come a

Mexican exile, by name Almonte, who was an object of suspicion to Juarez on account of his monarchical opinions. Juarez demanded his surrender as a traitor, and was supported in his demands by England. The French could not in honour, even if they had been willing, listen to a demand of this kind. The result of this difference was that the French, about 5000 in number, were left alone, while the English and Spaniards returned to Europe together. Hostilities soon broke out, and an attempt made by the French to take Puebla signally failed. In the winter of 1862, however, General Forey arrived with 30,000 men, captured that city, and then marched to Mexico, where he met with no opposition. The programme of French policy was now fully declared, and the Archduke Maximilian of Austria was announced as a candidate for the throne of Mexico at the instigation of the church or reactionist party, whose motto, "God and order," was opposed to that of the liberals or Juarists, "Liberty and independence."

Maximilian, on receiving the offer of the sceptre of Mexico, hesitated long ere he yielded to the persuasions of the Mexican commissioners, backed by the French cabinet. His acceptance of the throne took place on April 10, 1864, and was followed by the treaty of Miramar, concluded between him and France, which bound the latter power to maintain a military force in Mexico on certain settled conditions. By the beginning of the year 1865, thanks to General Bazaine's zeal and activity, Mexico, for the first time since its independence, was almost at peace. A national army had been organized; important towns had been put into a state of defence, so far as earthworks and guns availed for that end, and the various government factories of arms had been re-organized and refurnished. Could Maximilian have insured the continued presence of a European force, his plans might have been carried out to a successful issue, and order established in Mexico on a firm basis; but, unfortunately, he soon discovered the futility of single attempts to ameliorate the condition of a degenerate people. Wherever the French troops put down opposition, and confided their conquests to Mexican troops, liberals would immediately reappear in arms and retake their old positions. Not till the end of 1865 was Juarez, who still styled himself the president of the republic, at length subdued. He was driven from Chihuahua, the last stronghold of the liberal cause, into the territory of the United

States. The spring of 1866, however, opened unhappily on the new empire. Its resources were not equal to the strain of constant warfare, and the troops, not receiving their pay, resumed their more natural character of marauders. The imperial finances fell into such a critical position, that Bazaine took upon himself to advance Maximilian money, to the no small displeasure of the cabinet of the Tuileries. In fact, the government and people of France were beginning to regret their share in the founding of the new Mexican empire. The French people, who had been induced by the statements of the ministers to take up two Mexican loans, had gradually been enlightened as to the real state of matters, both military and political, in Mexico. Other causes influenced the French government. On the one hand, events happened in Germany in 1866 that made France anxious to have all her available strength within reach; and, on the other, the United States' government had informed the French cabinet, even in 1864, that the unanimous feeling of the American people was opposed to the recognition of a monarchy in Mexico. As time wore on, and the Washington government had more leisure for external affairs, they expressed themselves in more decided terms. To a note addressed to the Tuileries in December, 1865, the French government was constrained to answer that it was disposed to hasten as much as possible the recall of its troops from Mexico. Emboldened by his success, Mr. Seward, the American minister, on the 12th February, 1866, worded a still more pressing message, the rudeness of which was very galling to French dignity. Mr. Seward, however, gained the day, and the emperor agreed to make arrangements for the withdrawal of the French troops from Mexico, a step that would leave Maximilian to his own resources, by the autumn of 1867.

Bazaine had the unpleasant task of communicating his orders to Maximilian. The return of Almonte, whom the emperor had sent to Napoleon to endeavour to procure fairer terms, and on whose embassy both he and the empress had built great hopes, in nowise changed the aspect of affairs. The imperial family naturally complained of the breach of faith on the part of France. Maximilian asserted that he had been tricked; that a formal convention had been entered into between the Emperor Napoleon and himself, which guaranteed

the assistance of the French troops till the end of the year 1868. He felt that but one course was left for him. On July 7 he took pen in hand to sign his abdication. The empress, however, prevailed on him to delay this step till she had tried in her own person to gain a favourable hearing from the ruler of the destinies of France. With this design the Empress Charlotte landed in France on the 18th August, 1866, and hastened to Paris, where her success was as small as might have been expected. Napoleon tried to evade giving her an audience; but her entreaties were so passionate that he was compelled at last to give way. The answer she received crushed all her hopes, and completely unhinged the poor lady's mind. In the meantime the dissolution of the Mexican empire went on. Maximilian perhaps hastened its pace, by leaving the party which had supported him, because it was the French party, and by selecting his cabinet from the extreme clerical party. The effect was to immediately increase the growing disaffection. On December 1, 1866, Maximilian further crippled himself by signing a convention extorted by France, by which half the proceeds of the custom-houses of Vera Cruz and Tampico were assigned to France in payment of her debt. The evacuation of Mexico by the French troops was the signal for risings and desertions. To the trouble of his empire was added the anguish caused by the intelligence of his wife's illness. He then recurred to his former purpose, and prepared to leave for Europe; but the members of the extreme clerical party prevailed on him, by offers of active support in money and men, to change his intention and return to Mexico. The clerical party kept their promises; but their measures excited the opposition of almost every class in the country but the priests. The French withdrew from Mexico even before the time announced to the United States as the term of the French occupation, exacting from their unfortunate protégé heavy pecuniary claims ere they left him. Bereft of every aid save that of native Mexicans, Maximilian's empire quickly fell. His troops, which the presence of French soldiers had not been sufficient to keep in thorough subordination, yielded everywhere to the successful liberals. Town after town fell into the hands of Juarez or of his generals. On the 19th June, 1867, the final act of the tragedy was played, Maximilian,

who had foolishly left Mexico for Queretaro, an unfortified town, fell into the hands of Juarez, was tried by court martial, and by the president's orders condemned to be shot. This heinous crime was not without excuse. The refusal of the imperialists in Mexico to look upon Juarez in any other light than as a guerilla chief in rebellion, naturally exasperated the feelings of the liberals, who, as events showed, possessed the sympathies of the majority of the Mexican nation. Juarez was, as he persisted in proclaiming himself, president of the Republic. A decree of Maximilian's issued in October, 1865, had excited feelings of revenge, for it declared that execution awaited every man taken in arms against the emperor, and by virtue of it Generals Arteaga and Salazar were executed. A few days after Maximilian's death Mexico capitulated; and on the 27th June Vera Cruz was occupied, as the last of the foreign troops were embarking. Thus the attempt to establish monarchical government in Mexico ended in a failure, of which one of the terrible consequences was the cruel death of a distinguished representative of one of the noblest families in Europe. His tragical end, and the scarcely less mournful fate of his brave and amiable consort, must ever remain a dark stain on the history of the second French empire.

Both the military and the political prestige of Napoleon III. were dimmed by the melancholy issue of the Mexican expedition. Complications, too, in other quarters troubled him. His relations with Italy were not the least embarrassing. Committed to the support of the political unity of Italy, he was yet fully aware that the critical position of the pope, in regard to his temporal power, exasperated the Catholic feeling in France. The clergy gave the signal of opposition, and seized every opportunity to hamper the imperial government. In fact, the policy of the French cabinet, like most temporizing measures, was pleasing to hardly any party, either in France or Italy. The friends of Italy in France demanded the recall of the French troops from Rome, while the opposite party still more vehemently urged an energetic intervention in favour of the pope and the dispossessed Italian sovereigns. The emperor had no easy task in mediating between these two extremes. It was not without hesitation and delay that the emperor had recognized Victor Emanuel as king of Italy. In notifying this determination to the cabinet at

Turin, the imperial government declared that it declined beforehand every responsibility in enterprises likely to disturb the peace of Europe; and that the French troops would continue the occupation of Rome until the interests which had brought them there were covered by sufficient guarantees. The recognition of the kingdom of Italy put an end to many doubts and uncertainties. Diplomatic relations were renewed with Turin, where M. Benedetti was accredited in quality of minister plenipotentiary. The principal difficulty was, however, with Rome. On the 28th May, the ambassadors of Spain and Austria had addressed joint despatches to offer the aid of their governments, should France think the opportunity a fit one, to unite the efforts of the Catholic powers in securing the pope's temporal power. This proposition rested on the assumption that Rome was the property of Catholicism, and that its sovereignty could not be placed under the protection of any but the spiritual head of the Catholic church. The French minister of foreign affairs evaded the difficulties raised by this step of Spain and Austria, by declaring that the French government, in its general policy towards Italy, would not join any combination that would be incompatible with its respect for the dignity and independence of the papacy. For that answer the Italians expressed themselves grateful, and the Catholic party could offer no further opposition to French policy.

Napoleon addressed excellent advice to the pope; but his holiness was not of a character amenable to any advice that clashed with his cherished opinions. "The Holy Father," he said, "cannot consent to anything which, either directly or indirectly, ratifies in any manner the spoliation of which he has been the victim." The Gordian knot which diplomatists were endeavouring slowly to untie, Garibaldi resolved to cut with the sword, by the expedition already described, that terminated so unfortunately for him at Aspromonte. It was on the 15th September, 1864, that Napoleon signed, with the Italian government, the treaty which is known as the September Convention, the articles of which were as follows:—1st, Italy engaged not to attack the papal dominions, and to prevent even, by force, every attack upon the said territory coming from without. 2nd, France agreed gradually to withdraw her army from the pontifical states in proportion as the pope's army should be organized. The evacuation, nevertheless, was to



be accomplished within the space of two years. 3rd, The Italian government undertook to raise no protest against the organization of a papal army, even if composed of foreign Catholic volunteers, sufficing to maintain the integrity of the frontier of the papal states, provided that the force should not degenerate into a means of attack against the Italian government. 4th, Italy declared herself ready to enter into an arrangement to take the burden of a proportionate part of the debt of the former states of the church.

In accordance with the terms of this convention, on the 11th December, 1866, the French troops left Rome for Civita Vecchia, and embarked for France. The Italians soon began to exhibit signs of impatience at the restraint diplomacy had put on their movements. Insurrectionary committees were formed throughout Italy, with no attempt at repression on the part of the government. Men were openly enlisted by them. Ratazzi, the Italian minister, at length bestirred himself to check any measures the Italian nation might take without the sanction of the government. Garibaldi was arrested on his way to the papal frontier. Everywhere, however, and from all classes, Garibaldi received an ovation, while Ratazzi met with proportionate disfavour. Bowing to this expression of the popular will, he allowed Garibaldi to return to Caprera. He endeavoured to palliate his conduct to the French ambassador by intimating to him that Garibaldi had given it to be understood that he would not leave his island again without the permission of the Italian government—a statement that was denied by Garibaldi as soon as it reached his ears. At the request of Victor Emanuel, Napoleon, who had ordered the French fleet to return to Italy, rescinded his order. Garibaldi, meantime, contrived in a small boat to pass the ships set to watch Caprera, and getting on board an American vessel, landed on the continent. He made no secret of his design, but publicly harangued the populace at Florence. Rejecting the advice offered him by General Cialdini, he set out in a special train for the frontier. His presence soon united the scattered elements of disaffection; and entering the papal dominions, on the 25th October he gave battle to 3000 pontifical troops, whom he defeated, at Monte Rotondo. His aim was to push on to Rome without delay, and get possession of the city by a *coup de main*, before the arrival of the French troops. His plan was

frustrated, however, by the resistance he met with from the pope's forces. The French army, which on the receipt of the intelligence of Garibaldi's escape from Caprera had at once embarked for Italy, landed at Civita Vecchia on the 29th October, and hastened to the scene of action. This second occupation of Rome by foreigners sorely wounded Italian pride; and Menabrea, the general of the regular Italian army, was ordered to enter the pontifical states. Commands were issued to Garibaldi, at the same time, to fall behind the royal lines. In carrying out this order, Garibaldi, with 5000 men, was attacked on the 3rd November at Mentana, by 3000 of the papal soldiers, and 2000 French, under the command of Generals Kanzler and Polhès. The fight lasted four hours. At night, so little was known for certain of the issue of the engagement, that fresh troops were sent from Rome. A little later, however, Mentana capitulated, and Garibaldi, leaving 500 dead on the field and 1600 prisoners in the hands of his opponents, effected his retreat into Italian territory, and surrendered with his followers to General Ricotti, by whom he was sent to Fort Varignano, near Spezzia. He was soon after allowed to return once more to Caprera. The victory of Mentana was in a great measure due to the fact that the French contingent was armed with Chassepot rifles. The advantage the possession of this weapon gave may be estimated by the fact that the Garibaldians left 600 dead and 200 wounded behind them, while the French losses amounted to only two men killed and thirty-six wounded. The pope's soldiers lost twenty men killed and had 123 wounded. After the episode of Mentana the Italians made no further attempt forcibly to dispossess the pope of his temporal power, but resigned themselves to the tedious ways of diplomacy. The only consequence of Garibaldi's efforts in 1867 was that the French tricolor again waved over Italian soil.

In the rest of Europe France had not played the high-handed part she did in Italy. The year 1863 witnessed an act of Napoleon which deserves mention, notwithstanding its failure, as giving signs of a wiser policy than had hitherto prevailed in European councils. The emperor issued to the various sovereigns of Europe letters of invitation to a congress, at which all the questions that were filling the minds of politicians with anxiety were to be settled, and tottering peace established on

a surer basis. While the embers of war were smouldering, and before they had kindled into a blaze, Napoleon hoped by an appeal of this nature to stay a conflagration of which he could see the disastrous effects. It seemed, too, reasonable to expect that the patching up of continually widening rents in the old treaties, or their recasting, which would have to follow a war, could be done better and with a greater hope of durability than if the work were left till conflict had exasperated the tempers of nations. To the surprise of France the first refusal, not too courteously expressed, of the emperor's proposal came from England, and produced a soreness in the relations between the two countries. The example of England was soon followed, on various pretexts, by the other great powers. The good intentions of the French emperor were not questioned by any, as every minister in his reply took pains to assure him, but doubts were freely expressed as to any substantial results of the congress. Moreover, Napoleon was informed that no state could allow a representative to take part in any proceedings without a previous knowledge of the questions to be discussed, and their proposed settlements.

The idea of French intervention in Poland had been found impracticable. The insurrection which broke out in that country in 1863 was suppressed by the Russian government with great harshness. Sympathy for the cause of the Poles was pretty general, but in France great indignation was expressed at the treatment they were receiving at the hands of their conquerors. The French government was ready to go to war for Poland, if they could have secured the co-operation of England and Austria. A proposal was, in fact, made to these countries to form an alliance with France, for the purpose of obtaining in concert from Russia some guarantees for the better regulation of Polish affairs. The diplomatic methods were first to be followed, and if these did not succeed other means were to be resorted to. No country except France, however, was prepared to go this length, and the emperor's proposal was declined, though each of the three powers made separate representations to Russia, couched in similar terms. They severally asked Russia to agree to an armistice, that negotiations might be entered into with a view of restoring order in the insurgent provinces, and thus great bloodshed be stayed. Russia replied with an absolute refusal. She

would not recognize the right of any other nation to offer advice, or interfere in any manner with her internal policy, and pursued the strong measures which had called forth their remonstrances, with no less harshness than before.

The year 1866 was an eventful year, and full of serious import for all countries in Europe; but nowhere did the circumstances that took place in Germany attract more attention than they did in France. The settlement of the question of the duchies of the Elbe, about which Austria and Prussia had fought side by side two years before, attracted the attention of France in the beginning of 1866 to Germany. The conduct of Prussia in this affair, and the consequences to the peace of Europe that many foreboded from it, added to ignorance of the policy likely to be pursued by the government in the expected crisis, created great uneasiness amongst all classes in France. The mercantile world suffered a panic from this general feeling of insecurity. The funds and personal securities were affected to as great an extent as if France herself had been at war. When, later in the year, the worst anticipations were realized, and the six weeks' war between the leading powers of Germany was waged, the feeling of anxiety and alarm was not lessened by the success of Prussia. With the exception of the actors in this event, no country felt the effects of the victory of Prussia so much as France. For when the North German Confederation became nominally a league of independent states, but really an empire of which Prussia held the entire control, the position of ascendancy in Europe that France had so long occupied was shaken. In face of the new power, which had shown itself possessed of such capital military organization, and had evinced such ability in conducting the operations of war, the French people began to feel distrust in the capacity of the imperial government to vindicate the interests of their country. Suspensions, indeed, floated about, that the neutrality of France in the struggle between Austria and Prussia had been bought with a promise that was not to be fulfilled. The price was even hinted at. There was to be, so went the rumours, a rectification of the frontier at the expense of either Germany or Belgium. The emperor was believed to have been overreached, and to have been unable to get the compensation, whatever it was, which Prussia had engaged to give. Thiers did not hesitate to

upbraid the government for its tolerance of Prussia's acts. This statesman's patriotism, which objected to the unity of Italy, would have had France oppose by force the amalgamation into one nation of the separate and independent states beyond the Rhine. Now that Germany had achieved her unity, with the co-operation of the emperor, as he said, Thiers pressed upon the government the adoption of a firm policy, supported by a vigorous organization of the military forces of France. It was in vain that the emperor by his despatches tried to reassure the people of the unaltered position of their country. Popular opinion was on the side of Thiers. With the intent to inspire the people with greater confidence, a new map of Europe was published in 1868, under the auspices of the government. In this map was shown how France in resources and population still surpassed Germany, after all the changes that had taken place in that country. Had only these resources been handled with ability and honesty, France would, indeed, have had no just cause for fear.

The ill-gotten power which Napoleon had wielded for eighteen years in France and Europe was evidently on the wane, and he cast about anxiously for an opportunity of re-establishing his authority, if he could not recover his fame for successful cleverness. Germany, the object of such burning jealousy ever since Sadowa, offered itself as a field for some striking warlike achievement. France has been an evil neighbour to Germany for nearly 400 years, says an eminent writer. All readers of history know what a persistent spirit of universal aggression and dictation set in with the ministry of Richelieu and the reign of Louis XIV. Both the Napoleons upheld France's right to give law to Europe. Details of the negotiations between England and France in 1831 and in 1840, prove that under the Orleanists and the peace-loving monarch, Louis Philippe, the encroaching and dictatorial spirit of the nation was as rampant and ingrained as ever. The whole life of M. Thiers, an eminently representative man, a typical Frenchman; all his writings, all his speeches, every action of his ministerial career, have been inspired by this spirit, and have breathed the pretension, that France's voice ought to be, and must be made, paramount in determining all political and international arrangements, and that no other nation must be suffered to grow strong lest France should grow relatively weak.

The unfortunate Prevost Paradol, also a leading spirit among the better class of Frenchmen, in the last melancholy chapter of his "*France Nouvelle*," warned his countrymen in the most solemn manner, that the unity of Germany, if once accomplished, would be the fall and humiliation of France; that talent, literature, the graces and the pleasures of existence, might still remain to her, but that life, power, splendour, and glory would be gone. At the unification of Germany France would disappear from the political scene.

The Great Frederick of Prussia, wrote one of the most moderate of French organs of public opinion after Sadowa, perfectly comprehended that the expansive force of France was turned to the side of Germany. "France," said he, "is bounded on the west by the Pyrenees, which separate it from Spain, and form a barrier which nature herself has placed there. The ocean serves as a boundary on the north of France, the Mediterranean and the Alps on the south. But on the east France has no other limits than those of its own moderation and justice. Alsace and Lorraine, dismembered from the empire, have carried to the Rhine the frontier line of the domination of France." That this, continues the French writer, the only side on which, according to Frederick, we are not suffocated by the obstacle of a natural barrier, should be closed upon us by the mass of an enormous state, is a fact so contrary to all our national existence, and to the natural constitution of France, that it is impossible that French bosoms should not be oppressed by it. The idea of suffocation is very characteristic of the excitable French mind. England has to endure being suffocated by ocean all round her, and content herself with expansion in colonies and dependencies. Italy is equally shut in by the Alps; Spain by the Pyrenees. But France, like a steam-boiler, must have an open valve—must have the means of expansion; and the spirit of colonisation is not in her people.

The emperor had carefully watched the development in the national mind of that alarmed jealousy of French ascendancy which had been at work ever since 1866. The completeness and unexpectedness of the Prussian victories in the war waged by King William with the rest of Germany, had been fondly attributed to the destructive power of the needle-gun. The emperor, therefore, not only gave the French army a more deadly weapon

in the Chassepot rifle, the arm that was used with such fatal effect at Mentana, but applied his own special knowledge of artillery to the invention of a still more formidable engine of destruction, since known to the world as the mitrailleuse. Armed with this new man-slayer he might, he thought, defy the German, and he waited for a convenient moment to throw down the gauntlet and fight for ascendancy in Europe. Meanwhile, to pacify men's minds at home, and perhaps to conceal the real tendency of his foreign policy, he suddenly in December, 1869, announced his intention of abandoning the personal government which he had maintained so long, in exchange for a Parliamentary system that would make the ministers of the crown responsible for their measures to the Chambers, and not to the emperor personally. More than once before had Napoleon shown a desire to relax the restrictions of various kinds with which his reign had been inaugurated, but his hand had always been held back by those partisans who had risen to power with him, who feared to loose their hold from the necks of the people, who were more Bonapartist than the Bonapartes, more imbued with Cæsarism than Cæsar himself. Let every reader remember, as he reads the following pages, that Napoleon III. was no longer an exile, seeing public affairs with disabused eyes; but a man whose high station and considerable power tempted the designing to keep him, for their own selfish interests, in ignorance of much that was going on around him. The more blind they could keep him, the easier for them 'was it to work out their own ends. His bad health and undecided will favoured their narrow unpatriotic conduct. Even when he conceived a project evidently safe and calculated to prove beneficial to the country, his ministers, the instruments of his will, as they were supposed to be, took care to pare down every concession to the tone of their own minds, and to the level of their own interests. Such is the inevitable result of personal government.

Whether this truth had impressed itself on the emperor's mind, or no, is not in evidence. Certain it is, however, that two days after the Christmas-day of 1869, the imperial cabinet was dissolved, and a letter from the emperor was published, inviting M. Emile Ollivier, an eloquent liberal and opposition member of the Chamber, to aid in the task his Majesty had undertaken, to bring into regular working a constitutional system. There were

not unnatural suspicions in the public mind, that the emperor by this step meant rather to give the semblance than the substance of liberty to his subjects; that though he might govern under changed forms, he would govern all the same. Had he been sincerely converted to the theory of constitutional government, it was thought the direction of the new ministry would have been confided to the one man in the Assembly who had more talent, political knowledge, and parliamentary experience than any of his colleagues—M. Thiers. This veteran statesman had for six years occupied a seat in the Legislative Assembly of the second empire, where, by dint of skilful debating and attractive oratory, he had succeeded in forming an opposition to the imperial cabinet which, if not very formidable, was far from despicable. Its influence in the country was undoubtedly greater than its influence in the Chamber, where a majority of imperial nominees did all that could be done to stifle discussion.

In M. Emile Ollivier, a man of unquestioned ability, the emperor expected doubtless to find a more pliable and manageable minister than he would have had in the ex-premier of Louis Philippe, and his Majesty was not disappointed. One great blot of the old system was the injurious pressure by prefects and other officials at the election of deputies, in favour of government candidates. The liberal party in the Chamber disputed the validity of these elections, and attempted to exclude the deputies so returned from the Assembly. M. Ollivier, after his appointment to office, forgetful of his liberal creed, instead of supporting his old friends in carrying out this purification of the Chamber, voted with the government majority that confirmed the election of all the official candidates, with the solitary exception of one, thus rendering the verification of returns as mere a form as it had been in the worst days of personal government. Conduct like this alienated many supporters from the new minister, and excited general suspicion. He found a difficulty in forming a respectable cabinet, and was, it has been conjectured, compelled to promise specific measures of reform, electoral and other, in order to induce men like Count Daru and M. Buffet to accept portfolios. The experiment of a constitutional empire, a compromise between personal government and a republic, was not without its perils. The emperor, though disposed to give it a



fair trial, had himself no faith in the system, and unless his ministers could show that they were backed by the majority of the people of France, he would in all likelihood resume the power of which he had lately, by his own free will, relieved himself.

The position of the new ministry was beset by an unexpected difficulty, in an incident that reflected much discredit on the Bonaparte family, and rendered it the object of intense hatred among the extreme republicans. Two or three journalists, including M. Victor Noir, belonging to that party, feeling offended by a letter that Prince Pierre Bonaparte had written, called at that gentleman's house for the purpose of obtaining an explanation. In the interview and altercation which ensued M. Victor Noir was shot dead by the prince, and the other journalists fled from the room. That a savage act of this kind should be committed by a relation of the emperor's, however distant, was enough to serve the purpose of agitators who were greedy for opportunities of attacking the empire. M. Ollivier, as minister of justice, at once announced that a high court of justice would be assembled at Tours to try the Prince Pierre for the crime with which he was charged. There was no truckling to the emperor in that matter. On the other hand, the law had to vindicate itself against the violent and unconstitutional language of the extreme republicans. M. Rochefort, a friend and fellow-journalist of Victor Noir's, and a member of the Chamber, was tried for libel. If the ministers acted without fear of the emperor, they also acted without fear of the mob. These were symptoms of success in the constitutional experiment. The firm attitude of the government overawed the would-be rioters who followed Victor Noir's remains to the grave, and the demonstration which was planned for the day of the funeral ended in the bloodless discomfiture of Rochefort and his red republicans. The preservation of order, the repression of violent revolution, was, indeed, the only thing now that inspired devotion to Bonapartism. The glory of the first empire, and of its warlike founder, had at length lost its glamour, and well would it have been for France if Napoleon III. had thoroughly understood this fact.

Early in February there was a foolish outbreak of democrats, headed by Gustave Flourens, which aimed at the release of M. Rochefort from prison. It had the effect of keeping Paris uneasy for three days, but in all other respects was harmless; for

although six hundred persons were arrested, the greater number of them were speedily released.

As the year advanced it seemed to grow more evident, from speeches of Count Daru and M. Ollivier, that the emperor had adopted the constitutional system in all sincerity. The time had at last arrived, as people thought, for the long promised "crowning of the edifice" of government with liberty. But the emperor found it easier to humble himself before the force of circumstances than to humble some of his servants, and had no small difficulty in inducing the Senate to adopt with him "all the reforms demanded by the constitutional government of the empire." It is possible that his faith in parliamentary rule was no stronger than of yore, and that he had determined to give it a trial under a conviction that it would fail, and personal government again become necessary. Anyhow, a suspicion of this kind was engendered in the minds of some leading politicians on the publication of the *senatus consultum* at the end of March. In this document the imperial government declared that "the constitution cannot be modified except by the people on the proposition of the emperor." The emperor was evidently determined to maintain and extend that untrustworthy political instrument, the plebiscitum. The *senatus consultum* further limited the succession to the throne, and provided for an election by the people in case of failure of heirs. It vested the government of the country in the emperor, his ministers, the Council of State, the Senate, and the Corps Législatif—the last two assemblies sharing with the emperor the power of legislation. The emperor was made responsible before the French people, to whom he had the right to appeal, his prerogatives being those of chief of the state. His ministers were held responsible to the Chambers, of which they were members *ex officio*. The character of the Senate was considerably changed, and the power given to it in 1852 nearly all transferred to the lower house, the Legislative Assembly. To the surprise of every one who believed in the good faith with which these advances to constitutional freedom had been made, a week had barely elapsed from the publication of the *senatus consultum*, when the emperor revealed his determination at once to put in practice the principle he had promulgated of his right to appeal to the people. Representative government was at once discredited. Responsible ministers were treated as puppets, and



their legislative labours as toys to be cast to the variable winds of a popular vote. The emperor apparently had resolved to show the Chambers that there was a power superior to them in the country, which he could use whenever he chose. What use in legislating for reform, or anything else, if laws, when passed by the Assembly and the Senate, could be reversed by a plebiscitum; for the minister of the Interior, with the army of prefects and local officials at his command, could always insure that the vote should be agreeable to the emperor. How the consent of any of the ministers to this self-stultifying resolution was obtained can only be conjectured. Certain it is that two of the most eminent amongst them, the minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Daru, and M. Buffet, the minister of Public Instruction, resigned office. The Chamber seemed to accept the slight it had received with perfect humility, and an entire sense of its own insignificance; for on a hint from M. Ollivier that it might be in the way during the plebiscitary period, it adjourned, abnegating its functions at the most critical moment of a parliamentary crisis. Personal government was, in fact, restored under the vain show of parliamentary forms.

On the 23rd of April a decree, written, it is said, by the emperor's own hand, was issued, convoking the French nation for the 8th of May in their comitia, to accept or reject the following plebiscitum:—"The people approve the liberal reforms effected in the constitution since 1860 by the emperor, with the co-operation of the great bodies of the state, and ratifies the senatus consultum of the 20th of April, 1870." The votes were to be simply "Aye" or "No," and the manifesto was to be sent to every voter, who would learn, probably for the first time—such was the political ignorance of the majority of the population—that the constitution had undergone a change, and that Napoleon was the author of what was good in that change. Thus the usage of parliamentary government, that the sovereign should not speak in his own name of political matters, but by the mouth of a responsible minister, was unceremoniously ignored. The voters would be led to the polling booths like flocks of sheep, to vote as they were told, and practically to restore their "saviour of society" to undisputed autocratic power.

This series of contradictory transactions, so perplexing to ordinary observers, was very characteristic of Napoleon III., who was always feeling his

way and making tentative experiments. The truth seems to be that the emperor and the imperialists had been considerably alarmed at the success of the liberals at the elections in the autumn of 1869, and had made these proposals for a representative government under the influence of fear; but as soon as they discovered that the liberals, after all, formed only a minority that might safely be disregarded, they took measures to retrace their steps, and applied the plebiscitum as a test of their strength. The emperor, in a proclamation, clearly refused to recognize the acts of the Assembly as the acts of the people. "I believe," he said, "that everything done without you is illegitimate." Representation, delegation of power, was not, in his opinion, good for the people, who, to the number of eight millions, were called upon to give a direct vote; a vote, too, that should show by a large majority how strong the government was in the popular esteem. Virtually the vote to be taken was for the emperor and personal government, against the liberals and parliamentary government. In point of numbers there was no doubt on which side the majority would be, but the minority would include nearly all the intelligence and political honesty of the country. M. Ollivier, whom Guizot styled "a practical Lamartine," cruelly betrayed the cause of liberalism when he consented to remain in office and promulgate the plebiscitum. Had he joined Count Daru and M. Buffet, the whole cabinet would have resigned, and the emperor would have given way rather than face such a crisis. On the 29th of April the French police discovered, or professed to have discovered, a plot against the life of the emperor. Many people were sceptical as to the genuineness of this conspiracy, believing it to be a theatrical invention to prepare the popular mind for the plebiscitum of the 8th of May, by exciting horror of the bloodthirsty projects of the revolutionists, and sympathy for the person of the emperor. The result of the voting on that day was 7,138,367 Ayes, against 1,518,385 Noes. In the towns the majority was generally against the emperor, and a still more ominous preponderance of Noes came from some of the garrisons. To a man in the position of the emperor, dependent as he was upon the army, this partial defection of the troops was food for very serious reflection. These men had not of late been coaxed and petted, and their humour had been soured by the addition to their numbers of

men from discontented districts. They had no military employment, but spent an idle, dissatisfying, inglorious barrack life. The emperor showed how sensitive he was on the subject of the army, by writing a public letter to Marshal Canrobert to thank the troops for their admirable behaviour in suppressing some popular riots that took place in Paris the day after the plebiscitum. "He assured them that his confidence in them had never been shaken." No one had said it had; but the military vote of the 8th of May might justify a want of confidence, which his Majesty loudly professed he did not feel. Three important results flowed from the plebiscitum—the liberal party with their parliamentary constitution were overthrown, and their nominal leader, M. Ollivier, politically demoralized, was converted into an obsequious tool of the emperor's will; the emperor was restored to a blind confidence in his power and in the imperial destiny of his son; while at the same time he made the discovery, which ought to have been a warning, that there was no enthusiasm in the army either for him or for his dynasty.

*Quem Deus cult perdere dementat* is a maxim that many events of history have verified, but of no historical personage can it be said with more truth than of Napoleon III. in the eighteenth year of his reign. With the immense resources that he commanded, the countless channels of information he controlled, he was enveloped in a cloud of ignorance and falsehood both as to his real power and means, and as to his position relatively to his neighbours, that none but an autocrat could have endured. Self-deception bore no small part in the creation of the fool's paradise in which he lived and dreamed. His knowledge of artillery, his success in two wars, the deference paid him by foreign potentates, the number and costliness of his army, the vote of his seven million subjects, the defeat of his political opponents at home, the divisions, as he believed, of his enemies abroad, and the self-seeking flattery of his courtiers and ministers, all combined to make Louis Napoleon resolve on striking a final and victorious blow for the dynasty of the Bonapartes. An ingenious writer has endeavoured to draw a parallel between the Bonapartes in 1869–70 and the Bourbons in 1789–90. At both periods France was engaged in the same kind of task—trying to make a constitution and avoid a revolution. The reigning monarch in each case attempted, with apparently

honest intentions, to convert an absolute into a representative government. The elections to the Legislative Assembly in 1869 pointed to a new era, as clearly as did the elections to the *Tiers Etat* in 1789. The differences in the personages are as striking as the resemblance of the circumstances. Louis Napoleon was neither so dull nor so innocent as Louis Capet, the sixteenth of his name. The Empress Eugenie could hardly be compared with the daughter of Maria Theresa, Marie Antoinette, nor Prince Napoleon Jerome with Orleans Egalité, while Rochefort fell considerably short of Robespierre, and Ollivier missed being a Necker. France, too, in 1870 had no such work before her as that which the first revolution threw upon her hands. The privileges of the church and aristocracy then destroyed had not been restored. Social equality was established, and a career opened every where to talent. Sansculottism, in Mr. Carlyle's words, had got itself breeched, and the mass of the people, knowing the value of property, however small, had come to fear and hate violent revolutions. But as the national rapture and exultation which marked the first revolution was followed by the awful miseries of the Reign of Terror, so, alas! was the corresponding jubilation throughout France that welcomed the concessions of the emperor at the commencement of 1870, destined to terminate in disaster and mourning and woe. Upon whom was the onslaught of France to be made? the calculated attack that had so long occupied the meditations of Napoleon III? Upon a nation to all appearance lapped in dreams of peace; a people absorbed in the peaceful occupations of art, learning, commerce, and agriculture; the artists of Munich and Dresden; the professors and students of Heidelberg, Göttingen, Leipzig, and Berlin; the merchants of Hamburg, Bremen, and Dantzic; the ploughmen of Bavaria, the fishermen of Pomerania, and the sturdy peasantry of Schleswig and Holstein, quite newly re-united to the Fatherland. All these would have to be summoned to the war, and thousands of them to die; their homesteads left to women and children, their fields standing untilled, their country houses and warehouses closed, and their ships locked in port or captured by hostile men of war. Fearful is the responsibility of those who engage in war, great should be the provocation that can justify it, for awful are the consequences of the first step that sets in motion that bitterest scourge of the human race.

## PART II.

### CHAPTER I.

Attitude of France and Prussia—A Pretext only required for War—The German Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern chosen as a Candidate for the Spanish Throne—Great excitement on the subject in Paris—Important Speech of the Duc de Gramont in the Corps Législatif—Military preparations—Warlike tone of the French Press—Stock-exchange panics—The King of Prussia denies having been in any way connected with the selection of the Prince—Refusal of the French Government to accept this statement—Critical position of affairs—Apparent solution of the difficulty, the Candidature of the Prince being withdrawn—Calm tone of the Prussian Press and Government to this point—Further demands from Prussia by the French Government—Interview of M. Benedetti, the French Ambassador, with the King of Prussia, at Ems—Diplomatic relations broken off—Great excitement in Berlin—Important communication from the French Government to the Chambers—Declaration of War—Speech in opposition to such a procedure by M. Thiers—Votes for the Army and Navy—Enlistment of volunteers—Great animation in Paris—Speeches in the English Parliament—Communications between the Senate and the Emperor—Receipt of the news of the Declaration of War in Prussia—Address to the King—Patriotic proclamation of the German Liberal Union—Meeting of the North German Parliament—Speech of the King—Supplies voted with enthusiasm—Proclamation of the King—Important Circular of the Duc de Gramont—Speech of the Emperor—Proclamation to the French Nation.

THE events narrated in the previous pages have shown that in consequence of the marked success of Prussia in the war between her and Austria in 1866, and the subsequent formation of the North German Confederation, with Prussia at its head, France considered herself menaced by a too powerful neighbour; and it became evident that a struggle between them, for the purpose of deciding their military supremacy and future position in Europe, was only a question of time and opportunity. The circumstance which was at last made the pretext for a declaration of war, was, however, in itself apparently the most unlikely to have led to such a result, and affords one of the most striking historical illustrations of the ancient adage:—

“What mighty ills from trivial causes spring.”

The throne of Spain had remained vacant from the flight of Queen Isabella, in 1868, notwithstanding that the Cortes had, by a large majority, decided in favour of continuing the monarchical form of government. Several candidates had been proposed, but all had been deemed more or less unsuitable, until in June, 1870, General Prim, with the full approval of the ministry, offered it to Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, the eldest son of the reigning prince of Hohenzollern, who had, in 1849, surrendered his sovereign rights to Prussia. The prince, who had been married to the sister of the king of Portugal in 1861, was thirty-five years of age, and a Roman Catholic in religion; and the offer was accepted by him subject to the approval of the Cortes, which it was believed was certain to be obtained.

No sooner, however, was the news of the event officially made known in Paris, on Tuesday, July 5, than the greatest excitement was caused; the selection of him being regarded there as the work of the Prussian Count von Bismarck, with the view of either causing a rupture with France, or of making Spain little better than a dependency of Prussia. In the Legislative Assembly on the following day, the Duc de Gramont, the foreign minister, in reply to a question on the subject, said that the negotiations which had led to the prince accepting the offer of the crown had been kept a secret from the French government. They had not transgressed the limits of strict neutrality in reference to the pretenders to the Spanish throne, and they should persist in that line of conduct; but, the duke added, amid the cheers of the deputies, “We do not believe that respect for the rights of a neighbouring people obliges us to suffer a foreign power, by placing a prince upon the throne of Charles V., to disturb the European equilibrium to our disadvantage, and thus to imperil the interests and the honour of France. We entertain a firm hope that this will not happen; to prevent it we count upon the wisdom of the German nation, and the friendship of the people of Spain; but in the contrary event, with your support and the support of the nation, we shall know how to do our duty without hesitation or weakness.”

This important statement was read, not spoken, thus showing that it had been carefully considered; in fact, the terms of it were settled at a council held at St. Cloud in the morning, at which the

emperor presided. The assertion that the candidature of the prince had been kept secret from the French government, and had consequently taken them by surprise, was only true in a technical sense; for it was afterwards proved that the French ambassador at Madrid had known of it as being probable for several months. The matter had also been discussed in the German, and even alluded to in the French press, and on the prorogation of the Spanish Cortes on June 11—three weeks before the excitement in Paris—General Prim made a series of explanations as to the non-success which had attended his endeavours to procure a suitable candidate for the throne; and after alluding to the ex-king of Portugal, the duke of Aosta, and the duke of Genoa, he mentioned a fourth candidate, of whom he said he had great hopes, but who, after going so far as to send two emissaries to Spain, had refused, owing to their report of the divisions in the Cortes, and an insurrection in Catalonia which took place during their stay. He asked to be permitted not to name this candidate—his object being to prevent the raising up of any obstacle to his renewal of negotiations. It was at once concluded, however, that he could be no other than Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern. Baron Mercier, the French ambassador, who was present when the explanation was made, quite agreed in this, and was by no means backward in stating so to his friends in the diplomatic gallery; and it is unreasonable to suppose that, even if he had not done so before, he did not state the fact in his communication to the French government on the following day. The name of the prince was also mentioned in the Madrid papers the same evening, and it would, therefore, certainly appear that the "surprise" of the French government, as expressed by the Duc de Gramont, was feigned; and that whatever other reason may have induced the emperor to delay objecting to the candidature of the prince, it could not have been because he was not aware of its being in contemplation.

At the same sitting of the Corps Législatif, M. Ollivier, the prime minister, declined to accede to a request for the production of documents on the subject. He said that the declaration made by the Duc de Gramont betrayed no uncertainty as to the question whether the government desired peace or war. The government passionately wished for peace, but with honour. The ministry was con-

vinced that the Duc de Gramont's statement would bring about a peaceful solution; for whenever Europe was persuaded that France was firm in her legitimate duty, it did not resist her desire. There was no question here of a hidden object, and if a war was necessary, the government would not enter upon it without the assent of the Legislative Body. Great excitement prevailed in the Chamber during the delivery of both speeches. On the following day M. Picard asked the government to communicate to the House copies of the despatches exchanged since the previous day between the courts of Paris and Berlin. M. Segrís, in the absence of the minister for foreign affairs, replied that the government would, when expedient, communicate everything which did not compromise the peaceful settlement it was endeavouring to bring about. M. Jules Favre supported M. Picard's request, and upon M. Ollivier moving the adjournment of the debate, exclaimed, "Then it is a ministry of stock-exchange jobbers." At this there was great uproar, and the speaker was called to order. M. Ollivier afterwards declared that when the government deemed the time opportune, it would lay before the House all the information received at the foreign office. Meantime the country might rest assured of its firmly maintaining its dignity. Orders were immediately issued to the military authorities throughout the empire not to grant any further leave of absence; officers were ordered to return at once to their regiments, and the frontier fortresses were thoroughly inspected.

The French press, with only two or three exceptions, at once assumed a very menacing and hostile tone, and undoubtedly did much to enkindle that bitter feeling against Prussia which it was afterwards impossible to quell, even had such a thing been desired. One important journal declared that if France had once more submitted to be insulted and outwitted by Bismarck, "no woman of character would have consented to be seen on a Frenchman's arm;" another compared Prussia to an eagle, which, drunk with repeated successes, had rashly pounced upon a lamb, not knowing that the shepherd's rifle was ready for her; and, as if determined to do all in its power to provoke a quarrel, it asked if the shepherd was not to fire merely because the eagle might be scared into dropping her prey, although sure some day to return, and then perhaps seize, not lamb, but mutton? "Sooner or later," it



said, "France and Prussia must fight, and it is best to get it over at once." Nearly all the papers re-opened the old sore of the rectification of the Rhine frontier—an admirable method of playing into their enemy's hands, by making the quarrel German instead of Prussian; but they were too excited and angry to be diplomatic. One journal had the candour to say plainly that, the instant war was proclaimed, all talk of the Hohenzollern question ought to be at an end: to fight about whether a German prince should or should not sit on the Spanish throne, would, it said, be simply a "*guerre impie*," an iniquitous war.

This warlike tone of the French press, and the uncertainty which consequently prevailed as to the continuance of peace, naturally caused a great convulsion in all the European exchanges, but especially on the Paris Bourse and the London Stock Exchange. The panic in London on Monday, July 11, was more severe than any which had been witnessed there for the previous sixteen years. All kinds of stocks and shares, many totally unconnected with European complications, and some even which would be likely to be benefited by war, were all heavily borne down, and in some instances were almost unsaleable. Consols fell to 91½; a price about 2 per cent. below the average point at which they were maintained during the two years of the Indian mutiny, and exactly the same as during the four equally anxious years of the American struggle. Foreign stocks could scarcely be disposed of at all during the height of the panic. Some of them fell 7 or 8 per cent., and taking them at their money value, Spanish had at one time fallen 25 per cent. The total depreciation during the week, reckoning all classes of securities common to the Paris and London exchanges, could not have represented a sum of less than from £60,000,000 to £100,000,000. Among a few persons at Paris, enjoying early information, great gains were made; but the amount of general distress occasioned was unusually severe, owing to the fact, that for the previous six months operations for a rise had been extensive and continuous in all markets.

In the meantime Baron Werther, the Prussian ambassador at Paris, proceeded to Ems to consult with the king, and received from him an assurance that he had had nothing to do with the selection of the prince of Hohenzollern. The official *North German Gazette*, published at Berlin, also stated

that the declaration of the Duc de Gramont, in the French Chamber, that the prince had accepted the offer of the crown of Spain, was the first definitive announcement to that effect received there. The French government, however, responded that it could not accept the answer of the king, and that either he must forbid the prince's persistence in his candidature, or war must ensue. An ultimatum to this effect was presented to the king by M. Benedetti, the French ambassador at Berlin, and in the meantime military preparations were actively pushed on. On Tuesday, July 12, the Spanish ambassador in Paris received a despatch from the father of Prince Leopold, stating that, in consequence of the opposition his son's candidature appeared to have met with, he had withdrawn it in the name of the prince. On the following day the communication was read aloud in the "Salle des Conférences" adjoining the Chamber of the Legislative Body, and M. Ollivier, being eagerly questioned as to what it portended, said, France had never asked for more than the withdrawal of the prince's claims, had said nothing about the treaty of Prague, and the whole affair was therefore now at an end. Shortly afterwards the Duc de Gramont made the announcement officially to the Legislative Body, but added the significant words:—"The negotiations which we are carrying on with Prussia, and which never had any other object in view than the above-mentioned solution, are not as yet terminated; it is therefore impossible for the government to speak on the subject, or to submit to-day to the Chamber and to the country a general statement of this affair." On being pressed, he declined to add anything to his statement, and said he had nothing to do with rumours circulating in the lobbies of the Chamber; evidently referring to the announcement just before made by M. Ollivier, and from which it would appear, either that there had not been complete harmony in the cabinet, or that the Duc de Gramont had been made the special medium of the emperor's wishes. After some discussion it was decided that the question should be debated on the following Friday. Much dissatisfaction and surprise prevailed in Paris at the vague and incomplete character of the duke's statement; but the general opinion was that war had been averted, at least for a time. The *Constitutionnel*, one of the oldest and most respectable journals, said the

prince would not reign in Spain, and France asked for nothing further. All her just demands had been satisfied: "We receive with pride this pacific solution, and this great victory which has been obtained without one drop of blood having been shed."

Up to this point the Prussian government and press had preserved great calmness throughout the whole proceedings. The semi-official *North German Correspondent* said, that Prussia had hitherto avoided all interference in the question of the Spanish succession, and was resolved to adhere to the same policy in the future. The Spaniards themselves ought to be the best judges of what was fitting for their country; whether a republic or a monarchy, this prince or that, a Spaniard or a foreigner. The Prussian government, whilst it respected the independence of Spain, was not conscious of having received any special mission to solve the complicated constitutional question on which the attention of Europe was fixed, but believed it would be most safe and politic to leave this problem in the hands of the Spanish people, and their accredited representatives. Similar views were expressed in a communication sent from the foreign office at Berlin to the representatives of the North German Confederation; and it was added that those views were already known to the French government, but explanatory and confidential utterances had been prevented by the tone which the French minister had assumed from the beginning.

On the following day (Wednesday, July 13), everything was changed, and the question again assumed a phase of exceeding gravity. The king of Prussia, unattended by a minister, was at Ems for the benefit of the waters; and as he was walking in the public garden he met M. Benedetti, the French ambassador, and told him he had a newspaper in his hand which showed that the prince had withdrawn his candidature. To his surprise the ambassador then made the further demand of a pledge, that he would never, under any circumstances, approve or give his consent to the candidature of the prince. The king replied that this was a step he could not take, as he must reserve to himself the right of action in future circumstances as they arose. Soon afterwards he found that the ambassador had asked for a fresh audience, and he sent an aide-de-camp to tell him that the prince's candidature had been withdrawn,

and that in the same way and to the same extent as he had approved of it, he approved of its withdrawal, and he hoped, therefore, that all difficulty on that point was at an end. On subsequently meeting the ambassador, the king wished to know if he had anything to say to him other than the proposition he had already made, and which he had declined. M. Benedetti replied that he had no fresh proposition, but had certain arguments to adduce in support of the former one, which he had not been able to urge. His Majesty said that with regard to himself he had already given his decision; but that if there were a political question to be discussed, he had better go to Count von Bismarck, and discuss with him the arguments which were to be adduced. M. Benedetti asked if the count was expected the next day, and when told he was not, he said he would be content with the king's answer. Unfortunately the fact of the king's refusing to renew the discussion was telegraphed to Paris without the addition of the reference to Count von Bismarck, and the pressure put upon the king by M. Benedetti was published in Germany without the explanation that it was by way of sequel to a conversation the king had himself initiated. Neither the king nor M. Benedetti realized the offence that had been given and received, till Paris and Berlin informed them that each had been insulted.

It afterwards transpired, from the despatches presented to the North German Parliament, that in addition to this demand on the king of Prussia at Ems, on July 13, in a conversation on the previous day M. Ollivier and the Duc de Gramont requested Baron Werther to communicate to Count von Bismarck their demand that the king should write a letter of apology to the emperor, and that no allusion must be made in it to the fact of the Catholic Hohenzollerns being near relatives of the Bonapartes. In his reply to Baron Werther, Count von Bismarck said he had no doubt misconceived the meaning of the French ministers, and that he had, at all events, better desire them to put their demand down in writing, and have it communicated to the Prussian government in the usual way through their ambassador at Berlin.

The king caused the circumstances connected with the fresh demands made on him by Count Benedetti at Ems, and of his having refused to accede to them, to be immediately telegraphed to Count von Bismarck at Berlin, who lost no time in publishing it; at nine o'clock the same evening

boys in great numbers, in all the principal thoroughfares, distributed gratis a special supplement to the official *North German Gazette* relating what had occurred. The effect this bit of printed paper had upon the city was tremendous. It was hailed by old and young. It was welcomed by fathers of families and boys in their teens. It was read and re-read by ladies and young girls, and in patriotic glow finally handed over to the servants, who fondly hoped their sweethearts would soon be on the march. As though a stain had been wiped out from the national escutcheon, as though a burden too heavy to be borne for a long time past had been cast off at last, people were thanking God that their honour had been ultimately vindicated against intolerable assumption. There was but one opinion as to the conduct of the king; there was but one determination to follow his example. By ten o'clock the square in front of the royal palace was crowded with an excited multitude. Hurrahs for the king and cries "To the Rhine!" were heard on all sides. Similar demonstrations were made in other quarters of the town. It was the explosion of a long pent up anger against the French attempts to interfere with the domestic concerns of Germany since 1866, and in the first flush of excitement people absolutely felt relieved at the prospect of circumstances permitting them to fight it out. Thank God! They now could hope to unsheath the sword in a rightful quarrel. Their love of peace, till the day before faithfully preserved even under the trying events of the previous week, had been mistaken for fear by a nation of an entirely different intellectual type. Their king had been affronted beyond endurance, and had given the only possible reply. The crisis had arrived. They yearned to prove the present error of the French in estimating their national character, to avenge past injuries and obviate their recurrence, and so provide against the constant imperiling of peace, industry, and civilization for the future. Everywhere the same sentiments were uttered, the same resolves announced. In all the clubs and taverns, in many a private house, people remained together nearly the whole night, and only at break of day the streets assumed their usual aspect.

The most intense excitement also prevailed in Paris during the night, and on every one's lips was that word of evil omen, "*la guerre*." Bodies of men paraded the principal streets up to a late hour,

mixing up in a very odd fashion the cries of "A Berlin!" "A bas la Prusse!" "Vive l'empereur!" and the singing of the revolutionary war song, the "Marseillaise." It was a somewhat significant fact, that though this public singing of the "Marseillaise" was illegal, and was before occasionally put down with great energy by the gend'armes, even though it was only indulged in by a few revellers returning late from a supper party, and not sufficiently numerous to be very formidable to the safety of the state, it was now allowed to pass without notice; in fact, from despatches made known after the flight of the empress, on September 4, it transpired that orders had been given by the government to the police not to interfere in the matter.

On the morning of Thursday, July 14, the Emperor Napoleon went from St. Cloud to Paris, and presided at a cabinet council, which sat for several hours. The two Chambers expected a communication from the government, but none was made. On the following day, July 15—a day which must now be ever memorable in the history of Europe—a communication drawn up at the council of ministers on the previous day was simultaneously made by the government to the Senate and Corps Législatif, explaining the situation of affairs, and terminating in a declaration of war. The communication was as follows:—

"Gentlemen—The manner in which you received the declaration of the 6th inst., afforded us the certainty that you approved our policy, and that we could count upon your support. We commenced then negotiations with the foreign powers, to invoke their good offices with Prussia, in order that the legitimacy of our grievances might be recognized. We asked nothing of Spain, whose susceptibilities we did not wish to wound. We took no steps with the prince of Hohenzollern, considering him shielded by the king of Prussia, and we refused to mix up in the affair any recrimination upon other subjects. The majority of the powers admitted, with more or less warmth, the justice of our demands. The Prussian minister of foreign affairs refused to accede to our demands, pretending that he knew nothing of the affair, and that the cabinet of Berlin remained completely a stranger to it. We then addressed ourselves to the king himself, and the king, while avowing that he had authorized the prince of Hohenzollern to accept the nomination of the Spanish crown, maintained that he had also been a stranger to the

negotiation, and that he had intervened between the prince of Hohenzollern and Spain as head of the family, and not as sovereign. He acknowledged, however, that he had communicated the affair to Count von Bismarck. We could not admit this subtle distinction between the chief of the family and the sovereign. In the meanwhile we received an intimation from the Spanish ambassador, that the prince of Hohenzollern had renounced the crown. We asked the king to associate himself with this renunciation, and we asked him to engage, that should the crown be again offered to the prince of Hohenzollern, he would refuse his authorization. Our moderate demands, couched in equally moderate language, written to M. Benedetti, made it clear that we had no *arriere pensee*, and that we were not seeking a pretext in the Hohenzollern affair. The engagement demanded the king refused to give, and terminated the conversation with M. Benedetti, by saying that he would in this, as in all other things, reserve to himself the right of considering the circumstances. Notwithstanding this, in consequence of our desire for peace, we did not break off the negotiations. Our surprise was great when we learned that the king had refused to receive M. Benedetti, and had communicated the fact officially to the cabinet. We learned that Baron Werther had received orders to take his leave, and that Prussia was arming. Under these circumstances we should have forgotten our dignity, and also our prudence, had we not made preparations. We have prepared to maintain the war which is offered to us, leaving to each that portion of the responsibility which devolves upon him. Since yesterday we have called out the reserve, and we shall take the necessary measures to guard the interest, and the security, and the honour of France."

In both Houses the ministerial declaration was received with great applause, and M. Ollivier said he entered on the struggle with a "light heart." An energetic minority were, however, indisposed to approve the policy of the government. M. Jules Favre called upon the ministers to communicate the documents which had passed during the negotiations, and especially the Prussian despatch addressed to foreign governments admitting the refusal of the king of Prussia to receive M. Benedetti. M. Buffet opposed the demand for papers, and M. Jules Favre's motion was rejected by 164 votes against 83. An important speech was also

made against the proceeding of the government by the veteran statesman, M. Thiers, who eloquently denounced the imprudence and impolicy of the war. He had been as deeply vexed as any one by the events of 1866, and earnestly desired reparation, but he considered the present occasion ill chosen: "for," added he, "when the satisfaction we had a right to demand had been granted; when Prussia had expiated by her withdrawal the grave fault she had committed in stepping beyond the limits of Germany, where lies her strength, and raising hostile pretensions suddenly in our rear; when Europe with honourable readiness declared that we were in the right—then for the government to have listened to susceptibilities upon questions of form might one day cause them regret." The opposition speakers could not, however, get a fair hearing, no tolerance being shown for those who differed from the majority. "I am about to quit the tribune," said M. Thiers, "borne down by the fatigue of speaking to people who will not hear me. I shall nevertheless have demonstrated that the interests of France were safe, and that you aroused the susceptibilities from which war has issued. That is your fault."

In the evening sitting of the Legislative Body, after a noisy debate, a credit of 50,000,000 francs was voted by 246 votes against 10; a credit of 16,000,000 francs for naval purposes was also voted by 248 votes against 1. A motion to call out the Guard Mobile to active service was adopted by 243 votes against 1. Another motion, authorizing the enlistment of volunteers for the duration of the war, was adopted by 244 votes against 1.

During the night, extraordinary animation prevailed throughout Paris. Numerous crowds, each numbering several thousands, came forth from the suburbs and traversed the Boulevards, singing the "Marseillaise" and the "Chant du Départ," and shouting "Vive la guerre! A bas la Prusse! Vive l'Empereur! A Berlin!" It has been suggested that these patriotic displays were organized by the police. The soldier, however, became the hero of the hour, and could hardly show himself in the streets without being surrounded and applauded. In fact, the people became intoxicated by martial enthusiasm, and so blinded by jealous passion, that they were really not open to argument as to the right and wrong of the quarrel, and it became far less a question of a Hohenzollern pretension and a Benedetti rebuff,



than one of seeing which was the stronger nation. Animosity against Prussia had vented itself so long in words, and it had become such a constant habit with many Frenchmen to speak of some future day of reckoning with their upstart rival as a matter of necessity, that the actual declaration of war seemed to afford relief to a very strong national feeling, and little else was thought of at first. Most Frenchmen had been fighting Prussia in imagination for the previous four years, and giving her the lesson her presumption deserved; the imagination and the longing had been so strong, and the reality for some days so tangible, that the transition from the one to the other was scarcely felt. It is true that the Republican journals, representing the opinions of the mass of the artisans, were from the first against war, nor was it at all popular with the peasantry, to whom it meant only a wider conscription and increased taxation; but in the heat of the excitement all prudential considerations were forgotten, and the voices and opinions of those who deplored the result to which matters had been brought had no influence with those who had the power and were determined to use it. Some attempts made by artisans and others in Paris, on the evening war was declared and on the following day, to get up counter-demonstrations in favour of peace, were immediately put down by the police.

The news of war having actually been declared reached England immediately, and when Parliament met the same afternoon, Mr. Disraeli, the leader of the Opposition, asked the prime minister, Mr. Gladstone, if he could inform the House of the real cause of the rupture, as he could not bring himself to believe that in the nineteenth century, with its extended sympathies and its elevated tendencies, anything so degrading as a war of succession could take place; and he reminded the House that only about two years before, in the matter of Luxemburg, both France and Prussia had invited the good offices of England, and they were successful in removing difficulties which then threatened a rupture. France and Prussia had thus, in his opinion, no moral right to go to war without consulting England, and he wished to know whether the government had taken any steps to impress this upon them. With great solemnity of manner he concluded, "I will only venture to express my individual opinion, that the ruler of any country who at this time disturbs the peace of Europe,

incurs the gravest political and moral responsibility which it has ever fallen to the lot of man to incur. I hear, Sir, superficial remarks made about military surprises, the capture of capitals, and the brilliancy and celerity with which results which are not expected or contemplated may be brought about at this moment. Sir, these are events of a bygone age. In the last century such melodramatic catastrophes were frequent and effective; we live in an age animated by a very different spirit; I think a great country like France, and a great country like Prussia, cannot be ultimately affected by such results; and the sovereign who trusts to them will find at the moment of action that he has to encounter, wherever he may be placed, a greater and more powerful force than any military array, and that is the outraged opinion of an enlightened world." Mr. Gladstone, excusing himself from the same freedom of remark in which the leader of the Opposition had indulged, justified the right of England to intervene in the cause of peace, not only on moral grounds, but on the strength of the protocol of Paris in 1856, which set forth the duties of all of the powers there represented to submit to friendly adjudication any causes of difference, before resorting to the last extremity. Neither France nor Prussia had, however, shown any indisposition to listen to her Majesty's government on this occasion, and the foreign secretary had therefore not deemed it necessary to make an express representation, in the sense suggested by Mr. Disraeli.

At a reception of the members of the Senate by the emperor at St. Cloud, on the following day (Saturday, 16th July), M. Rouher, addressing his majesty, said—"The guarantees demanded from Prussia have been refused, and the dignity of France has been disregarded. Your majesty draws the sword, and the country is with you trembling with indignation at the excesses that an ambition over-excited by one day's good fortune was sure, sooner or later, to produce. Your majesty was able to wait, but has occupied the last four years in perfecting the armament and the organization of the army." M. Rouher added his hope that the empress would again act as regent, and that the emperor would take the command of the army. The emperor replied—"Messieurs les Senateurs, I was gratified to learn with what great enthusiasm the Senate received the declaration which the minister of

foreign affairs has been instructed to make. Whenever great interests and the honour of France are at stake, I am sure to receive energetic support from the Senate. We are beginning a serious struggle, and France needs the co-operation of all her children. I am very glad that the first patriotic utterance has come from the Senate. It will be loudly re-echoed throughout the country."

In Prussia the news that France had determined upon war was received with enthusiasm. King William arrived at his palace in Berlin on Thursday night, July 14, and was received with the greatest possible loyalty and warmth. Upwards of 100,000 persons were assembled, from the Brandenburg Gate to the palace, cheering loudly and singing the national anthem. The Unter den Linden was illuminated, and decorated with the North German and Prussian flags. King William came forward repeatedly to the windows of the palace, saluting and thanking the crowd.

The following "Proclamation to our Countrymen" by the National Liberal party—the most numerous both in Parliament and among the people—is a fair specimen of the numerous addresses which were at once issued by both public and private societies:—

"War has become inevitable. From the plough, the workshop, the office, and the study, our brothers congregate to ward off an enemy that menaces the highest treasures of the nation. The army whose onslaught they are going to encounter is differently composed from our own. It consists of mercenaries and conscripts, without any educated and well-to-do people among them, and for this very reason is liable to be made a tool of by an unjust and frivolous cabinet. Since the Corsican's nephew, by conspiracy, perjury, and every description of crime, surreptitiously obtained the throne of France, his only means of concealing domestic decline was to engage in foreign adventure. The French nation, humiliated at home, was to be reconciled to its fate by martial triumphs, flattering to its national vanity. Through cunning and force France was to be raised to an artificial supremacy over the rest of the world. To disturb the peace of Europe has ever been the only policy of Bonapartism, the vital condition of its existence. Since Louis Napoleon ascended the throne, all his hypocritical assurances of pacific sentiments have never sufficed to give any one a firm confidence in the continuation of peace; since he has

been reckoned among sovereigns war has always been considered a mere question of time, and the utmost exertion of the industrious classes has been barely sufficient to cover the military expenditure of the various states. There is no country in Europe with which he has not meddled. He has quarreled with all, menaced all. Even if a state allied itself to him it was not safe from his treachery, as Italy experienced to her cost. The Poles were encouraged by him to rebel, only to be left to their terrible fate when it no longer suited him to play their patron. Neutral Belgium, German Luxemburg, and even some cantons of Switzerland, that tower of peace erected between contending nations, have at various times been the objects of his cupidity, and were only saved by the vigilance of the other powers, and their instinctive opposition to the immorality and mendacity of the Napoleonic politics. As long ago as the Crimean war Napoleon endeavoured to find a pretext for occupying the Rhine province. While we were fighting Austria he again had his eye upon the Rhine, and if we had not so quickly conquered, would have pounced upon us and have kindled universal war. Is it necessary to enumerate other instances of his disgraceful interference? Italy had to pay with two of her provinces for the French alliance, and at his hands, besides suffering many other indignities, was destined to provide the human bodies which first attested the efficiency of the 'miraculous' Chassepot. In Spain French influence has long been the strongest impediment in the way of progress, and although the independence of nations has ever been pompously paraded by him, Napoleon assisted the slave breeders in America, invaded Mexico, and in Germany calculated upon Austria being victorious. That he was mistaken in this latter calculation, and that the German people have at last found, and are steadily marching on, their way towards unity, makes him perfectly restless. It was certainly no very becoming act on the part of French diplomacy, when we had defeated Austria, to come to us begging for a small douceur in the shape of a province or two to reward them for their evil-disposed neutrality; nor was it very honest on the part of the same worthies to attempt to deprive us of our Italian ally by bribery and deceit. Again, it was France, who, by her perfidious intermeddling, prevented us from imposing such conditions of peace upon Austria as would have extended the ties of

national unity to the southern states. In thus keeping them out from the Confederacy, Napoleon hoped to make the southern sovereigns tools in his hands and traitors to the Fatherland. We submitted to his arrogance on all these occasions, as also when the Luxemburg affair was brought upon the carpet, because we hoped to be able to avoid war. But his latest demands, and the manner in which they have been preferred, exceed everything that has gone before. To mask his domestic embarrassments, to save his throne, which would otherwise succumb to the hatred and contempt of his own subjects, the sanguinary adventurer has embarked in his last military job. In taking up the gauntlet thrown down to us, we are actuated by a sense of honour, and also by a desire at last to free ourselves from the dangers and solitudes of the fictitious peace we have endured so long. More injurious than open war, the armed peace to which we have submitted has exhausted our resources, undermined our industry, stopped the advance of our culture, and, worst of all, kept us in constant dread of the sword suspended over us by a hair. In contending against the execrable system of Bonapartism, we shall be fighting, not only for our independence, but for the peace and culture of Europe. Unknown to the Germans is the lust of conquest; all they require is to be permitted to be their own masters. While protecting our own soil, language, and nationality, we are willing to concede corresponding rights to all other nations. We do not hate the French, but the government and the system which dishonour, enslave, and humiliate them. The French have been inveigled into war by their government misrepresenting and calumniating us; but our victory will be also their emancipation. We are firmly convinced that this will be the last great war the German nation is destined to undergo, and that the unity of our race will be the result of it. The God of Justice is with us. The insolent provocation of the French despot has done away with our internal divisions. The Main even now is bridged over. Party divisions are extinct, and will remain so as long as our united strength is required to overthrow the common enemy, who is equally the enemy of Germany and humanity. Inspired by the magnitude of the task before us, we are all united, a people of brethren, who will neither tarry nor rest until the great object has been accomplished."

Not a few passages in the above document would make the reader imagine it proceeded from a radical source. But its authors, the National Liberals, are the most temperate section of the liberals in Germany, and for the most part include the wealth and rank of the nation. If a class of politicians, whose sobriety and, in many instances, tameness had become proverbial, was moved to employ such language as the above, the feeling and expressions of the less moderate can be easily imagined.

The mobilization of the whole of the North German army was ordered on 16th July, and on the following Monday the king received an address from the Berlin town council, thanking his majesty for having repelled the unheard-of attempt made upon the dignity and independence of the nation, and asserting that France having declared war against Prussia, every man would do his duty. The king, in reply, expressed his gratitude for the sentiments contained in the address, and said:—

"God knows I am not answerable for this war. The demand sent me I could not do otherwise than reject. My reply gained the approval of all the towns and provinces, the expression of which I have received from all parts of Germany, and even from Germans residing beyond the seas. The greeting which was given me here on Thursday night last animated me with pride and confidence. Heavy sacrifices will be demanded of my people. We have been rendered unaccustomed to them by the quickly gained victories which we achieved in the last two wars. We shall not get off so cheaply this time; but I know what I may expect from my army, and from those now hastening to join the ranks. The instrument is sharp and cutting. The result is in the hands of God. I know also what I may expect from those who are called upon to alleviate the wounds—the pains and sufferings—which war entails. In conclusion, I beg you to express my sincere thanks to the citizens for the reception they have given me." At the termination of the royal address, which was delivered with much earnestness and gravity, the assembly, in a transport of enthusiasm, shouted unanimously, "Long live the king!"

The North German Parliament was opened on the next day (Tuesday, July 19), with a speech from the throne delivered by King William in person. In the course of it he said:—



"The candidature of a German prince for the Spanish throne—both in the bringing forward and withdrawal of which the Confederate governments were equally unconcerned, and which only interested the North German Confederation in so far as the government of a friendly country appeared to base upon its success the hopes of acquiring for a sorely-tried people a pledge for regular and peaceful government—afforded the emperor of the French a pretext for a *casus belli*, put forward in a manner long since unknown in the annals of diplomatic intercourse, and adhered to after the removal of the very pretext itself, with that disregard of the people's right to the blessings of peace of which the history of a former ruler of France affords so many analogous examples. If Germany in former centuries bore in silence such violation of her rights and of her honour, it was only because, in her then divided state, she knew not her own strength. To-day, when the links of intellectual and rightful community which began to be knit together at the time of the wars of liberation join—the more slowly the more surely—the different German races; to-day that Germany's armament leaves no longer an opening to the enemy, the German nation contains within itself the wish and the power to repel the renewed aggression of France. It is not arrogance that puts these words into my mouth. The Confederate governments, and I myself, are acting in the full consciousness that victory and defeat are in the hands of Him who decides the fate of battles. With a clear gaze we have measured the responsibility which, before the judgment seat of God and of mankind, must fall upon him who drags two great and peace-loving peoples in the heart of Europe into a devastating war.

"The German and French peoples, both equally enjoying and desiring the blessings of a Christian civilization and of an increasing prosperity, are called to a more wholesome rivalry than the sanguinary conflict of arms. Yet those who hold power in France have, by preconcerted misguidance, found means to work upon the legitimate but excitable national sentiment of our great neighbouring people, for the furtherance of personal interests and the gratification of selfish passions.

"The more the Confederate governments are conscious of having done all their honour and dignity permitted to preserve to Europe the blessings of peace, and the more indubitable it shall appear

to all minds that the sword has been thrust into our hands, so much the more confidently shall we rely upon the united will of the German governments, both of the north and south, and upon your love of country, and so much the more confidently we shall fight for our right against the violence of foreign invaders. Inasmuch as we pursue no other object than the durable establishment of peace in Europe, God will be with us, as He was with our forefathers."

When the House met in the afternoon for the despatch of business, Count von Bismarck informed the members that the French chargé d'affaires had delivered a declaration of war against Prussia. Hereupon all present arose, and greeted the announcement with loud cheering; the persons in the gallery shouting "Hurrah!"

On the following day the Parliament, in reply to his speech, presented the king with an address, in which they said:—

"One thought, one resolve, pervades all Germany at this grave juncture.

"With proud satisfaction has the nation witnessed your Majesty's dignified attitude in rejecting a demand of unprecedented arrogance put forward by the enemy. Disappointed in his hope of humiliating us, the enemy has now invented a sorry and transparent pretext for levying war.

"The German nation has no more ardent wish than to live in peace and amity with all nations that respect its honour and independence.

"As in 1813, in those glorious days when we freed the country from foreign aggression, we are now forced again to take up arms to vindicate our rights and liberties against a Napoleon.

"As in those well-remembered days, all calculations based upon human frailty and faithlessness will be destroyed by the moral energy and resolute will of the German nation.

"That portion of the French people which by envy and selfish ambition has been seduced into hostility against us, will, too late, perceive the crop of evil sure to grow out of sanguinary battlefields. We regret that the more equitably inclined in France have failed to prevent a crime aimed no less at the prosperity of their own country than the maintenance of amicable international relations in this part of the world.

"The German people are aware that they have a severe and portentous struggle before them.

"We confide in the gallantry and patriotism of



our brethren in arms, in the indomitable resolve of an united people to sacrifice life and treasure rather than suffer a foreign conqueror to set his foot on German necks.

"We confide in the guidance of our aged and heroic king, who when a young man, more than half a century ago, warred against the French, and who, in the evening of life, is destined by Providence decisively to terminate a struggle he then began.

"We confide in the Almighty, whose judgment will punish the bloody crime perpetrated against us.

"From the shores of the German Ocean to the foot of the Alps the nation has risen as a single man at the call of its allied princes. No sacrifice will be too heavy for it to make.

"Throughout the civilized world public opinion recognizes the justice of our cause. Friendly nations are looking forward to our victory, which is to free some from the ambitious tyranny of a Bonaparte, and to avenge the injury he has inflicted upon so many others.

"The victory gained, the German nation will at last achieve its unity, and on the battle-field, held by force of arms, with the common consent of its various tribes, erect a free commonwealth, which shall be respected by all peoples.

"Your Majesty and the allied German governments see us and our brethren in the South ready to co-operate for the attainment of this object. The prize of the war is the protection of our honour and liberty, the re-establishment of peace in Europe, and the promotion of the prosperity of nations.

"With profound respect and in loyal obedience,

"THE PARLIAMENT OF THE NORTH  
GERMAN CONFEDERACY."

Immediately after the passing of this address, and as an incontrovertible proof that it meant something more than words, a loan of 120,000,000 thalers (£18,000,000) was voted by acclamation. In neither case was there a discussion. As the sum granted was equal to a fourth of the whole Prussian debt, there was a significant eloquence in the figures which ought not to be overlooked by the contemporary historian. Smaller grants, but which in the aggregate reached nearly a third of the Federal loan, were in the next two days likewise devoted to military purposes by the various state parliaments and governments of Northern and Southern Germany.

On Thursday the Parliament was prorogued. Count von Bismarck read a message from the President of the Confederation, and concluded as follows:—"After the words that the king has twice addressed to the Parliament, I should have nothing to add, were it not that his Majesty has commanded me to express his warmest thanks to the Parliament for the rapidity and unanimity with which it has provided for the requirements of the nation. In thus fulfilling the king's order, I declare Parliament closed." Dr. Simson next addressed a few words to the House, and said:—"The labours of the representatives of the people are for the present at an end, and the work of arms will now take its course. May the blessing of the Almighty descend upon our people in this holy war! Long live King William, commander-in-chief of the German army!" The session terminated amid loud and prolonged cheering.

The same day the king issued the following proclamation to his subjects:—

"I am compelled to draw the sword to ward off a wanton attack, with all the forces at Germany's disposal. It is a great consolation to me, before God and man, that I have in no way given a pretext for it. My conscience acquits me of having provoked this war, and I am certain of the righteousness of our cause in the sight of God. The struggle before us is serious, and it will demand heavy sacrifices from my people and from all Germany. But I go forth to it looking to the omniscient God and imploring His almighty support. I have already cause to thank God that, on the first news of the war, one only feeling animated all German hearts and proclaimed aloud the indignation felt at the attack, and the joyful confidence that Heaven will bestow victory on the righteous cause. My people will also stand by me in this struggle as they stood by my father, who now rests with God. They will, with me, make all sacrifices to conquer peace again for the nations. From my youth upwards I have learnt to believe, that all depends upon the help of a gracious God. In Him is my trust, and I beg my people to rest in the same assurance. I bow myself before Him in acknowledgment of His mercy, and I am sure that my subjects and fellow-countrymen do so with me. Therefore I decree that Wednesday, the 27th of July, shall be set apart for an extraordinary solemn day of prayer and divine service in all our churches, with abstention from all public occupa-

tions and labour, so far as may comport with the pressing necessities of the time. I also decree that while the war lasts prayers shall be offered in all divine services, that in this struggle God may lead us to victory, that He may give us grace to bear ourselves as Christian men even unto our enemies, and that it may please Him to allow us to obtain a lasting peace, founded on the honour and independence of Germany.

(Signed) "WILLIAM.

(Counter Signed) "VON MÜHLER.

"Berlin, July 21."

On July 21 the Duc de Gramont addressed a circular to the French representatives abroad, with the object of proving that the nomination of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern for the Spanish throne had been mysteriously promoted by Prussia, in the hope that France would be obliged to accept it as an accomplished fact. The circular stated:—"Either the cabinet of Berlin considered war necessary for the accomplishment of the designs it had long since been meditating against the autonomy of the German states, or not satisfied with having established in the centre of Europe a military power redoubtable to its neighbours, it desired to take advantage of the strength it had acquired to displace definitely, for its own benefit, the international equilibrium. The premeditated intention of refusing us the guarantees most indispensable to our security as well as our honour, is plainly exhibited in all its conduct.

"France has taken up the cause of equilibrium, that is to say, the interest of all the populations menaced like herself by the disproportionate aggrandizement of a royal house. In so doing does she place herself, as has been asserted, in contradiction to her own maxims? Assuredly not. Every nation, we are foremost to proclaim, has a right to govern its own destinies. That principle, openly affirmed by France, has become one of the fundamental laws of modern politics. But the right of each people, as of each individual, is limited by that of others, and any nation is forbidden, under the pretext of exercising its own sovereignty, to menace the existence or security of a neighbouring nation. In that sense it was that M. de Lamartine, one of our great orators, said, in 1847, that in the choice of a sovereign a government has never the right to pretend, and has

always the right to exclude. That doctrine has been admitted on several occasions, and Prussia, whom we did not fail to remind of those precedents, appeared for a moment to give way to our just demands. Prince Leopold withdrew his candidatureship; there was room to hope that the peace would not be broken. But that expectation soon gave place to fresh apprehensions, and then to the certainty that Prussia, without seriously abandoning any of her pretensions, was only seeking to gain time. The language, at first undecided, and then firm and haughty, of the chief of the house of Hohenzollern, his refusal to engage to maintain on the morrow the renunciation of yesterday, the treatment inflicted on our ambassador, who was forbidden by a verbal message from any fresh communication for the object of his mission of conciliation, and, lastly, the publicity given to that unparalleled proceeding by the Prussian journals, and by the notification of it made to the cabinets—all those successive symptoms of aggressive intentions removed every doubt in the most prejudiced minds. Can there be any illusion when a sovereign who commands a million of soldiers declares, with his hand on the hilt of his sword, that he reserves the right of taking counsel of himself alone, and from circumstances? We were led to that extreme limit at which a nation who feels what is due to itself cannot further compromise with the requirements of its honour. If the closing incidents of this painful discussion did not throw a somewhat vivid light on the schemes nourished by the Berlin cabinet, there is one circumstance not so well known at present, which would put a decisive interpretation on its conduct. The idea of raising a Hohenzollern prince to the Spanish throne was not a new one. So early as March, 1869, it had been mentioned by our ambassador at Berlin, who was at once requested to inform Count von Bismarck what view the emperor's government would take of such an eventuality. Count Benedetti, in several interviews which he had on this topic with the chancellor of the North German Confederation and the under secretary of state intrusted with the management of foreign affairs, did not leave them in ignorance that we could never admit that a Prussian prince should reign beyond the Pyrenees. Count von Bismarck, for his part, declared that we need be under no anxiety concerning a combination which he himself judged to be

incapable of realization, and during the absence of the Federal chancellor, at a moment when M. Benedetti considered it his duty to be incredulous and pressing, Herr von Theile gave his word of honour that the prince of Hohenzollern was not and could not seriously become a candidate for the Spanish crown. If one were to suspect official assurances so positive as this, diplomatic communications would cease to be a guarantee for the peace of Europe; they would be but a snare and a source of peril. Thus, although our ambassador transmitted these statements under all reserve, the Imperial government deemed fit to receive them favourably. It refused to call their good faith into question until the combination which was their glaring negation suddenly revealed itself. In unexpectedly breaking the promise which she had given us, without even attempting to take any steps to free herself towards us, Prussia offered us a veritable defiance. Enlightened at once as to the value to be attached to the most formal protests of Prussian statesmen, we were imperiously obliged to preserve our loyalty from fresh mistakes in the future by an explicit guarantee. We therefore felt it our duty to insist, as we have done, on obtaining the certitude that a withdrawal, which was hedged round with the most subtle distinctions, was this time definite and serious. It is just that the court of Berlin should bear, before history, the responsibility of this war, which it had the means of avoiding and which it has wished for. And under what circumstances has it sought out the struggle? It is when for the last four years France, displaying continual moderation towards it, has abstained, with a scrupulousness perhaps exaggerated, from calling up against it the treaties concluded under the mediation of the emperor himself, but the voluntary neglect of which is seen in all the acts of a government which was already thinking of getting rid of them at the moment of signature. Europe has been witness of our conduct, and she has had the opportunity of comparing it with that of Prussia during this period. Let her pronounce now upon the justice of our cause. Whatever be the issue of our combats we await without disquietude the judgment of our contemporaries as that of posterity."

Immediately this circular reached Berlin both Count von Bismarck and Herr von Theile issued one, denying most positively that any such pledge

was ever given, and in no ambiguous phrase affirming that M. Benedetti had made a statement quite unfounded in fact. On search at the French Foreign Office, however, a despatch narrating the circumstance was found, but as previously stated by the Duc de Gramont, it was marked "under all reserves," a stereotyped phrase of diplomatic phraseology of a rather elastic nature.

On July 22 the emperor received the members of the Legislative Body, and the president, M. Schneider, addressed him as follows :—

"Sire,—The Legislative Body has terminated its labours, after voting all the subsidies and laws necessary for the defence of the country. Thus the Chamber has joined in an effective proof of patriotism. The real author of the war is not he by whom it was declared, but he who rendered it necessary. There will be but one voice among the people of both hemispheres, throwing, namely, the responsibility of the war upon Prussia, which, intoxicated by unexpected success and encouraged by our patience and our desire to preserve to Europe the blessings of peace, has imagined that she could conspire against our security, and wound with impunity our honour. Under these circumstances France will know how to do her duty. The most ardent wishes will follow you to the army, the command of which you assume, accompanied by your son, who, anticipating the duties of maturer age, will learn by your side how to serve his country. Behind you, behind our army, accustomed to carry the noble flag of France, stand the whole nation ready to recruit it. Leave the regency without anxiety in the hands of our august sovereign the empress. To the authority commanded by her great qualities, of which ample evidence has already been given, her Majesty will add the strength now afforded by the liberal institutions so gloriously inaugurated by your Majesty. Sire, the heart of the nation is with you, and with your valiant army."

The emperor replied :—

"I experience the most lively satisfaction, on the eve of my departure for the army, at being able to thank you for the patriotic support which you have afforded my government. A war is right when it is waged with the assent of the country and the approval of the country's representatives. You are right to remember the words of Montesquieu, that 'the real author of war is not he by whom it is declared, but he who renders it necessary.' We

have done all in our power to avert the war, and I may say that it is the whole nation which has, by its irresistible impulse, dictated our decisions. I confide to you the empress, who will call you around her if circumstances should require it. She will know how to fulfil courageously the duty which her position imposes upon her. I take my son with me; in the midst of the army he will learn to serve his country. Resolved energetically to pursue the great mission which has been intrusted to me, I have faith in the success of our arms; for I know that behind me France has risen to her feet, and that God protects her."

On the following day, July 23, the emperor addressed the following proclamation to the French nation:—

"Frenchmen,—There are solemn moments in the life of peoples, when the national sense of honour, violently excited, imposes itself with irresistible force, dominates all interests, and alone takes in hand the direction of the destinies of the country. One of those decisive hours has sounded for France. Prussia, towards whom both during and since the war of 1866 we have shown the most conciliatory disposition, has taken no account of our good wishes and our enduring forbearance. Launched on the path of invasion, she has provoked mistrust everywhere, necessitated exaggerated armaments, and has turned Europe into a camp, where reigns nothing but uncertainty and fear of the morrow. A last incident has come to show the instability of international relations, and to prove the gravity of the situation. In presence of the new pretensions of Prussia, we made known

our protests. They were evaded, and were followed on the part of Prussia by contemptuous acts. Our country resented this treatment with profound irritation, and immediately a cry for war resounded from one end of France to the other. It only remains to us to leave our destinies to the decision of arms.

"We do not make war on Germany, whose independence we respect. We wish that the people who compose the great German nationality may freely dispose of their destinies. For ourselves, we demand the establishment of a state of affairs which shall guarantee our security and assure our future. We wish to conquer a lasting peace, based on the true interests of peoples, and to put an end to that precarious state in which all nations employ their resources to arm themselves one against the other. The glorious flag which we once more unfurl before those who have provoked us, is the same which bore throughout Europe the civilizing ideas of our great revolution. It represents the same principles and will inspire the same devotion.

"Frenchmen! I am about to place myself at the head of that valiant army which is animated by love of duty and of country. It knows its own worth, since it has seen how victory has accompanied its march in the four quarters of the world. I take with me my son, despite his youth. He knows what are the duties which his name imposes upon him, and he is proud to bear his share in the dangers of those who fight for their country. May God bless our efforts! A great people which defends a just cause is invincible.

"NAPOLEON."



## CHAPTER II.

Unusual lull in Foreign Affairs immediately before the events which led to the Declaration of War—The determination of the French Government to resist the Candidature of Prince Leopold made known to the English Ambassador at Paris, and the Mediation of England solicited—Principles acted upon by the British Government throughout—M. Ollivier's private views of the whole matter—Lord Lyons, the English Ambassador at Paris, uneasy at the effect produced by the Duc de Gramont's strong-worded declaration in the Corps Législatif—The Duc's explanation with regard to it—English Mediation again invoked—Interview between Lord Lyons and the Prussian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris—The French Ambassador in London and Lord Granville—Important Communication from the latter to Lord Augustus Loftus, the English Minister at Berlin, urging Prussia to endeavour to have the Prince withdrawn—Despatch to Mr. Layard, the Ambassador at Madrid, to the same effect—Count Bernstorff's statement of views of the North German Government—Further despatch to Mr. Layard urging the withdrawal of the Prince—Surprise of Lord Lyons at the rapidity of the proceeding of the French Government—The Duc de Gramont's solution of the question—Hopes entertained of an Amicable Arrangement—Lord Granville's regret at the tone adopted by the French Press—The matter as it stood on July 10, stated by the Duc de Gramont—The Spanish Government's views of the whole question, and their strong Desire for Peace—Remarks of General Prim—State of public feeling in France—Important Interview between Lord Lyons and the Duc de Gramont—The former's regret that the renunciation of the Candidature of the Prince is not at once accepted, and his warning to the French Government—Lord Granville's representation to the French Government of the immense responsibility they were incurring—He also denies that he had ever admitted that the Grievances complained of by France were legitimate—Further pressing appeal by Lord Lyons, and another explanation of the Duc de Gramont—Important statement by him in writing as to what France required to have the matter settled—Further appeal to Prussia—Count Bismarck's reply to the whole question—Feeling in Germany—No fear as to the result of a War—The fatal telegram from Ems—Interesting despatch from Lord Lyons describing the change caused by it in France—Thanks of the French Government to England for her efforts in trying to preserve Peace—The real *gravamen* of the offence against France—Last effort made by England, under the Treaty of Paris of 1856, to prevent hostilities—Replies from both France and Prussia declining the proposal—Efforts made by other European Powers in the cause of Peace—Successful endeavours made by England to secure liberal terms for Neutrals—Proclamation of Neutrality, and notification with regard to the ships of both belligerents—Passing of a new and stringent Foreign Enlistment Act—Description of its chief provisions.

HAVING thus brought the course of events to the declaration of war, it will be better to retrace our steps a little, for the purpose of showing the earnest efforts made by the British government to avert so great a calamity. When, in consequence of the death of Lord Clarendon, Lord Granville became secretary of state for Foreign Affairs in July, 1870, so little was any fear entertained in England of a premature disturbance of the peace of Europe, that Mr. Hammond, the able and experienced permanent secretary at the Foreign Office, told his lordship he had never before known such a lull in foreign politics.

The first intimation of the candidature of Prince Leopold was received officially in England on Tuesday evening, 5th July, in a telegram from Mr. Layard, the British ambassador at Madrid, stating the fact, and that it was expected he would be accepted by the requisite majority. A letter was received the next morning from Lord Lyons, the British ambassador at Paris, stating that the Duc de Gramont had just informed him that France would not permit the selection to be carried into effect: she "would use her whole strength to prevent it." Nothing, the duke added, could be further from the wishes of the French government

than to interfere in the internal affairs of Spain; but the interest and dignity of France alike forbade them to permit the establishment of a Prussian dynasty in the Peninsula. They could not consent to a state of things which would oblige them, in case of war with Prussia, to keep a watch upon Spain which would paralyze a division of their army. The proposal to set the crown of Spain upon a Prussian head was nothing less than an insult to France, and with a full consideration of all that such a declaration implied, he said the government of the emperor would not endure it.

It will thus be seen that, from the first day on which the matter was officially made known, the British government were informed that unless the project were relinquished war would certainly ensue. Nothing more would have been necessary to have called forth the immediate intervention of England, but in addition to this, the Duc de Gramont concluded the conversation to which we have referred by expressing to Lord Lyons his earnest hope that the British government would co-operate with that of France in endeavouring to ward off an event which, he said, would be fraught with danger to the peace of Europe.

As will be shown in the following narrative of events, the principle acted upon by the British government throughout, and which secured for it the approval, not only of persons of all parties in England, but the thanks of both France and Prussia, was, that though it could not recognize the election of Prince Leopold as being a danger to France, or that France would be entitled to put it forward as a cause of war either against Prussia or Spain, yet considering the fact that France was violently excited on the subject, and that the imperial government was fully committed to resist the election by force, it was a public duty to obtain the abandonment of the project. In the words of Lord Granville, who so ably conducted the negotiations throughout, its course was to urge the French government to avoid precipitation, and, without dictation, to impress on Prussia and Spain the gravity of the situation. "I felt that our position was very much that of trying to prevent a fire with inflammable materials all around, and with matches all ready to ignite; that it was not the moment to go into any elaborate inquiries as to who had brought the materials, or the rights and wrongs of the case, but that we should endeavour as soon as possible to remove those materials and to prevent one of the greatest calamities which could happen to the world." To this practical end the efforts of the English government were, therefore, directed, and with complete success so far as France had asked for its co-operation—the withdrawal of the prince's candidature.

After writing his letter of the 5th of July, Lord Lyons attended a reception at M. Ollivier's, the head of the French government. The latter took him on one side, and spoke at some length and with considerable emphasis, respecting the news just received. His language was in substance the same as that held by the Duc de Gramont in the afternoon, but he entered rather more into detail, and spoke with still more precision of the impossibility of allowing the prince to become king of Spain. Public opinion in France, he said, would never tolerate it, and any government which acquiesced in it would be at once overthrown. For his own part, he said, it was well known he had never been an enemy to Germany; but with all his good will towards the Germans, he must confess that he felt this proceeding to be an insult, and fully shared the indignation of the public. Lord Lyons urged that the official declaration to be made on the sub-

ject in the Chamber on the following day should be moderate, and M. Ollivier assured him that it should be as mild as was compatible with the necessity of satisfying public opinion in France; but in fact, he said, our language is this, "We are not uneasy, because we have a firm hope that the thing will not be done; but if it were to be done, we would not tolerate it." After this conversation, Lord Lyons said, in a despatch written on July 7, that he hardly expected the declaration (which is given in the previous chapter) would have been so strongly worded as it proved to be. He admitted, however, that, forcible as it was, it did not go at all beyond the feeling of the country, and it was only too plain that, without considering how far the real interests of France might be in question, the nation had taken the proposal to place the prince of Hohenzollern on the throne of Spain to be an insult and a challenge from Prussia. The wound inflicted by Sadowa on French pride had never been completely healed, but time was producing its reconciling effects in many minds when this matter had revived all the old animosity: both the government and the people had alike made it a point of honour to prevent the accession of the prince, and had gone too far to recede. Lord Lyons added, however, he did not believe that either the emperor or his ministers wished for war or even expected it: on the contrary, he thought they confidently hoped they should succeed by pacific means in preventing the prince from wearing the crown of Spain, and conceived if that should be so, they should gain popularity at home by giving effect energetically to the feeling of the nation; and that they should raise their credit abroad by a diplomatic success. They were, moreover, not sorry to have an opportunity of testing the public feeling with regard to Prussia, and they were convinced that it would have been impossible, with safety, to allow what, rightly or wrongly, the nation would regard as a fresh triumph of Prussia over France.

In the afternoon of the same day (July 7) Lord Lyons had an interview with the Duc de Gramont, and told him he could not but feel uneasy respecting the declaration which he had made the day before in the Corps Législatif, and thought that milder language would have rendered it more easy to treat both with Prussia and Spain for the withdrawal of the pretensions of Prince Leopold. The duke said he was glad Lord Lyons had mentioned

this, as he wished to have an opportunity of conveying to the British government an explanation of his reasons for making a public declaration in terms so positive. As minister in a constitutional country, he was sure Lord Granville would perfectly understand the impossibility of contending with public opinion, and on this point the French nation was so strongly roused, that its will could not be resisted or trifled with, and nothing less than what he had said would have satisfied the public. His speech was in fact, as regarded the internal peace of France, absolutely necessary; and diplomatic considerations must yield to public safety at home. Nor could he admit that it was simply the pride of France which was in question. Her military power was at stake, for, as king of Spain, Prince Leopold could make himself a military sovereign, and secure the means of paralyzing 200,000 French troops, if France should be engaged in a European war. It would be madness to wait until this was accomplished; if there was to be war it had better come at once; but he still trusted much to the aid of the British government, and by exercising their influence at Berlin and Madrid they would manifest their friendship for France, and preserve the peace of Europe. As regarded Prussia, the essential thing was to make her understand that France could not be put off with an evasive answer; it was not to be credited that the king of Prussia had not the power to forbid a prince of his family and an officer of his army from accepting a foreign throne. It was, however, in Spain that the assistance of the British government could be most effectually given to France. The regent might surely be convinced that it was his duty to separate himself from a policy which would plunge Spain into civil war, and cause hostilities in Europe. The same day (July 7) Lord Lyons reported to Earl Granville a conversation he had just had with the Prussian chargé d'affaires at Paris, who considered the Duc de Gramont's declaration to have been too hastily made, and expressed his belief that neither the king nor Count von Bismarck was aware of the offer of the crown to Prince Leopold; but that he hardly knew what power the king of Prussia might possess of enforcing a renunciation, but certainly, being in the army, he could not leave it without the king's permission. Lord Lyons observed that much as they might deplore it, they could not shut their eyes to the fact that the feelings of the

French nation would now render it impossible for the government, even if they wished, to acquiesce in the elevation of the prince to the throne. Neither Prussia, nor any other nation that he knew of, had any real interest in making the prince king of Spain; but all nations were deeply interested in preventing war, and that nation would most deserve the gratitude of Europe which should put an end to this cause of disquiet and danger. It seemed to him, therefore, that the king of Prussia, more than any other sovereign, possessed the means of putting a stop to the whole imbroglio in a dignified and honourable manner.

On the previous day, 6th July, M. de Lavalette, the French ambassador in London, had called on Lord Granville, and urged on him the importance of endeavouring to induce the obnoxious candidate to retire; and in compliance with this request, the latter promised to write at once to Lord Augustus Loftus, the English minister at Berlin; but at the same time he expressed his regret at the strong language reported to have been used to the Prussian representative in Paris, and guarded himself against admitting that France was justified in her complaints. In his letter to Lord Augustus Loftus he said, both Mr. Gladstone and he himself were taken very much by surprise by the news received the previous evening; and although the British government had no wish to interfere in Spain or to dictate to Germany, they certainly hoped, and could not but believe, that this project of which they had hitherto been ignorant had not received any sanction from the king. Some of the greatest calamities in the world had been produced by small causes, and by mistakes trivial in their origin, and in the then state of opinion in France, the possession of the crown of Spain by a Prussian prince would be sure to lead to great and dangerous irritation. Of this, indeed, there was conclusive evidence in the statements made by the minister to the French chamber. In Prussia it could be an object of no importance that a member of the house of Hohenzollern should occupy the throne of the most Catholic country in Europe. It was in the interest of civilization, and of European peace and order, that Spain should consolidate her institutions; and it was almost impossible that this should be accomplished if a new monarchy were inaugurated, which was certain to excite jealousy and unfriendly feelings, if not hostile acts, on the part of her immediate and powerful neigh-



bour. He therefore hoped that the king and his advisers would find it consistent with their views of what was advantageous for Spain, effectually to discourage a project fraught with risk to the best interests of that country. Lord Augustus Loftus, however, was cautioned to say nothing which could give ground for the supposition that the English government controverted, or even discussed, the abstract right of Spain to the choice of her own sovereign; and for his own information it was added, that they had not in any measure admitted that the assumption of the Spanish throne by Prince Leopold would justify the immediate resort to arms threatened by France. On that topic, however, he was not then to enter into communication with the Prussian government. The groundwork of the representations which he was instructed to make was prudential. To considerations, however, of that class, Earl Granville said he could not but add the reflection, that the secrecy with which the proceedings had been conducted as between the Spanish ministry and the prince who had been the object of their choice, seemed inconsistent with the spirit of friendship or the rules of comity between nations, and had given, what the government could not but admit to be, so far as it went, just cause of offence.

The following day (July 7) Lord Granville wrote to Mr. Layard at Madrid, calling his attention to the great disfavour with which the candidature of the prince had been received in France, and said that although her Majesty's government had no desire to recommend any particular person whatever to Spain as her future sovereign, or to interfere in any way with the choice of the Spanish nation; still, entertaining as they did the strongest wish for the well-being of Spain, it was impossible that they should not feel anxious as to the consequences of the step thus taken by the provisional government, and they therefore wished him, whilst carefully abstaining from employing any language calculated to offend them, to use every pressure upon them which in his judgment might contribute to induce them to abandon the project.

Similar views were urgently impressed on the Spanish minister in London, who called on Lord Granville the same day; and it was forcibly represented to him that the step, if persevered in, might, on the one hand, induce great European calamities, and on the other, was almost certain to render the relations of Spain with a power which

was her immediate neighbour, of a painful, if not a hostile character. A monarchy inaugurated under such auspices would not consolidate the new institutions of the country, and difficulties abroad would certainly find an echo in Spain itself. Senor Rances, the Spanish minister, explained that the project had not been intended as hostile to France; that it was the natural result of other combinations which had failed; and that it was to meet the ardent wish of the liberal party for the election of a king, in order to consolidate their institutions. He promised, however, to represent to his government, in as strong terms as were consistent with the respect due to them, the earnest wish of her Majesty's government, that they would act in the matter with a view to the maintenance of peace in Europe, and the future welfare of Spain.

On July 8 Count Bernstorff, the ambassador of the North German Confederation at London, called on Lord Granville, and informed him that he had received letters from the king of Prussia, and also from Berlin and Count von Bismarck, from the general tenor of which it appeared that the reply of the North German government to the request first made to them by France, for explanation respecting the offer of the crown to Prince Leopold, was to the effect that it was not an affair which concerned the Prussian court. They did not pretend to interfere with the independence of the Spanish nation, but left it to the Spaniards to settle their own affairs; and they were unable to give any information as to the negotiations which had passed between the provisional government of Madrid and the prince of Hohenzollern. He added, that the North German government did not wish to interfere with the matter, but left it to the French to adopt what course they pleased; and the Prussian representative at Paris had been directed to abstain from taking any part in it. The North German government had no desire for a war of succession, but if France chose to commence hostilities against them on account of the choice of a king made by Spain, such a proceeding on her part would be an evidence of a disposition to quarrel without any lawful cause. It was premature, however, to discuss the question as long as the Cortes had not decided on accepting Prince Leopold as king of Spain; still, if France chose to attack North Germany, that country would defend itself. Count Bernstorff went on to say that these views



were held by the North German government, and also by the king of Prussia. His Majesty, he added, was a stranger to the negotiations with Prince Leopold, but he would not forbid the prince to accept the crown of Spain. The count dwelt much on the violent language of France. Lord Granville repeated to him the principal arguments of the despatch to Lord Loftus given above, and added that the position of North Germany was such that, while it need not yield to menace, it ought not to be swayed in another direction by hasty words uttered in a moment of great excitement.

The same day (July 8) Lord Granville sent Mr. Layard copies of the despatches just received from Lord Lyons, showing in what a very serious light the matter was received by the French government, and how imminent was the risk of great calamities, if means could not be devised for averting them. The provisional government of Spain would not, he was sure, wish to do anything which would be unnecessarily offensive to France, from whom they had received much consideration in the crisis through which their country was passing. In turning their thoughts to the prince of Hohenzollern they probably looked at the matter in an exclusively Spanish, and not in a European point of view; and being convinced of the necessity of the speedy re-establishment of a monarchy, and disheartened by the successive obstacles which they had encountered in attempting to bring it about, they turned their attention to a prince who might be ready to accept the crown, and who, in other respects, might be acceptable to the Spanish people. Her Majesty's government could quite understand that the excitement which their choice, looked at from a European point of view, had called forth, was unexpected by the provisional government, whose wish, they felt sure, could never be to connect the restoration of the monarchy in their country with a general disturbance of the peace of Europe, and which could not fail to be fraught with danger to Spain itself. The English government had no wish to press their own ideas upon the government of Spain; but they believed it would have been unfriendly to have abstained from thus laying before them some of the prudential reasons which seemed to them of vital importance to the best interests of their country. They hoped that their doing so would be accepted as the best evidence of their anxiety for the greatness and

prosperity of Spain, and of their admiration of the wise course of improvement which had been inaugurated under the provisional government; and they trusted that this frank communication might induce the Spanish government to avoid all precipitation, and devise some means, consistent with their dignity and honour, to put an end to the cause of dissension.

On the same day (July 8) Lord Lyons had an interview with the Duc de Gramont in Paris, when the latter expressed great satisfaction with a report he had received from M. de Lavalette, of the conversation between him and Lord Granville on the 6th, and desired that his best thanks should be conveyed to him for the friendly feeling he had manifested towards France. He then went on to say he was still without any answer from Prussia, and that this silence rendered it impossible for the French government to abstain any longer from making military preparations. Some steps in this direction had been already taken, and the next day the military authorities would begin in earnest. The movements of troops would be settled at the council to be held at St. Cloud in the morning. On Lord Lyons manifesting some surprise and regret at the rapid pace at which the French government seemed to be proceeding, M. de Gramont insisted that it was impossible for them to delay any longer. They had reason to know—indeed, he said, the Spanish ministers did not deny it—that the king of Prussia had been cognizant of the negotiation between Marshal Prim and the prince of Hohenzollern from the first. It was therefore incumbent upon his Majesty, if he desired to show friendship towards France, to prohibit formally the acceptance of the crown by a prince of his house. Silence or an evasive answer would be equivalent to a refusal. It could not be said that the quarrel was of France's seeking. On the contrary, from the battle of Sadowa up to this incident, France had shown a patience, a moderation, and a conciliatory spirit which had, in the opinion of a vast number of Frenchmen, been carried much too far. Now, when all was tranquil, and the irritation caused by the aggrandizement of Prussia was gradually subsiding, the Prussians, in defiance of the feelings and of the interest of France, endeavoured to establish one of their princes beyond the Pyrenees. This aggression it was impossible for France to put up with. It was earnestly to be hoped that

the king would efface the impression it had made, by openly forbidding the prince to go to Spain.

There was another solution of the question to which the Duc de Gramont begged Lord Lyons to call the particular attention of the English government. The prince of Hohenzollern might of his own accord abandon his pretensions to the Spanish crown. He must surely have accepted the offer of it in the hope of doing good to his adopted country. When he saw that his accession would bring domestic and foreign war upon his new country, while it would plunge the country of his birth, and indeed all Europe, into hostilities, he would certainly hesitate to make himself responsible for such calamities. If this view of the subject were pressed upon him, he could not but feel that honour and duty required him to sacrifice the idle ambition of ascending a throne on which it was plain he could never be secure.

A voluntary renunciation on the part of the prince would, M. de Gramont thought, be a most fortunate solution of difficult and intricate questions; and he hoped the English government would use all their influence to secure it.

These views were at once communicated to Lord Granville, and hopes were entertained that an amicable arrangement of the difficulty might soon be found. On the next day Lord Granville wrote to Lord Lyons directing him to urge forbearance, and in another despatch, written on the same day, he said her Majesty's government regretted the tenor of the observations successively made in the French Chambers and in the French press, which tended to excite rather than allay the angry feelings which had been aroused in France, and might probably call forth similar feelings in Germany and Spain; and their regret had been increased by the intimation now given by the Duc de Gramont that military preparations would forthwith be made. Such a course, they feared, was calculated to render abortive the attempts which the English government were making to bring about an amicable settlement, and was calculated to raise the serious question as to the expediency of making any further efforts at that time for the purpose, which such precipitate action on the part of France could hardly fail to render nugatory, and of rather reserving such efforts for a future time, when the parties most directly interested might be willing to second them by moderation and forbearance in the support of their respective views. When

these opinions were represented to the Duc de Gramont on the following day, he told Lord Lyons that in this matter the French ministers were following, not leading, the nation. Public opinion would not admit of their doing less than they had done. As regarded military preparations, common prudence required that they should not be behindhand. In the midst of a profound calm, when the French cabinet and Chamber were employed in reducing their military budget, Prussia exploded upon them this mine which she had prepared in secret. It was necessary that France should be at least as forward as Prussia in military preparations.

He said the question now stood exactly thus:—The king of Prussia had told M. Benedetti on the previous evening that he had in fact consented to the prince of Hohenzollern's accepting the crown of Spain; and that, having given his consent, it would be difficult for him now to withdraw it. His Majesty had added, however, that he would confer with the prince, and would give a definitive answer to France when he had done so.

Thus, M. de Gramont observed, two things were clear: first, that the king of Prussia was a consenting party to the acceptance of the crown by the prince; and, secondly, that the prince's decision to persist in his acceptance, or to retire, would be made in concert with his Majesty, so that the affair was, beyond all controversy, one between France and the Prussian sovereign.

The French government would, M. de Gramont added, defer for a short time longer (for twenty-four hours, for instance) those great ostensible preparations for war, such as calling out the reserves, which would inflame public feeling in France. All essential preparations must, however, be carried on unremittingly. The French ministers would be unwise if they ran any risk of allowing Prussia to gain time by dilatory pretexts.

Finally, he told Lord Lyons that he might report to Lord Granville that if the prince of Hohenzollern should, on the advice of the king of Prussia, withdraw his acceptance of the crown, the whole affair would be at an end. He did not, however, conceal that if, on the other hand, the prince, after his conference with the king, persisted in coming forward as a candidate for the throne of Spain, France would forthwith declare war against Prussia.

The next day (July 11) Lord Lyons had another

interview with the Duc de Gramont, and stated that the information which had been received from Spain and other quarters, gave good reason to hope that peaceful means would be found for putting an end, once for all, to the candidature of the prince; and he urged that, this being the case, it would be lamentable that France should rush into a war, the cause for which might be removed by a little patience. M. de Gramont replied that the French ministers were already violently reproached, by the deputies and the public, with tardiness and want of spirit. Any further delay would seriously damage their position; and there were military considerations much more important, which counselled immediate action. The government had, however, determined to make another sacrifice to the cause of peace. No answer had yet reached them from the king of Prussia. They would, nevertheless, wait another day, although by so doing they would render themselves one of the most unpopular governments which had ever been seen in France. Lord Lyons replied that the unpopularity would be of very short duration, and that the best title which the ministry could have to public esteem, would be to obtain a settlement of the question, to the honour and advantage of France, without bloodshed. In reporting this conversation to Lord Granville, Lord Lyons stated it was quite true that the war party had become more exacting. It had, in fact, already raised a cry that the settlement of the Hohenzollern question would not be sufficient, and that France must demand satisfaction on the subject of the treaty of Prague.

In a despatch from Madrid, written on July 12, Mr. Layard said the Spanish government fully appreciated the consideration and friendly feeling of that of England, and the equitable and impartial tone of their despatches. They maintained, however, that they had become involved in the difficulty most unwittingly; that they never entertained the remotest thought of entering into a Prussian alliance, or into any combination hostile or unfriendly to France; and they were most desirous of withdrawing from the position in which they had unfortunately placed themselves, if they could do so consistently with the honour and dignity of the country. At Mr. Layard's request they promised to make a communication to this effect to the European powers, as they were desirous to come to any arrangement which might save Europe from the calamities of a war. In an

interview, General Prim the same day personally desired Mr. Layard to thank the English government for its good offices, and disclaimed in the most energetic way any intention to take a step hostile to France. He said that he himself was intimately connected with France and Frenchmen; he had experienced great kindness from the emperor; had married and had many relations in that country; and was consequently the last man to wish to menace or offend France or her ruler. He also desired Mr. Layard to remind the English government of the great difficulties of his position; that when, after the revolution, Spain was without a king, and he was going from door to door in search of one, no European government gave him any help, and that he was everywhere repulsed. But when the Cortes and the country had insisted upon having a king, and when, after having been accused of wishing to maintain the interregnum for personal objects, he had at last succeeded in finding the only eligible candidate, he was immediately accused of having laid a deep plot against France, and of having sought to violate the international law of Europe. He repudiated in the strongest terms any desire of secrecy in order to deceive France or any other power: the reserve which had been maintained during the negotiations was absolutely necessary to save the country from the humiliation of making overtures to a fresh candidate, which might be again refused.

It was on this day (July 12) that the candidature of Prince Leopold was withdrawn, and Lord Lyons then had another interview with the Duc de Gramont on the subject. The latter said the king of Prussia was neither courteous nor satisfactory. His Majesty disclaimed all connection with the offer of the crown of Spain to the Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern, and declined to advise the prince to withdraw his acceptance. On the other hand, Prince Leopold's father had formally announced in the name of his son that the acceptance was withdrawn. In fact, the prince had sent a copy of a telegram which he had despatched to Marshal Prim, declaring that his son's candidature was at an end.

The duke said that this state of things was very embarrassing to the French government. On the one hand, public opinion was so much excited in France that it was doubtful whether the ministry would not be overthrown if it went down to the Chamber the next day, and announced that it

regarded the affair as finished, without having obtained some more complete satisfaction from Prussia. On the other hand, the renunciation of the crown by Prince Leopold put an end to the original cause of the dispute. The most satisfactory part of the affair was, he said, that Spain was, at all events, now quite clear of the transaction. The quarrel, if any quarrel existed, was confined to France and Prussia.

Lord Lyons did not conceal from the Duc de Gramont his surprise and regret that the French government should hesitate for a moment to accept the renunciation of the prince as a settlement of the difficulty. He reminded him pointedly of the assurance which he had formerly authorized him to give to the English government, that if the prince withdrew his candidature the affair would be terminated; and he also urged as strongly as he could all the reasons which would render a withdrawal on his part from this assurance painful and disquieting to that government. Moreover, too, he pointed out that the renunciation wholly changed the position of France. If war occurred, all Europe would say that it was the fault of France; that France rushed into it without any substantial cause—merely from pride and resentment. One of the advantages of the former position of France was, that the quarrel rested on a cause in which the feelings of Germany were very little concerned, and German interests not at all. Now Prussia might well expect to rally all Germany to resist an attack which could be attributed to no other motives than ill-will and jealousy on the part of France, and a passionate desire to humiliate her neighbour. In fact, Lord Lyons said, France would have public opinion throughout the world against her, and her antagonist would have all the advantage of being manifestly forced into the war in self-defence to repel an attack. If there should at the first moment be some disappointment felt in France, in the Chamber, and in the country, he could not but think that the ministry would in a very short time stand better with both if it contented itself with the diplomatic triumph it had achieved, and abstained from plunging the nation into a war for which there was certainly no avowable motive.

After much discussion, the Duc de Gramont said a final resolution must be come to at a council which would be held in presence of the emperor the next day, and the result would be announced to the

Chamber immediately afterwards. He should not, he said, be able to see him (Lord Lyons) between the council and his appearance in the Chamber, but he assured him that due weight should be given to the opinion he had offered on behalf of the English government.

The result of this interview was made known at once to the English cabinet, and Lord Granville immediately wrote regretting that the renunciation had not been accepted as a settlement of the question, and said he felt bound to impress upon the French government the immense responsibility which would rest on France if she should seek to enlarge the grounds of quarrel, by declining to accept the withdrawal of Prince Leopold as a satisfactory solution of the question. With regard to the statement made by the Duc de Gramont in the Corps Législatif, that all the cabinets to which the French government had referred the subject appeared to admit that the grievances complained of by France were legitimate, he said such a statement was not applicable to her Majesty's government. He had expressed regret at an occurrence which had, at all events, given rise to great excitement in the imperial government and French nation; but he had carefully abstained from admitting that the cause was sufficient to warrant the intentions which had been announced, while, at the same time, he had deprecated precipitate action, and recommended that no means should be left untried by which any interruption of the general peace could be averted.

In an interview with the French ambassador the same day (July 13), Lord Granville earnestly entreated him to represent to his government that her Majesty's government thought, after their exertions at the request of France, they had a right to urge on the imperial government not to take the great responsibility of quarrelling about forms, when they had obtained the full substance of what they desired, and which M. de Gramont had told Lord Lyons, if obtained, would put an end to everything. All the nations of Europe had now declared their ardent wish that peace should be maintained between Prussia and France, and her Majesty's government believed that the imperial government would not give the slightest pretence to those who might endeavour to show that France was desirous of going to war without an absolute necessity.

The same day Lord Lyons, in a letter which



was sent specially to St. Cloud, and delivered at the table at which the ministers were still sitting in council, in the presence of the emperor, again urged upon the Duc de Gramont in the most friendly, but at the same time most pressing, manner, to accept the renunciation of the prince as a satisfactory settlement; and in a personal interview with him in the afternoon—just after his statement in the Corps Législatif, that although the candidature of the prince was withdrawn, the negotiations with Prussia were not concluded—he expressed his surprise and regret that his declaration to the Chamber had not consisted of a simple announcement that the whole question with Prussia, as well as with Spain, was peaceably settled. The duke said he would explain in a few words the position taken up by the government of the emperor. The Spanish ambassador had formally announced to him that the candidature of Prince Leopold had been withdrawn. This put an end to all question with Spain. Spain was no longer a party concerned. But from Prussia France had obtained nothing, literally nothing. He then read to Lord Lyons a telegram, stating that the emperor of Russia had written to the king of Prussia soliciting him to order the prince of Hohenzollern to withdraw his acceptance of the crown, and had, moreover, expressed himself in most friendly terms to France, and manifested a most earnest desire to avert a war. The king of Prussia, M. de Gramont went on to say, had refused to comply with this request from his imperial nephew, and had not given a word of explanation to France. His Majesty had, he repeated, done nothing, absolutely nothing. France would not take offence at this. She would not call upon his Majesty to make her any amends. The king had authorized the prince of Hohenzollern to accept the crown of Spain; all that France now asked was, that his Majesty would forbid the prince to alter at any future time his decision. Surely it was but reasonable that France should take some precautions against a repetition of what had occurred when Prince Leopold's brother repaired to Bucharest. It was not to be supposed that France would run the risk of Prince Leopold suddenly presenting himself in Spain, and appealing to the chivalry of the Spanish people. Still France did not call upon Prussia to prevent the prince from going to Spain; all she desired was that the king should forbid him to change his

present resolution to withdraw his candidature. If his Majesty would do this, the whole affair would be absolutely and entirely at an end.

Lord Lyons asked him whether he authorized him categorically to state to his government, in the name of the government of the emperor, that in this case the whole difficulty would be completely disposed of. He said, "Undoubtedly;" and on a sheet of paper wrote the following memorandum, which he placed in the hand of the English ambassador:—

"Nous demandons au roi de Prusse de défendre au prince de Hohenzollern de revenir sur sa résolution. S'il le fait, tout l'incident est terminé." ("We ask the king of Prussia to forbid the prince of Hohenzollern to alter his resolution. If he does so, the whole matter is settled.")

Lord Lyons observed to the duke that he could hardly conceive the French government really apprehended that, after all that had occurred, Prince Leopold would again offer himself as a candidate, or be accepted by the Spanish government if he did; to which the duke replied that he was bound to take precautions against such an occurrence, and that if the king refused to issue the simple prohibition which was demanded, France could only suppose that designs hostile to her were entertained, and must take her measures accordingly. Finally, he asked whether France could count upon the good offices of England to help her in obtaining from the king this prohibition; to which Lord Lyons said that nothing could exceed the desire of her Majesty's government to effect a reconciliation between France and Prussia, but that, of course, he could not take upon himself to answer offhand, without reference to the government, a specific question of that kind.

The substance of this was at once telegraphed to Lord Granville, and the following day Lord Lyons was informed that, in the opinion of the English government, a demand on Prussia for an engagement covering the future could not be justly made by France. Nevertheless, and although they considered that France, having obtained the substance of what she required, ought not in any case to insist to extremities upon the form in which it was obtained, they had at once and urgently recommended to the king of Prussia, that if the French demand was waived, he should communicate to France his consent to the renunciation of Prince Leopold. This renunciation

had been placed before the king on behalf of the English government, in the following terms; namely, that as his Majesty had consented to the acceptance by Prince Leopold of the Spanish crown, and had thereby, in a certain sense, become a party to the arrangement, so he might with perfect dignity communicate to the French government his consent to the withdrawal of the acceptance, if France should waive her demand for an engagement covering the future. Such a communication, made at the suggestion of a friendly power, would be a further and the strongest proof of the king's desire for the maintenance of the peace of Europe.

On July 13 Lord Augustus Loftus had an interview with Count von Bismarck, and congratulated him on the apparent solution of the crisis by the spontaneous renunciation of the prince of Hohenzollern. The count, however, appeared somewhat doubtful as to whether this solution would prove a settlement of the difference with France. He told Lord Augustus Loftus that the extreme moderation evinced by the king of Prussia under the menacing tone of the French government, and the courteous reception by his Majesty of Count Benedetti at Ems, after the severe language held to Prussia both officially and in the French press, was producing throughout Prussia general indignation. He had that morning, he said, received telegrams from Bremen, Königsberg, and other places, expressing strong disapprobation of the conciliatory course pursued by the king of Prussia at Ems, and requiring that the honour of the country should not be sacrificed.

The count then expressed a wish that the English government should take some opportunity, possibly by a declaration in Parliament, of expressing their satisfaction at the solution of the Spanish difficulty by the spontaneous act of Prince Leopold, and of bearing public testimony to the calm and wise moderation of the king of Prussia, his government, and of the public press. He adverted to the declaration made by the Duc de Grammont to the Corps Législatif, "that the powers of Europe had recognized the just grounds of France in the demand addressed to the Prussian government;" and he was, therefore, anxious that some public testimony should be given that the powers who had used their "bons offices" to urge on the Prussian government a renunciation by Prince Leopold, should likewise express their appreciation of the

peaceful and conciliatory disposition manifested by the king of Prussia. He added that intelligence had been received from Paris (though not officially from Baron Werther), to the effect that the solution of the Spanish difficulty would not suffice to content the French government, and that other claims would be advanced. If such were the case, he said, it was evident that the question of the succession to the Spanish throne was but a mere pretext, and that the real object of France was to seek a revenge for Königgratz.

The feeling of the German nation, said Count von Bismarck, was that they were fully equal to cope with France, and they were as confident as the French might be of military success. The conviction, therefore, in Prussia and in Germany was, that they should accept no humiliation or insult from France, and that, if unjustly provoked, they should accept the combat. But, said he, we do not wish for war, and we have proved, and shall continue to prove, our peaceful disposition; at the same time we cannot allow the French to have the start of us as regards armaments. He had, said he, positive information that military preparations had been made, and were making, in France for war. Large stores of munition were being concentrated, large purchases of hay and other materials necessary for a campaign being made, and horses rapidly collected. If these continued, they should be obliged to ask the French government for explanations as to their object and meaning. After what had occurred they would be compelled to require some assurance, some guarantee, that they would not be subjected to a sudden attack; and must know that this Spanish difficulty once removed, there were no other lurking designs which might burst upon them like a thunderstorm.

The count further stated that unless some such assurance were given by France to the European powers, or in an official form, that the present solution of the Spanish question was a final and satisfactory settlement of the French demands, and that no further claims would be raised; and if, further, a withdrawal or a satisfactory explanation of the menacing language held by the Duc de Gramont were not made, the Prussian government would be obliged to seek explanations from France. It was impossible, he said, that Prussia could rest, tamely and quietly, under the affront offered to the king and to the nation by the insulting language of the French

government. He could not, he said, hold communication with the French ambassador after the menaces addressed to Prussia by the French minister for Foreign Affairs in the face of Europe. In communicating these views to Lord Granville, Lord Augustus Loftus said he would perceive that unless some timely counsel, or friendly hand, could intervene to appease the irritation between the two governments, the breach, in lieu of being closed by the solution of the Spanish difficulty, was likely to become wider. It was evident to him, he said, that Count von Bismarck and the Prussian ministry regretted the courteous attitude and moderation shown by the king towards Count Benedetti, thinking that after the menacing language used in France with regard to Prussia he ought not to have received him at all; and in view of the public opinion of Germany, they felt the necessity of taking some decided measures for the safeguard and honour of the nation. The only means, he thought, which could pacify the wounded pride of the German nation, and restore confidence in the maintenance of peace, would be a declaration of the French government that the incident of the Spanish difficulty had been satisfactorily adjusted; and in rendering justice to the moderate and peaceful disposition of the king of Prussia and his government, a formal statement that the good relations existing between the two states were not likely to be again exposed to any disturbance. He greatly feared that if no mediating influences could be successfully brought to bear on the French government to appease the irritation against Prussia, and to counsel moderation, war would be inevitable.

These views from Prussia were communicated to the English Foreign Office on 13th July, but did not reach there until the 15th. As previously stated, on the previous day, 14th July, Lord Granville had telegraphed to Berlin, and recommended the king of Prussia to communicate to France his consent to Prince Leopold's renunciation, if, on her part, France would withdraw her demand of a guarantee for the future. The suggestion was declined; and Count von Bismarck expressed his regret that her Majesty's government should have made a proposal which it would be impossible for him to recommend to the king for his acceptance. In justification of the reasonableness of the plan suggested by the English government it should, however, be stated, that when the

facts became rightly known it transpired that, in his communication with M. Benedetti at Ems on the previous day, as described in the preceding chapter, the king had himself voluntarily taken the identical course they recommended. When declining the suggestion, Count von Bismarck told Lord Augustus Loftus that Prussia had shown, under a public menace from France, a calmness and moderation which would render further concession on her part equivalent to a submission to the arbitrary will of her rival, and would be viewed as a humiliation which the national feeling throughout Germany would certainly repudiate. Under the irritation caused by the menaces of France, the whole of Germany had arrived at the conclusion that war, even under the most difficult circumstances, would be preferable to the submission of their king to any further demands. The Prussian government, as such, had nothing to do with the acceptance of the candidature of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern, and had not even been cognizant of it. They could not, therefore, balance their assent to such acceptance by their assent to its withdrawal. A demand for interference on the part of a sovereign in a matter of purely private character could not, they considered, be made the subject of public communication between governments; and as the original pretext for such a demand was to be found in the candidature itself, it could no longer be necessary now that the candidature had been renounced.

The fatal telegram, detailing the supposed insult to the French ambassador at Ems, arrived in Paris on July 13, and in a despatch sent on the following day Lord Lyons thus reported the change which immediately occurred in public feeling:—

“PARIS, *July 14, 1870.*

“My Lord,—In my despatch of yesterday I communicated to your lordship the account given to me by the Duc de Gramont of the state of the question regarding the acceptance of the crown of Spain by Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern, and the recent withdrawal of that acceptance.

“My despatch was sent off at the usual hour, 7 o'clock in the evening. During the early part of the night which followed, the hope that it might yet be possible to preserve peace gained some strength. It was understood that the renunciation of his pretensions by Prince Leopold himself had come to confirm that made on his

behalf by his father, and that the Spanish government had formally declared to the government of France that the candidature of the prince was at an end. The language of influential members of the cabinet was more pacific, and it was thought possible that some conciliatory intelligence might arrive from Prussia, and enable the government to pronounce the whole question to be at an end.

"But in the morning all was changed. A telegram was received from the French chargé d'affaires at Berlin, stating that an article had appeared in the Prussian ministerial organ, the *North German Gazette*, to the effect that the French ambassador had requested the king to promise never to allow a Hohenzollern to be a candidate for the throne of Spain, and that his Majesty had thereupon refused to receive the ambassador, and sent him word by an aide-de-camp that he had nothing more to say to him.

"The intelligence of the publication of this article completely changed the view taken by the French government of the state of the question. The emperor came into Paris from St. Cloud, and held a council at the Tuileries; and it was considered certain that a declaration hostile to Prussia would be addressed at once by the government to the Chambers.

"I made every possible endeavour to see the Duc de Gramont, but was unable to do so. I sent him, however, a most pressing message by the chief of his cabinet, begging him, in the name of her Majesty's government, not to rush precipitately into extreme measures, and, at all events, not to commit the government by a premature declaration to the Chambers. It would, I represented, be more prudent, and at the same time more dignified, to postpone addressing the Chambers at least until the time originally fixed—that is to say, until to-morrow.

"In the meantime, although the news of the appearance of the article in the *North German Gazette* had not become generally known, the public excitement was so great, and so much irritation existed in the army, that it became doubtful whether the government could withstand the cry for war, even if it were able to announce a decided diplomatic success. It was felt that when the Prussian article appeared in the Paris evening papers it would be very difficult to restrain the anger of the people, and it was generally thought that the government would feel bound to appease

the public impatience by formally declaring its intention to resent the conduct of Prussia.

"The sittings of the Legislative Body and the Senate have, however, passed over without any communication being made on the subject, and thus no irretrievable step has yet been taken by the government.

"I cannot, however, venture to give your lordship any hope that war will now be avoided. I shall continue to do all that is possible, in the name of her Majesty's government, to avert this great calamity; but I am bound to say that there is the most serious reason to apprehend that an announcement nearly equivalent to a declaration of war will be made in the Chambers to-morrow.

I have, &c., "LYONS."

The next day M. Ollivier made, in the Corps Législatif, a statement equivalent to a declaration of war; and shortly afterwards Lord Lyons had another interview with the Duc de Gramont, when the latter desired him to express to the British government the thanks of the government of the emperor for the friendly endeavours which they had made to effect a satisfactory solution of the question with Prussia. The good offices of her Majesty's ministers had, however, he said, been made of no effect by the last acts of the Prussian government, who had deliberately insulted France by declaring to the public that the king had affronted the French ambassador. It was evidently the intention of the government of Prussia to take credit with the people of Germany for having acted with haughtiness and discourtesy, to humiliate France. Not only had the statement so offensive to France been published by the government in its accredited newspaper, but it had been communicated officially by telegraph to the Prussian agents throughout Europe. Until this had been done, the duke said, the negotiation had been particularly private. It had, from the peculiar circumstances of the case, been carried on directly with the king of Prussia. The Prussian minister for foreign affairs, Count von Bismarck, had been in the country, and it had been impossible to approach him. The acting minister, Herr von Thiele, professed to know nothing of the subject, and to consider it as a matter concerning, not the Prussian government, but the king personally. Although the distinction was not in principle admissible, still it obliged France to treat with the king directly, and



the French ambassador had been sent to wait upon his Majesty at Ems. The negotiation had not proceeded satisfactorily, but so long as it remained private there were hopes of bringing it to a satisfactory conclusion. Nor, indeed, had the king really treated M. Benedetti with the rough discourtesy which had been boasted of by the Prussian government. But that government had now chosen to declare to Germany and to Europe, that France had been affronted in the person of her ambassador. It was this boast which was the *gravamen* of the offence. It constituted an insult which no nation of any spirit could brook, and rendered it, much to the regret of the French government, impossible to take into consideration the mode of settling the original matter in dispute which was recommended by the English cabinet.

Lord Lyons having, at Lord Granville's request, called the attention of the duke to the statement made by him in the Chamber, that all the cabinets to whom he had applied had appeared to admit that the complaints of France were legitimate; the duke affirmed that he certainly intended to include the government of Great Britain in the statement, and that he must confess he still thought that he was perfectly justified in doing so. In fact, he said, the friendly efforts made, under Lord Granville's instructions, by her Majesty's minister at Madrid to get the candidature of Prince Leopold set aside, and the representations made for the same purpose by her Majesty's government in other countries, surely indicated that they considered that France had reason to complain of the selection of this prince, and the circumstances which had attended it.

Lord Lyons reminded the duke that the English government had throughout carefully abstained from admitting that this matter was sufficient to warrant a resort to extreme measures: to which he replied, that neither did his statement in the Chamber imply that the governments to which he alluded had made any such admission. The statement had been made at a comparatively early stage of the negotiation, and before the insult which had rendered extreme measures necessary. Finally, he said, he knew the English way of proceeding, and was aware that the English detested war, and therefore were not disposed to look favourably upon those who were the first to commence hostilities. Still, he trusted that France would not lose the sympathy of England. Lord Lyons said that if her Majesty's

government had not been able to take exactly the same view of this unhappy dispute as the government of the emperor, he thought that they had, nevertheless, given most substantial proofs of friendship in the earnest endeavours they had made to obtain satisfaction for France. He could not deny that her Majesty's government had reason to feel disappointed, not to say hurt. They had been led to believe that the withdrawal of the prince of Hohenzollern from all pretensions to the crown of Spain was all that France desired. They had exerted themselves to the utmost to obtain this, and were then told that France required more. However this might be, there was, he said in conclusion, most certainly no diminution of the friendly feeling which had now for so many years existed between the two governments and the two nations.

As a last resource, on 15th July Lord Granville wrote simultaneously to the English ambassadors at Paris and Berlin, expressing his deep regret that the breaking out of war between the two countries seemed imminent. But being anxious not to neglect the slightest chance of averting it, the English government appealed to the twenty-third protocol of the conferences held at Paris in the year 1856, in which "*Les plénipotentiaires n'hésitent pas à exprimer, au nom de leurs gouvernements, le vœu que les états entre lesquels s'élèverait un dissentiment sérieux, avant d'en appeler aux armes, eussent recours, en tant que les circonstances admettraient, aux bons offices d'une puissance amie.*" ["The plenipotentiaries do not hesitate to express, in the name of their governments, their strong desire that states between which any serious difference may arise, before appealing to arms, should have recourse, so far as circumstances will admit, to the good offices of a friendly power."] And they felt themselves the more warranted in doing so, inasmuch as the question in regard to which the two powers were at issue had been brought within narrow limits.

Her Majesty's government, therefore, suggested to France and to Prussia, in identical terms, that before proceeding to extremities they should have recourse to the good offices of some friendly power or powers acceptable to both; the English government being ready to take any part which might be desired in the matter.

This well-intentioned effort on the part of England was decisively but courteously rejected by

both countries. M. de Gramont thanked the English government for the sentiment which had prompted the step, but said he must recall to their mind that in recording their wish in the protocols, the Congress of Paris did not profess to impose it in an imperative manner on the powers, which alone remained the judges of the requirements of their honour and their interests. This was expressly laid down by Lord Clarendon, after the observations offered by the Austrian plenipotentiary. However disposed they might be to accept the good offices of a friendly power, and especially England, France could not now accede to the offer of the cabinet of London. In face of the refusal of the king of Prussia to give the French government the guarantees which his policy had forced them to demand, in order to prevent the recurrence of dynastic aims dangerous to their security, and of the offence which the cabinet of Berlin had added to this refusal, the care of the dignity of France allowed no other course. At the eve of a rupture which the kind efforts of friendly powers had been unable to avert, public opinion in England would, he believed, recognize that under the circumstances the emperor's government had no longer a choice in its decisions. On the other hand, Count Bismarck said, the king of Prussia's sincere love of peace, which no one had had a better opportunity of knowing than the English government, rendered him at all times disposed to accept any negotiation which had for its object to secure peace on a basis acceptable to the honour and national convictions of Germany; but the possibility of entering into a negotiation of this nature could only be acquired by a previous assurance of the willingness of France to enter into it also. France took the initiative in the direction of war, and adhered to it after the first complication had, in the opinion even of England, been settled by the removal of its cause. If Prussia were now to take the initiative in negotiating, it would be misunderstood by the national feelings of Germany, excited as they had been by the menaces of France.

In addition to the unceasing efforts of England for the preservation of peace, endeavours in the same direction were made by Russia, Austria, and Italy. Count Beust, the Austrian minister, also told Lord Bloomfield, our ambassador at Vienna, that perhaps no one was better able to judge of the state of feeling in the South German

states than himself; and he was convinced that if France counted on the sympathies of those states, she would make a great mistake. With a view, therefore, to discourage her from looking to anything like support from that quarter, he had thought it well, in the interests of peace, to bring this conviction to her knowledge.

War having thus been actually brought about, notwithstanding all they had done to avert it, the English government turned their attention to securing the rights of neutrals. Renewed assurances that the neutrality of Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland would be respected were given by both France and Prussia. Time was also requested for neutral vessels, and protection for neutral property; and both powers at once conceded everything on those points that could, with good grace, be asked. French vessels which were in German ports at the beginning of the war, or which entered such ports subsequently, before being informed of the outbreak, were allowed to remain six weeks, reckoned from the outbreak of the war, and to take in their cargoes, or to unload them. In France the period allowed was thirty days. They were provided with safe-conducts to enable them to return freely to their ports, or to proceed direct to their destination. Vessels which had shipped cargoes for France, and on account of French subjects, in enemy's or neutral ports previously to the declaration of war, were declared to be not liable to capture, but were allowed to land freely their cargoes in ports of the empire, and to receive safe-conducts to return to the ports to which they belonged. The French government, however, declined to extend to the enemy's vessels, with neutral cargoes, the same privileges granted to them with French cargoes. It was also agreed that the following stipulations, agreed to at the treaty of Paris in 1856, should be recognized by both countries during the war:—

1. Privateering is, and remains, abolished.
2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war.
3. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under enemy's flag.
4. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective, that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy.

On 19th July a proclamation of strict neu-

trality was issued by the English government, in which the queen's subjects were expressly forbidden to equip or arm any vessel for the use of either belligerent, and warning all who should attempt to break any blockade lawfully established that they would rightfully be liable to hostile capture, and the penalties awarded by the law of nations in that respect, and would obtain no protection whatever from the government.

A notification was also issued from the Foreign Office, stating that no ship of war, of either belligerent, would be permitted to take in any supplies at any port in the United Kingdom or her colonies, except provisions and such other things as might be requisite for the subsistence of her crew, and only sufficient coal to carry such vessel to the nearest port of her own country, or to some nearer destination. All ships of war were prohibited from making use of any port or roadstead in the United Kingdom, or her colonial possessions, as a station or resort for any warlike purpose; and no vessel of war was to be permitted to leave any port she might have entered for necessary supplies, from which any vessel of the other belligerent (whether the same were a ship of war or a merchant ship) should have left at least twenty-four hours.

As an additional proof of the sincerity of their desire to remain thoroughly neutral during the struggle, and to prevent the possibility of any justifiable complaint from either belligerent, the government introduced and carried a new Foreign Enlistment Act, which went far beyond any law ever before passed in any country for the purpose of enforcing neutrality, and involved a total revolution in the ideas of English statesmen with regard to the duties of neutrals. The chief provisions of the Act are, that a penalty of fine and imprisonment, or both, at the discretion of the court, may be imposed for enlistment in the military or naval service of any foreign state at war with any state at peace with her Majesty, or inducing any other person to accept such service. Similar penalties are imposed for leaving her Majesty's dominions with intent to serve a foreign state, or for embarking persons under false representations as to service. Any master or owner of a ship who knowingly receives on board his ship, within her Majesty's dominions, any person illegally enlisted under any of the circumstances above described, is made liable to fine and imprisonment; his ship may be detained till all the penalties have

been paid, or security given for them; and the illegally enlisted persons are to be taken on shore, and not allowed to return to the ship. The object of these latter clauses is, of course, to strike at the former practice of hiring men for an ostensibly peaceful and legal service, and afterwards, with or without their connivance, employing them in a military or naval expedition.

But the most interesting and important division of the Act is that which relates to illegal ship-building and illegal expeditions. As in the previous Act, it is declared to be an offence to commission, equip, or despatch any ship with intent or knowledge, or having reasonable cause to believe, that the same will be employed in the military or naval service of any foreign state at war with any friendly state. The offender is punishable by fine and imprisonment; and the ship, in respect of which any such offence is committed, with the equipment, is to be held forfeited to her Majesty. But over and above this the new Act embodies a provision, making the building of a vessel under such circumstances an offence in itself; and what is more, the onus of disproof lies with the builder:—"Where any ship is built by order of or on behalf of any foreign state at war with a friendly state, or is delivered to or to the order of such foreign state, or any agent of such state, or is paid for by such foreign state or their agent, and is employed in the military or naval service of such state, such ship shall, until the contrary is proved, be deemed to have been built with a view to being so employed, and the burden shall lie on the builder of such ship of proving that he did not know that the ship was intended to be so employed in the military or naval service of such foreign state." Further, it is declared an offence to augment the warlike force of any ship for the use of a belligerent. These clauses are intended to check the practice adopted during the American war of building or fitting out a vessel in this country and then sending her either out to sea, or to some other neutral port, to take on board an armament sent to meet her in some other ship. No distinction of this kind as to time or place will, under the new Act, suffice to elude the law. The mere building of a ship with the intent or knowledge that it is afterwards to be equipped and used for purposes of war against a state with whom we are at peace, is ranked as an offence, quite apart from the actual

equipment and despatch of the ship for this purpose. The defects of the law were strikingly illustrated by the two cases of the *Alabama* and the rams. While the former escaped, because the authorities had not authority to seize her, even though her intended use and destination were perfectly notorious, in the other instance the government took the law into their own hands, and arbitrarily seized the rams on their own responsibility. The law is now sufficient to meet all cases of this description, and to spare the authorities any necessity of straining it, in order to discharge the obligations of a neutral. This branch of the measure is completed by two other clauses, enacting that illegal ships shall not be received in British ports, and making it an offence, punishable with fine and imprisonment, to prepare or fit out, or in any way assist in preparing, any naval or military expedition to proceed against the dominions of a friendly state; all ships forming part of such an expedition being forfeited to the crown.

The remaining clauses of the Act relate to the legal procedure in regard to the offences described, the courts which are to try cases, the officers authorized to seize offending ships, &c. A special power is given to the secretary of state, or chief executive authority, to issue a warrant to detain a ship, if "satisfied that there is a reasonable and

probable cause for believing" that it is being built, equipped, or despatched for an illegal purpose. The owner of a ship so detained may apply to the Court of Admiralty for its release, and if he can show that the ship was not intended for the use suspected it will be restored to him. If he fails in this proof the secretary of state will be at liberty to detain the vessel as long as he pleases; the court having, however, a discretionary power to release the vessel on the owner giving security that it shall not be employed contrary to the Act. If there has been no reasonable cause for detention, the owner will be entitled to an indemnity to be assessed by the court. The "local authority" may also detain a suspected ship until reference can be made to the secretary of state or chief executive authority. The secretary of state may issue a search warrant in any dockyard in the queen's dominions, and he is to be held free from legal proceedings in connection with any warrant he may issue, and is not bound to give evidence as a witness except with his own consent. The decision of the important question whether a ship is or is not rightly suspected, is withdrawn from the cognizance of a jury and submitted to the consideration of a judge, so that there can be none of those failures of justice which formerly took place in consequence of the misdirected patriotism of juries.



## CHAPTER III.

Important Statement of the French Emperor—He declares that he neither expected nor was prepared for War, but that France had slipped out of his hands—A thoroughly National War—His Version of a very important conversation with Count von Bismarck—Publication of a Proposed Secret Treaty between France and Prussia, by which France was to acquire Luxemburg by purchase and conquer Belgium with the Assistance of Prussia, on Condition of not interfering with the Plans of Prussia in Germany—Great Excitement on the Subject in England and Belgium—Statements of the English Government in both Houses of Parliament—Manly Speech of Mr. Disraeli—Letter from M. Ollivier, the Head of the French Government, repudiating the Treaty—General State of Feeling on the Question in France—Explanation of the *Journal Officiel*—The Prussian Version of the Transaction—Other Propositions of a Similar Nature made by France to Prussia divulged, including an offer of 300,000 men to assist in a War against Austria, in return for the Rhenish Provinces—Continued Efforts of France to “lead Prussia into Temptation”—Count von Bismarck’s Reasons for not divulging the Proposals at the time they were made—Explanation of M. Benedetti, the Proposer of the Secret Treaty—He states that it was well known that Prussia offered to assist France in acquiring Belgium in return for her own Aggrandisement—Such Overtures persistently declined by the French Government—The Secret Treaty written at the Dictation of Count von Bismarck—The Proposals rejected by the French Emperor as soon as they came to his Knowledge—Count von Bismarck’s only Reason for publishing them must have been to mislead Public Opinion—French Official Explanation on the same Subject from the Duc de Gramont—The idea of France appropriating Belgium a purely Prussian one, to avert Attention from the Rhine Provinces—Offer of Prussian Assistance to accomplish it—The Emperor steadily refused to entertain the Idea—Emphatic Denial that France intended to offer to conclude Peace on the Basis of the Secret Treaty if it had not been published—Proposals made by France to Prussia through Lord Clarendon to reduce their Armaments—The Proposition rejected by the King of Prussia—Further Proofs adduced by Prussia against France—Anxiety in England—Action taken by the Government—£2,000,000 and 20,000 men enthusiastically voted by the House of Commons—Great Debate on the whole Matter—Mr. Disraeli stigmatises the Pretext for War as “Disgraceful,” and Proposes an Alliance with Russia—Guarded Statement of Mr. Gladstone—Dissatisfaction at it in the House—Spirited Speech of Lord Russell in the House of Lords in Favour of supporting Belgium at all Cost—Reassuring reply of Lord Granville—Important Statements in both Houses of Parliament by the Government as to the Course they had adopted, and Comments thereon—The Complete Text of New Treaty agreed on to preserve the Neutrality of Belgium—Feeling of Reassurance in England—Altered State of Feeling in Austria towards France—Biographical Notices of Count von Bismarck and M. Benedetti.

In the two preceding chapters the circumstances connected with the war have been consecutively described from the 5th July, when the first official announcement of Prince Leopold’s candidature reached England and France, to the 23rd July—a week subsequent to the actual declaration of war by France. Immediately this event took place, both countries commenced massing troops on their respective frontiers, and were so engaged for the next fortnight. Only a few slight skirmishes, however, took place between the reconnoitring parties of the two armies; and before proceeding to describe the more stirring events of the contest, we must, in order to continue the narrative of events consecutively, devote a chapter to the now celebrated “Secret Treaty”—a document which for a time excited even more interest in England than the war itself, and which led to some important steps being adopted by the British Parliament.

Simultaneously with the publication of the Treaty (Monday, 25th July) another communication was published, which would doubtless have created much more attention than it did had it not been that everything else was, for a time, to a great

extent overlooked. We, however, reproduce it here, before describing the treaty, and shall then have no further cause to refer to it. It was an account of an interview with the Emperor Napoleon, in the previous week, and was inserted in the *Daily Telegraph* newspaper under the signature of “An Englishman,” who said he had his Majesty’s free consent to its publication. It stated that the emperor, after speaking upon some private matters, turned suddenly to the political situation of France and of Europe. He said: “One fortnight before the utterance of the Duc de Gramont in the Corps Législatif—which utterance has, as it seems to me, been so unjustly reflected upon by the English press—I had no notion that war was at hand, nor am I, even at this moment, by any means prepared for it. I trusted that, when the Duc de Gramont had set me straight with France by speaking manfully in public as to the Hohenzollern candidature, I should be able so to manipulate and handle the controversy as to make peace certain. But France has slipped out of my hand. I cannot rule unless I lead. This is the most national war that in my time France has undertaken, and I have no choice but to advance at the head of a public opinion

which I can neither stem nor check. In addition, Count von Bismarck, although a very clever man, wants too much, and wants it too quick. After the victory of Prussia in 1866, I reminded him that but for the friendly and self-denying neutrality of France he could never have achieved such marvels. I pointed out to him that I had never moved a French soldier near to the Rhine frontier during the continuance of the German war. I quoted to him from his own letter in which he thanked me for my abstinence, and said that he had left neither a Prussian gun nor a Prussian soldier upon the Rhine, but had thrown Prussia's whole and undivided strength against Austria and her allies. I told him that, as some slight return for my friendly inactivity, I thought that he might surrender Luxemburg, and one or two other little towns which gravely menace our frontier, to France. I added that in this way he would, by a trifling sacrifice, easily forgotten by Prussia in view of her enormous successes and acquisitions, pacify the French nation, whose jealousies it was so easy to arouse, so difficult to disarm.

"Count von Bismarck replied to me, after some delay, 'Not one foot of territory, whether Prussian or neutral, can I resign. But, perhaps, if I were to make further acquisitions, I could make some concessions. How, for instance, if I were to take Holland? What would France want as a sop for Holland?'

"I replied," said the emperor, "that if he attempted to take Holland, it meant war with France; and there the conversation, in which Count von Bismarck and M. de Benedetti were the interlocutors, came to an end."

The only notice of importance which was taken of this document was in a debate in the House of Lords, in which Lord Malmsbury said he knew the writer (Honourable F. Lawley) was worthy of all credence, and in the official *North German Gazette*, which admitted the truth of the description of the conversation between Count von Bismarck and the emperor down to the word "resign," but said the remainder of the statement (that concerning Holland) was altogether fictitious.

On the same day (25th July) as this document appeared in the *Daily Telegraph*, the *Times* startled the world by publishing the "Draft of a Secret Project of Alliance, Offensive and Defensive, between France and Prussia," which, on account of its importance, and the results to which it led, we

give both in the original French, and also in an English version. The only variations from the text of the actual proposed treaty, and the copy of it published in the *Times*, are indicated by italics and brackets.

#### PROPOSED TREATY BETWEEN FRANCE AND PRUSSIA.

Sa Majesté le roi de Prusse et sa Majesté l'empereur des Français jugeant utile de resserrer les liens d'amitié qui les unissent et de consolider les rapports de bon voisinage heureusement existant entre les deux pays, convaincus d'autre part que pour atteindre ce résultat, propre d'ailleurs à assurer le maintien de la paix générale, il leur importe de s'entendre sur des questions qui intéressent leurs relations futures, ont résolu de conclure un traité à cet effet, et nommé en conséquence pour leurs plénipotentiaires, &c., savoir:

Sa Majesté, &c.;

Sa Majesté, &c.;

Lesquels, après avoir échangé leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des articles suivants:—

*Article I.*—Sa Majesté l'empereur des Français admet et reconnaît les acquisitions que la Prusse a faites à la suite de la dernière guerre qu'elle a soutenue contre l'Autriche et contre ses alliés [*ainsi que les arrangements pris ou à prendre pour la constitution d'une Confédération dans l'Allemagne du Nord, s'engageant en même temps à prêter son appui à la conservation de cette œuvre*].

*Article II.*—Sa Majesté le roi de Prusse promet de faciliter à la France l'acquisition du Luxemburg; à cet effet la dite Majesté entrera en négociations avec sa Majesté le roi des Pays-Bas pour le déterminer à faire, à l'empereur des Français, la cession de ses droits souverains sur ce duché, moyennant telle compensation qui sera jugée suffisante ou autrement. De son côté l'empereur des Français s'engage à assumer les charges pécuniaires que cette transaction peut comporter. [*Pour faciliter cette transaction, l'empereur des Français, de son côté, s'engage à assumer accessoirement les charges pécuniaires qu'elle pourrait comporter.*]

*Article III.*—Sa Majesté l'empereur des Français ne s'opposera pas à une union fédérale de la Confédération du Nord avec les états du midi de l'Allemagne, à l'exception de l'Autriche, laquelle union pourra être basée sur un Parlement commun, tout en respectant, dans une juste mesure, la souveraineté des dits états.

*Article IV.*—De son côté, sa Majesté le roi de Prusse, au cas où sa Majesté l'empereur des Français serait amené par les circonstances à faire entrer ses troupes en Belgique ou à la conquérir, accordera le secours [*concours*] de ses armes à la France, et il la soutiendra avec toutes ses forces de terre et de mer, envers et contre toute puissance qui, dans cette éventualité, lui déclarerait la guerre.

*Article V.*—Pour assurer l'entière exécution des dispositions qui précèdent, sa Majesté le roi de Prusse et sa Majesté l'empereur des Français contractent, par le présent traité, une alliance offensive et défensive qu'ils s'engagent solennellement à maintenir. Leurs Majestés s'obligent, en outre et notamment, à l'observer dans tous les cas où leurs états respectifs, dont elles se garantissent mutuellement l'intégrité, seraient menacés d'une agression, se tenant pour liées, en pareille conjoncture, de prendre sans retard, et de ne décliner sous aucun prétexte, les arrangements militaires qui seraient commandés par leur intérêt commun conformément aux clauses et prévisions ci-dessus énoncées.

## TRANSLATION.

His Majesty the king of Prussia and his Majesty the emperor of the French, deeming it useful to draw closer the bonds of friendship which unite them, and to consolidate the relations of good neighbourhood happily existing between the two countries, and being convinced, on the other hand, that to attain this result, which is calculated besides to assure the maintenance of the general peace, it behoves them to come to an understanding on questions which concern their future relations, have resolved to conclude a treaty to this effect, and named in consequence as their plenipotentiaries, that is to say,

His Majesty, &c.;

His Majesty, &c.;

Who, having exchanged their full powers, found to be in good and proper form, have agreed upon the following articles:—

*Article I.*—His Majesty the emperor of the French admits and recognizes the acquisitions which Prussia has made as the result of the last war which she sustained against Austria and her allies [*as also the arrangements adopted or to be adopted for constituting a Confederation in North Germany, engaging, at the same time, to render his support for the maintenance of that work*].

*Article II.*—His Majesty the king of Prussia

promises to facilitate the acquisition of Luxemburg by France: to that effect his aforesaid Majesty will enter into negotiations with his Majesty the king of the Netherlands, to induce him to cede to the emperor of the French his sovereign rights over that duchy, in return for such compensation as shall be deemed sufficient or otherwise. On his part, the emperor of the French engages to bear the pecuniary charges which this arrangement may involve. [*In order to facilitate this arrangement, the emperor of the French engages, on his part, to bear accessorially the pecuniary charges which it may involve.*]

*Article III.*—His Majesty the emperor of the French will not oppose a federal union of the Confederation of the North with the southern states of Germany, with the exception of Austria, which union may be based on a common Parliament, the sovereignty of the said states being duly respected.

*Article IV.*—On his part his Majesty the king of Prussia, in case his Majesty the emperor of the French should be obliged by circumstances to cause his troops to enter Belgium, or to conquer it, will grant the succour [*co-operation*] of his arms to France, and will sustain her with all his forces of land and sea against every power which, in that eventuality, should declare war upon her.

*Article V.*—To insure the complete execution of the above arrangements, his Majesty the king of Prussia and his Majesty the emperor of the French contract, by the present treaty, an alliance offensive and defensive, which they solemnly engage to maintain. Their Majesties engage moreover, and specifically, to observe it in every case in which their respective states, of which they mutually guarantee the integrity, should be menaced by aggression, holding themselves bound in such a conjuncture to make without delay, and not to decline on any pretext, the military arrangements which may be demanded by their common interest, conformably to the clauses and provisions above set forth.

This treaty had, of course, been supplied to the *Times* by the Prussian government; and in its comments on the matter in a leading article—evidently written under inspiration—the great English journal stated that it was rejected at the time it was tendered, but that it had recently again been offered as a condition of peace. At all events, means had been taken to let it be understood that the old project was open, and that a ready acceptance of it would save Prussia

from attack. The suggestion had not, however, been favourably received; on the contrary, matters had, as was well known, been so far advanced that it was impossible to arrest the progress of the war by a *coup de théâtre*.

As will be readily understood, the publication of this document caused the greatest sensation, not only in England, but on the Continent, and especially in Belgium. England was, of course, most deeply interested, because by the treaty of 1839 she, in common with France, Prussia, and other great powers, had guaranteed the independence of the Belgian kingdom. The subject formed the sole topic of conversation in the city during the day, and had a considerable effect on the stock markets, producing a fall both in consols and foreign securities. The excitement at the meeting of the House of Commons in the afternoon was so great, that an octogenarian member said he remembered no more stirring spectacle since 1815. Questions were addressed to the government in both Houses, but they replied that they could give no information as to the source from which the *Times* had obtained the document. They were, however, convinced that, after the announcement of the existence of such a draft treaty, both the governments of France and Prussia would immediately and spontaneously give an explanation to Europe of the matter. In prefacing his question in the House of Commons, Mr. Disraeli, the leader of the opposition, said, amidst loud and general cheering, that the policy indicated in the treaty was one which England had never approved, and never could approve. He should look upon the extinction of Belgium as a calamity to Europe and an injury to England, and therefore he trusted such an attempt would not be made; but if it were, the engagements into which England had entered with respect to that kingdom would demand the gravest consideration. An increase of distrust was observable in all the markets in the city on the following day, the observations in both Houses of Parliament having coincided with the feeling previously entertained as to the gravity of the disclosure regarding the treaty. At the same time, however, there was an augmented sense among all the mercantile classes of the importance of maintaining a strict neutrality.

The same day M. Emile Ollivier, the head of the French government, sent the following letter to a friend in England, evidently with a view to publication:—

“PARIS, July 26, 1870.

“My dear Friend,—How could you believe there was any truth in the treaty the *Times* has published? I assure you that the cabinet of the 2nd of January never negotiated or concluded anything of the kind with Prussia.

“I will even tell you that it has negotiated nothing at all with her. The only negotiations that have existed between us have been indirect, confidential, and had Lord Clarendon for their intermediary. Since Mr. Gladstone slightly raised the veil in one of his speeches, we may allow ourselves to say that the object of those negotiations, so honourable to Lord Clarendon, was to assure the peace of Europe by a reciprocal disarmament. You will admit that this does not much resemble the conduct of ministers who seek a pretext for war.

“You know the value I set upon the confidence and friendship of the great English nation. The union of the two countries has always seemed to me the most essential condition of the world's progress. And for that reason I earnestly beg you to contradict all those false reports spread by persons who have an interest in dividing us.

“We have no secret policy hidden behind our avowed policy. Our policy is single, public, loyal, without after thoughts (*arrières pensées*); we do not belong to the school of those who think force is superior to right; we believe, on the contrary, that good right will always prevail in the end; and it is because the right is on our side in the war now beginning, that with the help of God we reckon upon victory.

“Affectionate salutations from your servant,

(Signed)

“EMILE OLLIVIER.”

The excitement created in France was, however, by no means so great as in England. At first the authenticity of the document was boldly denied, but when this was no longer possible, people said, “Well, if it be true, where is the harm of it?” for the idea of annexing Belgium had more than once been broached in the numerous pamphlets which had been published from time to time, advocating a rectification of the French frontiers; and it was not seriously believed by scarcely one Frenchman in a hundred that England would go to war to prevent it. The first formal notice taken of the matter was on Wednesday, July 27, when the



*Journal Officiel* said, "After the treaty of Prague several negotiations passed at Berlin between Count von Bismarck and the French embassy on the subject of a scheme of alliance. Some of the ideas contained in the document inserted by the *Times* were raised, but the French government never had cognizance of a written project; and as to the proposals that may have been spoken of in these conversations, the Emperor Napoleon rejected them. No one will fail to see in whose interest, and with what object, it is now sought to mislead the public opinion of England."

The treaty was published in the Berlin journals the same day (July 27), accompanied with the statement that it had been submitted to Count von Bismarck by M. Benedetti, the French ambassador, and that the original, in his handwriting, was in the Berlin archives.

On the following day a long telegraphic despatch was forwarded to the Prussian ambassador in London, to be at once communicated to the English government, with a notification that a fuller account of the whole transaction in writing would be despatched forthwith. This latter document was received a few days after, in the shape of a circular to the North German representatives at the courts of neutral states; and as it contains the complete version of the Prussian side of the question, and is of great historical importance, we give it in full.

"BERLIN, July 29, 1870.

"The expectation expressed by Lord Granville and Mr. Gladstone in the British Parliament, that more exact information in reference to the draught treaty of M. Benedetti, would be furnished by the two powers concerned, was in a preliminary manner fulfilled on our side by the telegram which I addressed to Count Bernstorff on the 27th inst. The telegraphic form only enabled me to make a short statement, which I now complete in writing.

"The document published by the *Times* contains by no means the only proposition of a similar nature which has been made to us on the part of the French. Even before the Danish war, attempts, addressed to me, were made both by official and unofficial French agents to effect an alliance between France and Prussia, with the object of mutual aggrandizement. It is scarcely necessary for me to point out the impossibility of such a transaction for a German minister, whose position is dependent on his being in accord with the

national feeling; its explanation is to be found in the want of acquaintance of French statesmen with the fundamental conditions of existence among other nations. Had the agents of the Paris cabinet been competent to observe the state of German affairs, such an illusion would never have been entertained in Paris as that Prussia could permit herself to accept the aid of France in regulating German affairs.

"Your excellency is, of course, as well acquainted as I am myself with the ignorance of the French as regards Germany.

"The endeavours of the French government to carry out, with the assistance of Prussia, its covetous views with reference to Belgium and the Rhine frontier were brought to my notice even before 1862—therefore before my accession to the ministry of Foreign Affairs. I cannot regard it as my task to transfer such communications, which were purely of a personal nature, to the sphere of international negotiations; and I believe it will be best to withhold the most interesting contribution which I could make towards the elucidation of the matter from private letters and conversations.

"The above-mentioned tendencies of the French government were first recognizable by the external influence on European politics and the attitude favourable to us which France assumed in the Germano-Danish conflict. The subsequent bad feeling which France displayed towards us in reference to the Treaty of Gastein, was attributable to the apprehension lest a durable strengthening of the Prusso-Austrian alliance should deprive the Paris cabinet of the fruits of this its attitude. France before 1865 reckoned upon the outbreak of war between us and Austria, and again willingly made approaches to us as soon as our relations with Vienna began to be unfriendly. Before the outbreak of the Austrian war proposals were made to me, partly through relatives of his Majesty the emperor of the French, and partly by confidential agents, which each time had for their object smaller or larger transactions for the purpose of effecting mutual aggrandizement.

"At one time the negotiations were about Luxemburg, or about the frontier of 1814, with Landau and Saarlouis; at another, about larger objects, from which the French Swiss cantons and the question where the linguistic boundaries in Piedmont were to be drawn were not excluded.

"In May, 1866, these pretensions took the form of a proposition for an offensive and defensive alliance, and the following extract of its chief features is in my possession:—

"1. En cas de Congrès, poursuivre d'accord la cession de la Vénétie à l'Italie et l'annexion des Duchés à la Prusse. 2. Si le Congrès n'aboutit pas, alliance offensive et défensive. 3. Le roi de Prusse commencera les hostilités dans les 10 jours, la séparation du Congrès. 4. Si le Congrès ne se réunit pas, la Prusse attaquera dans 30 jours après la signature du présent traité. 5. L'empereur des Français déclarera la guerre à l'Autriche, dès que les hostilités seront commencées entre l'Autriche et la Prusse en 30 jours, 300,000. 6. On ne fera pas de paix séparée avec l'Autriche. 7. La paix se fera sous les conditions suivantes—La Vénétie à l'Italie, à la Prusse les territoires Allemands ci-dessous, 7 à 8 millions d'après au choix, plus la réforme fédérale dans le sens Prussien; pour la France, le territoire entre Moselle et Rhin, sans Coblenze et Mayence, comprenant 500,000 âmes de Prusse, la Bavière, rive gauche du Rhin, Birkenfeld, Homburg, Darmstadt, 213,000 âmes. 8. Convention militaire et maritime entre la France et la Prusse dès la signature. 9. (Adhésion du roi d'Italie.)"

[1. In the event of a Congress, to agree upon the cession of Venetia to Italy, and annexation of the duchies to Prussia. 2. If the Congress come to nothing, an alliance offensive and defensive to be concluded. 3. The king of Prussia to commence hostilities within ten days of the breaking up of the Congress. 4. Should the Congress not reassemble, Prussia to attack in thirty days after the signature to the present treaty. 5. The emperor of the French to declare war against Austria as soon as hostilities shall be commenced between Austria and Prussia, and in thirty days to have 300,000 men in the field. 6. No separate peace to be concluded with Austria. 7. Peace to be made under the following conditions—Venetia to be given to Italy, the German territories, with about seven or eight millions of inhabitants according to their choice, to go to Prussia, besides the prosecution of the Federal reform in the Prussian sense; for France the territory between the Moselle and Rhine, excepting Coblenz and Mainz, comprising 500,000 Prussians, Bavaria, left bank of the Rhine, Birkenfeld, Homburg, Darmstadt, with 213,000 inhabitants. 8. A military and

maritime convention between France and Prussia, dating from the signature. 9. The king of Italy's adhesion to be obtained.]

"The strength of the army with which the emperor, in accordance with Article 5, would assist us was in written explanations placed at 300,000 men; the number of souls comprised in the aggrandizements which France sought for was 1,800,000 souls, according to calculations which, however, did not agree with the actual statistics.

"Every one who is familiar with the secret diplomatic and military history of the year 1866 will see, glimmering through these clauses, the policy which France pursued simultaneously towards Italy (with whom she at the same time secretly negotiated), and subsequently towards Prussia and Italy.

"In June, 1866, after we had rejected the above scheme of alliance, notwithstanding several almost threatening warnings to accept it, the French government began to calculate on the Austrians being victorious over us, and upon our making a bid for French assistance after the eventuality of our defeat, to pave the way for which diplomatically French diplomacy was occupied to the uttermost. That the congress anticipated in the foregoing draught of alliance, and again proposed later, would have had the effect of causing our three months' alliance with Italy to expire without our having profited by it is well known to your excellency, as is also the fact that France, in the further agreements relative to Custozza, was busied in prejudicing our situation, and if possible bringing about our defeat. The patriotic affliction of the minister Rouher furnishes a comment upon the further course of events. Since that time France has not ceased leading us into temptation by offers at the cost of Germany and Belgium. I had never any doubt as to the impossibility of acceding to any such offers; but I considered it useful in the interests of peace to permit the French statesmen to hold these illusions peculiar to them, so long as it should be possible so to do without giving even a verbal assent to their propositions. I imagined that the annihilation of the French hopes would endanger the preservation of peace, the maintenance of which was in the interest both of Germany and Europe. I was not of the opinion of those politicians who considered it unadvisable to shun by all the means in one's power a war with France, on the ground that such a war was

in any case unavoidable. No one can so surely foresee the designs of Divine Providence; and I look upon even a victorious war as an evil in itself, which the statesmanship of a country must strive to spare its people.

"I could not in my calculations leave out the possibility that, in the constitution and policy of France changes might arise which would relieve the two great neighbouring peoples from the necessity of war—a hope which was favoured by each postponement of the rupture. For these reasons I was silent about the propositions made, and delayed the negotiations about them, without ever on my side giving a promise. After the negotiations with his Majesty the king of the Netherlands fell, as is well known, to the ground, extended proposals were again addressed to me by France, including in their purport Belgium and South Germany. At this conjuncture comes the communication of the Benedetti manuscript. That the French ambassador, without the consent of his sovereign, and on his own responsibility, drew up these propositions, handed them to me, and negotiated them, modifying them in certain places as I advised, is as unlikely as was the statement on another occasion that the Emperor Napoleon had not agreed to the demand for our surrendering Mayence, which was officially made to me in August, 1866, by the French ambassador, under threat of war in case of our refusal. The different phases of French bad feeling and lust for war which we have gone through from 1866 to 1869, coincided with tolerable exactness with the willingness or unwillingness for negotiations which the French agents believed they met with in me. In 1866, at the time when the Belgian Railway affair was being prepared, it was intimated to me by a high personage, who was not a stranger to the former negotiation, that in case of a French occupation of Belgium, '*nous trouverions notre Belgique ailleurs.*' Similarly, on another occasion, I had been given to understand that in a solution of the Eastern question France would seek its share, not in far-off places, but close upon its boundaries. I am under the impression that it was only the definite conviction that no enlargement of the frontiers was to be achieved with us, that has led the emperor to the determination to strive to obtain it against us. I have besides reason to believe that, had the publication in question not been made, so soon as our and the French pre-

parations for war were complete, propositions would have been made to us by France jointly, and at the head of a million armed men, to carry out against unarmed Europe the proposals formerly made to us, and either before or after the first battle to conclude peace on the basis of the Benedetti proposals, and at the expense of Belgium.

"Concerning the text of these proposals, I remark that the draught in our possession is from beginning to end from the hand of M. Benedetti, and written on the paper of the Imperial French Embassy; and that the ambassadors here, including the representatives of Austria, Great Britain, Russia, Baden, Bavaria, Belgium, Hesse, Italy, Saxony, Turkey, and Würtemberg, who have seen the original, have recognized the handwriting. In Article I. M. Benedetti, at the very first reading, withdrew the closing passage, placing it in brackets, after I had remarked that it presupposed the interference of France in the internal affairs of Germany, which I, even in private documents, could not allow. Of his own accord he made an unimportant marginal correction in Article II. in my presence. On the 24th inst. I informed Lord A. Loftus verbally of the existence of the document in question, and on his expressing doubts invited him to a personal inspection of the same. On the 27th of this month he took note of it, and convinced himself that it was in the handwriting of his former French colleague. If the imperial cabinet now repudiates attempts for which it has sought since 1864, both by promises and threats, to obtain our co-operation, this is easily to be explained in presence of the political situation.

"Your excellency will please read this despatch to M. —, and hand him a copy.

"VON BISMARCK."

The French side of the question is given in the following explanatory letter of M. Benedetti to the Duc de Gramont, and the latter's reply to the circular of Count Bismarck:—

"PARIS, *July 29, 1870.*

"M. le Duc,—Unjust as they were, I did not think it proper to notice the observations which were made upon me personally, when it was known in France that the prince of Hohenzollern had accepted the crown of Spain. As in duty bound, I left to the government of the emperor the task



of setting them right. I could not keep the same silence in face of the use which Count von Bismarck has made of a document to which he seeks to give a value which it never possessed, and I request your excellency's leave to re-establish the facts exactly as they occurred.

"It is a matter of public notoriety that Count von Bismarck offered us, before and during the last war, to assist in uniting Belgium to France, as a compensation for the aggrandizements of which he was ambitious, and which he obtained for Prussia. I might, on this point, appeal to the testimony of the entire diplomacy of Europe, to whom the whole affair was known.

"The government of the emperor constantly declined these overtures, and one of your predecessors, M. Drouyn de Lhuys, is in a position to give, on this subject, explanations which must remove every doubt. At the moment of the conclusion of the Peace of Prague, and in face of the emotion which was excited in France by the annexation to Prussia of Hanover, of Electoral Hesse, and of the town of Frankfort, Count von Bismarck again showed the strongest desire to re-establish the balance of power, which had been disturbed by these acquisitions. Various combinations having reference to the integrity of the states neighbours of France and Germany were put forward; they became the subject of several conversations, during which Count von Bismarck was always disposed to make his personal ideas prevail.

"In one of these conversations, and in order to give myself an exact idea of his combinations, I consented to transcribe them in a manner ("en quelque sorte") at his dictation. The form, no less than the substance, shows clearly that I confined myself to reproducing a project conceived and developed by him. Count von Bismarck kept this document, wishing to submit it to the king. On my side, I reported in substance to the imperial government the communications which had been made to me. The emperor rejected them as soon as they came to his knowledge. I am bound to say that the king of Prussia himself did not seem to wish to accept the basis of them; and since that time, that is to say, during the last four years, I have never again entered upon any new exchange of ideas on the subject with Count von Bismarck.

"If the initiative of such a treaty had been taken by the government of the emperor, the project would have been drafted by the Foreign Office,

and I should not have had to produce a copy of it in my own handwriting; it would besides have been drawn up differently, and it would have led to negotiations which would have been simultaneously carried on at Paris and Berlin. In that case Count von Bismarck would not have been satisfied with indirectly publishing the text, particularly at a time when your excellency was correcting, in despatches which were inserted in the *Journal Officiel*, other errors which attempts were also being made to propagate. But in order to attain the end which he had in view—that of misleading public opinion, and anticipating the revelations which we ourselves might have made—he employed this expedient, which relieved him from the necessity of defining at what time, under what circumstances, and in what manner this document had been written. He evidently flattered himself that, thanks to these omissions, he should suggest conjectures which, whilst freeing his personal responsibility, would compromise that of the emperor's government. Such proceedings need no comment; it is enough to point them out, by submitting them to the appreciation of the public opinion of Europe.

"Receive, &c.,

"(Signed) BENEDETTI."

The following was the French reply to Count von Bismarck, and which was addressed as a circular to the diplomatic agents of France at foreign courts :—

"PARIS, August 3.

"Sir,—We now know the full meaning of the telegram addressed by Count von Bismarck to the Prussian ambassador in London to announce to England the pretended secrets of which the Federal chancellor alleged that he was the depositary. His despatch adds no material fact to those which he has already put forth. We only find in it a few more improbabilities. We shall not attempt to point them out. Public opinion has already done justice to affirmations which derive no authority from the audacity with which they are repeated, and we regard it as completely established, notwithstanding all denials, that never has the Emperor Napoleon proposed to Prussia a treaty for taking possession of Belgium. That idea is the property of Count von Bismarck. It is one of the expedients of that unscrupulous policy which we trust is now approaching its end. I should, there-



fore, have abstained from reverting to assertions which have been proved to be false if the author of the Prussian despatch, with a want of tact which I noticed in so marked a degree for the first time in a diplomatic document, had not mentioned relatives of the emperor as having been bearers of compromising messages and confidences. Whatever repugnance I may feel at being compelled to follow the Prussian chancellor, and to engage myself in a manner so contrary to my habits, I overcome that feeling, because it is my duty to repudiate perfidious insinuations which, directed against members of the imperial family, are evidently intended to apply to the emperor himself. It was at Berlin that Count von Bismarck, originating ideas the first conception of which he now seeks to impute to us, solicited in these terms the French prince whom, in defiance of all customary rules, he now seeks to draw into the controversy. 'You desire,' said he, 'an impossible thing. You wish to take the Rhenish Provinces, which are German. Why do you not annex Belgium, where the people have the same origin, the same religion, and the same language as yourselves? I have already caused that to be mentioned to the emperor; if he entered into my views, we would assist him to take Belgium. As for myself, if I were the master and I were not hampered by the obstinacy of the king, it would be already done.' These words of the Prussian chancellor have been, so to speak, literally repeated to the court of France by the Count von Goltz. That ambassador was so little reticent upon the subject, that there are many witnesses who have heard him thus express himself. I will add that at the period of the Universal Exhibition the overtures of Prussia were known to more than one high personage, who took note of them and still remembered them. Moreover, it was not a mere passing notion with Count von Bismarck, but truly a concerted plan with which his ambitious schemes were connected; and he pursued his attempts to carry them out with a perseverance which is amply attested by his repeated excursions to France, to Biarritz, and elsewhere. He failed before the immovable will of the emperor, who always refused to connect himself with a policy that was unworthy of his loyalty. I now quit the subject, which I have touched upon for the last time, with a firm intention of never again recurring to it, and I come to the really new point in Count von Bismarck's despatch. 'I have reason

to believe,' he says, 'that if the publication of the projected treaty had not occurred, France would have made us an offer—after our mutual armaments had been completed—to carry out the proposition which she had previously made to us, as soon as we found ourselves at the head of a million of well-armed soldiers in the face of unarmed Europe; that is to say, to make peace before or after the first battle upon the basis of M. Benedetti's propositions at the expense of Belgium.' The emperor's government cannot allow such an assertion to pass without notice. In the face of all Europe, his Majesty's ministers defy Count von Bismarck to adduce any fact whatever to justify a belief that they have ever manifested, directly or indirectly, officially or by secret agency, an intention of uniting with Prussia to accomplish together in respect of Belgium the deed she has consummated in respect to Hanover. We have opened no negotiation with Count von Bismarck, either concerning Belgium or any other subject. Far from seeking war, as we have been accused of doing, we besought Lord Clarendon to interpose with the Prussian cabinet, with a view to a mutual disarmament, an important mission which Lord Clarendon, through friendship towards France and devotion to the cause of peace, consented confidentially to undertake. It was on these terms that Comte Daru, in a letter of the 1st of February, explained to the Marquis de Lavalette, our ambassador in London, the intentions of the government:—

" 'It is certain that I should not mix myself up with this affair, nor should I ask England to interfere in it if the question was one simply of an ordinary and purely formal nature, intended only to afford Count von Bismarck an opportunity to repeat once again his refusal. It is a real, serious, positive proposition, which it is sought to act upon. The principal secretary of state appears to anticipate that Count von Bismarck will at first manifest dissatisfaction and displeasure. That is possible, but not certain. With that possibility in view, it will be well to prepare the ground in such a manner as to avoid at the outset a negative reply. I am convinced that time and reflection will induce the chancellor to take into his serious consideration the proposition of England. If at first he does not reject all overtures, then the interests of Prussia and of all Germany will speedily speak out sufficiently to lead him to modify his opposition. He

would not be willing to raise against himself the opinion of his entire country. What, indeed, would be his position if we took away the sole pretext upon which he relies, that is, the armament of France?"

"Count von Bismarck at first replied that he could not take upon himself to submit the suggestions of the British government to the king, and that he was sufficiently acquainted with the views of his sovereign to foretell his decision. King William, he said, would certainly see in the proposition of the cabinet of London a change in the disposition of England towards Prussia. In short, the Prussian chancellor declared 'that it was impossible for Prussia to modify a military system which was so closely connected with the traditions of the country, which formed one of the bases of its constitution, and which was in no way abnormal.' Comte Daru was not checked by this first reply. On the 13th of February he wrote to M. de Lavalette:—

" 'I hope that Lord Clarendon will not consider himself beaten nor be discouraged. We will shortly give him an opportunity of returning to the charge, if it should be agreeable to him, and to resume the interrupted communication with the Federal chancellor. Our intention is, in fact, to diminish our contingent. We should largely have reduced it if we had received a favourable reply from the Federal chancellor. We shall make a smaller reduction, as the reply is in the negative; but we shall reduce. The reduction will, I hope, be 10,000 men. That is the number I should propose. We shall affirm by acts, which are of more value than words, our intentions—our policy. Nine contingents, each reduced by 10,000 men, make a total reduction of 90,000 men. That is already something; it is a tenth part of the existing army. The law upon the contingent will be proposed shortly. Lord Clarendon will then judge whether it will be proper to represent to Count von Bismarck that Prussia alone in Europe makes no concession to the spirit of peace, and that he thus places her in a serious position amid other European societies, because he furnishes arms against her to all the world, including the populations which are crushed beneath the weight of military charges which he imposes upon them.'

"Count von Bismarck, closely pressed, felt it to be necessary to enter into some further explanations with Lord Clarendon. These explanations, as far

as we are acquainted with them, from a letter from M. de Lavalette dated the 23rd of February, were full of reticence. The chancellor of the Prussian Confederation, departing from his first resolution, had informed King William of the proposition recommended by England, but his Majesty had declined it. In vindication of the refusal, the chancellor pleaded the fear of a possible alliance between Austria and the states of the south, and the ambitious designs that might be entertained by France. But in the foreground he especially placed the anxieties with which the policy of Russia inspired him, and upon that point indulged in particular remarks respecting the court of St. Petersburg which I prefer to pass by in silence, not desiring to reproduce injurious insinuations. Such were the pleas of non-acceptance which Count von Bismarck opposed to the loyal and conscientious entreaties several times renewed by Lord Clarendon at the request of the emperor's government. If, then, Europe has remained in arms; if a million of men are about to be hurled against each other upon the battle-field, it cannot be contested that the responsibility for such a state of things attaches to Prussia: for it is she who has repudiated all idea of disarmament, while we not only forwarded the proposition to her, but also began by setting an example. Is not this conduct explained by the fact that, at the very time when confiding France was reducing her contingent, the cabinet of Berlin was arranging in the dark for the provocative nomination of a Prussian prince? Whatever may be the calumnies invented by the Federal chancellor, we have no fear; he has forfeited the right of being believed. The conscience of history and of Europe will say that Prussia has sought the present war by inflicting upon France, while she was engaged in the development of her political institutions, an outrage which no high-spirited and courageous nation could have accepted without meriting the contempt of nations.

"Agreez, &c.,

"GRAMONT."

The Prussian reply to this circular was issued a week afterwards, not, it was stated, with the view of taking advantage of the abundant matter it contained for criticism, but of supplying a fresh piece of evidence, and requesting the Prussian representatives at foreign courts to bring it under the notice of the respective governments to which they were accredited. Count von Bismarck said:—"If

I have not made use of this evidence before, it was owing to my reluctance, even in a state of war, to drag the person of a monarch into the discussion of the acts of his ministers and representatives; and also because, considering the form of government which avowedly existed in France up to the 2nd of January last, I was not prepared to hear that the draught treaty and the other proposals and arrogant demands alluded to in my despatch of the 29th should have been submitted to me without the knowledge of the Emperor Napoleon. But certain statements which appear in the latest French utterances necessitate my having recourse to a different line of conduct. On the one hand, the French minister of Foreign Affairs assures us that the Emperor Napoleon has never proposed to Prussia a treaty having the acquisition of Belgium for its object (*que jamais l'Empereur Napoleon n'a proposé à la Prusse un traité pour prendre possession de la Belgique*); on the other, M. Benedetti gives out that the draught treaty in question emanates from me; that all he had to do with it was to put it on paper—writing, so to say, from my dictation (*en quelque sorte sous ma dictée*), which he only did the better to apprehend my views; and that the Emperor Napoleon was made cognizant of the draught only after its completion at Berlin. Statements such as these render it indispensable for me to make use of a means at my disposal calculated to support my account of French politics, and to strengthen the supposition I have previously expressed respecting the nature of the connection between the emperor and his ministers, envoys, and agents. In the archives of the Foreign Office at Berlin is preserved a letter from M. Benedetti to me, dated 5th August, 1866, and a draught treaty inclosed in that letter. The originals, in M. Benedetti's handwriting, I shall submit to the inspection of the representatives of the neutral powers, and I will also send you a photographic fac-simile of the same. I beg to observe that, according to the *Moniteur*, the Emperor Napoleon did pass the time from the 28th of July to the 7th of August, 1866, at Vichy. In the official interview which I had with M. Benedetti in consequence of this letter, he supported his demands by threatening war in case of refusal. When I declined, nevertheless, the Luxemburg affair was brought upon the carpet; and after the failure of this little business came the more comprehensive proposal relative

to Belgium embodied in M. Benedetti's draught treaty published in the *Times*."

The profound impression created in England by the publication of the treaty increased and deepened with the charges and counter-charges made by and against the respective governments, and the confidence before reposed in the friendship of both countries was put to a severe test. Questions were repeatedly asked of the government in both Houses of Parliament, but without eliciting any further facts than those already given; and the nation became thoroughly in earnest on the subject of its naval and military strength, and the number of breech-loaders already served out and in store.

On Monday, August 2, Mr. Cardwell, the War Minister, laid on the table of the House of Commons a supplementary estimate of £2,000,000 "for strengthening the naval and military forces of the kingdom, including an addition to the army of 20,000 men of all ranks during the European war." There was much cheering on both sides of the House when the estimate was read; and in reply to questions addressed to him immediately afterwards, Mr. Cardwell stated that the whole force of the army was only about 2000 below the establishment; that the militia regiments, with a few exceptions, were recruited up to their full strength; and that the Supply Department was in a position to meet any emergencies.

The same evening Mr. Disraeli, leader of the Opposition, called the attention of the House, according to previous notice, to the position of the country with reference to the war. By way of justification for his interposition, he said that, having witnessed the outbreak of several great wars during his parliamentary career, he had noticed that much injury had been done by the reserve and silence observed by the House of Commons on such occasions, which, instead of assisting and strengthening the hands of the government, had embarrassed it. He spoke contemptuously of the ephemeral and evanescent pretexts for the present war. Whether there was a pretender to the Spanish throne, or whether there was a breach of etiquette at a watering place, or whether Europe was to be devastated on account of the publication of an anonymous paragraph in a newspaper—were pretexts which would have been disgraceful in the eighteenth century, and could not now seriously influence the conduct of any body of men; he pointed out



that its real causes were to be gathered from the public declarations of the leading statesmen on both sides, such as M. Rouher and Count von Bismarck; and the recent revelations showed that vast ambitions were stirring in Europe, and subtle schemes were being devised, which had brought about this war, and might produce other events of the utmost importance. After some remarks on the treaties guaranteeing Belgium and Luxemburg—of the former of which he said that it had been negotiated by distinguished Liberal statesmen, and was in accordance with the traditional policy of England—Mr. Disraeli reminded the House that at the Treaty of Vienna England had guaranteed to Prussia her Saxon provinces. That engagement, he contended, ought to have given her an overpowering influence with Prussia; but Russia had undertaken a similar guarantee, and Russia, too, was as anxious to be neutral as England, and in this coincidence he discerned a means by which, from the joint action of these two powers, peace might be restored. The policy of England should be an armed neutrality, and at the proper time she might step in, and in conjunction with Russia, exercise the most considerable effect on the course of public affairs. This led him to consider whether the armaments of the country were in such a position as to enable her to take that line, and to require from the government more complete information as to the strength of the fleet and the army, the condition of stores, and the progress made in the fortifications; insisting that at a crisis like the present no effort should be spared to put the country in a position of complete security. He earnestly urged the House to profit by the lessons of the Crimean war, which might have been prevented had England spoken out at the right moment. She had then as strong a government as at present; but the House of Commons maintained a reserve, and there followed discordant councils, infirmity of action, and, finally, war. If the government spoke to foreign powers with that firmness which could only arise from a due appreciation of their duty, and a determination to perform it, Mr Disraeli predicted that England would not be involved in the war, and her influence, combined with that of Russia, might lead to the speedy restoration of peace. But, above all, England ought to declare in a manner not to be mistaken that she would maintain her treaty engagements, and thereby secure the rights of independent nations.

Mr. Gladstone, the prime minister, confessed that the particular incident out of which the war had arisen had taken him by surprise, though, of course, he was perfectly aware of the state of feeling of which that incident was a symptom. He next sketched the steps taken by the government to preserve peace, which have been fully detailed in Chapter II. During the negotiations, the position of England had been that of a mediator, and her attitude now was one of neutrality; but not an "armed neutrality"—a phrase which he strongly deprecated as having an historical significance totally opposed to the friendly disposition which ought to be preserved towards both belligerents. But he agreed that England's neutrality ought to be accompanied with adequate measures of defence; that it ought to be what he called a "secured neutrality." As to the suggestion of joint action with Russia, he merely said that he saw no objection to coalescing not only with one, but all the neutral powers, for the restoration of peace; but he differed entirely from Mr. Disraeli's idea of the claim which the Saxon guarantee gave England. The dissolution of the German Confederation and the recent aggrandizement of Prussia had destroyed its binding force, and England could not have advanced it without involving herself in the responsibilities of war. Describing next the attitude of the government with regard to the future, he said that the "projected treaty" was considered by the government to be a most important document, giving a serious shock to public confidence, and the country ought to feel indebted to those who had brought it to light. The government had taken the whole circumstances attending it into their consideration, and the propositions they meant to make to the House in their opinion met the necessity of the case, and were calculated to establish perfect confidence and security. Having explained the various steps the government had taken to maintain neutrality, he warmly defended it against Mr. Disraeli's charge of undue reduction of the services in the early part of the year. In every reduction they had made real strength had been arrived at, and efficiency had been increased. The country had 89,000 soldiers at home, there was a considerable Channel fleet afloat, the armament for the forts was ready, the supply of arms of precision was adequate, and stores were in excellent order. The House, to some extent, must rely on the responsibility of the government; but



he assured it that they were deeply sensible of the discredit of weakening the power of this country, and that, having made the most careful inquiries, they would take up and maintain that dignified position which would enable England at the proper time to interfere for the restoration of peace.

The studious reserve maintained by Mr. Gladstone throughout his speech upon the obligations of Great Britain under the treaties guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg, caused great dissatisfaction, and from the tone of every speech subsequently made, it was evident that the feeling of the House was unmistakable in its recognition of England's duties to the fullest extent. Subsequent events proved that in its negotiations with both France and Prussia the government had been by no means so reticent, and had given them clearly to understand that England felt herself fully bound by the treaty of 1839, and that in case of any violation of the neutrality or independence of Belgium she would at once interfere on her behalf.

On the following evening Lord Russell, in an energetic speech in the House of Lords, which stirred even the well-bred repose of his aristocratic audience, and drew hearty cheers from both sides of the House, asserted the duty of England to defend Belgium to the uttermost. After reviewing the treaty obligations of Great Britain, and referring to the secret treaty, and the explanations to which it had given rise between France and Prussia, he said it would be impossible to feel in future perfect confidence in either of the parties, and unwise to ignore the danger that the treaties in regard to Belgium might be violated. "For my part," he said, "I confess I feel somewhat as if a detective officer had come and told me he had heard a conversation with respect to a friend of mine whom I had promised to guard as much as was in my power against any act of burglary or housebreaking, and that two other persons, who were also friends of mine, had been considering how they might enter his house and deprive him of all the property he possessed. I should reply, under such circumstances, that I was very much astonished to hear it, and that I could not, in the future, feel perfect confidence in either of the parties to that conversation." As to the beginning of the war, it might be a question whether as regards France the charioteer had not himself lashed the horses which he found himself afterwards unable

to guide; but, putting aside that point, England's duty was clear. "It is not a question of three courses. There is but one course and one path—namely, the course of honour and the path of honour—that we ought to pursue. We are bound to defend Belgium. I am told that that may lead us into danger. Now, in the first place, I deny that any great danger would exist if this country manfully declared her intention to perform all her engagements, and not to shrink from their performance. I am persuaded that neither France nor Prussia would ever attempt to violate the independence of Belgium. It is only the doubt, the hesitation, that has too long prevailed as to the course which England would take which has encouraged and fostered all these conversations and projects of treaties, all these combinations and intrigues. I am persuaded that if it is once manfully declared that England means to stand by her treaties, to perform her engagements, that her honour and her interest would allow nothing else, such a declaration would check the greater part of these intrigues, and that neither France nor Prussia would wish to add a second enemy to the formidable foe which each has to meet. I am persuaded that both would conform to the faith of treaties, and would not infringe on the territory of Belgium, but till the end of the war remain in the fulfilment of their obligations. When the choice is between honour and infamy, I cannot doubt that her Majesty's government will pursue the course of honour, the only one worthy of the British people. The British people have a very strong sense of honour, and of what is due to this glorious nation. I feel sure, therefore, that the government, in making that intention clear to all the world, would have the entire support of the great majority of this nation. I need hardly speak of other considerations which are of great weight. I consider that if England shrunk from the performance of her engagements, if she acted in a faithless manner with respect to this matter, her extinction as a great power must very soon follow. The main duty of the hour therefore is, how we can best assure Belgium, assure Europe, and assure the world that we mean to be true and faithful, that the great name which we have acquired in the world by the constant observance of truth and justice, and by fidelity to our engagements, will not be departed from, and that we shall be in the future what we have been in the past."

Lord Granville replied briefly, declining to enter upon a general discussion, and justifying the reserve of the government. He gave a positive assurance that the government were aware of the duty this country owed to Belgium, and declared his perfect confidence that if they followed judiciously and actively the course which the honour, the interests, and the obligations of the country dictated, they would receive the full support of Parliament and the nation. He added, that the ministry had taken steps in the previous week to convey to other powers in the clearest manner, though without adopting an offensive or menacing tone, what England believed to be right.

The speech of Lord Granville was received with cheers that testified to a feeling of relief, and when he had concluded, the unfavourable impression which had been produced by Mr. Gladstone's caution on the previous evening was removed. The country now felt it had reason to be satisfied, and waited patiently for the additional communications on the subject which were promised to Parliament as soon as diplomatic considerations would permit. This promise was redeemed on the following Monday (August 8), when statements were made by the ministerial leaders in both Houses. Earl Granville, in the Lords, said that from the first the government were determined to deal in no vague threats or indefinite menaces. At the Cabinet Council of July 30 he was authorized to write to the courts of France and Prussia in the same terms, *mutatis mutandis*, renewing the expressions of the satisfaction of the British government at the assurances given by the emperor and the king respectively, that they intended to respect the neutrality of Belgium. There could be no doubt, he said, as to the duty of both countries to maintain the obligations of the treaty into which they had thus entered with Great Britain and the other signatories; but he pointed out that the assurance was not complete, because each power made a reservation in case the neutrality of Belgium was violated by the other. In the event of a violation of the neutrality by Prussia, France was to be released from her obligation, and in the case of a similar event on the part of France, Prussia was to be released from hers. Her Majesty's government therefore proposed, either by treaty or otherwise, to place on solemn record the common determination of the great powers who were signatories to the treaty of 1839 to maintain the independence

of Belgium, and satisfactory replies had been received from Austria and Russia. France also accepted the principle of the new treaty, and as regarded Prussia, Count von Bismarck was ready to concur in any measure for strengthening the neutrality of Belgium, and the king, as soon as he saw the draught treaty, authorized Count Bernstorff, the Prussian ambassador in London, to sign it. Lord Granville next described the treaty, which is given on page 214, and which, as will be seen, renewed all the obligations of the treaty of 1839. It provided that, if the armies of either belligerent violated the neutrality of Belgium, Great Britain should co-operate with the other in its defence, but without engaging to take part in the general operations of the war. The other powers would pledge themselves to a corresponding co-operation, and the treaty was to hold good for twelve months after the war. The government had thus endeavoured clearly to announce their own determination in this matter without menace or offence to the two belligerents, with whom they were still in friendly alliance. Expressing a hope that this treaty would remove the alarm which had been felt, while it would in no degree weaken the force or impair the obligations of the treaty of 1839, he said he trusted it would be seen that her Majesty's ministers had not been unmindful of their responsibilities with regard to this great and important question.

The duke of Richmond, the leader of the opposition, expressed a general approval of the attitude of the government, and a fervent hope that Great Britain might preserve her neutrality, and at the same time her honour inviolate during the war.

In the Commons a statement similar to that of Lord Granville was made by the Premier, and Mr. Disraeli, while guarding himself against giving any decided opinion on details so suddenly communicated to the House, expressed his belief that the determination at which he assumed the government to have arrived—to defend the neutrality and independence of Belgium—would give general satisfaction to the country. At the same time he doubted as a general principle the wisdom of founding any other engagements on the existing treaty of guarantee. Neither could he understand how, if England joined with one of the belligerents, her interference was to be limited to the defence of the Belgian frontier, nor how she was to avoid being involved in the general fortunes of the

war. Mr. Disraeli concluded by repeating his gratification at finding that the government had pursued a wise and spirited policy, and not the less wise because spirited; and to lay down as a general principle of statesmanship that England, though not merely an European but an Asiatic and Oceanic power, could not absolve herself of all interest in the peace and prosperity of the European states. The coast from Ostend to the North Sea, he held, should be in the possession of powers from whose ambition England and Europe had nothing to fear.

Parliament was prorogued on the following Wednesday (10th August), and in consequence of Lord Cairns' desire to express his opinion on the treaty, and to obtain a fuller and more detailed statement with respect to it, the House of Lords met at the unusual hour of twelve o'clock in the morning. Whilst expressing cordial approval of the object in view—the preservation of the neutrality of Belgium—Lord Cairns objected to the new engagement into which England had entered, as containing the seeds of considerable embarrassment and possible complication. The natural course would have been to announce to the two belligerents, but not by way of menace, that England was prepared to maintain the treaty of 1839, and to oppose any attempt by either or both to violate it. Russia and Austria ought to have been informed of these communications, in order that arrangements might be made for a united course of action in any contingency which might arise. Pointing out certain elements of danger in the treaty, he examined in turn the consequences of its violation by France or Prussia. It would be impossible to agree as to the particular operations which might justly be required of us, while if England joined any of the belligerents the other would necessarily declare war against her, and carry it on wherever she could be struck at and injured. It was the object of each belligerent to obtain the alliance and co-operation of England, and a skilful strategist might so arrange matters as to compel the other belligerent to violate the territory of Belgium. The engagement would be useless if both the belligerents violated the neutrality of Belgium, because there could then be no co-operation with England on the part of either. He also feared that the treaty might involve England in difficulties with Austria and Russia.

Lord Granville denied that the course taken by

the government was either menacing or offensive, and argued that the plan proposed by Lord Cairns would not have been successful. The government had received from Austria the assurance of her readiness to adhere to their proposal, assuming that France and Prussia did not object to sign it. Russia sent her most friendly assurances, but declined to join the signatories, because she considered herself as already bound by the original treaty. She also desired an understanding of a much wider description, the effect of which would have been to bring England under obligations by which she was not at present bound. England having now entered upon the treaty was limited to its obligations. He did not believe the contingency contemplated would arise, but if it did England would be obliged to act upon it. It would, however, be an enormous advantage to have a power numbering its soldiers by hundreds of thousands co-operating with the British army and fleet. He repudiated as gratuitous the suspicion that such a piece of strategy as that suggested by Lord Cairns would be attempted, or that after the solemn renewal of this treaty obligation, binding on the personal honour of the emperor of the French and the king of Prussia, they would either of them, within a very few months and in the face of the world, violate such an engagement. While the treaty would, he believed, prevent a particular event which would be most disagreeable and entangling to Great Britain, he strongly denied that it would weaken the obligations of the treaty of 1839. Replying to the objection that the action of her Majesty's government had been disrespectful to Belgium, he stated that she had not been at first consulted in the matter because it was not desired to compromise her with either belligerent; but he officially informed the Belgian government of the negotiations when they had reached a certain point, assuring them that he wished to act in harmony with Belgium, and that England's sole object was the independence and neutrality of that country. These assurances were entirely satisfactory to the Belgian king and Chambers. So far as the treaty had gone, there was reason to believe that it would be the best means of preventing a great difficulty which had excited much alarm and anxiety both at home and abroad.

In reply to a question of Lord Cairns, as to what progress had been made with the treaty, and whether he could give the text, Lord Granville

said the treaty with Prussia was signed by Count Bernstorff and himself on the previous day. The French ambassador had authority to sign as soon as his full powers arrived. He then read the following draught of the treaty between England and Prussia, explaining that the treaty with France was, *mutatis mutandis*, identical with it:—

“DRAUGHT OF TREATY BETWEEN ENGLAND AND  
“PRUSSIA RESPECTING BELGIUM.

“Her Majesty the queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and his Majesty the king of Prussia, being desirous at the present time of recording in a solemn act their fixed determination to maintain the independence and neutrality of Belgium, as provided in the seventh article of the treaty signed at London on the 19th of April, 1839, between Belgium and the Netherlands, which article was declared by the Quintuple Treaty of 1839 to be considered as having the same force and value as if textually inserted in the said Quintuple Treaty, their said Majesties have determined to conclude between themselves a separate treaty, which, without impairing or invalidating the conditions of the said Quintuple Treaty, shall be subsidiary and accessory to it; and they have accordingly named as their plenipotentiaries for that purpose, that is to say:—

“Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, &c.

“And his Majesty the king of Prussia, &c.

“Who, after having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon and concluded the following articles:—

“Art. I. His Majesty the king of Prussia having declared that, notwithstanding the hostilities in which the North German Confederation is engaged with France, it is his fixed determination to respect the neutrality of Belgium so long as the same shall be respected by France, her Majesty the queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland on her part declares that, if during the said hostilities the armies of France should violate that neutrality, she will be prepared to co-operate with his Prussian Majesty for the defence of the same in such manner as may be mutually agreed upon, employing for that purpose her naval and military forces to insure its observance, and to maintain, in conjunction with his Prussian Majesty,

then and thereafter, the independence and neutrality of Belgium.

“It is clearly understood that her Majesty the queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland does not engage herself by this treaty to take part in any of the general operations of the war now carried on between the North German Confederation and France, beyond the limits of Belgium as defined in the treaty between Belgium and the Netherlands of April 19, 1839.

“Art. II. His Majesty the king of Prussia agrees on his part, in the event provided for in the foregoing article, to co-operate with her Majesty the queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, employing his naval and military forces for the purpose aforesaid; and the case arising, to concert with her Majesty the measures which shall be taken, separately or in common, to secure the neutrality and independence of Belgium.

“Art. III. This treaty shall be binding on the high contracting parties during the continuance of the present war between the North German Confederation and France, and for twelve months after the ratification of any treaty of peace concluded between those parties; and on the expiration of that time the independence and neutrality of Belgium will, so far as the high contracting parties are respectively concerned, continue to rest as heretofore on the 1st article of the Quintuple Treaty on the 19th of April, 1839.

“Art. IV. The present treaty shall be ratified, &c.”

In the House of Commons, on the same day, the treaty was vigorously attacked by Mr. Bernal Osborne, who said he would prefer to have no treaty rather than the extraordinary document which had been laid on the table in so extraordinary a manner, and which he characterized as “a childish perpetration of diplomatic folly.” It was not only superfluous, but it superseded the previous treaties; and if it had been submitted to the House he was confident it would have been unanimously rejected. He maintained, too, that England was bound to stand by Belgium, not only in honour but by interest, for her liberties and independence would not be safe for twenty-four hours if Belgium were in the hands of a hostile power.

Mr. Gladstone protested with all the emphasis at his command against Mr. Osborne's extravagant and exaggerated statement that the liberties of England would be gone if Belgium were in the



possession of a hostile power, and maintained that England's concern in the preservation of Belgian independence was substantially no greater than that of the other powers. The government had not been moved by any such selfish spirit, nor had they based their action solely on the guarantees to which an impracticably rigid significance had been attached, against which he felt himself bound to protest. Far wider and stronger than interest or guarantees was the consideration whether England could warrantably stand by and see a crime perpetrated by the absorption of Belgium, which would have been the knell of public right and public law in Europe. He dwelt, too, on the claims Belgium had on their friendship as a model for orderly government, combined with perfectly free institutions; and answering Mr. Osborne's criticisms, he maintained that the treaty of 1839 was not weakened nor superseded by this addition, and that the peculiar circumstances of the case justified this departure from general rules.

It will be seen from the events just narrated, that the uneasiness and excitement which had so universally prevailed on the first publication of the secret project, and the subsequent revelations made in connection with it, were finally allayed; and that the demand of the country that the defence of Belgium against foreign aggression should be again put forward as a cardinal principle of English policy, was complied with by the government in the manner they deemed best calculated to secure the end in view—although on that point much difference of opinion prevailed. The end, however, having been attained, people cared little about the particular means which had been employed to attain it; and when Parliament broke up the feeling of security which had been somewhat interrupted in the country had quite returned.

The publication of the statement of Count von Bismarck, that before the war of 1866 France had offered her alliance to Prussia, with a promise to declare war against Austria and to attack her with 300,000 men, provided that Prussia would consent to make certain territorial concessions to France on the left bank of the Rhine, had an immense influence in Austria, and put an end to all thought of a French alliance, which up to that time had been considered probable. As a suitable conclusion to this chapter, in which their names have figured so largely, we annex biographical notices of Count von Bismarck and M. Benedetti.

KARL OTTO, COUNT VON BISMARCK, whose name will always be identified with the great work of the unification of Germany, was born at Brandenburg, in 1813, or as some accounts affirm, on the 1st April, 1814. Although the period is comparatively short since his name has become generally familiar in England, he has shared about equally with Napoleon III., for several years, most of the attention bestowed by the readers of English newspapers on continental affairs. His earlier reputation as a Prussian politician is now lost in his renown as one of the greatest statesmen of Germany, and this which is his good fortune now will no doubt be his glory in after ages. His career divides itself naturally into two parts, answering to these two characters: what we may call a Prussian part, in which he figures principally as the most strenuous upholder of divine right in the Prussian monarchy: and a German part, in which his principal *role* is that of the great presiding genius of German unification. Descended from a noble and very ancient family, he was educated at the universities of Göttingen, Greifswalde, and Berlin, and apparently at first was destined for a military career, which he commenced in an infantry regiment as a volunteer, after which he attained the rank of a lieutenant in the landwehr. He became a member of the Diet of the province of Saxony in 1846; and the year following was elected a member of the German Diet, where his character and abilities soon attracted attention, and the reputation which he bore for some years afterwards was fixed by some of those paradoxical utterances in which his toriyism and his wit found vent together, such as his reported saying that he wished that "all the large manufacturing and commercial towns, those centres of democracy and constitutionalism, could be abolished from the surface of the earth," so that a purely rural population might submissively obey the king's decrees. One of the earliest notices of his public life which have fallen under our notice, one written shortly after his first appearance in the Diet, speaks of him as, if not a deep political thinker, at any rate an expert debater, whose wit and irony were often displayed with trenchant effect. It would now have to be allowed, perhaps, that the irony and the wit of which he is master, have been often since used to further the plans of a deep enough thinker. In the revolutionary year, 1848, Bismarck was of course one of the most unpopular men in Germany; he was excluded from the

National Assembly of that year, but next year he took his seat in the Second Chamber, where he resumed his post of uncompromising opposition to the movements of the liberal party in Parliament. This, if it increased his unpopularity, also marked him out for royal favour. In 1851 he entered the diplomatic service as first secretary of legation to the Prussian embassy at Frankfort, a post which he exchanged after a few months for that of ambassador at the sittings of the Federal Bund. Bismarck's nomination to it was a decisive proof that he was already regarded by the king as his most able as well as most zealous servant. He showed himself worthy of this proof of confidence in his ability and his intentions. Count Rechberg was the representative of Austria at the Diet, and presided at its meetings. Austria, in Bismarck's opinion, was the power that Prussia had to withstand and outwit. Rechberg and Bismarck therefore had frequent encounters, in which the dignity of the one, it is said, suffered terribly from the witty sallies of the other. Till 1858 Bismarck was principally occupied in various places, and on various grounds, in this struggle with the representative of the Austrian empire. It is said that a pamphlet on "Prussia and the Italian question," which appeared in 1858, and which, referring to the ancient enmity between Austria and Prussia, recommended an alliance between France, Prussia, and Russia, was indited or inspired by him. Be this as it may, in the following year he went to St. Petersburg as ambassador, and there gained the friendship and confidence of Gortschakoff, and of his master the Czar, who conferred on him one of his orders of nobility. In the month of May of the same year he was transferred to the capital of France, to the court of the sovereign with whose history his own was afterwards to be mixed up in some of the most remarkable events of this century. He remained in Paris over two years; but in September, 1862, returned to Berlin to undertake the task of forming a new ministry, the previous cabinet having succumbed to adverse votes respecting their war budget. In the ministry which was thus formed by him he retained the portfolio of foreign affairs. The difficulties which in this position he had to face were not those of his own department. They were not of relations to foreign powers, but chiefly of the relations of the government to the representatives of the people. The policy of the administration, which was declared to be violently

reactionary in all its tendencies, was especially obnoxious in respect to military re-organization. The Prussian Parliament then became for a period a scene of perpetual struggle of the fiercest description, in which, by large majorities, the deputies opposed the government at every important step. It is curious now, after the wars which Prussia has waged with Denmark, Austria, and France, and waged with such astonishing success, to remark that these fierce struggles were fiercest as to the army budget and military reforms; the administration contending for the extension of the period of compulsory service in the army, and the Chamber bitterly resisting that proposal. Bismarck, who has never been afraid of strong measures when they were required, finding the majorities in the Chamber thus unmanageable, closed the session. His administration, however, continued to be signalized by the same parliamentary scenes which marked its commencement. His policy in respect to Poland was severely blamed; by a majority of 246 to 46 votes he was severely censured for entering into a secret treaty with Russia, having reference to Polish affairs. In 1865-66 the relations of the administration to the Chamber were at the worst. Unable to govern Parliament, the executive governed without Parliament altogether. Stormy debates constantly occurred; there were memorable oratorical encounters between Bismarck and Virchow, but the result, practically, was that military organization, the premier's great project, was proceeded with according to his wish; and several sessions of Parliament were closed or dissolved like that of 1862, by royal decree, and without the sanction of the Chamber. During this period restrictions were laid upon the press, and in several instances opposition journals were subjected to penalties. What the result of all this might have been, had there been nothing to distract attention from home affairs, it would be difficult to say; but the death of the king of Denmark having re-opened the Schleswig-Holstein question, an opportunity was afforded to the administration of exhibiting in actual war the soundness of their policy of military re-organization; and though this did not avail to reconcile to them the majority of the Chamber, or put a stop to parliamentary recriminations, it materially helped to avert a serious crisis in the relations between the two parties, until a much larger question than that of the duchies began to occupy public attention,

and to divert it from home to foreign affairs. This larger question was that of war with Prussia's great rival in the struggle for the leadership of the German empire. The history of this question has been already related in the first part of this work, and need not here be recapitulated, especially as almost every one is familiar with the leading incidents of the period which intervened between the disputes of Austria and Prussia touching the duchies of the Elbe at the beginning of 1866, and the third day of July in that year, memorable in the history of Germany as the day of the battle of Königgrätz, and that which finally determined not so much the ascendancy of one German power over the rest, as the union of all in one great empire. Just before the declaration of war against Austria an attempt was made upon the life of Bismarck. An assassin named Blind fired four times from a pistol at the minister, who however, was only slightly wounded. Bismarck, whose courage and coolness have been tested in various ways, and have seldom failed, himself arrested the criminal. In the year following the conclusion of the war with Austria he had advanced his great project another stage. The North German Confederation was formed—by far the most important political work of this century, yet far more than otherwise the work of one single man. The first chancellor of the Confederation could be no other than Count von Bismarck, who was appointed to that office at the first meeting of the Federal Council. At this point the character of Prussian politician, which he has maintained hitherto, merges in that of the greatest of the living statesmen of Germany. The popularity which in the one character he has despised, now of course pursues him in the other. In the dispute with France respecting the Luxemburg frontier, which followed the Austrian campaign, and which threatened to embroil Europe in war, Bismarck of course played an important part. At the beginning of 1868 he was obliged, on account of his health, which was very seriously impaired, to retire temporarily from public life. His retirement, it was expected, would be lengthy, but it proved to be short. In October he was again at his post in Berlin, and occupying himself as energetically and as ably as ever, in pushing forward the confederation of the various states of the empire. His difficulties in this work were destined to be largely removed by an event, the end of which and the consequences of which it is difficult to foresee.

What was needed to do in a day in respect to that work which it would still have taken years to accomplish, was a declaration of war against Prussia, the head of the German Confederation, by some rival power. That declaration of war was made by France in the month of July; and from that time Bismarck, whose life has alternated between the camp and the court, followed the fortunes of the German army in its campaign on the soil of France.

In 1865 Bismarck was promoted to the rank of count. After Königgrätz he was gazetted a general. His great distinction is that, beginning public life as a Prussian, he has made himself at length the representative of Germany. His personal character and manners are well defined and well known. His imperious earnestness and vehemence in public life contrast wonderfully, and yet agree, with his genial humour and merry wit and perfect unaffectedness in private. Not only the stories which are constantly told of him, but letters which he has allowed to be published, exhibit the great statesman of Germany as, in private life, a brilliant ornament of society.

M. VINCENT BENEDETTI is of Italian extraction, and was born in Corsica about 1815. He was educated for the consular and diplomatic service, and began his career in 1848 as consul at Palermo. From this post he was subsequently advanced to that of first secretary of the embassy at Constantinople. In May, 1859, he was offered, in succession to M. Bourrée, the post of envoy extraordinary at Teheran, but he declined to accept that mission, and was shortly afterwards nominated director of political affairs to the foreign minister, and it was in this capacity that he acted as editor of the protocols in the Congress of Paris in 1856, and as secretary to those ministers who drew them up. In 1861, when the French emperor recognized the newly-established kingdom of Italy, M. Benedetti was appointed minister plenipotentiary from his country at Turin, but resigned that post in the autumn of 1864, upon the retirement of M. Thouvenel from the ministry of Foreign Affairs. On November 27 of that year he was appointed to the post of French ambassador at Berlin, a position in which he remained until the outbreak of the war. He was made a chevalier of the legion of honour as far back as June, 1845, and after passing through the intermediate stages of promotion, he was nominated a grand officer in June, 1860.

## CHAPTER IV.

Necessity of understanding the Military Organization and Strength of each Combatant—Foundation of Prussia by the "Great Elector"—Its rapid extension—Frederick William I.'s singular passion for Tall Soldiers—His able Military Administration—First Successes of his son, Frederick the Great—The perfection to which he brought his Army—The Seven Years' War against the united forces of Russia, Saxony, Sweden, France, Austria, and the small German States—Its varying results and the state of Prussia at its close—She is admitted as the Rival of Austria for the leadership of Germany—Frederick's Bloodless Campaign, known as the "Potato War"—Policy of his nephew, Frederick William II.—Prussia's share in the spoliation of Poland—The French Revolution opposed by Prussia—Alliance with Austria—War declared against France—Complete failure of the Expedition, and the French frontier advanced to the Rhine—Humiliated and demoralized position of the Prussian Army—Popular fury against Napoleon for forcing a passage through their country, in spite of its neutrality—The King appeased with the bribe of Hanover—Battle of Austerlitz and humiliation of Austria—Insults offered to Prussia by Napoleon—Determination of the people to endure it no longer without a struggle—Battle of Jena and complete defeat of Prussia—The country overrun by French troops, and the King made little better than a vassal of France—Appearance of the great statesmen Stein and Scharnhorst on the scene—Foundation of the present Military System of Prussia with the approval of the whole Nation—Its fundamental principles, and the composition and numbers of the Army and Reserves under it—The Landwehr called out in 1830—The military spirit of the people found to have considerably evaporated—Further defects of the System discovered in 1848, 1850, 1854, and 1859—Material alterations and increase in the numbers of the Army made in 1860—Remonstrances on the part of the House of Deputies useless—Reasons for the alterations and additions—Extension of the term of service—Increased security conferred on the rest of the population—The great advantages of the New System shown in the War of 1866—Extension of the Prussian system to the whole of the North German Confederation in 1867—Present number of the Armies of the Confederation, and of the South German States—Divisions of the Armies in time of War, and their composition—Difference in the numbers of the Armies on paper and those actually engaged on the Field of Battle explained—The requirements of an Army on a Campaign—Extraordinary elasticity of the system proved in 1866 and 1870—The details of it easy enough to be universally understood—Steps taken when the Army is Mobilized, and the rapidity with which they can be executed—The equipment of the different arms of the service after Mobilization—Detailed description of the Prussian organization for insuring regular Supplies to the Army, attending to the Diseased and Wounded, and maintaining the number of Combatants at their full strength during the progress of hostilities—A defect in the Prussian system in the formation of garrison troops—The difficulty of insuring proper Supplies for an Army—Admirable provisions of the Prussian system in this respect, and its great success in the War—The Prussian hospital trains—The employment of Spies—Reconnoitring Parties—Field Signals and Telegraphs—Great ability of the Prussian officers—Peculiarities of the system for obtaining them—Necessity of a previous training in the ranks—Severity of their examinations—The *esprit de corps* which pervades the whole body, but strong development of class spirit—Special examination for the Artillery and Engineer officers—Admirable system of officering the Landwehr—Re-enlistment of men not much encouraged in the Prussian Army—All ordinary Government Appointments reserved for Non-commissioned Officers after they have served twelve years—Frequent alterations in Prussian tactics—The plan adopted by them at present—Salutary effects of the Military Training on the Prussian population—Economy of the Prussian system—The strain on the Resources of the Country if the Campaign is prolonged—Certainty of any War undertaken by Prussia being a national one—The Prussian Artillery—Description of Krupp's Monster Gun—Description of the Needle-gun—The Prussian Navy.

In order to estimate correctly the position and resources of both Prussia and France, it is necessary, before entering upon the detailed record of the deadly struggle in which they engaged, that we should put before the reader a statement of their military growth, their most recently invented weapons, the constitution and strength of their respective armies, and the methods adopted in each country to recruit them.

The "Great Elector," Frederick William, may be regarded as the founder of the present grandeur of the Prussian throne. Under his able rule, from 1640 to 1688, the whole strength of Brandenburg and Prussia was directed to securing the acknowledgment of the independence of the latter dukedom, originally held separately as a fief from Poland. His success in this enterprise was soon followed by claims on Juliers, Cleves, and Berg,

skilfully urged by the pen, and boldly supported by the sword; and the limits of the dominions handed to his son were thus extended from the Oder to the Rhine. Lower Pomerania had been among the additions gained by the treaty of Westphalia, and Frederick William used the opening it afforded to the Baltic, to lay the foundation of the navy, which Prussia's statesmen even thus early regarded as essential to support her claim to a distinguished place among the great European powers. The same policy, rather than any love for Austria or hatred of the Turk, led to the despatch of a contingent to the relief of Vienna, when threatened by the Sultan in 1683.

Under his successor, grandfather of the Great Frederick, and first king, the Prussian troops were in constant service as allies of Austria in her Turkish and French wars; and various small prin-



cialties, obtained as reward or purchased, swelled his now extensive though scattered dominions. He was succeeded in 1713 by his son, Frederick William I., whose habits were entirely military, and whose constant care was to establish the strictest discipline among his troops. He had such a ridiculous fondness for tall soldiers, that in order to fill the ranks of his favourite regiment, he would use force or fraud, if money would not effect his object, in order to obtain the tallest men in Europe. Indulging freely this singular passion, the father of Frederick the Great was in all else economical to parsimony; and without straining the resources of his five millions of subjects, he left his son an abundant treasury, and the most efficient army in Europe, to be at once the temptation and the instrument for continuing the family policy. The most important measure which Frederick William I. adopted in the military organization of Prussia, was one in which we may clearly trace the origin of her present formidable system of recruiting. In 1733, seven years before his death, the whole of his territories were parcelled out by decree into cantons, to each of which was allotted a regiment, whose effective strength was to be maintained from within its limits; and all subjects, beneath the rank of noble, were held bound to serve if required. With this ready instrument for supplying the losses of a war, and with an army of 66,000 men, more splendidly equipped and trained than any other of the time, his son, then known as Frederick II., stepped into the field of European politics.

Surpassing his predecessors no less in the scope of his policy than in ability for carrying it out, the new sovereign's ambition was favoured by the stormy times in which he came to the throne. His first success in the seizure of Silesia only fanned his aspirations for further conquest, and he strove next to extend Prussian rule beyond the newly-gained mountain frontier into the northern districts of Bohemia, where his successor's arms in 1866 afterwards met with such signal fortune. On this occasion, however, his strength proved unequal to the new task of spoliation. The king was fairly worsted, and forced out of Bohemia by Daun and Prince Charles of Lorraine; and although the ready tactics of Hohenfriedberg and Sohr proved his increasing dexterity in handling the machine-like army he had trained, he was soon glad to come to terms,

and to resign his audacious attempt to aggrandize Prussia upon condition that she retained her late acquisitions.

During the ten years of comparative tranquillity that followed, Frederick employed himself in bringing his troops into a state of discipline never before equalled in any age or country, with the view of concentrating his whole resources on the deadly struggle, not far distant, whose issue, as he foresaw, would be all-important to his dynasty.

Secret information of an alliance between Austria, Russia, and Saxony, gave Frederick reason to fear an attack, which he hastened to anticipate by the invasion of Saxony in 1756. This commenced the Seven Years' War, in which he contended, almost single-handed, against the united forces of Russia, Saxony, Sweden, France, Austria, and the great majority of the other German states. Various were the changes of fortune that befel him during the next six years, success alternating from one side to the other. The glories of Rosbach, Prague, and Leuthen were overshadowed by the disasters of Kollin, Hochkirch, and Kunersdorf. Frederick himself at times seemed to despair of any issue but death for himself and dissolution for his realm. Yet his boldness as a general and readiness as a tactician remained undiminished by defeat, failure, or depression. These qualities, with the excellent training of his troops, his good fortune in possessing the two finest cavalry officers a single army has ever known, and the moral and material support consistently given by England, sufficed to save the struggling kingdom from the ruin that so often, during this tremendous struggle, seemed inevitable. What Prussia suffered whilst it lasted may be conjectured from a few words occurring in the king's own correspondence. On this subject he, of all men, would be little likely to exaggerate. He says, "The peace awakens universal joy. For my own part, being but a poor old man, I return to a city where I now know nothing but the walls; where I cannot find again the friends I once had; where unmeasured toils await me; and where I must soon lay me down to rest in that place in which there is no more unquiet, nor war, nor misery, nor man's deceit." After all his many vicissitudes of fortune, however, the king was left in 1763 in the peaceful possession of his paternal and acquired dominions; the position of his country was assured, and the policy steadily pursued for three successive generations had attained

its first great aim. The principality, raised out of obscurity by the Great Elector, and made a kingdom by his son, was henceforth to hold a solid position as one of the first powers of Europe, and the admitted rival of Austria for the leadership of Germany. Her land had indeed a long rest after the great strife for existence; but Frederick, whilst watching diligently over its internal improvement, took care to insure its independent position by refilling as soon as possible the gaps in his army. The standing forces which he maintained and handed over to his successor were scarcely inferior in strength to those which Prussia, with more than three times his resources, kept in pay before the war of 1866; and the greatness of the burden thus imposed is better understood when it is known that the three per cent. of the population which, under Frederick, were actively kept in arms, supply under the present system the whole peace army, the landwehr of the first call, and most of those of the second.

The only other military enterprise of any pretensions undertaken by Frederick was a campaign against Austria, distinguished by its marked difference of character from the somewhat reckless strategy for which he had been famed, and the striking parallel which its opening afforded to that of the great war of 1866; for its scene lay on the very ground where Benedek was afterwards called to oppose another Prussian invasion of Bohemia. The great general's conduct, however, was here in truth very different from that of the Frederick of twenty years before, and we can only account for it by admitting either that his intellect and daring were dulled by coming infirmity, or by supposing that he believed the objects of the campaign could be fully attained without the risk and bloodshed of a great battle. Certain it is, that in this the closing military adventure of his life, he appeared as though utterly foiled by the adversaries he had so often in earlier days worsted in fair field. Frederick, however, if losing some of his military prestige in the bloodless campaign (known familiarly as the "Potato War") of his old age, found sufficient consolation in its political results, and the admission practically made by Austria that her imperial position had sunk to the mere presidency of a confederation. Henceforth, there was recognized in Prussia a power whose consent was a first condition for any action of Austria within the Germanic empire; a power

to whom every element hostile to the Kaiser would rally, should the constant rivalry for the control of Germany break out into open hostility.

The military force so ably used by Frederick in enlarging the influence of Prussia at the expense of Austria, was for some years employed with scarcely inferior success in other quarters by his nephew and successor, Frederick William II. Interfering in the civil war in Holland (1787), the well-drilled Prussian battalions without difficulty put down the popular party, and restored the Stadtholder to his shaken seat; and the king had the double satisfaction of increasing the moral weight of his influence in Europe, and of asserting that principle of divine right, to him no less dear than to the first monarch of the line, or to their present representative. A more material gain was that achieved under the guidance of his unscrupulous minister, Herzberg, at the second partition of Poland, when Dantzic and Thorn, districts long coveted as including the mouths of the Vistula, were obtained as the price of Prussia's complicity in a spoliation carried out with an amount of diplomatic fraud even greater than that in which Frederick had shared.

The intervention of Prussia in the affairs of Holland had not long ceased to excite attention, and the final partition of Poland was still unaccomplished, when that mighty storm arose in the west which was destined for a time to extinguish the rivalries and animosities of German powers in their general humiliation, and to school them by common sufferings, by common hatred and fear of a foreign foe, into the union which was only dissolved by the outbreak of 1866. Austria was to be laid prostrate by republican armies, Prussia to be humbled in the dust, and for years to bear the chain of the victor. A new general was to eclipse the achievements of Frederick, and a bolder and more unscrupulous diplomacy than the Great Elector's was to change the whole map of Europe, and remove her most ancient landmarks. The French Revolution and Napoleon came; and the march of Prussian progress was arrested until the overthrow of the latter at Waterloo.

Prussia hesitated considerably before showing any practical opposition to the proceedings of the Republic, and not until the sacred rights of kings were attacked in the person of Louis XVI., after his flight to Varennes, did Frederick William move

to the rescue. By the treaty of Pillnitz (August, 1791) he then entered into an alliance with Austria for an armed intervention on behalf of the French sovereign, and with a force mainly composed of Prussian battalions, under the duke of Brunswick, entered Champagne in 1792, having first issued a boastful proclamation against the Revolution and its abettors. Relying too much on the promised support with which they nowhere met, the Prussian staff threw aside the prudent, but cumbrous, arrangements of magazines by which Frederick had always prepared for his offensive movements; and their troops, plunging into an inhospitable district in unusually bad weather, perished by the thousand for lack of supplies. The sickness that ensued, and the unexplained vacillation of the king or of the duke of Brunswick at Valmy, proved the ruin of the expedition, and the turning point of the revolutionary war. Thenceforth the republican armies grew in *morale* as rapidly as in numbers, and a system of tactics destined to replace that which Frederick had bequeathed to Europe, was initiated by the revolutionary generals, and brought to its perfection under Napoleon's master hand, to overthrow the troops of each great power in turn. The failure of the Prussians in their campaign was as great a surprise to Europe in 1792, as the sudden collapse of the Austrian army in 1866, or that of France in 1870. The disasters proved a powerful motive for Frederick William's withdrawal from a struggle in which there was nothing for Prussia to gain, but which had brought a victorious enemy to the borders of her own western provinces. The treaty of Basle soon followed, and Europe saw with dismay the great German power, whose arms, forty years before, had defied France, though leagued with half the Continent, admitting the claim of the aggressive Republic to advance her frontier to the Rhine.

The conduct of the war that Prussia thus relinquished had dimmed her former fame no less than the peace that closed it; yet no administrator rose at this time competent to point out the causes of the ill success which, save in the desultory but brilliant skirmishes conducted by Colonel Blücher and his cavalry, had invariably attended her arms. The activity of this daring trooper was, however, exceptional, and the chief commanders illustrated every degree of military imbecility, while their troops retained only the drill of the battalions of Frederick, and exhibited nothing of

their heroic spirit. In spite of the severe system of conscription by districts, enforced by every penalty which the law could employ, a trade in permits for absence had long been established as a perquisite of the captains. Those who could pay well for the exemption were thus allowed to escape the allotted service, the bribes received being partly put in the pockets of the recipients and partly used to attract an inferior class of recruits to the ranks of an army which an iron discipline, maintained in every detail, made thoroughly distasteful in time of peace. Composed thus of indifferent material, brought together by a system of corruption, the companies were as ill-led as they were badly composed, and the army which had once been acknowledged the first in Europe, was now inferior to others in fitness for the field. It was specially ill-suited to meet the growing enthusiasm of the French soldiery, whose ardour, springing from political fanaticism, was sustained through the sternest trials by the hope of professional advancement.

Frederick William III., who succeeded in 1797 to the throne, continued for nearly ten years the neutral policy inaugurated by his father. The indignity, however, which Napoleon inflicted upon Prussia by forcing a passage through the country on his way to Ulm and Austerlitz, excited such a fever of popular fury through the kingdom as shook the royal power, and showed alike the antipathy of the whole German race to the progress of French influence within the empire, and the necessity which thenceforth lay upon the king to adopt a policy more conformable to the wishes of his subjects. To incur the active hostility of Prussia, besides that of Russia and Austria, was what Napoleon was just now anxious to avoid, and he watched with some uneasiness the feeling gathering against him. The entreaties of queen, ministers, and people, had well-nigh swept away the vacillation of the king, and war was to be declared by Prussia on December 15 against the French emperor. At this crisis Napoleon, feigning reconciliation and friendship, adroitly offered a bribe, the temptation of which proved irresistible; and on the very day on which war was to have been declared, Frederick William accepted at the hand of the crafty emperor the coveted gift of Hanover, which now, more honestly won, extends the limits of the once petty margraviate from Russia to the German Ocean.

Austria, meantime, unaided by Prussia, had encountered Napoleon at Austerlitz, and was now writhing under the humiliation of a crushing defeat. The degrading acquisition of territory which Prussia had made was not long destined, however, to reward its public treachery. The bribes of Napoleon Frederick William found to be no free gifts. Bavaria was enlarged at the expense of his kingdom. Cleves and Berg were surrendered to provide the despot's brother-in-law with a new duchy, and fresh insults followed with contemptuous rapidity. From the rank of a great power Prussia found herself suddenly fallen to the condition of a French dependency, and her monarch treated as the French emperor's vassal. Yet she had attempted no struggle and suffered no defeat; had looked on unscathed whilst her neighbours bled; and now, waiting for their loss to make her gain, found herself isolated, exposed, and humbled without pity—a warning for all time to statesmen who make a traffic of neutrality. If the court could endure this, the people could not. Alike the noble, the burgher, and the peasant felt a warlike fever fire their veins, and that tempest of passion swept over the nation, which is to individual fury as the trampling of a multitude to the footfall of a man. Without counting the cost or measuring the odds—without waiting for the aid of Russia, still hostile to France—Frederick William was forced into the struggle he dreaded, and Prussia, single-handed, faced Napoleon and his vassals. Planted already by Bavarian permission within easy distance of the chief strategic points; armed with the might of superior numbers, long training, and accumulated victory; led by a chief whose bold strategy had not yet degenerated into limitless waste of men's lives; the French poured up on the flank exposed by the rash and ill-considered advance of their enemy. Jena was fought and won by the French almost within sight of the little hill of Rosbach, which had given name to their defeat half a century before, and that signal victory was avenged tenfold by the battle which laid Prussia prostrate at the conqueror's feet.

With a rapidity of which even Napoleon's troops were scarcely thought capable, the kingdom was overrun, the remains of its army annihilated, and its cities occupied. The hollowness of its military condition was manifested alike by the evil condition of its fortresses and the overthrow of its columns. Blücher, indeed, fought fiercely to the last; but

with this, and two other less noted exceptions to the shameful imbecility of the commanders, generals and governors seemed to vie with each other in surrendering their posts with the least effort at resistance. Reduced, however, as Frederick William was, to a single city and a few square miles of territory, he refused to submit to the harsh terms required of him, until the disaster of Friedland, and the subsequent retreat of the allies, compelled that abandonment of his unhappy kingdom which was one of the conditions imposed by the conqueror when he met Alexander at Tilsit.

No need is there for us to repeat the fatal story of Jena and of Friedland. The bitter lesson taught the nation then has stamped itself ever since upon the national armament, and Prussian administrators strive now as earnestly to be in advance of all Europe in warlike knowledge, as they then clung warmly to the traditions of obsolete tactics which all Europe but themselves had abandoned. But the penalty of truckling policy and pedantic manoeuvring was undergone; and for the next six years the kingdom suffered such humiliation as no other civilized country in modern years has endured. French soldiers swaggered on the pavements of the garrisons. French officers forbade the concert-room its national airs. French generals lived at free quarters in the pleasant squires' houses, which even the all-pervading rapacity of Tilly's and Wallenstein's hordes had not always reached. French battalions lay scattered in the secluded villages, and roused a jealous demon in the dullest Hans whose sweetheart was exposed to the audacious attentions of wandering chasseurs. French *douaniers* checked and controlled and took bribes for the little trade which the long maritime war had spared. And all these intruders were to be maintained at the expense of the quiet orderly land of which they seemed to have taken permanent possession. The Prussian army seemed to have disappeared, so diminished were its numbers. The enslaved monarchy was guarded by the ablest and most feared of the rough soldiers, whom the long course of French victories had brought to eminence; and Davoust headed a garrison so large and highly organized, that even warm patriots shrank from a hopeless contest with its strength. The history of that sad time, with all the irritating details of the French occupation, is written in the municipal records of every Prussian town, in village legend, in popular romance.



The burden is always the same: French insults endured in the hope of revenge to come; ardent longing for the day of freedom; tears for the fate of brave Major Schill, warrior of the true heroic type, who, unable to bear longer his country's shame, rode forth one morning at the head of such of his men as would follow him, to declare war single-handed with oppression, and give his life freely in a conflict without hope. Multiply the story of one village by a thousand, the indignation of one citizen by millions, and it will be seen that each day of the French occupation served to give strength and depth to the growing hatred which henceforth must burn in every Prussian breast, and in due time burst forth in furious action.

No doubt the confidence which Bohemian victories gave the nation in its arms has much to do with the readiness for a struggle on the Rhine which Prussia has since displayed. No doubt the vague desire for German unity has been strengthened into passionate longing since Austria has ceased to bar the way. But the ancient loathing of French rule, the ancient detestation of French interference, the deep memory of the time when a Napoleon was indeed "the Scourge of the Fatherland," was all that was needed to touch the heart of the nation with that fire which we have watched this summer so fiercely blaze forth into action.

Stripped of half her territory, the rest a mere field for French tax-gatherers, or exercise-ground for French troops, the policy of Prussia for the six years succeeding Jena seemed to consist but in different degrees of servility to the master whose chains she had no power to shake off. Her revenues were swallowed up by foreign exactions, her army reduced to a mere corps by the decree of Napoleon, and her means of rising against the oppressor seemed hopelessly gone. But whilst despised by both foe and ally, Prussia had yet within her the elements of self-purification. The hard school of humiliation did not break her spirit, nor turn her statesmen aside from the deliberate endeavour to retrieve the past. Frederick William was happy in his counsellors, for there were those among them who never lost sight of the past greatness of their country, and in her hours of deepest darkness strove to fit her for a better destiny than that of a vassal province. Stein, her great minister, laboured indefatigably to prepare her recovery, by raising the legal condition of her peasantry, and breathing into them the spirit of patriotism through measures

of domestic reform. Scharnhorst gave no less efficient aid by devising that system of short service in the regular army, on which the existing organization rests. By Napoleon's decree the standing army was not to exceed 40,000 men; but no restriction was named as to the time the men should serve. By Scharnhorst's plan the actual time of service was limited to six months, with frequent calls of recruits succeeding each other in the ranks, and thence returning home to be embodied in the militia, so as to spread through the suffering nation a general knowledge of arms against the day of need. The laws of promotion were modified, and many of the exemptions from military service abolished; to each company was allotted twice the necessary number of officers; and the disbanded men assembled from time to time in their cantons, and were provided with arms, stores, and clothing from the dépôts disseminated over the country.

The immediate result of Stein's reforms was a vast increase of national spirit and strength. The military service of the country was accepted by all without reluctance, in tacit preparation for the day of reckoning with France; and the struggle of 1814 once over, the minister was encouraged by every class to elaborate a complete project for the perpetuation of the system which had restored glory and freedom to Prussia. The foundation of the permanent constitution of the national force was laid by the remarkable law of September 3, 1814—which for more than forty years was the charter adhered to by government and people as binding on both sides, and which in its introduction is declared to be the issue of the wishes of the whole nation—and in the landwehr ordinance of 21st November, 1815.

"In a lawfully administered armament of the country lies the best security of lasting peace." Such is the principle proclaimed as its groundwork, together with the more immediate necessity of maintaining intact by the general exertions the freedom and honourable condition which Prussia had just won. All former exemptions from service in favour of the noblesse were from this time abrogated. Every native of the state, on completing his twentieth year, was to be held as bound to form part of her defensive power; but, with a view to the avoiding inconvenient pressure on the professional and industrial population, the armed force was to be composed of sections whose service

should lessen in severity as their years advanced. The whole system comprised, 1st, a standing army, the annual contingent of recruits to which was laid down at 40,000 men, who were to form the nucleus of the regular army of 140,000; 2nd, a landwehr of the first call; 3rd, a landwehr of the second call; and 4th, the landsturm.

The standing army was to be composed of volunteers willing to undergo the necessary examinations for promotion, with a view to the adoption of a regular military career; of men voluntarily enlisting without being prepared for such examination; and of a sufficient number of the youth of the nation called out from their twentieth to their twenty-fifth year—the first three years to be spent by these latter actually with the colours; the other two as “reserved” recruits, remaining at home, but ready to join the ranks at the first sound of war.

The landwehr of the first call, composed of men from twenty-five to thirty-two who had passed through the regular army and reserve, was designed for the support of the standing army in case of war, and was liable to serve at home or abroad, though in peace only to be called out for such exercise as is necessary for training and practice.

The landwehr of the second call was intended in case of war for garrison duty, or in special need, to be used in its entirety either for corps of occupation or reinforcements to the army. It consisted of all who had left the army and the first call. The drill of the second call was in time of peace only for single days, and in their own neighbourhood.

The landsturm was to be called out only in provinces of the kingdom actually invaded, and then must be summoned by a special royal decree. It included all the men up to the fiftieth year who were not regularly allotted to the army or landwehr; of all who had completed their landwehr service; and of all the youth able to carry arms who had attained their seventeenth year. It consisted of civic and local companies in the towns, villages, and open country, according to the divisions of the districts for other governmental purposes. No provision, however, was made for the exercise of these companies, which have, in fact, existed only on paper.\*

\* In the preceding historical sketch, as well as in the similar portion of the following chapter on the military system of France, we have been considerably indebted to a very able work by Colonel Chesney and Mr. Henry Reeve, on “The Military Resources of Prussia and France” (London, Longman & Co., 1870).

From what we have just said it will be seen that by the law of 1814 every Prussian subject capable of carrying arms was called upon to serve from the age of twenty to twenty-three in the active army; from twenty-three to twenty-five in the reserve; from twenty-five to thirty-two in the first call of the landwehr; and from thirty-two to thirty-nine in the second—the landsturm comprehending all citizens from the age of seventeen to forty-nine who were not incorporated in the army or landwehr. The Prussian forces were therefore composed in the following manner:—1st. The standing army in time of peace, 140,000; and by the embodiment of the reserve on a war footing, of 220,000. 2nd. The first call of the landwehr, infantry and cavalry, numbering in time of war 150,000. 3rd. The second call of the landwehr, numbering 110,000. If we add to these figures the 50,000 men capable of being recruited by the anticipation of their time of service, we attain a total of 530,000, of which 340,000 composed the armies in the field, and the rest the depôts and garrisons. Only a quarter of these forces were maintained by the state in time of peace.

Such was the achievement of Scharnhorst, and of those patriots whom yet Prussia remembers with gratitude. The organization subsisted, almost without modification, during the two reigns of Frederick William III. and of his son, Frederick William IV., brother of the reigning king. During many years no occasion arose to consecrate on the field the system initiated in 1813. While Prussia seemed for ever condemned to inaction, Russia was skirmishing in the Caucasus, Austria was kept in arms by her Italian difficulties, and France had ever in Algeria a school of war in which to form her officers and prove her troops. It was feared that time had in a great measure deadened the spirit of 1813, and that the enforced military service had become odious to the people. In 1830, under the influence of a strong popular emotion, the Prussian government called out a part of the landwehr, and the result undeniably showed that the enthusiasm kindled by the War of Independence had considerably evaporated. Nevertheless, it was judged dangerous to modify the existing system, since it contained the essential germ of an ideal army: obligatory service. In 1848, in 1850, in 1854, and in 1859, the landwehr was again embodied; and though no hostilities followed to test the system by the stern proofs of war, the

government found it unready for action, and ill suited to the needs of a bold policy. On each occasion it was observed that the tactical combination of elements so differently constituted worked badly in practice. The landwehr officers showed a keen jealousy of the assumed superiority, both of their comrades of the line and of the staff, who controlled the whole. Educated in a thoroughly military course; possessed generally of more means than the regulars; and commanding soldiers as good, at the least, as the recruits under the latter; endowed, moreover, constitutionally, with a sort of military equality, they manifested an unmistakable impatience in appearing in the field to support a policy which, in two instances at least, was not heartily favoured by the sympathies of the nation.

The royal government saw clearly enough that an army thus composed could not be relied upon for accomplishing the vast scheme of German supremacy, bequeathed by the Great Elector as his hereditary legacy to the Hohenzollerns. The decrees of November, 1850, and of April, 1852, aimed at remedying these evils. The formation of the army was materially altered. Infantry brigades were thenceforward to be composed of two regiments of the line and one corresponding body of landwehr. In March, 1853, a ministerial order completed this amelioration, and the arrangement was highly effective in amalgamating the two elements which composed the national forces. These alterations, however, were trifling compared to the measures of 1860, in which year the national forces underwent, at the mere will of the executive, a change, in regard to numbers, as great as any ever wrought by republican vote or imperial decree; and notwithstanding six years of firm remonstrance on the part of the House of Deputies, the new system was maintained in every detail until the long-prepared-for war came to justify its authors in the eyes of the nation. At one stroke the annual supply of recruits actually drafted into the line was raised from 40,000 to 63,000. The standing army was augmented by 117 infantry battalions, 10 regiments of cavalry, 31 companies of artillery, 18 of engineers, and 9 battalions of train for the hitherto insufficient transport departments.

The authors of the re-organization took for the starting-point of their calculations the fact that the resources of the country in point of population

and revenue had so increased since 1815 that the army was no longer in proportion with them. When the fundamental law of 1814 first took effect, a call to arms was made of  $1\frac{1}{4}$  per cent. of the population; and though the standing army was now augmented from 140,000 to 217,000, the proportion still remained below  $1\frac{1}{4}$  per cent., so rapid had been the increase of population. The pecuniary sacrifices were also relatively much inferior to those accepted without a murmur in 1814. At that epoch, in spite of the impoverished condition of the nation, the army of 140,000 cost 35 per cent. of the state receipts. On the eve of the Austrian war, the army of 217,000 then absorbed but 29 per cent. of the budget of receipts. It will be thus seen that the augmentation of the active army in 1860 was consistent with the spirit and letter of the law of September, 1814. But the king's object was not only to multiply the numerical force of the army in proportion to the growth of population, but to give that army a permanent consistency that should abrogate the necessity of drawing able-bodied men from "the people under arms," and thus relieve the country from the indisputable evils attendant upon the landwehr system pure and simple.

The most serious innovation of 1860 remains to be noticed. It will be remembered that, under the law of 1814, the recruit owed the state three years of active and continual service, and two years of service in the reserve. The re-organization decree of 1860 prolonged the service in the reserve to four years. The increase of taxation thus caused, and the prolongation of military service, were amply compensated, however, by the security conferred upon the rest of the population. Under the old system the army could only be placed on a war footing by drafting into it large bodies of the landwehr. It is easy to understand the constant perturbation and anxiety the possibility of such an event created among the people. The line of policy that led Prussia into the war of 1866 might not have possessed the suffrage and consent of the whole nation; but the discontent would have been immeasurably more open and serious had the 610,000 men that expressed the strength of the Prussian army in July, 1866, been obtained principally by means of the landwehr. The actual means employed were found to be less costly than the former system. Even a partial mobilization entailed enormous expense, each commune having to be in-

demnified for its relief of the families left destitute by the departure of the male members. Statistics prove that the cost of each soldier was considerably lessened by the re-organization. In 1820 a soldier cost annually 211 thalers; in 1830 the expense had fallen to 177 thalers; during the mobilization that took place in 1859, the cost reached 214 thalers. After the re-organization it was rated at 196 thalers. Though the Schleswig campaign was undertaken in the winter of 1864, it was not found needful to call upon any part of the landwehr, or indeed to mobilize all the standing army corps. In 1866, however, under the pressure of a heavier strain, Prussia was obliged to have recourse to the landwehr, and the great advantages of the system were then fully demonstrated. The number of men from the landwehr incorporated in the army of 610,000, at the disposition of the Prussian government in 1866, was estimated at 191,500; but of the 261,000 combatants who took part in the battles of Turnau, Münchengrätz, Trautenau, Skalitz, Nachod, Gitchin, and Sadowa, only 27,000 had been summoned from it. How completely the victories of that year swept away all opposition to the Bismarck régime and the royal military system; how the current of democracy, long dashing vainly against the power of the monarchy, turned aside to flow in the tempting channel of national aggrandisement; how German patriots came to look upon their great standing army as no useless attribute of absolutism, but the mighty instrument of completing the once ideal Fatherland, and framing, for the vision of past days, a solid existence: these are now matters of familiar history.

The campaign of 1866 added four millions of the most warlike races of Germany to the Prussian dominions; and to the whole of these the obligation to serve in the army was extended. The eight corps of the old Prussian army were raised to twelve and a half by the formation of one in Schleswig-Holstein, another in conquered Hanover, a third in Cassel and Frankfort, a fourth created out of the fine Saxon army, and a division raised in the northern half of Hesse-Darmstadt. The Prussian system was also introduced into the independent North German States, and every North German is, therefore, now liable to service, and no substitution is allowed. The Federal troops take the oath of fealty to the Federal generalissimo, and all form one army under one command.

Within less than a year of the victory of Sadowa, when the South Germans still sorely felt their defeat, and murmured at their coming Prussianization, and when the new army of the Northern Confederation existed only on paper, Prussia had to face the prospect of a war with France on the Luxemburg question with the lesser resources that had proved so sufficient, and had served her so well, against Austria. But France was then supplied with inferior weapons. Her troops would have had to face the breech-loader at the same risk as those of Benedek; and though the danger of collision passed away for a season, it was certainly not from any fear on the side of the military guides of Prussia, who afterwards avowed that their sole strategy would have been to have massed the armies lately victorious in Bohemia in two great columns on the Rhine, and march straight for Paris, trusting to the needle-gun. The Luxemburg question, however, was solved at the instance of Europe, and by the special interposition of England, and the mortal struggle of the two countries was postponed for three years; and how were these three years spent by the Germans? The field army was vastly increased, as were also the reserves, by the application of the Prussian system to the new Confederation and its allies. These additions were the natural result of annexation and alliance, and concerned the infantry chiefly; but most important changes and additions were also made in the artillery and cavalry departments, which will be alluded to further on in our description of those branches of the service.

In a case where the whole male population may be said to be trained for arms, it is, of course, not an easy matter to arrive at the exact total of men capable of being brought into the field. According to official returns, however, which recent experience has shown to be below rather than above the numbers, the total strength of the army of the North German Confederation amounts to 316,224 men on the peace footing, and to 952,294 men on the war footing. This war establishment comprises:—Field troops, privates and non-commissioned officers, 553,189; depôts, ditto, 185,623; garrison troops, ditto, 208,517; staff, 4965. These are the armies of Prussia, or rather the one army of the North German Confederation. But as the non-confederate states of the South have made common cause in defence of the Fatherland, in the war of which this work treats, we must add



their forces to the total. The Bavarian army numbers 73,419 men, or, by calling in the reserves, 96,804. Wurtemberg can furnish in war time 29,392 men, and Baden 24,386.

It must not be supposed that the Prussian system involves the training for arms and personal service in the ranks of the *entire* male population. The peculiarity of the system is more in the universal *liability* to service, without any option of substitution. The number of young men who every year arrive at the age of twenty is, however, much larger than the annual contingent to be drafted into the army. Those who are not required for the annual contingent are placed in the second Ersatz reserve. They are liable to be called on in case of war; but as the landwehr have to go first, the chance of their ever being so is exceedingly remote. A very large number of able-bodied men in Germany are never enrolled. It is true that the landsturm includes all men between seventeen and fifty not forming part of the army or landwehr; but this force is only liable to be called out in case of actual invasion.

The Prussian army which takes the field in time of war consists of twelve corps d'armée of troops of the line, and of the corps d'armée of the guard. Each corps d'armée is organized with the intention of being a perfectly complete little army of itself, so that without inconvenience it can be detached from the main army at any time. Each corps d'armée of the line in time of war consists of two divisions of infantry, one division of cavalry, sixteen batteries of artillery, and a military train. Each division of infantry is composed of two brigades, each of which has two regiments, and as each regiment contains three battalions, in a division of infantry there are twelve battalions; to every infantry division is also attached one regiment of cavalry of four squadrons, and one division of artillery of four batteries, making the total strength of the force under the command of every infantry divisional general twelve battalions, four squadrons, and four batteries.

A cavalry division consists of two brigades, each containing two regiments, and as every regiment has in the field four squadrons, the division contains sixteen squadrons; it has also two batteries of horse artillery attached to it. The Prussian cavalry bore itself gallantly in action in the war of 1866, and proved of abundant service in outpost work in Bohemia; but difficulties were experienced from the

admixture of half-broken horses and unpractised riders. These evils it was judged necessary to avoid in future, by raising very considerably the peace effective of the cavalry by adding a fifth squadron to each regiment, and increasing the number of regiments—a change which made the Prussians in the war of 1870 show a more marked superiority in that arm over the enemy, than Europe had witnessed since the Archduke Charles outmanœuvred Morcau and Jourdan on the Danube by the dexterous use of his horse.

The reserve of artillery consists of one division of field artillery, which forms four batteries, and of two batteries of horse artillery, besides an artillery train for the supply of ammunition.

This gives the strength of a corps d'armée as twenty-four battalions of infantry, twenty-four squadrons of cavalry, and sixteen batteries of artillery. Besides this, however, each corps has one distinct "Jaegerbataillon" (battalion of sharpshooters), the men of which are all "picked." The sons of "Waldhüter," "Förster," "herrhsaftliche Jaeger," all from their childhood familiar with the handling of a rifle, are chosen for this service. Their uniform is dark green instead of dark blue. The corps has also one battalion of engineers, besides an engineer train for the transport of materials for making bridges, and a large military train which carries food, hospitals, medicines, fuel for cooking, bakeries, and all the other necessities not only of life, but of the life of an army, the members of which require not only the same feeding, clothing, and warming as other members of the human race, but also bullets, powder, shot and shells, saddlery for their horses, and who from the nature of their life are more liable to require medicines, bandages, splints, and all hospital accessories than other men.

If we do not consider the train when we are calculating the number of combatants who actually fall in, in the line of battle, every battalion may be considered to consist of 1002 men. Thus the force of infantry and engineers in a corps d'armée numbers over 26,000, and on account of men absent through sickness may in round numbers be calculated at this figure. Each squadron of cavalry may be calculated at 150 mounted men, which makes the whole cavalry force about 3000 men. Each division of four batteries of horse artillery brings into the field 590 actual combatants, and each of field artillery the same, so that the whole

artillery force of a corps d'armée is about 2350 men. The actual number of combatants with a corps d'armée is in this way seen to be 31,350 men, which may be stated in round numbers at 31,000. The guard corps d'armée differs chiefly from the line corps in having one additional rifle battalion, one additional fusilier regiment, and two additional cavalry regiments, which increase its strength by about 5150 actual combatants; the total number of combatants in this corps may be safely assumed as 36,000 men, in round numbers.

If we turn, however, to the list furnished by the military authorities, we find that the army is said to consist of 553,189 men, with 165,591 horses, of which only about 102,000 belong to the cavalry and artillery, and that it is accompanied by a waggon train of 17,743 carriages, of which only 5000 belonging to the artillery perform any service on the field of battle.

What has then become of these 90,000 men, 60,000 horses, and 11,000 carriages which form the difference between the returns we find of an army on paper and the actual number of men engaged on the field of battle? This difference represents the moving power of the combatant branches; it is this difference that feeds the warriors when they are well, that tends them when wounded, and nurses them when struck down with disease. Nor are these the only duties of the non-combatant branches. An army on a campaign is a little world of itself, and has all the requirements of ordinary men moving about the world, besides having an enemy in its neighbourhood, who attempts to oppose its progress in every way possible. When the line of march leads to a river, over which there is either no bridge or where the bridge has been destroyed, a bridge must be immediately laid down, and, accordingly, a bridge train is necessarily always present with the army. When a camp is pitched, field bakeries have to be immediately established to feed the troops; field telegraphs and field post-offices must be established for the rapid transmission of intelligence. A large staff must be provided for, which is the mainspring which sets all the works going. And these are only ordinary wants, such as any large picnic party on the same scale would require. When we consider that 200 rounds of ammunition can easily be fired away by each gun in a general action, that every infantry soldier can on the same occasion dispose of 120 rounds of ball cartridge, and that this must

be all replaced immediately; that all this requires an enormous number of carriages, with horses and drivers; that outside of the line of battle there must be medical men, their assistants, and nurses; that within it and under fire there must be ambulance waggons, and men with stretchers to bear the wounded to them; and that 40 per cent. of the infantry alone in every year's campaign are carried to the rear, we may understand how the large difference between the number of actual fighting men and of men borne upon paper is accounted for.

Each corps d'armée of the line in time of peace is quartered in one of the several provinces of the kingdom; its recruits are obtained from that province, and its landwehr are the men in the province who have served seven years and who have been dismissed from actual service, but are subjected to an annual course of training. The provinces to which the different corps d'armée belong are:—1, Prussia Proper; 2, Pomerania; 3, Brandenburg; 4, Prussian Saxony; 5, Posen; 6, Silesia; 7, Westphalia; 8, Rhine Provinces; 9, Schleswig-Holstein; 10, Hanover; 11, Cassel, &c.; 12, Saxony. The guards are men chosen from the strongest of the military recruits throughout all the provinces of the kingdom. They are from five feet nine inches to six feet one inch in height, and from twelve stones to thirteen and a half stones in weight. The landwehr of the guard consists of the men who have formerly served in it.

The extraordinary elasticity of this organization was first manifested during the campaign of 1866. In a wonderfully short time the large armies which fought at Königgrätz were placed on a war footing, and brought about 260,000 combatants into the very field of battle, besides the necessary detachments which must be made by a large army to cover communications, mask fortresses, and so on; but the detachments made from the Prussian army were very small compared to those which would have had to be separated from an army organized on a different system; for as the field army advanced the dépôt troops moved up in rear, and formed both dépôts and reserves for the first line, while some of the garrison troops of landwehr came up from Prussia, and formed the garrisons of Saxony, Prague, Pardubitz, and all the other points on the lines of communication. At the same time General Mülbe's corps, formed for the most part of reserve and dépôt soldiers, pushed up to Brünn, and was hastening to take its place in

the first line, when its march was stopped by the conclusion of the long armistice. In the present war the system was shown to even greater perfection than in 1866; for not only were all gaps in the ranks speedily filled, but the Germans were able to leave 290,000 fighting men for the sieges of Strasbourg and Toul and the investment of Metz, and yet have over 270,000 at the battle of Sedan, and 50,000 men in the line of communication.

Though the part of the Prussian organization which refers to the recruiting of the army and to the filling up of the ranks in case of war had a great deal to do with the success of the campaigns in 1866 and 1870, on account of the facility and rapidity with which by its means the army could be mobilized and brought upon a war footing, the portion of the Prussian organization which relates to the combination of the recruits so obtained in pliable bodies, which can be easily handled, easily moved, yet formed in such due proportions of the different arms as to be capable of independent action, did not fail to be appreciated most fully by those who, with its assistance, gained such tremendous results. This portion of the military organization of the Prussian army is so simple that almost every man in the ranks can understand it. Jealous of expense in time of peace, it allows for a wide expansion, without hurry and without confusion, on the outbreak of war. It provides at the same time for the broadest questions and the most minute details, and is so clearly laid down and so precisely defined, yet at the same time admits of so much elasticity, that the Prussian officers can find no words strong enough to express their praise of it.

As has been previously stated, the Prussian system is a strictly localized one. Every district has its line and landwehr regiment. Adjoining districts are combined in the same military division, and adjoining divisions are united in the same corps d'armée. Each regiment, division, and corps d'armée has thus its local head-quarters, so that the regimental rendezvous is within easy reach of the soldiers' homes, and the combination of the several regiments into their divisions, and of the divisions into their corps, can be easily effected. The military and civil staff remain at the respective head-quarters, and once a year, after the harvest has been got in, the entire machine is put together, its readiness for service tested, and any defects supplied by calling out the active army for a series of military manœuvres by which the officers of

all ranks, as well as the men, are exercised and instructed.

In peace everything is always kept ready for the mobilization of the army, every officer and every official knows during peace what will be his post and what will be his duty the moment the decree for the mobilization is issued, and the moment that decree is flashed by telegraph to the most distant stations every one sets about his necessary duty without requiring any further orders or any explanations.

When a war is imminent the government decrees the mobilization of the whole army, or of such a portion as may be deemed necessary. Every commanding general mobilizes his own corps d'armée; the "Intendantur" the whole of the branches of the administrative services; the commandants of those fortresses which are ordered to be placed in a state of defence take their own measures for strengthening the fortifications and for obtaining from the artillery dépôts the guns necessary for the armament of their parapets. A telegraphic signal from head-quarters puts the whole machinery in operation at once. In the landwehr offices of every village the summonses for assembly lie constantly ready, and have only to be distributed. The mobilization of the whole army is soon complete in every branch. In the present campaign, within four days of the order for mobilizing, military trains began to run at the rate of forty a day towards the Rhine frontier, and in about a fortnight every arm of the service was deposited in their selected places, completely equipped for the field, even to the removers and helpers of the wounded.

The process of the mobilization may be classed under the following five heads:—1, The filling in of the field troops to their war strength; 2, the formation of dépôt troops; 3, the formation of garrison troops and the arming of the fortresses; 4, the mobilization of the field administration; 5, the formation of the head-quarter staffs, &c., who are to remain in the different districts to supply the places of those who march to the seat of war.

The completion of the rank and file of the field troops to war strength is effected by drawing in some of the reserve soldiers, who supply half the total war strength of the infantry, one-third of that of the artillery, and one-twenty-fifth of that of the cavalry. The cavalry has, of course, on account of being maintained in such force during peace, a superabundance of reserve soldiers avail-

able on a mobilization; these, after the men required for the cavalry itself have been drawn from them, are handed over to the artillery and military train, so that these services thus obtain many valuable soldiers, well accustomed to mounted duties. The reserve soldiers who are to be enrolled have orders sent to them through the commanding officer of the landwehr of the district in which they live, who can avail himself of the services of the provincial and parochial civil authorities to facilitate the delivery of these orders. The men are, immediately on the receipt of their orders, required to proceed to the head-quarters of the landwehr of the district, where they are received, medically inspected, and forwarded to their regiment, by an officer and some non-commissioned officers of the regiment which draws its recruits from the district. Officers who are required to fill up vacancies in the regular army on a mobilization are obtained by promoting some of the senior non-commissioned officers and calling in reserve officers.

A great advantage accrues to the Prussian army from the fact, that the country supplies horses in sufficiency for every branch of the service. Of these, as of the men, the local authorities in every hamlet keep a register, and the requisite number is called for as the demand arises. On a mobilization, the whole army requires about 100,000 horses more than it has in time of peace; in order to obtain these quickly the government has the power, if it cannot buy them readily from regular dealers, to take a certain number from every district, paying for them a price which is fixed by a mixed commission of military officers and of persons appointed by the civil authorities of the district.

Each regiment of field artillery forms nine ammunition columns, in each of which are waggons to carry reserve ammunition for infantry, cavalry, and artillery, in the proportions in which experience has shown that ammunition is usually required. In the field these ammunition waggons follow directly in rear of the field army, but are kept entirely separate from the field batteries, the officers of which are justly supposed to have enough to do in action in superintending their own guns, without being hampered with the supply of cartridges to the cavalry and infantry.

Every battalion of engineers forms a column of waggons which carries tools for intrenching purposes, and also a heavy pontoon train and a light

field bridge train for which all is kept ready during peace. If a portion of the army is mobilized merely for practice, or goes into camp for great manœuvres, as is done nearly every summer during peace, one, or perhaps two or three, engineer battalions make their trains mobile, in order to practice the men and to accustom them to the use of the *matériel*. Arms and ammunition which are required to complete the war strength of regiments are supplied from the artillery depôts. Officers are allowed soldier servants on a more liberal scale than in the English army, but no officers' servants are mustered in the company; they form, with all the non-combatant men of each battalion of infantry, the train which is attached to every battalion: this consists of the officers' servants and the drivers of the regimental waggons; every one else borne on the muster-roll draws a trigger in action, so that the muster-rolls actually show the number of rank and file who are present, and do not include any of the followers, who often never come up into the line of battle at all. On service the captain of every company is mounted, and is required to have two horses, to aid in the purchase of which he is allowed a certain sum of money by the state.

The strength of an ordinary battalion on active service is one field-officer, four captains, four first lieutenants, nine second lieutenants, one surgeon, one assistant-surgeon, one paymaster, one quartermaster, 1002 non-commissioned officers and privates. The train attached to this battalion is, besides officers' servants, the drivers of the ammunition waggon, which has six horses; of the *Montirung Wagon*, which carries the paymasters' books, money chest, and a certain amount of material for the repair of arms and clothing, and is drawn by four horses; a hospital cart with two horses, an officers' baggage waggon with four horses, and men to lead four packhorses, each of which carries on a pack-saddle the books of one company.

The baggage of a cavalry regiment on service consists of one medicine cart with two horses, one field forge with two horses, four squadron waggons, each with two horses, one officers' baggage waggon, with four horses; the total strength of a cavalry regiment in the field being 23 officers, 659 men, of whom 600 fall in in the ranks, 713 horses, and seven carriages.

The nine ammunition columns which are formed by each artillery regiment for the supply of ammunition to the artillery and infantry of the corps



d'armée to which the regiment belongs are divided into two divisions, one of which consists of five columns, and has a strength of two officers, 175 men, 174 horses, and 25 waggons; the second, consisting of four columns, has two officers, 173 men, 170 horses, and 24 waggons. This division is made to facilitate the dispatch of the two divisions separately to the ammunition dépôt to have the waggons refilled after their first supply of cartridges has been exhausted, or to allow one division to be detached with each infantry division, in case of the corps d'armée being divided, in which case four columns can conveniently be attached to each infantry division, and one column to the cavalry division of the corps.

The reserve ammunition park from which these ammunition columns are replenished, is also divided into two divisions, each of which has a strength of nine officers, 195 men, 264 carriages, and is further subdivided into eight columns of thirty-three waggons each. It is brought into the theatre of war either by railway or water carriages, or by means of horses hired in the country where the war is being conducted. Generally it is one or two days' march in rear of the army.

A siege train for attacking fortresses is not generally organized at the beginning of a war, unless the general plan of the campaign should be likely to lead the army into a country where fortresses exist, which could not be either neglected or masked, and which must be reduced. If a siege train is organized, it is formed with especial reference to the fortresses against which it is to act, and follows the army in the same manner as the reserve ammunition park.

It is thus that the Prussian army is formed in peace, that its field forces can be made ready to march in a few days in case of war, and that the troops in the field are supplied with the powder and shot which give them the means of fighting. But *l'art de vaincre est perdu sans l'art de subsister* (the art of conquering is as nothing without the art of maintaining the conquering army). An organization of even more importance lies still behind—the organization of the means of supplying the warriors with food when in health, with medicine and hospitals when diseased or wounded, and for filling up the gaps which are opened in the ranks by battle or pestilence; an organization which has always been found to be more difficult and to require more delicate handling than even

strategical combinations, or the arraying of troops for battle.

The Prussian army can enter the field with 760,000 men in its ranks; but, as is well known, no army, nor any collection of men, can maintain its normal strength for a single day; in such a host, even of young healthy men, ordinary illness would immediately cause a few absentees from duty, much more so do the marches, the hardships, and the fatigues to which a soldier is exposed on active service before the first shot is fired. Then as soon as an action takes place, a single day adds a long list to the hospital roll, and the evening sees in the ranks many gaps which in the morning were filled by strong soldiers, who are now lying torn and mangled or dead on the field of battle. The dead are gone for ever; they are so much power lost out of the hand of the general; nor can an army wait till the wounded are cured and are again able to draw a trigger or to wield a sabre. Means must be taken to supply the deficiencies as quickly as possible, and to restore to the commander of the army the missing force which has been expended in moving his own army through the first steps of the campaign, or in resisting the motion of his adversary. What is the amount of such deficiencies may be estimated from Prussian statistics, which have been compiled with great care, and from the experience of many campaigns; these state officially that at the end of a year's war 40 per cent. of the infantry of the field army, 20 per cent. of the cavalry, artillery, and engineers, and 12 per cent. of the military train would have been lost to the service, and have had to be supplied anew.

It is for the formation of these supplies of men, and for forwarding them to the active army, that dépôts are intended. The dépôts of the Prussian army are formed as soon as the mobilization takes place, and it is ordered that one half of the men of each dépôt should be soldiers of the reserve, who, already acquainted with their drill, can be sent up to the front on the first call; the other half of each dépôt consists of recruits who are raised in the ordinary way, and of all the men of the regiments belonging to the field army which have not been perfectly drilled by the time their regiment marches to the seat of war. The officers of the dépôts are either officers who are detached from the regular army for this duty, or are officers who have been previously wounded, and who cannot bear active

service, but can perform the easier duties of the *depôt*, besides young officers, who are being trained to their duty before joining their regiments.

Since the re-organization of 1859, the number of *depôt* troops kept up during a war has been quite doubled; formerly every two infantry regiments had one *depôt* battalion, and every two cavalry regiments one *depôt* squadron. When the army was re-organized, it was foreseen that this amount of *depôt* troops would never be sufficient in case of a war of any duration or severity, so by the new regulations each infantry regiment has one *depôt* battalion of 18 officers and 1002 men; each rifle battalion, a *depôt* company of 4 officers and 201 men; each cavalry regiment, a *depôt* squadron of 5 officers, 200 men, and 212 horses; each field artillery regiment (96 guns), a *depôt* division of one horse artillery battery, and three field batteries, each of four guns, with 14 officers, 556 men, and 189 horses; every engineer battalion, one *depôt* company of 4 officers and 202 men; every train battalion, a *depôt* division of two companies, which muster together 12 officers, 502 men, and 213 horses. All this is required to feed the army in the field with supplies of men to take the places of those who pass from the regimental muster roll into the lists of killed, died in hospital, or disabled; for those who are only slightly wounded return to their duty either in the *depôt* or at once to their battalions, as is most convenient from the situation of the hospital in which they have been.

As a rule, four weeks after the field army has marched, the first supply of men is forwarded from the *depôts* to the battalions in the field. This first supply consists of one-eighth of the calculated yearly loss which has been given above. On the first day of every succeeding month a fresh supply is forwarded. Each of these later supplies is one-twelfth of the total calculated yearly loss. If a very bloody battle is fought, special supplies are sent at once to make up the losses of the troops that have been engaged.

The troops in *depôt* are provided with all articles of equipment with which they should take the field. When a detachment is to be sent to the front, all who belong to one corps d'armée are assembled together; the infantry soldiers are formed into companies of 200 men each for the march, the cavalry into squadrons of about 100 horsemen, and are taken under the charge of officers to the field army, thus bringing to the front with them

the necessary reserves of horses. The places in the *depôts* of those who have marched away are filled up by recruiting.

An army, though of great strength and well provided with supplies of men, cannot always be sure of taking the initiative, and by an offensive campaign driving the war into an enemy's country. Judging from the experience of both the Prusso-Austrian and Franco-Prussian wars, there seems no doubt that an offensive campaign is much better for a country and much more likely to achieve success than a defensive one. But political reasons or want of preparation often force an army to be unable to assume the offensive, and with the loss of the initiative make a present to the enemy of the first great advantage in the war. In this case the theatre of war is carried into its own territory, when an army requires fortresses to protect its arsenals, dockyards, and its capital, to cover important strategical points, or to afford a place where, in case of defeat or disaster, it may be re-organized under the shelter of fortifications and heavy artillery. It has been seen in this war that small fortresses do not, as a rule, delay the progress in the field of a large invading army, which can afford to spare detachments to prevent their garrisons from making sallies. Bitsche, Phalsburg, and Thionville did not delay the German armies for a day, though they are each strong places; but they were masked by detachments, the loss of which from the line of battle was hardly felt by the main body, and the great lines of the German armies passed in safety within a few miles of their paralyzed garrisons.

Under certain circumstances, however, it was found that small fortresses may prove a very serious inconvenience to an invader, who generally counts upon using the main roads and lines of railway of the country through which he passes. In the case of Toul, during the late war, a third-rate fortress, with a garrison ridiculously small compared with the overwhelming number of besiegers, prevented the Germans for full six weeks from using the main railway to Paris; thus obliging them to make a wide detour over a toilsome road, with all their heavy guns and provisions. It was a double inconvenience, inasmuch as the very essential Prussian field telegraph could not be attached to and used with the ordinary lines, but was obliged to be laid across the open country, where, notwithstanding the innumerable patrols,

it was being constantly cut by the French peasants.

As long as fortresses exist they require garrisons, but the troops which are formed in Prussia on the breaking out of a war are not intended, in case of an offensive campaign, only to hang listlessly over the parapets of fortified places. When an army pushes forward into a foreign country, it leaves behind it long lines of road or railway over which pass the supplies of food, clothing, medicines, and stores, which are vitally important to the existence of an army. With an unfriendly population, and the enemy's cavalry ready always to seize an opportunity of breaking in upon these lines of communication, of charging down upon convoys, and destroying or burning their contents, and of thus deranging seriously what might be called the household economy of the army, it is necessary, especially on lines of railway, that strong garrisons should be maintained at particular points, and that patrols should be furnished for nearly the whole line. Towns have to be occupied in rear of the front line, depôts of stores have to be guarded and protected, convoys have to be escorted, telegraph lines watched, the fortifications which may fall garrisoned. To detach troops for the performance of all these duties dribbles away the strength of an army. To provide for these duties, and to allow the main armies to push forward in almost unimpaired strength, Prussia forms on the mobilization of the field army her so-called garrison troops.

For the formation of garrison troops the Prussian government makes use of the landwehr men, or men who have passed through the army and reserve, and are between twenty-seven and thirty-two years of age. The landwehr battalions can be called out either of a strength of 402 men each, by calling in the younger men of the landwehr, or as it is technically called, the first augmentation of the landwehr. By calling in the older men in the second augmentation each battalion is raised to a strength of 802 men. These battalions can be placed in the field formed into divisions of the same number of battalions as the divisions of the regular army. In the campaign of 1870 five such landwehr divisions were actively employed in France.

In some respects, which are easily seen, the Prussian landwehr resembles the British militia, but there are two vital differences between our

organization and that of Prussia. The first is, that in England when a militia regiment is formed it is made up of men who are not old soldiers, and consequently, if the regiment is for some years disembodied, all its late recruits know nothing of their work except what they can pick up in the short period of annual training; so that in course of time, if a regiment remains for many years without being embodied, the mass of the ranks contain men who from want of training are not qualified to step at the outbreak of war into the line of battle. In the second place, the landwehr is as much an attendant and concomitant of an army in the field as the park of reserve artillery; and it is this which makes the landwehr so valuable, because it thus takes up the duties which otherwise would have to be performed by detachments from the active army. If the Prussian armies in 1866 had been obliged to leave detachments in Leipsic, Dresden, Prague, Pardubitz, and along the railway from Görlitz to Brünn, besides troops in Hanover, Hesse, and on the lines of communications of the armies which were fighting against the Bavarians, how many troops would have formed the first lines of battle either on the Danube or in the theatre of war near the Main? The armies which were collecting, together 225,000 regular troops, for the attack upon Vienna, would, unless they had had these landwehr behind them, have been reduced to under 125,000 men. In fact, an English army under the same circumstances would have been shorn of almost half its strength.

When a Prussian army with its unimpaired strength is preparing to fight a battle in an enemy's country, when supplies of men are already coming up in anticipation of the losses which the action will cause, and when its lines of communication are guarded and secured by the garrison troops in its rear, it musters an enormous number of soldiers, who must every day be provided with food, without which a man can neither fight, march, nor live; and not only must it provide for itself alone, but also for the prisoners of the enemy who may fall into its hands—not only food, but hospitals, medicines, and attendants for the sick, surgeries, assistants, and appliances for the wounded, and the means of conveying both sick and wounded from the places where they fall helpless to convenient spots where they may be tended and healed at a safe distance from the danger of battle, or of being



taken in case of a sudden advance of the enemy. It is extremely difficult from mere figures to realize what a gigantic undertaking it has been to supply even food alone to the armies which have fought in the late campaign. The difficulties of such a task may be conceived if we remember that the front line of the Prussian armies invading France, while Metz, Strasburg, and Toul were still unsubdued, mustered twelve times the number of British troops with which Lord Raglan invaded the Crimea; that close behind this line lay a second large army, and that this army and the army which was besieging Strasburg were alone stronger by 200,000 men than all the British, German, and Spanish troops that fought at Talavera; that behind them again was a large mass of landwehr; that during the siege of Sebastopol the British army was stationary, and had the great advantage of sea transport to within a few miles of its camps, while in the late campaign the Prussian army moved forward at an enormously rapid rate; and that the men to be fed in the front line alone numbered about 270,000—a population larger than that of the twelfth part of London. He would be a bold man who would undertake to supply the twelfth part of the whole population of the metropolis with one day's food; a bolder still who would undertake the task if this portion of the population were about to move bodily on that morning down to Richmond, and would require to have the meat for their dinner delivered to them the moment they arrived there, and who, without railway transport, agreed to keep the same crowd daily provided with food until moving at the same rate they arrived at Plymouth; and yet a general has to do much more than this in giving food to his men—he has, besides the ordinary difficulties of such a task, to calculate upon bad roads, weary horses, breaking waggons, the attacks of an enemy's cavalry; he has not only to get the food to the troops, but in many cases he has to provide it in the first place; he has to keep his magazines constantly stocked, to increase the amount of transport in exact proportion as his troops advance; to feed not only the fighting men, but all the men who are employed in carrying provisions to the combatants, to find hay and corn for all the horses of the cavalry and for the horses of the transport waggons, and to arrange beforehand so that every man and horse shall halt for the night in close

proximity to a large supply of good water. This is not the lightest nor the least of a general's duties. It was the proud boast of England's great soldier that "many could lead troops; he could feed them." When the enemy is in front, and any moment may bring on an action, a general has little time to turn his mind to the organization of a system of supply. Then he must sift intelligence, weigh information, divine his adversary's intentions almost before they are formed, prepare a parry for every blow, and speed a thrust into any opening joint of his antagonist's harness. The means of supplying troops ought to be given ready into the hands of a general; they should be all arranged and organized beforehand, so that he has but to see that they are properly administered and made use of.

The transport which follows a Prussian army in the field, exclusive of the waggons of each battalion, the artillery, engineer, and ammunition trains, and the field telegraph divisions, is divided under two heads. The first and larger portion is under the direction of the Intendantur department, and is maintained solely for the supply of food, forage, money, and extra clothing to men and horses. The second portion is also under the Intendantur, but is placed at the disposal of the medical department, and carries the medicines and hospital necessities for the sick and wounded, together with the means of carrying disabled men.

The first portion in charge of the Intendantur department consists, in the first place, of a certain amount of waggons, which are in time of peace always kept ready in case of war, and immediately on the mobilization of the army are provided with horses and drivers from the military train, who are entirely under the control of the principal officer of the Intendantur. Each army has a principal Intendantur officer; each corps has with its headquarters an Intendantur officer of high rank, and one of the next inferior grade is attached to each division. These officers, with their subalterns and assistants, form the first links of the chain by which a general draws food to his troops. The Commissariat columns of each corps d'armée, which are always retained in peace ready to be mobilized, consists of five provision columns, each of which has 2 officers, 101 men, 165 horses, and 32 waggons. If the corps d'armée is broken up into divisions, a certain portion of these columns accompanies each infantry division, the cavalry division, and the reserve artillery, and to each of



these divisions an officer of *Intendantur* is attached. The Prussian plan of thus giving each column a "Proviant Meister," with waggons, &c., under his command, and making him responsible, has been proved beyond all doubt to be the best in practical working—far superior indeed to the French *Intendance*, to the utter failure and break-down of which their earliest disasters are believed to have been due. Under the Prussian system of dividing the responsibility into sections, not only is everything more manageable and simple, but the blame can be laid on the right shoulders when anything goes wrong; whereas in a great cumbrous central organization like that of the French it is difficult to make any single individual responsible. In the present war the Prussians, at a distance from their own supplies, and consequently compelled to maintain a long line of communication through an enemy's country, were actually better furnished with material and food than the French. They succeeded in moving their wounded more rapidly from the field of battle; and their operations were never once impeded by a want of transport. The French system is described in the next chapter, and it will be seen that it is essentially one of centralization, whereas that of Prussia is exactly the reverse; and instead of providing one *Intendance* of the whole army, it makes each corps d'armée complete in itself.

The Prussians carry no tents, and sleep with nothing but their cloaks between them and the ground. They, however, secure a slight protection from the weather when convenient and necessary by constructing *tentes d'abri* with the boughs of trees. When the men arrive at the end of their day's march, they select the driest and most convenient place of ground they can find, and set to work at once to bivouac. Having halted, the arms are piled, the battalions being drawn up in line of contiguous columns at quarter distance; the men then take off their helmets, and each man places his helmet on his rifle, which acts as an effectual protection from any wet getting down the barrel; the companies then break off by subdivisions to the right and left of their arms, the knapsacks are placed in a row, the camp kettles taken off, and the fatigue squad falls out from each company to draw water. Meantime the remainder dig small, oblong holes in the ground for their fires; a couple of sticks at each end, and another resting across, completes the simple but practical arrangement.

On this stick hangs the camp kettles, generally speaking by twos—one for the potatoes, and the other for the soup and meat. This soup is the mainstay of the German as well as of the French, and indeed of most continental armies. It is very simply made. Into the camp kettle is put very much whatever comes to hand, and a savoury mess, at least for hungry men, is soon made. At night big fires are got to burn, cloaks are then spread upon the ground, and in ten minutes the bivouac is complete. The officers are exactly on the same footing as the men, and quite as much exposed. Upon coming to the ground where it is intended to halt for the night, the officers commanding battalions tell off an officer and twelve men to bring up provisions for the troops. There is no pillaging of the villages permitted; the strictest orders protect the inhabitants everywhere, although it is difficult to prevent the cavalry from making free quarters of every village they come to, inasmuch as they are in the advance of every column of troops. The men sometimes think it hard that in a conquered country they are not allowed to dig the potatoes; but the general's order is strict, and a speedy punishment awaits the offender.

The 160 waggons which form the Commissariat columns carry three days' provisions for every man in the corps d'armée; as soon as the waggons which carry the first day's supply are emptied, they are sent off to the magazines in rear, replenished, and must be up again with the troops to supply the fourth day's food, for in the two days' interval the other waggons will have been emptied. As it is easier to carry flour than bread in these waggons, each corps d'armée is accompanied by a field bakery, which consists of 1 officer and 118 men, 27 horses, and 5 waggons, which are distributed among the troops as may be most convenient; and as the horses of both the provision columns and field bakeries have very hard work, a *dépôt* of 86 horses, with 48 spare drivers, accompanies each corps d'armée. These provision columns thus carry three days' provisions, but in a country where supplies are not very abundant they can do nothing in the way of collecting food; their duty is simply to bring provisions from the magazines where they are gathered together, and to carry them to the troops. It is evident, therefore, that as the army advances these magazines must advance

also, and that means must be provided for keeping the magazines full. The collection of food in such magazines entails an enormous amount of transport; this transport is obtained by hiring waggons and carts in the country where the war is being carried on, or in the countries near it. Waggons hired in the country are also used for carrying forage for the horses of the cavalry and artillery from the magazines to the front, for the provision columns only carry food for the men.

When it was found that the country was not laid waste, the provision waggons in some cases were filled in the neighbourhood of the troops by requisitions; but this was found not to be so good a plan as to send them back to the magazines where the provisions were collected ready for them, because the time taken up in gathering together dribblets of food and forage from each village, and the great distances over which waggons had to move, imposed an enormous amount of work on both the men and horses. Although the requisition system was very useful, it was only regarded as an auxiliary means of supply, for the armies moved prepared every day to find that the country in front of them might be devastated, and Germany was always looked upon as the real source of supplies; and this was absolutely necessary, because it would have been impossible to feed such a large force as the Prussian armies presented by requisitions alone: for requisitions cannot conveniently be made at great distances from the direct line of communications, and in a very short time the quarter of a million of men who were in the front line alone would have eaten up everything in the country around them if they had been dependent on that tract of country only for supplies. Then, even if the troops could have got food from more distant places, the villagers and country people would have starved; and it is the interest of a general to make his requisitions so that they do not drive the inhabitants to destitution, for terrible sickness always follows in the train of want, and if pestilence breaks out among the people of the country, it is certain immediately to appear in the ranks of the invading army. A Prussian regiment of infantry (3006 men, with 69 officers) has a medical staff of six surgeons attached to it. All these belong to the highest class of the profession, and have passed their degrees as physicians. Each cavalry regiment (602 men, with 26 officers) has

three surgeons, and each detachment of artillery (540 men, and 18 officers), likewise three surgeons in its train. Accordingly, there is more than one surgeon to every 500 combatants, apparently an ample provision when it is considered that the ordinary proportion in Prussian society is one to 2000. In addition to the medical there is a special *Krankenträger* or sick-bearer service. This is divided into detachments, three detachments belonging to each corps d'armée. Each detachment comprises 150 bearers, eight nurses, eight lazarethe assistants (a lower order of the craft), one apothecary, seven doctors, and three military officers. Six carriages for the transport of the wounded, and four carriages with bandages, lint, medicine, &c., are allotted to a detachment. To assist the *Krankenträger* in their work, four men in every company of infantry (250 men) have been instructed in the best way of lifting and carrying the wounded from the field. When fighting occurs, one half the doctors attached to each regiment accompanies the combatants into action; the other half, at a short distance in the rear, dressing the wounds of those whose cases were not attended to on the battle-field itself.

Each soldier carries in his breast some lint and a bandage, so that when he falls the surgeon can instantly run up, open his coat, and apply a bandage. A certain number of tourniquets are also carried by the non-commissioned officers of each regiment; and, although in the heat of a pitched battle the non-commissioned officers could not stop to apply tourniquets to the wounded, yet, as a proportion of these also fall, the instruments are always at hand for the surgeons, and in the skirmishes, or in regiments not exposed to the full brunt of a conflict, there will yet be a certain number of wounded, many of whose lives, which would otherwise be lost, may be saved by the prompt application of a tourniquet or bandages. Round each man's neck as he goes into action, also, is a card upon which is his name. As he falls the surgeon who examines and binds up his wounds sees at once whether it is of a nature which will permit of the patient being moved to a distance or not. According to its severity, then, he writes on the card whether the man is to be taken to the field hospital close at hand, or to the hospitals further in the rear. Accordingly, when the ambulance arrives, it is seen at once where the wounded man is to be conveyed.

A field lazarethe is provided with everything necessary for 200 sick and wounded. Five doctors, a number of inferior assistants, and from three to four carriages, form its staff, which in case of need is augmented by *Krankenträger* or common soldiers. Each army corps has twelve field lazarethes, or, to give it in figures, there is provision made for the perfect and scientific treatment of 2400 out of every 30,000 men. If sufficient formerly, this was found inadequate in this first breech-loading campaign, when it has occurred that every third man in a regiment has been disabled. The field lazarethe moves with the troops. Modern warfare involving many battles in a short space, it would be impossible to detain the staff of the field lazarethes long in one locality. Accordingly, all the slightly wounded, as soon as they can be transported, are sent off to the war hospitals in Germany—institutions both public and private, the extent of which may be gathered from the fact that they contain a total of 65,000 beds. The number of the reserve doctors, which has always been found too small, in this sanguinary war has proved so utterly insufficient as to cause the appointment of 200 extra surgeons to be employed wherever most required. The action of the medical service on the battle-field is directed by division doctors. The next above them in rank are the *General Aertze*, or physicians-general, one to each corps d'armée, who receive their instructions from the *General Stabs Arzt*, or chief of the medical staff. To give the soldiers the benefit of the best help, all the most eminent surgeons of the country were besides requested to repair to the front, and accept high military grades, created for them on purpose, and held only during the war.

To convey the wounded from France into the home hospitals, thirty physicians and some hundred lazarethe assistants and nurses were engaged by the government. Each transport of a hundred wounded had an escort of one or two doctors, two lazarethe assistants, and thirteen nurses. The thirty physicians set apart for this duty saw their melancholy convoy only as far as one of the three *Haupt Etappen* or principal stations on the frontier, by which the army communicates with home. Thence to the hospitals the journey was made under the direction of one of another body of thirty physicians distributed over the *Etappen*. The sum total of the doctors employed in the army at the time of the battle of Sedan exceeded 2700.

To facilitate the treatment by successive doctors, the one who sees the patient first writes his diagnosis on a card, which is fastened round the sufferer's neck. This useful bit of pasteboard is, of course, attached only when a man falls ill; but another is fastened to his arm the very day he leaves his garrison for the field. Containing the number of his regiment and *his* number in the regiment, it serves for identification in case of death. The men are perfectly aware of the reasonableness of this novel arrangement, and regard it as a proof of the anxious solicitude borne them by the government; yet they have an instinctive dislike to the fatal badge, and, in grim allusion to its purpose, dubbed it their "tombstone" (*grabstein*).

Special arrangements are made for the conveyance of the wounded by rail. The fourth-class carriages of German lines are entered by doors at each end, and thus a considerable space can be obtained when the seats are removed. The space is made available by screwing into the opposite sides of the carriages stout hooks, from which the field-stretchers, bearing the wounded, are suspended by elastic rings. There is, therefore, no transfer of the patient from one bed to another, and the motion of the carriage is very little felt, less even than on board ship in a hammock.

When the field army, the dépôt and garrison troops, and the provision and medical department trains have been mobilized, the Prussian army is fit to take the field. The necessary commandants and staffs of the districts where the dépôt troops are stationed, are composed either of officers detached from the regular army, or of reserve or landwehr officers. When the army takes the field, its movements must be directed not only so as to pursue the original plan of the campaign, but also so as to keep pace with the enemy's combinations, and the movements of its different parts must be guided by orders from the directing general.

The Prussian army has its own arrangements for feeling its way through a hostile country. The commander of the advancing corps selects a clever and determined officer, and in the Prussian army such men are numerous. Some fifteen or twenty picked horsemen are confided to him, and the officer then takes a man previously acquainted with the country to serve as guide. The spot which the party desires to investigate has been explained to him, and pointed out on an excellent



map carried by the officer. The place is often twenty or twenty-five miles from the Prussian lines. To the rear of the first horseman, who is ordered to proceed slowly, following byroads and sometimes going across country, at a distance of 200 paces, follow two light troopers. A hundred paces behind them comes the officer, followed at a short distance by eight or ten of his men, charged to protect him if necessary. The rear guard is like the advance guard. If the foremost horseman is surprised he fires off his carbine and the band takes to flight, with the exception of the officer and his escort, who advance to reconnoitre before flying. Even in the case of an ambush, it is almost impossible to prevent two or three of the scouts getting back to camp.

The above is a sketch of the general system on which the Prussian army is normally organized. How such an army is worked in the field, how its resources are made available, and how it achieves the objects for which it has been mobilized, must depend in a great measure upon the skill of the general to whose direction it is intrusted. What an army so organized can effect when its motions are guided by a skilful hand and far-seeing intellect like that of Moltke, the rapid victories of the late campaign have shown. When the field army enters on the theatre of war, the organizer and administrator has done with it; his province is then to take care that its recruits are forthcoming and its supplies are ready when required. But when an army is handed over to the general who is to use it, he has a right to expect that when he receives his divisions he shall also receive the means of manœuvring them; and when he assumes the command of his corps he shall be provided with every appliance which can help him to move them in the combination and unison without which different bodies of troops are not an army, but a series of scattered detachments, which must be easily defeated in detail, or in isolation taken prisoners by an active and energetic enemy. After the plan of a campaign has been once decided upon, the means by which a general moves his troops into positions where they may act most advantageously, and from which they may strike the heavy blows that will gain a speedy and profitable peace—for a peace is the ultimate object of all wars—may be classed under the heads of Information, Intelligence, and the Transmission of Orders. Information of the enemy's preparations, of the number of troops

he can put into the field—how those troops will be armed, organized, and administered—should be obtained by the government of the country to which the army belongs, and communicated to the general when he takes the command of the army.

To acquire this information concerning foreign armies during peace every country in Europe devotes a special department of its war office, which is ever busy collecting and compiling statistics of every foreign army, because, however friendly the relations of any two countries may be, it can never be known how long they will remain so. As soon as hostilities are imminent, a war office has little chance of obtaining much information from inside the lines of the probable enemy; then the duty of collecting information devolves upon the general himself, who must, by every means he can avail himself of, discover, as far as possible, every position and intention of his adversary's troops. For this purpose, during war, spies are generally employed. Spies have a dangerous task, and not an honourable one; consequently, except in very rare and extreme cases, officers will not accept the invidious duty, and it is often extremely difficult to find persons who will consent to act as spies sufficiently conversant with military matters to make their information worth having. Money is the great means of obtaining good spies; needy adventurers and unscrupulous men will, if well paid, do the work, and for the sake of a sufficient sum run the risk of the certain death which awaits them if discovered in disguise within the hostile outposts.

The information collected from spies is not, in most cases, completely trustworthy. In the first place, the men who undertake this duty are nearly always mercenary wretches, who will sell friend and foe alike as best suits their own interest; in the second place, spies are seldom sufficiently acquainted with military matters not to exaggerate movements of slight importance and miss observing vital combinations. To test the accuracy of their reports intelligence is collected by means of reconnoitring officers, who, either alone or attended by a few troopers, get as close as they can to the enemy's posts; observe as far as possible, without the use of disguise and in full uniform, the positions of his troops; and when discovered and pursued by his patrols, fight or ride to bring their intelligence safe home to their own outposts. In the Prussian army the Uhlans, or lancers, are



often employed in this service, and their great successes in the present campaign proved how admirably they were suited for it. Intelligence is also culled by every vedette and every advanced sentinel, but the reconnoitring officer is the main source. To reconnoitre well requires not only a brave but a very able officer, with a quick eye, a ready memory, and a great knowledge of the indications which tell the presence of hostile troops, and allow an estimate to be formed of the force in which they are. When the reconnoitring officer regains the shelter of his own outposts, he must either personally bring or by some means send his intelligence as quickly as possible to head-quarters. The plan usually pursued in European armies has been for the officer himself to ride quickly to his general, and to be the first bearer of his intelligence. This means has, however, been found by experience to be too slow, and the Prussian army in the late campaign was accompanied by a telegraphic corps. By means of this corps signals were flashed from post to post, and the intelligence collected by the reconnoitring officer sometimes arrived at head-quarters within a few minutes after the officer had reached the outposts.

When a general receives intelligence, he has to weigh it, consider it, and often strike the balance between conflicting information. He has then to move his own divisions in accordance with his deductions, and must send word to any co-operating force of what he has heard, and what he is about to do. Undoubtedly, the quickest way for a reconnoitring officer to despatch his reports to his general, and for the general to communicate with his own divisions and with his colleagues, would be by electric telegraph; but it would be almost impossible for a reconnoitring officer always to communicate with head-quarters by electricity. Reconnoitring expeditions are made so suddenly and so uncertainly that, quick as the Prussian field telegraph is laid down, this means of communication is not always available with the outposts. Nor is the electric telegraph easily used to communicate with every division: it might be so used, but its application would require a number of extra waggons to be attached to every division, and would bring a confusing number of lines into the office of the chief of the staff. During the late campaign orders were sent to the divisional commanders by mounted officers, who were attached to head-quar-

ters for this special purpose. Besides these officers a certain number of picked troopers are selected from every cavalry regiment, and formed into a special corps at the beginning of a campaign, and a certain number attached to every general. These troopers form the general's escort, and act as orderlies to carry unimportant messages. When an officer is sent with an important order, one or two of these soldiers are sent with him, in case of his being attacked to act as a defence as far as possible, to yield up a horse to him in case of his own breaking down, or, in case of his being killed, to carry the order themselves to its destination, or, at any rate, to prevent its falling into the hands of the enemy if the officer is wounded and likely to be taken. During the campaign the communications between head-quarters and divisions were usually kept up by means of mounted officers; but communications between the head-quarters of each army and the king were always maintained by means of the field-telegraph.

To understand the Prussian field telegraph system, it should be borne in mind that the army is composed of various corps d'armée, and each corps of two divisions; therefore the telegraph is divided into three sections—1, the station at the commander-in-chief's; 2, the station at each corps; 3, the station at each division. Each station has one inspector and five secretaries or clerks, four carriages, two smaller ones, and six waggons. The first-named contain the cable, the second the apparatus and batteries, and the last-named the posts upon which the wires are fixed. Each carriage contains twenty English miles of cable, and the average time it takes to lay it is three hours to every four miles. The process of laying is naturally the most scientific part of the arrangement, and is conducted in the following manner:—An intelligent officer from the army with some assistant with him, is intrusted with the general supervision of the telegraph of each army, and to him is committed the task of directing where the main line shall run. He rides on ahead of the waggons, which proceed at a footpace, the cable being passed out over a wheel, and indicates to the drivers by means of a piece of paper stuck on a stick or a blazed tree the direction they shall follow. In the meantime, the foot soldiers attached to the telegraph, who are selected from the regiments for superior intelligence, and wear a different uniform, with a large T on the shoulder-strap, are divided into what is called

troops, or, in navy language, "gangs," of three men each. The first take the wire as it is payed out, lay it on the ground, and on it a post for every 100 yards; the second, coming after them, twist the cable round the insulator, which is made of gutta-percha, not glass as with British telegraphs, and erect the posts in the ground. This is a matter of great ease, they being about twelve feet high, and about the thickness of the butt end of a salmon rod, slightly tapering towards the top. The third troop strain the wire, and ascertain that it is clear of all wood, &c., and, in short, "runs clear." Whenever it is possible, the trees are used as telegraph posts, being easily ascended to the requisite height by means of a light ladder. The whole of the cable carried is seldom all required, for the lines of the communications of armies usually run along railways, and as far as possible the permanent wires are repaired by the men of the division, and made use of for the telegraphic communication of the army. The obstinate resistance, however, of several fortified places, Toul especially, prevented the carrying out of this plan for several weeks in the late war. Each division carries with it five miles of insulated wire for the purpose of laying through rivers or lakes, if these should come in the way of the line. The wires are coiled inside each waggon on rollers, from which they can be uncoiled as the waggon moves along, or in bad ground the roller can be transferred to a stretcher, which is carried between two men. The wire is carried about ten feet high, so that where it crosses roads it may pass clear over the heads of mounted men. As it is equally culpable in war to prevent communication by unfair means within the lines of an army, as it is to seek to obtain the same in disguise between the enemy's sentries, any enemy not in uniform, or any one in the enemy's pay who is detected cutting the telegraph wire, is regarded as a spy, and treated accordingly. When on the field of battle, the telegraph is worked by a machine fixed inside one of the carriages, unless a house is obtainable, when a room is instantly turned into an office.

One of the most highly prized services of the army is the Field Post. Each corps d'armée has a head postmaster, under whom are the following staffs:—Six clerks attached to the office of the head-quarters, four at the head-quarters of each division, and three with the reserve of each corps. Besides this he has fourteen letter-sorters and

nineteen postillions. The head-quarter's staff post of a corps d'armée has three waggons, one chaise, and one fourgon. The first ply with the letters, the second carries the postmaster and his second when on the march, as well as small parcels; and the third carries the luggage, such as tables, chairs, sorting-boxes, &c., necessary for the despatch of business. Each division of each corps has two waggons. The authorities issue cards to each regiment, on one side of which is printed,

"Feld Post Correspondenz Karte.

To

Address,"

and on the other side the letter is written in pencil or ink. If in the former, it is rendered perfectly secure against being rubbed out by the application of a wet cloth across it, which, thanks to some preparation on the surface of the card, secures its legibility to the end of its journey. Early each morning the field post rides through the camp or past the ranks of the troops on march, to collect the letters written during the preceding evening. Armed with posthorn and leathern bags, he rides up and down the ranks, receiving right and left, with both hands, the letters the soldiers hold out to him. On some days the task of this galloping letter box is much heavier, owing to most of the troops, in view of an impending battle, of which notice has been issued, having on the evening before written their letters of farewell. The number of letters sent off after a battle also are almost incalculable. In order that every chance of writing should be given, postillions ride over the field with cards and a pencil the day after the battle, and any wounded man who is still there can either write or dictate his message home. Poor fellows thus left have frequently been noticed to hold up their arms to attract the postillion's attention in preference to waving for the ambulance waggon. Remembering that in no country is education so universal as in Prussia, and that from the very composition of the German army no soldiers of any country have so many home connections, it will not be surprising to hear that during the first three months of the war upwards of twelve million letters were transmitted through the Field Post.

Another humane improvement has been introduced to lessen the horrors of war. By order of the postal department letters to soldiers who die in the war will be returned to the writers, not by the

ordinary postmen, but by the civil authorities. The latter are charged in each case to prepare the writers for the melancholy intelligence they have to impart.

The pages describing the chief engagements of the war will show how greatly the Prussian army has been changed from the stiff unbending machine which was transmitted by his father to Frederick the Great, and which, in his hands, won the victories of the Seven Years' War. On the conclusion of that war, all Europe hastened to adopt the Prussian model, and England, more than other countries, blindly accepting the outward appearance without the principle, padded, starched, and strangled with stocks her soldiers, under the impression that by obtaining the rigidity, she would also obtain the discipline and vigour of the Potsdam grenadiers. And even now, with but slight alterations, the system of drill and military carriage introduced into Prussia by the greatest sergeant-major that ever lived may be observed by the antiquary on the hills of Aldershot or the parade-ground of St. James'. But in the country where it was produced and perfected, it is a thing of the past. The crowning disaster of Jena proved to Prussia the antiquity and weakness of its military tactics, and convinced her administrators of the necessity of adapting their military tactics to altered times and circumstances. On this principle they have since unswervingly acted, and every decade has seen a steady advance in the tactical organization of the Prussian army. The present system may be briefly described. The front line of battle engaged with the enemy is composed of long lines of skirmishers, supported by small columns, which take up convenient positions wherever they can be sheltered from the enemy's fire by any variations of the ground. In the rear of these supports, reserves are stationed to reinforce the first line, or to repulse an attack made through or over it. These reserves and the first line are supposed, under the guidance of the officers who lead them, to carry out the general object of the commander-in-chief, who himself keeps in hand the chief reserves, to be moved to a flank which may be threatened by the enemy, or to drive home an offensive movement undertaken by the troops in front. The consequence of this precaution is, that a long thin line is spread in front of the hostile position, which is probably outflanked at the very commencement of the action, while behind the

skirmishers and their supports, additional forces are held ready to decide victory or avert defeat. This practice, no doubt, is the secret of those sudden flank attacks which have so surprised the French officers in the late war, and caused them such severe losses in prisoners. Its usefulness in resisting the most impetuous onslaughts of the French will be especially seen, as early in the campaign as the battle of Woerth.

Manœuvring on Prussian field-days is quite a different matter from the displays to which the British soldier is accustomed. At Aldershot marshes are drained, turf walls levelled, all difficulties cleared away, and the men are put through the routine farce of a sham fight, every detail of which is known to them all from the beginning. In Prussia, on the contrary, everything is arranged with a view of inculcating thorough self-reliance, and to drawing out the individual abilities of those in command. The positions chosen for exercising are those with considerable natural obstacles, such as might be met with in actual warfare, and the following sentence occurs in the official instructions:—It will be perceived by those who understand the purport of these exercises, that no movement is dictated, no time fixed; all must be left to the discretion of the commander. Beyond the general idea, he has received no instructions defining the issue of the affair. In fact, the situation at the end of the manœuvre should be the *bona fide* result of his own dispositions.

During the war of which the present work treats, the excellence and military aptitude of the Prussian officers have been the subjects of frequent comment. All accounts agree in crediting the Prussian officer with a knowledge of his work, and a professional zeal, which have contributed in a very marked degree to the successful issue of the various brilliant operations upon which the army has been engaged. It is therefore worth while to inquire what the system is under which such officers are produced. Its main peculiarity is that in all cases, with one single exception, a certain length of service in the ranks is an indispensable condition of obtaining a commission; and that proof of having received, first, a good general education, and, secondly, a certain amount of professional instruction, is required from every one before appointment to the rank of officer. The one exception to the rule about a preliminary service in the ranks occurs in the case of the young



men who, after a course in one of the preparatory cadet schools, obtain admission to the *highest* class—the *Selecta*—of that institution. But of these young men there are only fifty annually commissioned; all other officers must go through a certain preliminary training in the ranks. There are two main classes of officers:—1. Those who enter from civil life. 2. Those who enter the army from a cadet school.

The military schools of Prussia are under the general control of an inspector-general of military education, who is assisted by a council called the supreme board of military studies. To this department also belongs the military examination commission. As already stated, the first examination of the aspirant for a commission, the ensign's examination, is in subjects of general knowledge. But the rank of ensign, or *Portépée-fahnrich*, cannot be obtained until after six months' actual service in the ranks. The young *Avantageurs* on joining their regiments have the rank, and receive the pay and clothing, of private soldiers. The mode of treating them during their service in the ranks depends much upon the commanding officer of the regiment, the regulations in some regiments being much stricter than in others. For a certain time they have to perform the actual duties of private soldiers, to mount guard, and in the cavalry to clean their horses. In some regiments they are even required to live, sleep, and mess with the privates, though the period for which this is exacted seldom exceeds six weeks. In most regiments they are allowed to find their own lodgings, and to mess with the officers, by whom, except when on duty, they are treated almost as equals. The general principle which regulates their treatment is that they should, by actual performance of the various duties, learn the work of privates, corporals, and non-commissioned officers. There are thus two qualifications for the grade of *Portépée-fahnrich*, the test of the examination and the six months' service in the ranks. The examinations are held in Berlin before the supreme military commission. They are held constantly every week for about nine months of the year, each examination occupying a week. There are thus about forty examinations in all during the year, at each of which on an average twenty-five candidates present themselves, making in all about 1000 candidates yearly. The examination, after a nomination is obtained, is partly on

paper and partly *viva voce*. The following subjects are obligatory:—German, Latin, French, mathematics, geography, history, and drawing, including hill sketching. The questions are fewer in number and more comprehensive in character than in the military examinations in England; the answers are expected to approach nearly to the form of short essays. The main object is to find not so much positive knowledge as intellectual capacity to put knowledge to a useful purpose. There is no competition; the candidates are only required to come up to a certain qualifying standard. A candidate failing is allowed a second trial, or even a third frequently; the number of final failures does not exceed 10 per cent.

A certificate of having passed the *abiturient's*, or leaving examination of a gymnasium, or *real-schule*, which qualifies for admission to a university, exempts from this ensign's examination; and young men entering from the Cadet Corps are examined while still at the Senior Cadet House at Berlin. At least 200 *abiturienten* enter the army yearly, and are said to prove a very superior class of officers. The second or officer's examination is in purely professional subjects. Ten months in a war school is the usual preparation; but a small number of cadets, who have obtained admission to the two highest classes (the *Selecta* and *Oberprima*) of the Berlin Cadet House, receive their military instruction in these classes instead of at a war school, and pass their officer's examination before quitting the Cadet House; and exemption from attendance at a war school is also granted to young men who have studied for at least one year at a university before entering the army, and to landwehr officers who have received permission to be transferred to the active army. About 800 candidates are examined yearly for the rank of officer. The examination is not competitive. The subjects are tactics (including drill), science of arms, fortification, surveying, knowledge of military duty, and military drawing. Those who fail are allowed another trial, after a certain interval; but failures are very rare, and this examination is considered much less severe than that for the grade of ensign. Those who succeed are qualified for commissions as second lieutenants. But they must wait, according to seniority, for vacancies; and on a vacancy the senior ensign's name cannot be submitted to the king for his appointment without a document stating, on the part of the



officers of the regiment, that he has the requisite knowledge of the duties of the service, and that they consider him worthy of admission among them. If the majority is opposed to his admission, the name of the next ensign in order of seniority is brought forward. Comparatively few cases of veto occur; it is generally ascertained at a prior stage of a young man's career that he will not be ineligible. Still, the existence of the right of veto exercises an influence on conduct. In the majority of cases the officer's examination is passed between the ages of eighteen and a half and twenty-one.

The Royal Cadet Corps is under the command of a general officer, and is intended as a nursery for officers of the army. It includes pensioners, or paying pupils, and the king's cadets, who are educated at the cost of the state. After receiving a general education in the junior schools the cadets proceed at fifteen or sixteen to the upper school at Berlin, where they pass one year in the *secunda* class and one year in the *prima*. About seventy of the best pupils are retained for a third year to go through a special course of military instruction in the *Ober-prima* and *Selecta* classes. The discipline is strict. The most scrupulous neatness in dress is enforced; and any cadet seen in public, on leave, without his gloves or with his belt improperly put on would be severely "chaffed" by his comrades. The cadets appear upon the whole to work steadily, and few fail to pass the ensign's examination. The universal liability to military service in Prussia supplies a most powerful incentive both to industry and to good conduct. Idleness or bad conduct may entail the forfeiture of all prospect of obtaining a commission, and necessitate the performance of the legal period of service in the ranks. The advantage of passing through the Cadet Corps is that a general education is obtained at a cheap rate, and that a commission can be gained at an earlier age than by entering the army direct from civil life. It cannot be said that cadets as a rule show more professional ability, or rise to greater distinction in the service, than men who have not passed through the Cadet Corps. Equally distinguished officers are to be found in both classes; General Steinmetz and Herwarth von Bittenfeld are old cadets; General von Moltke entered the army from civil life. Among commanding officers of regiments there appears to be generally a feeling unfavourable to the cadets, partly perhaps because every cadet who is appointed to their regiments deprives

them of the patronage of a nomination, but mainly because they prefer their young officers to be men who have had the more liberal education afforded by civil schools. It is maintained by many distinguished officers that the exclusively military atmosphere by which cadets are surrounded from so early an age has a narrowing effect upon the mind, and that the almost monastic system in which they are brought up is fatal to freedom of thought and development of character. Others are of opinion that the admixture of the two classes is of advantage to the service.

The war schools afford to candidates for commissions, after a certain length of service in the ranks, the professional instruction necessary to fit them for the duties of regimental officers. The subjects of instruction are tactics, the science of arms, fortification, drawing and surveying, military regulations, and military correspondence. The system of small classes is adopted, not exceeding thirty in each. Each class attends lectures separately. A certain portion of each lecture is devoted to questioning, and the students are frequently set to write essays and memoirs. Progress is tested by quarterly examinations, both on paper and *viva voce*; great importance is attached to the latter as a means of cultivating readiness of resource and rapidity of judgment. Practical as well as theoretical instruction is given. The students have fencing and gymnastic lessons every second day, alternately with riding; they have artillery gun drill and aiming drill about once a week, and two hours' practice weekly in the regimental drill of their own arms, in addition to the more general instruction in drill which they receive during the lessons of application in connection with the course of tactics. The ensigns of artillery and engineers have additional instruction in the special duties of their corps. The students are more particularly instructed in the drill of the arms to which they respectively belong, but they also learn the general elements of that of the other services, and both the infantry and cavalry ensigns go through a course of instruction in the service of field guns. Battalion and regimental movements are practised by means of skeleton drill. The chief object kept in view in teaching both drill and gymnastics is that of fitting the young ensigns for the duty of giving instruction in these subjects when they become officers; and for this purpose individuals are constantly called out to put their comrades through field move-

ments. There is a course of swimming for those who are unable to swim. The last portion of the ten months' course is termed more especially the "practical course." Reconnaissances of military positions are then executed and reported, and dispositions for attack and defence have to be described by the students; there is musketry practice, and artillery practice is attended; field works are traced, and operations in sapping, bridging, &c., attended. Schemes are set for putting villages or houses into a state of defence, throwing up hasty intrenchments, and the like. Great importance is attached to rapid sketching without instruments, and to sketching on horseback. Some days are spent at a fortress.

The final examination on which depends an ensign's fitness for the rank of officer is held at the war schools, under the superintendence of the supreme examination commission. The paper work occupies about four days; the *viva voce* examination then follows. Candidates for the scientific corps, after some months' service with the troops, and passing through the war schools, go through a course of special instruction in the artillery and engineer school, and pass a further examination in their special subjects. They also, for practical instruction, serve with their regiments as supernumerary officers for a time, before receiving their definitive commissions. A thorough acquaintance with practical duty, acquired thus by service, is enforced before their special instruction as officers of the scientific corps commences. This system is considered by Prussian officers superior to that by which, as in England and France, the theoretical instruction is given before any regimental duty is performed. It is maintained that theory can be more easily understood if it is based upon a groundwork of actual experience; and that officers of the age of twenty-three or twenty-four, with a practical knowledge of their duties, derive more advantage from study than young men of seventeen or eighteen who have no practical acquaintance with the subject to which their studies relate.

The French and Prussian systems agree in this, that no attempt is made to give a special military education at an early age; that a general education is made the groundwork of the professional training; and that at least up to the age of seventeen or eighteen the future officer receives the same kind of education as the civilian. But the principle of deferring military education to a comparatively

late age is in Prussia carried even to a greater extent than in France, for all professional instruction is postponed until after the service has been entered, and regimental duty been performed for nearly a year. The theory of the profession is not studied until after the practice of it has been learnt. Much of the progress made is ascribed to the unity now given to the whole system of instruction. The general management of military education is vested in a single officer, the inspector-general; but he is assisted by the board of studies and the supreme examination board, and at the same time each of the educational institutions has its own board of studies, on which the civilian professors are represented. In discipline the heads of the various schools are almost entirely supreme. A marked point of contrast between the French and Prussian systems of military education consists in this, that in Prussia the principle of competition is little adopted, and never, perhaps, strictly adhered to. In a country where military service is compulsory, the desire to escape duty as a private soldier is a great inducement to exertion, and the object is to form a general estimate of the abilities, character, and military capacity of each man, rather than a comparison of the attainments of several. A remarkable feature of the system of teaching is the care bestowed upon the higher objects of education, upon forming and disciplining the mind and encouraging habits of reflection. The teachers are instructed to endeavour to develop the faculties, and to cultivate powers of thought and reasoning. The system of small classes enables them to devote attention to each student, and adapt the instruction to varieties of ability. The examination questions are framed with a view to test an intelligent acquaintance with a subject, and the power of turning knowledge to a useful purpose. In the Prussian method of instruction there is almost an entire absence of the minute detail as to numbers, dates, and facts, to which importance is attached in military teaching in England. The students are left to study in private in order to teach them self-reliance and encourage habits of work. The aim throughout is the development of the mind. The cultivation of special talents is ever kept in view at the war schools; the attainment of a high standard in individual subjects is regarded as of much greater importance than average requirements in all.

It follows from the above that those who regard

the Prussian system of officering the army as a system of promotion from the ranks, in the ordinary sense of the phrase, are greatly mistaken. Promotion from the ranks is, on the contrary, extremely rare, and the few individuals who obtain commissions in this manner are seldom left with the army, but are pensioned off or provided with civil appointments. The result is that admission to the *offizier corps* of the Prussian army is regarded as conferring distinctive privileges. The strong *esprit de corps* which pervades the whole body of officers undoubtedly creates an extremely high tone and a gentlemanly feeling which resents any conduct that might be considered discreditable to the character of an officer; on the other hand, its tendency is to make the officers of the army somewhat of an exclusive caste. There is probably no service in the world in which class spirit is so strongly developed, or which is so aristocratic in character, as that of Prussia. It is necessary to point this out, because otherwise there might be a tendency to entertain the erroneous idea—an idea which in one form or another is continually cropping up—that the only way to obtain a professional body of officers is by an indiscriminate system of promotion from the ranks. By observing the Prussian system we may see how at once education and professional requirements of an exacting order can be combined with careful selection, a high tone, and much *esprit de corps*.

Promotion in the Prussian service is by seniority, tempered by selection. If an officer is passed over two or three times, he generally accepts it as a hint to retire. If he does not take the hint, he is gazetted out. There are no examinations for promotion, except in the artillery and engineers. Not the slightest favour seems to have been shown to rank or position, as such, in the appointment of officers at the commencement of the war; but in all cases the men who occupied high command were such as had proved title to it by their experience and proved ability. The government, thinking it better to hurt the feelings of a man than to confide the fate of many thousands to him, if doubting his military talent or health, in several cases promoted juniors over the heads of the highest officers.

The landwehr is officered either by officers of the regular army who have quitted it within the limits of age, which render them liable to serve in the landwehr, or by means of an important

provision which allows all young men of the educated classes who can clothe and arm themselves, to take service in the rifle corps and other light infantry; and after completing one year at their own expense to receive furlough to the end of their regular call, upon application. This rule was introduced, no doubt, to save the wealthy and well-born the degradation which, in a country essentially aristocratic, the mixture in a barrack-room with recruits of the lowest classes would necessarily imply; and there has been built upon it, during the last half century, the elaborate system of *Einjährlige*, or one-year volunteers, which has solved at once two difficult problems. The universality of the conscription has been maintained without open opposition from that important middle order, the wealth and influence of which has grown in Prussia as much as in any part of Europe, and which, notwithstanding its claims, is excluded from the higher parts of the army; while a body of efficient officers, trained in all the duties of the line, has been provided for the staff of the landwehr without expense to the state. As a necessary consequence of the growing wealth of the commercial classes, the number of these *Einjährlige* has annually increased; and it has long been a regular part of the education of the son of every manufacturer, proprietor, professional man, and even of every well-to-do shopkeeper, to spend one of the three years between his seventeenth and twentieth birthdays in passing through his volunteer course.

As might be expected where military service is compulsory, there are comparatively few among the privates who make soldiering a profession, and re-enlistments into the ranks of the standing army are not very numerous nor much encouraged. If a man wishes to re-enlist after the completion of his three years' term of service he is allowed to do so, provided the general commanding his brigade approves him; but he only re-enlists for one year, at the end of which either party can break off the engagement: or, if both consent to continue, a re-enlistment can be effected for another year, and so on. In time of war the soldier cannot break off his engagement at the end of the year, but must continue to serve till the war is over. At any time he can be discharged for misbehaviour. A man who re-enlists, generally, if well educated, becomes a non-commissioned officer; but neither the pay nor the position of a non-commissioned officer is



high enough to induce men to stay long in the army under ordinary circumstances. But a sufficiently powerful inducement is found in the fact that, after a man has served twelve years, during nine of which he has been a non-commissioned officer, he is certain to obtain a good civil appointment; for all vacancies among railway and telegraph officials, government clerks, overseers of the public forests, gendarmes, non-commissioned officers of police, post-office clerks, and gaolers, are filled from the ranks of the non-commissioned officers whose times of service in the army have expired.

As regards dress, the German army exhibits less variety than the soldiers of any other country. The prevailing colour, however, is such as not to unduly expose the men to the observation of an enemy. The uniform of the Prussian guard differs only from that of the line in having white ornaments on the collars: they wear the helmet, dark-blue tunic, white belt,\* and black trousers with red stripes, similar to that of the British line. Their knapsacks, and those of the whole Prussian army, are of brown, undressed cowhide. The artillery differ from the line soldiers only in wearing black sword-belts instead of white, and in carrying a short rifle with a sword-bayonet, instead of the long rifle and straight bayonet of the line. This general uniformity between infantry and artillery gives a certain monotony to the appearance of large bodies of Prussian troops, as compared with those of other nations. There are exceptions, however. The chasseurs are dressed in dark green, with shakos similar to those of the British infantry, but larger; they carry a short rifle and short bayonet. The artillery carry their blanket, which is green, in a roll over the shoulder. Upon the whole, the only distinguishing mark of the various regiments is the colour of the facings. The Hessian contingents are distinguishable by their light-blue facings. The Bavarian infantry has not adopted the Prussian style of uniform, and retains the national green with red facings. The dragoon regiments are light blue. The hussars are red, black, green, yellow, and light blue. They wear shakos of miniver fur, and braided jackets. The Uhlans are principally light or dark blue, with lancer

caps; they are the heaviest cavalry of the Prussian army, with the exception of the ten cuirassier regiments, who wear white uniforms, with steel breast and back plates and helmets, with high buff leather boots and gauntlets.

In the face of the astounding events of the late campaign, the Prussian system needs no one to point out its superiority in the attainment of its one great object—success in war. But nations do not live for war, and people may well ask themselves what sort of effect the organization has on the nation at large apart from its warlike ends?

The serious disadvantages of universal military service are of course obvious to every one. The ordinary German is compelled to serve for three years; for three years, therefore, his regular occupations are interfered with; and though this drawback is to some extent remedied by the one year's service of those who have received a certain amount of education, fixed by government, the interference is, no doubt, very serious. This objection really sums up nearly every disadvantage which has been ascribed to the Prussian military system; and without denying its validity, it may be well to ask what the system has to give in return for so great a sacrifice?

The first point, which may sound very like a paradox, is that the Prussian military organization is essentially anti-warlike; it affords a guarantee against war. Just because every man is a soldier, just because war leaves hardly a home in Germany unscathed, just because every mother and every wife is "feelingly persuaded" what war means, the system tends to discourage war. The army is not composed of a set of professional soldiers to whom war means wealth, honours, and advancement, but of peaceful citizens called from their occupations, from the plough and from the study, from the workshop and the law court, who fight with a savage indignation, which carries all before it, when provoked, but at the same time affords a safe guarantee that war will not be undertaken for purposes of conquest or the establishment of a dynasty. Other advantages of the system are that, in addition to its military character, it is at the same time a system of education. Every soldier has had a certain amount of education in his youth; but when he comes to serve his time it often happens that his knowledge is, to say the least, very rusty, and sadly in want of a little brushing up. This the recruit receives with his drill, and what he

\* A great many regiments have now been permitted to adopt the black belt, and after the war it is believed that the black belt will be universal.



then learns is not so easily forgotten, owing to his riper age. But the Prussian system does more than merely freshen up the memories of those who come immediately under it. It stimulates education throughout the country by dismissing, after one year's service, those who possess certain attainments fixed by government, and by requiring every officer to pass a special examination.

Almost of equal importance with the mental is the bodily training which every German has to pass through as a soldier. Even in England a little drilling is considered a good thing for young men; at any rate we have our games, our cricket and football, our rackets and fives, to strengthen our muscles and lengthen our wind. The Germans have nothing of the sort. To such a people the value of drilling, and the installation of a little soldierly pride, is hardly to be over-estimated. In his soldier-life the German learns habits of self-control and neatness, and a certain amount of dandyism which to him at least is little more than a wholesome corrective.

In another respect the military system does what in England is one of the most valuable results of her public schools and universities. It brings together on a footing of perfect equality high and low, rich and poor. It is a mill in which men "rub each other's edges down." The aristocrat learns to understand the feelings of the democrat, and the democrat finds that the aristocrat is after all a man very much like himself. Of greater value still is military service to that class rapidly increasing in Germany, which is devoted to the pursuit of money. A young banker's son, who hardly knows what hardship means, suddenly comes to know that other things have a value besides money. He finds no amount of money will save him from exactly the same duties which his groom has to perform, and learns military obedience and devotion.

Among the lower orders, the necessity of military service encourages saving, while it delays marriage till the time of service is past. The German knows that he will have to leave his farm and occupations for a time, and therefore prepares for the time of need. At the same time his absence raises the importance of the women of his family. They must be prepared to undertake the management of his business, and must be acquainted with all its details, so that to a certain extent the position of the women is elevated.

The benefits derived from such a system are thus many and obvious. Its economy is also evident when we reflect that Prussia conducted two European campaigns (1864 and 1866) at about the same expense that England incurred in the expedition to Abyssinia. Although the Prussian is the most perfect of all armies in its equipments, the Prussian soldier is maintained at an average cost of about £29 10s. per head per annum. The French army, which shared with it the economy resulting from compulsory, and therefore underpaid labour, and which could not boast of anything like its efficiency in the non-combatant departments, cost above one-third more, or £41 10s. per head; whilst in England the expense is three times as great, being over £90 a year per man.

Another immense advantage, at least to a nation with a free form of government, is the absolute certainty that no such nation would ever incur the horrors of war except in a truly national cause and as a case of necessity. While hostilities last Prussia and North Germany have only one business in hand—the war. All other labour and industry is in abeyance, and every one out of three in the million of men under arms represents the sustenance of a family, a unit in the aggregate sustenance of the state. What a strain a campaign of twelve months' duration would be upon a community organized on Prussian military principles has not yet been tried; but it is an experiment from which Prussian rulers must at all times shrink. War reduces Germany to a state of suspended animation. Were the ordeal indefinitely prolonged, utter exhaustion must ensue. In England, a man may say, "Well, it will cost me twopence, perhaps fourpence, or even sixpence in the pound additional income tax; but that is the worst that can happen, and if we only win, I can stand that." But the same individual would think, speak, and vote very differently if he knew that he himself would have to shoulder his musket, leave home, friends, and comfort, to brave the perils of the field.

The Prussian system, brought as nearly as can be to perfection, has been seen to work admirably in the last three campaigns in which the nation has been engaged. It has been tried to the uttermost, and unmistakably asserts its superiority over every other. In fact, it is undoubtedly the greatest triumph of perfect organization the world has ever seen. On the 15th of July war against

Prussia was declared by France, and no great difficulty was supposed to stand in the way of a rapid dash across the Rhine and a triumphant progress to Berlin. On the 17th of July, however, General von Moltke is reported to have said, "Give me to the 3rd of August, and we are safe." Just three days after the given date, on the 6th of August, the French army was driven back, and the German nation in arms commenced its victorious progress into the very heart of France.

The lessons taught by every campaign of modern times have been carefully studied by Prussia with a view to improvement. While Europe gazed astonished at her successes in 1866, the Prussians themselves, so far from boasting, were not at all satisfied, and set to work immediately to remedy what experience showed to be the weak points of their army; notably in the case of their artillery, to the performances of which much of their success in France was due, and to which the emperor attributed the disasters to his army, resulting in the most memorable capitulation ever recorded in history—that of Sedan.

Part of the Prussian batteries at Sadowa were of the old smooth-bore construction, but of the breech-loading guns many batteries had been carried into the field. In the war of 1870 all confusion and uncertainty had passed away, and the simplest and most efficient breech-loading piece had been adopted throughout. The artillery service and the proportion of horses and drivers maintained in peace had also been brought up to a higher standard; the experience of 1866 having clearly shown that a large infusion of raw elements into the field artillery, to strengthen it suddenly, defeated its object by crippling the efficiency of the batteries. A full comparison between the Prussian and French artillery, and the system generally pursued in each arm by this branch of the service, is given in the next chapter; but as relating exclusively to Prussia, we give here a description of the great Prussian gun, illustrated on Plate 4, which was one of the articles sent by the firm of F. Krupp, of Essen, in Rhenish Prussia, to the Paris exhibition, 1867. At the commencement of the war of 1870 it was placed to defend the naval port of Wilhelmshaven. It is a rifled breech-loader, made entirely of cast steel, and supported on a steel carriage. The central cylindrical tube forming this piece of ordnance is made of a solid forging of steel, and

weighs by itself, in its finished state, about twenty tons. The weight of the cast-steel block employed in the manufacture of this tube was forty-eight tons, there being a waste of more than 50 per cent. of the original ingot caused by the operations of forging, turning and boring, and by cutting off the crop ends of the rough block. There are three superposed rings shrunk on to this central tube, the last ring inclosing the breech being forged in one piece with the trunnions, and made without any weld. The rings are of different lengths, as usual with built-up guns; and the whole is diminished in thickness towards the muzzle, only not tapered, but turned in parallel steps of decreasing diameter. The three superposed rings weigh thirty tons in all, and they are produced by a process similar to that followed in the production of weldless steel tyres. All these parts were hammered under the fifty-ton hammer constructed by M. Krupp for his own use. The weight and dimensions of this gun are as follows:—

Total weight, including breech,	50 tons.
Weight of breech-piece,	15 cwt.
Diameter of bore,	14 inches (English).
Total length of barrel,	210·25 inches.
<i>Rifling.</i>	
Number of grooves,	40.
Depth of grooves,	0·15 inch.
Pitch,	980 inches and 1014·4 inches.
<i>Projectiles.</i>	
Weight of solid steel shot,	1212 lbs. (English).
Total weight of steel shell,	765 lbs.
Lead coating,	200 lbs.
Charge,	16 lbs.
	981 lbs. Pruss. or 1080 lbs. Eng.
Weight of powder charge,	110 to 130 lbs. (English).

The gun carriage weighs about fifteen tons, and is placed upon a turntable, the total weight of which comes up to twenty-five tons. This also is made wholly of steel. The arrangements for working the gun are such, that it can be managed by two men with sufficient speed and accuracy for all practical requirements.

The manufacture of this piece of ordnance occupied a time exceeding sixteen months, the work being carried on without interruption day and night, including Sundays. There were no railway trucks in existence sufficiently strong to transport this gun, so M. Krupp designed and built a special truck at his own works for that purpose. This truck is made entirely of steel and iron, runs on six pairs of wheels, and weighs, when empty, twenty-three tons. The price of the gun was 105,000 Prussian dollars, without the carriage.

The complete piece, with carriage and turntable, cost 145,000 thalers, or £21,750.

It will be a fitting conclusion to our explanation of the Prussian military system, if we give a description of the weapon which Prussia was the foremost nation to adopt, and the remarkable success of which has caused quite a revolution in the manufacture of small-arms. To be loaded at the breech, and to be fired by the penetration of a needle into a detonating cap within the cartridge, are distinct attributes in a weapon. And although the latter system has only been before the public for about thirty years, systems for breech-loading have been tried, accepted, and abandoned without number during the last three centuries. Indeed, a sort of instinct dictates that loading at the breech is the preferable course; and all the earlier muskets were so made, the system being doubtless abandoned from the difficulty of accurately closing the breech, in those days of rough workmanship. The extraordinary efficacy, however, of these combined principles only came into special prominence during the Prussian wars of 1864 and 1866. In the face of such an irresistible argument, every other power hastened to either prepare new arms, or to convert their existing stock into needle-firing breech-loaders of as good a construction as circumstances would permit.

The first patent for the needle-gun was taken out in England, December 13, 1831, by one Abraham Adolph Moser, who pressed his invention upon the British government, but meeting with no encouragement tried his fortune abroad, and at last obtained the patronage of the Prussian war office. Various improvements were suggested by Dreyse, a gunmaker of Sommerada, and the perfected arm was put into the hands of the Prussian infantry in 1848. Other modifications have since been introduced, so as to render it lighter and more manageable, and considerable improvements were about to be introduced into it just as the present war broke out, and which were in consequence postponed. On Plate 3 two engravings of the weapon are shown, and in its present stage of development it may be described as follows:—

The barrel is closed by a sliding plunger or bolt, which can be pushed forward against the barrel, or withdrawn for the admission of the cartridge. In the former position it is secured by turning it, with the assistance of a small knob or lever, a quarter circle to the right, on the principle

of a common door bolt. The plunger is hollow; its front end forming, when the arm is shut, a sort of cap to the back end of the barrel, the two being coned to correspond with each other. The long steel needle, from which the gun derives its name, and by which the explosion of the charge is effected, works in the hollow bolt, being driven forward by means of a spiral spring. The spring and needle are set, and the needle, so to speak, cocked by means of a trigger. The action of the trigger likewise releases the needle, which is shot forward into a patch of detonating composition in the centre of the cartridge.

The ammunition consists of an egg-shaped bullet, whose base is imbedded in a *papier-mâché* sabot. The fulminate is placed in the hinder part of the sabot; and behind this again, in a thin paper case which is choked over the apex of the bullet, is the powder.

The alterations proposed in the needle-gun, but which were deferred by the advent of war, are very slight. The whole change consists in the insertion of a caoutchouc ring, which does not increase the efficiency, but facilitates the handling of the arm, and in a new cartridge with a smaller ball, and a proportionate increase in the thickness of the case. As the barrel remains the same, both the old and new cartridge may be employed indiscriminately, the only difference being that the smaller ball would have a wider range than the larger one. A comparison of the relative merits of the needle-gun and the Chassepot, as also of the artillery of the two countries, is given in the next chapter.

A characteristic of the Germans during the war with France was the deliberation with which the men aimed and fired, though they had in their hands a needle-gun, tempting them to fire eight shots a minute. As long as the Prussians had their old firelocks they stood in three ranks, if standing in line of battle. The two foremost ranks fired only; the men in the third rank had only to charge their guns, and to exchange them for the empty ones of the second rank. Now two ranks only are formed in battle, but the great amount of firing is done by skirmishers kneeling or lying. It is an old experience that the soldiers, if firing quick, very frequently do not take time to bring their guns in the right position, but fire without aiming, and before the barrels of their guns are in a horizontal position. Those



that fire in a kneeling position cannot fire high, without doing it purposely.

The formation of the Prussian navy only dates from 1848, and even up to 1864 it was very insignificant. But the result of the Danish war in that year, and the annexations made in 1866, rendered the possession of a powerful navy more than ever necessary to the welfare of Prussia. At the commencement of the present war she had six powerful iron-clads, the largest being the *König Wilhelm*, designed by Mr. E. J. Reed, then chief constructor of the English navy, and originally built for the Turkish government at the Thames Ironworks. The Sultan, however, being unable to pay for her, she was offered at the same price to the Board of Admiralty, who declined to buy her, and Prussia at once came forward and offered £487,500, or £30,000 more. Seeing their mistake, the English Admiralty then tried to outbid, but was too late. The vessel has a speed of fourteen knots, is plated with eight-inch armour, and carries twenty-eight guns, four 300-pounders, and twenty-four rifled 96-pounders made of Krupp's hammered steel, and capable of being fired with seventy-five lbs. charges twice in a minute. Besides this and five other iron-clads, there were nine screw frigates and corvettes, and eighty-six small vessels and sailing ships, carrying in the whole 542 guns, and manned by 5000 men and marines. The sailors and marines are raised by conscription from amongst the seafaring population, which is exempt on this account from service in the army. Great inducements are held out for able seamen to volunteer in the navy, and the number who have done

so in recent years has been very large. The total seafaring population of North Germany is estimated at 80,000.

During the last few years Prussia has done her best to strengthen her power in the Baltic and North Seas. On both these seas she has an important and an uninterrupted line of coast, where she has endeavoured to establish ports which might be useful either in time of peace or war. On the Baltic she has three ports: Dantzic, on the extreme east; Stralsund, midway between Memel and Holstein; and Kiel, the most important, which is established in a fine bay in Holstein. Of these three ports Kiel is the strongest and most formidable, and is supposed to be regarded by Russia with some degree of suspicion and alarm. The most superficial glance on the map will show its importance to the Prussians. When complete, it is so well situated, both geographically and locally, as to show that it may easily be made the Cherbourg of the Baltic. It is said that the Baltic will then be merely a Prussian lake, and that Prussia, without any difficulty, will not only be able to close the entrance to foreign fleets, but will possess the most complete power over Copenhagen. Wilhelmshaven, in the bay of Jahde, in the North Sea, one of the most important harbours for the newly-founded German navy, was opened by King William I. in 1869. It forms a vast artificial construction of granite, and comprises five separate harbours, with canals, sluices to regulate the tide, and an array of dry docks for ordinary and iron-clad vessels. Its total cost of construction was £1,500,000.



## CHAPTER V.

Sketch of the Organization of the Regular Army in France—State of things prior to the time of Louis XIV., and from that period to the Great Revolution—"Levée en Masse" in 1793—The Genius of Carnot—Wonderful Successes of the French Army in 1794—Introduction of the Law of Conscription—Nothing done by Napoleon to improve the Organic Constitution of the Army—Exhaustion of France after the Battle of Waterloo—Re-establishment of the Army in 1818—The State of the Army under the Second Empire—"Alarm at the Success of Prussia at the Battle of Sadowa"—Most important alterations made in 1868—The chief provisions of the Army Re-organization Act explained—The system of purchasing Substitutes—Broad Results of the New Act, and the Number and Composition of the Army intended to have been secured by it—Great Power given to the Emperor—Comparison of the French and Prussian Systems—Objections to the former—Serious effect of the Conscription on the Population in France—Failure of the Act of 1868—Reasons of Failure stated—Delusion entertained as to the National Guard—Actual Force in France at the commencement of the War—Weakness of the French Commissariat—The System explained—Contrast with that of Prussia—Rapid Strategy and Mobility of Force essential to Modern Warfare—Favour shown in France to the Corps d'Élite a weakness to the general Army—The Accoutrement of the French Soldier far too heavy—No important alteration made in the System of Tactics in France for nearly eighty years—Prussian Tactics the subject of incessant study and improvement—Enthusiasm of the French Troops of no use against Modern Weapons—Difference of Discipline in the French and Prussian Armies—Want of respect for their Officers amongst the French—Causes of the absence of Discipline on the part of the French traced chiefly to the tone of Society under the Empire—The Conscription now regarded only as a Blood-tax on the Poor for the benefit of the Rich—Evils of the "Exoneration" system—Paper Soldiers—Corruption on the part of the Government—Education and Training of the French Officers not calculated to create habits of command—Too many Court Generals, and incapacity of the *État Major*—The Destructive and Marauding Habits of the French Troops increased of late years—Rapidity of the decline in the *Prestige* of the French Army—Full description of the Chassepot and its Cartridge—Comparison with the Needle-Gun—The *Mitrailleuse*—Description of the Weapon, and also of the Gatling Gun—Importance of Artillery in War—Superiority of the Prussian Field Artillery over that of the French—The Guns and Projectiles, and the practice of firing in both Armies explained and contrasted—Breech *versus* Muzzle Loaders—The Strength and Composition of the French Navy.

THE history of the organization of the regular army of France commences in the middle of the seventeenth century. Prior to the reign of Louis XIV. war was carried on by men-at-arms, troops of horse, and bodies of sharpshooters who bore little relation to a modern army. The soldier was equally brave, and more independent; but the art of acting in great masses, and the discipline by which the individual is entirely merged in the corps to which he belongs, is of comparatively recent date. The formation of regular armies required systematic organization—uniformity of arms and dress, regularity of advancement, stricter conditions of service, graduated pay, and more certain methods of insuring the sustenance of troops.

These are the elements of which Louvois was the first great master, and by his careful application of them he contributed more to the success of the arms of Louis XIV. than Turenne and Luxemburg, who led the French forces to victory in the field. The organization of Louvois lasted, with no material changes, until 1793; it perished in that great convulsion which overthrew the monarchy and the privileged classes, who had played so great a part in it. In the French army, thus constituted during the eighteenth century, most of the peculiarities prevailed which have now disappeared from every

European army but that of England. The men were raised by voluntary enlistment. The regiments retained a local name and character from the districts to which they belonged; the brigades of Picardy, Normandy, Champagne, and Auvergne corresponding to the Coldstream Guards, Sutherland or Gordon Highlanders, Connaught Rangers, or Welsh Fusileers in the United Kingdom. The king's household troops were a privileged corps, with this distinction, however, that in the Royal Guards and Musketeers the purchase system never obtained, and that they were open to all ranks of society. In the rest of the army, regiments and companies having been originally raised by private persons for the service of the crown, had become a species of property, like commissions in the British army. The old French army was a highly aristocratic institution; for although the purchase of commissions was tolerated, Louvois had contrived to make the military service rather onerous than profitable, and the consequence was that the rich and the noble alone could hold them. The French nobility served with unflinching courage and enthusiasm; they were as ready to spend their fortunes in the purchase of a step as to spend their blood on the field of battle. Commissions were sometimes

vouchsafed by the king to private soldiers of signal valour and merit, but the *noblesse d'épée* may as a rule be said to have officered the army. The latter was essentially royal and aristocratic when the revolutionary storm of 1789 burst on France, and swept away both the nobility and the throne.

In 1791 the French army consisted of 166 regiments of foot and horse. These troops were well trained, but the corps were numerically weak; and the political agitation of the time had shaken the unity and self-reliance of the army. The consequence was that the outset of the war was disastrous; and the prodigious enthusiasm and energy of the volunteers of 1792 and 1793 alone restored victory to the standards of the Republic. The events of these years proved at once the value and the weakness of a great volunteer movement. The popular movement of 1792 saved France; but in the following year, when it was opposed to the renewed operations of regular troops, the spell was broken, the charm was over. The army of the Rhine was thrown across the Lauter; the army of the north was driven out of Belgium; and it became more than ever difficult to raise men for the necessary service of the country. On the 1st of January, 1793, the eight armies of the French republic had not more than 150,000 men in their ranks. For, as the Duc d'Aumale, in an able work on the military institutions of France, has said:—"It is of the essence of special volunteer corps not to renew their strength, although the mere existence of these corps seriously interferes with and may arrest enlistment for the line." It might be worth while for the leaders of public opinion in England to consider how far this remark applies to our popular volunteer movement, as well as to the great French rising of 1792. The French patriots of 1791 having enlisted for one year, took their discharge when that time had elapsed, and 60,000 of them returned home. The Convention called out 300,000 national guards, but the measure failed for want of authority to raise them. Toulon was taken by the English, Lyons was in insurrection, the eastern departments were invaded, the country was in a supreme hour of danger, when Carnot joined the Committee of Public Safety, and six days afterwards the "*levée en masse*" of the nation was decreed by the Convention. At that moment sprang to life the national army of France. A former law had placed all citizens from the age

of eighteen to forty (at one moment even from sixteen to forty-five) under the grasp of arbitrary rule, and subjected them to the caprice of a local authority. The law of the 20th August, 1793, was more harsh in appearance, but less vexatious and oppressive in reality. It abolished the local discretionary power, confined itself to men from eighteen to twenty-five, but within those limits *took them all*. In six months all the pressure of the Reign of Terror had failed to raise 300,000 men under the earlier law. In three months the general levy was effected without serious opposition under the later law, and on the 1st January, 1794, the strength of the army had risen to 770,932.

This vast army was consolidated by the genius of Carnot into one uniform machine. All distinctions of corps, and even the grades of the non-commissioned officers, were abolished. Local appellations of regiments were superseded by numbers, and the uniform of the whole army became identical; the white livery of the Crown being exchanged for the blue tunic of the Republic. Such was the constitution of the immortal armies of the "Sambre et Meuse," and of the "Rhin et Moselle," which saved France on the plains of Fleurus, won twenty-seven victories in a year, captured 3800 guns, and dissolved the European coalition.

The law of conscription was first established in France on the 5th September, 1798, fourteen months before the 18th Brumaire; and the statute which placed the population at the disposal of the state, as each succeeding generation completed its twentieth year, preceded the power which was to make so tremendous a use of it. From that time to the present, the youth of France just entering upon manhood has been cropped by law, like the tracts in a forest set apart for annual felling; and though the amount has varied, the principle of conscription is now deeply rooted in the law and the habits of the nation, although it devours so large a proportion of the adult male population. The first act of the First Consul was to demand, not an instalment of the conscription, but the whole class of the year, amounting to 100,000 men, and to take severe measures against every evasion of the law. These demands and measures increased in intensity throughout his reign. It is remarkable, however, that Napoleon, the greatest master of the art of modern warfare, did nothing to improve the organic constitution of the army. He employed

the military resources of the country with consummate ability, and with insatiable rapacity; but he consumed everything that he created. The permanent military strength of France could not keep pace with his extravagant demands upon it; and the termination of the empire was the annihilation of the force by which it had been raised to the highest pinnacle of power and glory.

For three years after the battle of Waterloo France remained without an army, and the allied forces were not all withdrawn from her territory, when Marshal Gouvion Saint-Cyr, minister of war under the Restoration, undertook in 1818 the difficult task of re-organizing the military institutions of the kingdom. The peace establishment of the army was fixed at 240,000 men, to be raised by an annual conscription of 40,000 men, enlisted for six years. The reserve was to be composed of soldiers belonging to the levies of the preceding ten years, but this part of the scheme failed. No man could be an officer, who had not passed a certain time in the ranks, or gone through one of the military schools. The guard was retained, and consisted of 30,000 men. The annual conscription on the peace establishment was raised successively to 60,000 and 80,000 by the government of Louis Philippe. Under the second empire it became at least 100,000; and during the Crimean and Italian wars 140,000 men was the annual contingent.

The efficient strength of the French army in 1867, including the staff, the gendarmerie, and the military train, was 389,604 men; of whom 23,105 were officers, 70,850 non-commissioned officers, 26,374 unclassified companies, musicians, &c., and 229,275 private soldiers. From this number, 80,000 must be deducted for home garrisons, depôts, and the force serving in Africa. A further deduction must be made of at least one-seventh for the raw conscripts of the year, and of another considerable fraction of men entitled to their discharge, as having served their time. By calling in the whole reserve of the contingents, the nominal strength of the army might have been raised to 600,000 men, but the actual strength was very far below that figure. As conscripts were allowed to commute or buy off their actual service by paying a certain sum to the military chest, a further deduction must be made for those who paid their debt of military service in money, and not in person. From 1856 to 1865 the average annual number of these exceeded 20,000 men, or one-fifth of the

whole conscription, in years of peace; but in 1859 and 1860, when the army was on a war footing, and the conscription was raised to 140,000, the number of "exonerations" exceeded 44,000, or nearly *one-third of the whole* contingent.

The result is, that in the wars of the Crimea and of Italy, France could only send to the field, and maintain by reinforcements, an army not much exceeding one-fourth of her nominal effective strength; and it is well known that in 1867, when the Luxembourg question was supposed to threaten war, the Emperor Napoleon could not immediately have sent above 150,000 men to the Rhine, and these, in case of a check, could not, under several months, have been supported by a second army. The startling success of the campaign ending with the battle of Sadowa caused a shock of surprise and alarm through France; and in the uneasiness that followed, the highest military authorities of the nation came to the conclusion that they were not in a position to meet on an equal footing the state of things which the system of the Prussian armies and the consolidation of Germany had produced in Europe.

Accordingly, in 1868, most important alterations were introduced by the "Army Re-organization Act." The conscription system was still retained, and the forces of the country classified in three divisions: the Active Army, the Army of Reserve, and the National Guard. The duration of service in the active army was fixed at five years, at the expiration of which time the soldier had to enter the reserve for four years longer. The period of service of the young men who had not been comprised in the active army, was four years in the reserve, and five in the national guard. The young men drawn for the active army were permitted to purchase substitutes from the government, but the privilege was withheld from the men of the reserve. They might, however, interchange with those of the National Guard, or furnish as substitute a man under thirty-two years of age, fulfilling the conditions required for military service, and liberated from all other obligations. Substitutes were formerly procured through private agencies, but an imperial decree in 1855 made the right to furnish them a government monopoly. The price to be paid for substitutes was fixed annually, and varied. In 1868 the minister of war settled it at 2500 francs, or £100. This sum, increased by various other items, was supposed to be thrown



into an army fund, out of which the substitutes were paid a certain amount at the time of enlistment, besides receiving an increase of pay at the end of seven years, another increase at the end of fourteen, and a pension of one franc, or tenpence a day, was to be given after a service of forty-five years. Soldiers were allowed to re-enlist as long as they were fit for service, and re-enlistments were greatly encouraged, so as to give the army a standing nucleus of experienced troops, who had made the military service their life-profession.

By the terms of the Act of 1868, the number of men to be drafted every year was fixed at 160,000, but more might be voted. The number to be called out in each department was settled by imperial decree, and the contingent for each canton by the prefect. The broad result of the law was to give the emperor the absolute command, for military purposes, of the entire male population between the ages of twenty and thirty. Every Frenchman, on attaining his twentieth year, was liable to nine years' military service. Previous to 1832, the period of compulsory enlistment was eight years, and from 1832 to 1868 seven years. Under the new system, not only were two years added to the enlistment, but the chances of escaping it were greatly curtailed. It was intended to maintain about 400,000 men in the active army, 430,000 in the reserve, and 408,000 in the national guard. The latter force was destined as an auxiliary to the active army in the defence of the fortresses, coasts, and frontier of the empire, and in the maintenance of order in the interior. The preceding figures give a total of 1,238,000 men, but the emperor could increase the force at pleasure. In any year he could, if he chose, call on the whole "class" of young men twenty years old, supposed to number about 300,000; the reserve could be rendered available for service in the field on the same conditions as the army; and the national guard called out for active duty in the room of the reserve by a special law, or, in the interval of the session, by a decree which was to be presented within twenty-one days to the legislative body. It will be thus seen that from 1868 conscripts were for nine years at the call of the government, their service being divided between the army (five years) and reserve (four years), or between the reserve (four years) and the national guard (five years). The regulation stature was reduced to 5 feet 1½ inches, a modification favour-

able to tall men, as the number of conscripts was thus increased, and they had a better chance of not serving in the active army. The reserves could, it is true, be called out by the emperor in time of war, but it was understood that such expeditions as those of Rome, or Mexico, or China, or Syria, did not constitute a time of war, which term, in fact, implied a serious menace of collision with some great Continental power. A French soldier was able to marry after having passed one year in the reserve, unless stopped by an imperial decree calling out that force. The married men of the reserve had to perform the same duties as their single comrades. Substitutes were again allowed, and the old offices where a man could step in and purchase another fellow to serve in his stead rose from their ashes. The movable national guard consisted of such Frenchmen as did not belong to the active army or reserve, and had no legal cause of exemption. If a man had a substitute in the active army or reserve, he must, nevertheless, belong to the national guard. These men served for five years, and in this force no substitutes were allowed, as in time of peace the duties would be light, and in time of war every man would be required at his post.

The amended plan was avowedly based on the Prussian system, but with two important differences. The period of service in the active army, which was five years in France, is only three years in Prussia. Again, only half of the French reserve was composed of conscripts who had seen actual service—the other half were of inferior efficiency. In Prussia, on the contrary, the reserve is wholly composed of experienced troops, who have spent three years under colours. In France the conscript was free at the age of twenty-nine, while in Prussia the war office retains its hold over him till he is thirty-two, and, indeed, if the landsturm is taken into account, for a longer period. But in peace a Prussian conscript is after three years practically at liberty to return to civil pursuits, the distribution of the reserve being so arranged that the men composing it can remain in their own town or village among their friends and associates, except during the brief annual exercises. The French conscript, however, was bound for five years in the army; and if the reserve had been made really efficient, the conscripts who there began their military career would have had to devote more time to it than the Prussian reserve men



(who have already been trained, and need only a little "setting-up" drill to freshen their recollection), and would have found the requirements of the service injuriously interfere with their ordinary occupations. The French plan, therefore, while more oppressive than the Prussian one, provided a less efficient reserve.

When the proportion between the conscription and the population is considered, a still more serious objection arises to the French system. It is calculated that about 320,000 young men every year reach the age of twenty in France, but of these quite *half* obtain exemption from military service on account of being included in one or other of the following classes:—Those below the standard; those whose infirmities unfit them for soldiering; the eldest of a family of orphans; the only son or eldest son, or, in default of son or stepson, the only or eldest grandson of a widow, or of a blind father, or of a father aged seventy; the eldest of two brothers drawn for service, if the younger is fit to serve; those who have a brother actually serving, not as a substitute; those who have had a brother killed or disabled in the service. Hence there were only some 160,000 men to supply the contingent of the year. Formerly the contingent stood at 100,000 in times of peace, but the Act of 1868 having raised it to 160,000, it will be seen that the conscription every year carried off every young man who was twenty years of age, and fit for service; and no margin was left for the necessities of war. Accordingly, the whole able-bodied male population of France was bound to military service of one kind or another between the ages of twenty and thirty. In Prussia there is some chance of escape from the army, even for those who are not cripples or invalids. The nominal "class" of the year is 170,000; deducting men unfit for arms, there remain some 75,000 to supply the annual contingent of 60,000. In Prussia, a conscript can marry after his three years' service under the colours. In France, six years at least was the period during which marriage was forbidden.

If we consider the French conscription in its effect upon the population, the case assumes a most serious aspect. At least a century of peace was necessary after 1815, to enable the population to recover from the tremendous drain of the wars of the first empire. Statistics prove that the levy of 100,000 men, more or less, under arms, instantly produces a marked effect on the popula-

tion. When the conscription was 40,000 men the population rapidly increased; with 60,000 the progress was slower; with 80,000, slower still; with 100,000 it was arrested; with 140,000 (in 1854 and 1855) it positively declined. The population of France has for many years increased more slowly than that of any other country, and under the Army Act of 1868 there seemed no prospect before it but rapid decline. No surprise can be felt at such a phenomenon when we remember that 160,000 stout and able-bodied young men were marched off every year to the barracks or the camp; that for at least six years they were unable to contract marriage; and that their more fortunate contemporaries who remained at home, cultivated their fields, married, and reared children, were precisely those who were rejected by the conscription on account of their diminutive size, their feeble constitutions, or other infirmities.

So far as results are concerned the Act of 1868 may really be said to have been a failure. In execution it fell very far short of its express intention, viz., of enabling the emperor to have 800,000 fighting men at his disposal, and of raising the available military strength of the empire to upwards of 1,200,000 men. The reasons of its failure are not hard to find. The imperial government did not possess the unequivocal or undivided confidence of any class of French citizens. The emperor, whose will was the only tangible form of authority, could not boast of high military talents, and had been unfortunate in several of his military experiments. After him there had not been for many years in France any general of such indisputable pre-eminence and authority, that he could at once give the vigour and unity of paramount command to the whole military system. As there did not exist any immediate and stirring motive for such a measure of national armament beyond the successes of a neighbour, the measure did not meet with popular sympathy; and a government whose relations with the people were never the most cordial, hesitated to enforce to the letter an objectionable law. The government even lacked the courage or strength to put into execution some of its mildest and least vexatious provisions, such as the training and arming of the garde mobile. If the policy of Napoleon III., after the passing of the Act of 1868, had not been characterized by such infirmity of purpose and fatal timidity and vacillation, the so-called "Army of the Rhine" of 1870

would not have been so hopelessly overwhelmed, outnumbered, and broken up as it was by the Prussian forces.

The great national guard, of which so much was expected, having been wilfully maintained in a condition which rendered it perfectly worthless in time of war, the notion that France had a great reserve on which to fall back, was found, when too late, to have been a delusion. The regular army were soldiers; but the national guard had neither drill, nor arms, nor officers worthy of the name. The reason of this is manifest enough in the extreme reluctance of the Bonapartist ministry to place arms in the hands of the civil population; and it must be remembered that before the French army had suffered a single reverse, the disaffection of the garde mobile had been so abundantly demonstrated in the camp at Chalons, that it was thought prudent to teach the bulk of the men drill with sticks instead of Chassepots.

At the commencement of the war the regular army of France was 400,000 men, of whom 40,000 were at Cherbourg getting ready for the Baltic, 5000 in Italy, 10,000 in Algeria, 35,000 in Paris and Châlons, 10,000 in Lyons, and at least 30,000 more in Marseilles, Toulon, Bordeaux, Toulouse, L'Orient, Rochefort, and the hospitals, leaving only 270,000 efficient for the front—that is, eight corps d'armée of 30,000 each, and the guard. On this army rushed, by German official accounts, the Crown Prince with 210,000 men, Prince Frederick Charles with 220,000 more, and Steinmetz with 90,000, or 520,000 in all. In addition to these, to reinforce German losses, there was "the second line"—the 200,000 soldiers encamped between the Rhine and the Weser.

An element of very considerable weakness in the French system, was to be found in what is called the administration of the army, better known in England as the commissariat. In time of peace it is difficult to learn the art of supplying an army in the field. In peace the delivery of contracts is perfectly simple, regular, and easy. In war everything—time, place, and demand—is urgent, difficult, and irregular. The only method of dealing with so many unforeseen contingencies is not by military routine, but by a ready and complete knowledge of business. But all the officers of the French commissariat had served for years in the army itself; and the heads of the department, or intendants, were superannuated generals.

The consequence was, that these persons knew nothing of the operations of trade, by which alone supply can adjust itself to demand. During the Italian campaign of 1859, the French troops were often without bread, in one of the richest corn-bearing regions of Europe. Biscuit was equally deficient, and an attempt was made to supply the place of these necessities by polenta, which the men could not eat, because they did not know how to cook it! The commissariat knew nothing about buying and selling food; they could only distribute it.

It will be seen, therefore, that the French were not only outnumbered and out-generalled, but that their organization completely broke down. The Prussians, at a distance from their own supplies, and consequently compelled to maintain a long line of communication through an enemy's country, were better furnished with matériel and food than the French. They succeeded in moving their wounded more rapidly from the field of battle; and their operations were never impeded by a want of transport. It is impossible, on the other hand, to explain some of the delays of the French generals except on the supposition that their transport failed them. Even the great disaster at Sedan might have been averted, or lessened, if MacMahon had been able to move at the rate of twenty miles a day. An admirable organization enabled the Prussians easily to accomplish distances which a want of it made it hopeless for the French to attempt.

On the French system the ministry of war, through a great department—the Intendance—monopolizes the whole business of the army. It musters the troops, checks the pay lists, issues provisions, fuel, forage, and clothing, supervises the hospital service, manages the whole transport of the army, and takes charge of all the matériel of war. The system of the Prussians is the exact reverse. Instead of centralizing, they have decentralized. Instead of providing one intendance for the whole army, they have aimed at making each corps d'armée complete in itself. Each corps has its own stores and its own reserves, and draws its supplies from its dépôts without the necessity of reference to a central authority. In France the entire transport is under the control of the Intendance, and the vehicles may be used for any purpose or for any regiment for which they may be temporarily required. In Prussia the duties of

the central authority are confined to the simple task of replenishing the dépôts from which each corps draws its stores; every corps Intendance has control over its own carriages, which can only be used for the service of the particular corps to which they are attached. Each corps has means at its disposal for the carriage of its reserve ammunition, its hospital service, its stores, and its supplies, and not only is adequate transport provided for each corps, but sufficient vehicles are furnished for each object. The ammunition waggon, the hospital carts, the store train, are all distinct from each other, and under the orders of separate officers, though subject to the commands of the general of the corps. The preference which has been shown by many high authorities for the French plan, is based on the supposition that the requirements of an army are so various and so incapable of being foreseen, that it is wasteful to maintain separate matériel for each regiment. One regiment may be stationed in a barren country, the other in a fertile one. The one may be far from its resources, the other near them. In either case the one would require more elaborate means of transport than the other, and, if each were provided with the same amount, half the horses in the one case would be standing idle, while all the beasts in the other would be worked to death. But this criticism overlooks the fact, that the Prussians knowingly provide a transport which in some cases may prove extravagant, in order that they may be quite sure that in every instance it may be adequate. And thus, at the outbreak of war, each regiment in the Prussian army is ready to move at a moment's notice, while the French cannot move a step till the Intendance has undertaken a preliminary distribution of stores, matériel, and transport. The French, from the nature of their system, were organizing while the Prussians were marching. Their organization may prove admirable, if they can fight at their own time. It must fail before an enemy prepared to assume at the very outbreak of the war an active offensive. In short, it is suited for the dilatory operations of ancient warfare. It is wholly unfitted for the sudden and rapid movements of modern armies.

The same principles of rapid strategy and mobility of force have ever been the keys of victory, whether this rapidity and mobility have been gained by improvement of roads, improvement of organization, adaptations of scientific

discoveries, or superiority of armament. The same skilful application of the science of war has turned the scale in every campaign from the days of Alexander to those of Moltke. Every great general who has handed down his name as a mighty master of his art has owed his successes and his reputation to the discovery or appreciation of some new means of rendering his army more easy to move, or more easy to concentrate for decisive action, than that of his opponent. Alexander conquered by means of the discipline and equipment of the troops handed down to him by his father, which enabled them to move more rapidly than the cumbrous forces of his enemies, in exactly the same manner as Frederick the Great triumphed over his enemies by means of the discipline and equipment of the troops handed down to him by his father. Caesar gained victories by the mobility of the legions, exactly in the same manner as Napoleon did by the adoption of the system of divisions and corps d'armée, first advocated by Moreau. Wherever we turn in the history of war, we find the same broad principles the foundation of success. The French gained the great victory of Jena by having adopted a system of manœuvre which was as superior in mobility to that handed down from the time of Frederick the Great as is the system of the present day, by which the Prussians have turned the tables on the French, to that of the first Napoleon. The art of war, like every other art, is ever progressive, ever advancing. There is no such thing as chivalry in war. A general who gave up an advantageous position nowadays to meet an enemy on equal terms, would be thought as great a madman as a knight would have been considered in the so-called days of chivalry, if he had taken off his armour and fought without protection. War is, always has been, and always must be, the means of doing the maximum of damage to an enemy with the minimum injury to oneself. And the principles of war have remained the same in all ages. They may be summed up briefly as the means of moving most rapidly against your enemy when he is unprepared, and of hitting him hardest when you get near him. Could soldiers fight more bravely than those of the French army did in the war? They showed a courage in the field of battle which allowed them to retire from even an unsuccessful struggle with every honour. Yet



of what avail was their gallantry for the defence of the country which they were maintained to defend? Their enemy had mastered the present conditions of the art of war, and all their gallantry and bravery was ineffectual and abortive.

The favour shown by the French military authorities to their *corps d'élite*, has a tendency to drain the line of its best men. By common consent the infantry of an army is its most essential and important element. The foot soldier of the French army, carrying on his back a weight of thirty-five kilogrammes, or seventy-five lbs., which is more than one-third of the regulation burden of a camp mule, has to march, to watch, to work, and to fight, for the support and defence of the whole service. In the Chassepot the voltigeur certainly has a much lighter weapon than the old muzzle-loader, but "the pack" is still greater than any man can be expected to carry on a long march without exhaustion. First, there is the Chassepot,  $7\frac{1}{2}$  pounds; next, the sword bayonet and scabbard, 3 pounds; 10 pounds of ammunition, distributed partly in two pouches, and partly in his knapsack; a pair of shoes; a four-pound loaf of bread; a canvas bag slung over the left shoulder, and containing any creature comforts the man may have procured; Over the knapsack—first, a great-coat; secondly, a blanket; thirdly, his share of the canvas for the *tente d'abri*, and sticks for the same; and fourthly, a huge camp kettle. Inside the knapsack he has a second pair of trousers, comb, brushes, needles, thread, buttons, a pair of gloves, a couple of pairs of socks, and three shirts; in addition, a flask capable of containing about a quart of liquid is flung over the right shoulder. A long march with such a weight must incapacitate all but the very strongest men. Yet how is the infantry of the line formed? It is what may fairly be called the *residuum* of the conscription. The artillery and engineers have the first choice, as they must have men of physical strength and superior intelligence. Then the big men are taken for the heavy cavalry regiments. Then the most agile and hardy men are selected for the light-infantry corps (*chasseurs à pied*); and when the regiments of the line are formed, the best men are drafted out of them to serve in the imperial guard, or to form the two picked companies of each battalion. What remains after all this selection, is of necessity the dregs of the whole mass. No error can be more fatal than this fostering of picked

bodies of troops at the expense of the whole army. The forces are weakened by continually subtracting their strongest ingredients; and the army, as a whole, loses that uniform solidity which is essential to great operations.

When we remember that it was the Emperor Napoleon I. who said that, to preserve the superiority of an army in war, the system of tactics required to be changed every ten years, it seems remarkable that the French military authorities should have been the last in Europe to act upon the principle. Yet such was the case. The exercises and manœuvres of the French line when the war with Prussia commenced were still almost those of 1791; indeed, they were introduced and copied from the drill of Frederick II., after the battle of Rosbach. In process of time these regulations, revised and amended in a thousand ways, reached an enormous bulk—some 846 articles of evolutions, most of which could not be executed in actual war. They are still essentially the regulations of Potsdam, devised by Leopold Von Dessau, soon after Frederick had adopted the iron ramrod, which was the needle-gun of the last century. The minuteness and complexity of these details exceeds all belief, and the study of them diverts the mind of an officer from the true objects of war. The whole drill should be reduced to a few pages; and now that the inflexible rigidity of the old Prussian line of battle has been superseded by elasticity, mobility, and the relative independence of its components parts, it is evident that simplicity and clearness in theory, and rapidity in execution, have become the absolute law of modern manœuvres and tactics. While French infantry tactics are thus complicated and old-fashioned, those of the Prussian army were the subject of incessant study and improvement from the battle of Jena, when their old system broke down, to the battle of Sadowa, when their new system culminated in victory. The German armies are now in the highest state of efficiency which can be reached by scientific preparation for war, by concentration, by compact discipline, and by forethought.

The French army has always been remarkable for a degree of enthusiasm in their fighting far beyond that of other nations; and the wars of the present generation show that this peculiarity has not altered. It is due, in the first instance, to the nervous, high-spirited temperament of the men; but it has been increased, rather than coun-



teracted, by the influence of the campaigns in Algeria, the great school of modern French arms. The loose formation and desultory warfare of Africa against the Arab tribes, have given to men and officers a high degree of individual resource and self-reliance, but they have weakened that severe discipline and close connection which is essential to regular movements against an enemy in line of battle. French soldiers take up their ground with extreme promptitude and gallantry: when the fire of the enemy begins to tell upon them they rush forward with irresistible ardour, but with some degree of confusion. In their European campaign of 1859, the French beat the Austrians by furious assaults with the bayonet; but that sort of thing, it was found, would never do with the present range and rapidity of firearms, and a novel system of movements had therefore to be introduced. The Prussians supplied this want, simultaneously with the adoption of the breech-loader, and successfully practised their new manoeuvre of fighting in dispersed columns four years ago. The French have yet to adapt themselves to this particular requirement of the age. Their noisy and impetuous movements are ill-timed and inconvenient; and in the event of a check inflicted by an enemy under stricter discipline and control, are followed by the most disastrous consequences.

In most of their campaigns of late years, before the war with Germany, the French troops were opposed to an enemy far inferior to themselves in soldierly qualities. They found that a well-directed attack generally secured them victory, and became, therefore, confirmed in the belief that nothing could withstand their rush. They seem to have forgotten that Germans, the most military of the continental nations, fighting for all they held dear, and imbued with the deepest feelings of nationality, were not men likely to yield without a desperate struggle. They did not recognize that with arms of precision, and especially with breech-loaders, calmness, steadiness, and resolution are more than a counterpoise for dash and enthusiasm. Even French writers noticed that the French conscripts fired wildly, and what does firing wildly with the Chassepot mean? It means a useless expenditure of ammunition from a rapidly loaded rifle, and an utter disregard of the value of accuracy. Possibly breech-loading arms may be better adapted for the slow and steady German than for the eager and impetuous Frenchman. It now requires a great degree of calmness on the part

of the soldier, when under a heavy fire, to refrain from expending his ammunition. Courage, apart from excitement, is necessary to enable him to keep cool and to use his arm of precision. Few who have studied the events of the war will be able to avoid the thought that, armed as soldiers now are, steady troops will have the advantage over those who trust to *élan* for their superiority, and seek by enthusiasm to replace the firm persistency which characterizes the northern nations.

It will not be out of place if we indicate here one or two other features of the campaign, which will to a great extent account for the overwhelming reverse of fortune which has overtaken the military power of France. No doubt a very large portion of the Prussian success may be accounted for by the superiority of numbers and the great talents of the strategists and generals who have planned and executed the various movements; but it would show a disregard of the lessons of war if the influence attaching to the composition of their rank and file were overlooked. In the first place, few can fail to be struck with the difference between the discipline of the German and French regiments, not only when defeat had tested to the utmost the quality of the latter, but even before the war had actually commenced, and during the march of the troops to the front. There was an earnestness and determination among the German soldiers which contrasted favourably with the excitement and effervescent enthusiasm of the French troops. What can be more marked in their difference than the narratives of the departure of the regiments from Berlin and Paris! In the former city quiet, order, and determination not unmixed with sadness, characterized the march of the men who had left home and family to fight for a cause which they believed to be identical with the existence of Germany as a nation. In Paris, on the contrary, the wild conduct of the Zouaves and Turcos was applauded as the natural outbursts of soldiers who by mere *élan* were to overcome their enemies and override Europe. To hold within bounds of discipline such soldiers requires a strong hand and a firm will. Neither of these seems to have been employed. Unprejudiced spectators have narrated how French regiments behave on the line of march; how the soldiers straggle, fall out, and lag behind; how the officers ride in front, careless of their men, and intent only on securing for themselves good quarters and good food. The necessary results

follow. The stragglers, released from the restraints of discipline, plundered and oppressed even their own countrymen, and in some instances, without the excuse of hunger or want, sacked the baggage of the army, which had been left without a sufficient guard. On the other hand, the marching of the Prussian regiments received the well-merited commendation of all who witnessed it, while their conduct in the enemy's country showed how well discipline had been preserved, not only by the power of military rule, but by the influence of men of education and good character on their comrades in the ranks. Neither the officers nor men of the German army shrunk from the hardships of war; all equally experienced them; and the generals, the staff, and the regimental officers, alike shared with their men the bivouac in the open and the inconvenience it entailed. The French officers do not appear to have considered necessary such a similarity of life between themselves and their men. Take the account of the capture of St. Privat by the Prussian guards, on the occasion of the battle of Gravelotte. They advanced across the open, up a steep hill, their generals and mounted officers in front, in face of a most withering fire from an enemy entrenched behind the walls and houses. Their mounted officers were all either dismounted or killed, their ranks were more than decimated; but they pressed on, drove the French from their position, and took their camp. The captured camp afforded unwonted luxuries. These Prussian guardsmen, men of the highest families of Berlin, were amazed at the comforts which abounded in the tents of the French officers. Their own generals and officers of all ranks were accustomed to sleep on the ground; but these gentlemen of France had beds, chairs, carpets, curtains, and looking-glasses, and, as a Prussian staff officer naïvely remarked, "we then quite understood why the French could not march so rapidly as we do."

The French army did not bear well the strain of disaster. To judge by the narratives of eye-witnesses, the soldiery appear to have broken loose from the bonds of discipline, and the officers to have lost all control over their men. The climax of this absence of discipline and of the good feeling which in a well-regulated army exists between all ranks, was reached in the last hours of the terrible battle of Sedan. In that awful time, when the organization of the best troops would have been subjected to the severest trial, the discipline of the

French army completely succumbed. Soldiers fired on their officers, and officers who surrendered themselves as prisoners were not ashamed to curse their men in the presence of their captors. But it may be said these troops by their behaviour on the battlefield wiped out any stain that might attach to their conduct in camp. Doubtless they showed great courage, which was worthily recognized by their enemy, and the whole world beside; but does not the cool determination of the soldiers of Germany appear to be more suitable for the proper use of the weapons of modern war, than the fierce enthusiasm of the French with its accompanying disorganization? The breech-loading rifle requires a steady and a thinking man to appreciate the effects of its power of accurate shooting, and the necessity of carefully husbanding every cartridge. Nor when the time arrived for attack over the open did the German soldiery fail. With a patient endurance and hardy courage contrasting greatly with the favourite French quality, no men, nevertheless, could have faced death more readily than they did when ordered to assault the French in their entrenched positions; while, probably for the first time in war, skirmishers in extended order not only received the charge, but actually advanced to the attack of heavy cavalry.

It is well worth while to ask what cause lay at the bottom of this absence of discipline on the part of the French? were similar faults observed in the great wars of the first empire? and are all armies when tried by defeat equally insensible to the calls of duty? These questions are difficult to answer, because their solution lies in a correct idea of what discipline implies, and on the means by which it can be best secured. An army is only an integral part of a nation, and as such contains within itself the particular virtues and vices of its society. This is especially true of armies raised by conscription, as they necessarily embrace representatives of all classes. Now the tone of society, using the term broadly, of the French nation under the empire was eminently selfish, luxurious, and vicious. Noble aims and worthy ambitions were set aside. Material prosperity alone was extolled. The rich lived for pleasure, and neglected all the duties of their position. The poor, longing for pleasures in which their superiors indulged, and envious of their supposed good fortune, imbibed eagerly the doctrines of Socialism. Amid the many changes of government loyalty became extinct, and even party

was regarded solely as a means of enriching self. The army did not escape these influences. The good feeling which in Great Britain unites class with class, and which may be observed in the village equally as in the barrack, did not exist. No common bond of sentiment united officers and men. Each acted for himself. The officers, looking for promotion, attached themselves to the party in power; the soldiers, imbued with Socialistic ideas, regarded their superiors with envy.

Another cause of an evil so novel and so strange, we believe will ultimately be found in the fact that the moral force of the conscription has at last entirely broken down. It is now considered not a blood-tax on France, but a blood-tax on the poor for the benefit of the rich. Owing partly to the spread of habits of comfort, partly to the demands for Algerine service and the frequency of foreign expeditions, but chiefly to the new development of the desire to make money, the reluctance to enter the service has of late years greatly increased; the mothers save more carefully to purchase immunity for their sons, and the whole burden of the war falls upon the poor, who again have been aroused by the liberal press and the artisans in the ranks to a perception that it is so—that equality before the law is a mere phrase. This feeling has sunk deeply into the peasantry, so deeply as to produce a deadly hatred of all who purchase exemption, and a bitter dislike of the service, and distrust of those in it who are above themselves. This feeling, which in Picardy especially has been openly manifested, has been fostered by the workmen ever since the soldiery were employed to put down strikes, and though quiet in ordinary times, breaks out under defeat with terrible violence. Then the conscript remembers that he is serving under compulsion, while the rich are exempt, and while his officer, whose mistake, as his men think, exposes rank and file to slaughter, is serving voluntarily. A spirit first of grudging, then of disaffection, and then of disgust springs up, which any accident, a defeat, a want of food, a harsh commandant, or even a severe order, may exasperate into a fury fatal to discipline and wholly incompatible with success in the field. It must be remembered that the defect of the French character, its special and persistent foible, is envy, and that the love of equality is in all classes, and more especially among the peasantry, a passion which is capable of inciting them to terrible acts, and

undoubtedly fosters that spirit of Socialism which the officers complain has crept into the army.

In enumerating the causes of the French misfortunes in the war, too much stress cannot be laid upon the evils of the "exoneration" system. Formerly substitutes were procured through private offices, but as before stated, of late years this business was made a government monopoly; and it became not only the means of infinite corruption, but a source of incalculable evil to the country. In theory France had an immense army; but when actual service was required, the nation, waking from a terrible and fatal delusion, found that its forces were largely composed of mere paper soldiers. If a young man who had drawn an unlucky number did not wish to be a soldier, his parents went to the government office appointed for that purpose, and paid, say, two thousand francs. Their dear lad was exonerated. Now, it was understood that with the two thousand francs a substitute, a *remplaçant*, was bought. This was the bargain between (1) the exonerated youth, (2) the government, and (3) the nation. While the traffic in men was in the hands of private companies the government took care to have their substitutes, since they had no interest in suppressing them. But when they turned dealers themselves, their interest lay at once in a different direction: They took the money from the pockets of families, and put it into their own. The substitute money did not buy a substitute. The effect of this was that the right number of men were put upon paper. To the public, who knew nothing of the dishonest transaction, the companies of French regiments were a hundred strong; and consequently the regiments, it was believed, had each 3000 men under the flag. But what was the actual truth? That in many instances the actual available men were not more than thirty to the company. Regiments that upon paper were at their full strength would barely muster 1800 fighting men, and some even less than this. This might almost be said to have been the key to the disasters which redden the brow of every Frenchman.

The education of the French officer does not seem calculated to create habits of command. A large number are trained in the great military schools of St. Cyr and Metz, which they enter by competition. They are then kept under the closest surveillance, and are forced to acquire in a short time a great amount of knowledge. No responsi-



bility is allowed them, and until they become officers they are treated in a way which no English schoolboy would endure. They consequently never attain habits of command; and, as the majority do not enter from the higher classes of society, have never, even as boys, received the rudimentary training which teaches how to rule and how to obey. Another portion of the officers (nearly a third) enter from the ranks, and are selected either by favour or merit from the non-commissioned officers. These seldom attain a higher grade than that of captain, and consequently continually see young men who have merely passed through the schools promoted over their heads. Again, the staff form a distinct corps, and are almost entirely separated, even at the commencement of their career, from the regimental service. Consequently they are ignorant of the feelings and prejudices of the soldiery, and have little or no sympathy with them. In times of victory, when success glosses over defects and even crimes, all goes well. The martial spirit of the French troops carries them through difficulties and dangers; while lookers-on are so dazzled by the blaze of glory that they fail to perceive the defects which lie beneath the surface. Ambition has been always held up to French soldiers as the incentive to action. Phrases, such as the soldier carrying in his knapsack the bâton of a marshal, have been repeated until it has been forgotten that those who are left behind in the race for glory may possibly feel a keen discontent, unknown to those who have been actuated by the humbler aim of doing their duty and being a credit to their regiment.

A country paying 600 million francs for its army, as France did, should have had the right of expecting itself always prepared for war, but the money was to a great extent thrown away in the pay of the generals and marshals who spent their lives at the court. The Etat Major, a body whose chief duties ought to consist in the study, in time of peace, of strategical positions all over Europe, and of reconnoitring in time of war, were officers who were not apparently up to their work. The Prussians sent usually a couple of dozen of Uhlans, as they call their lancers, using their original Polish name, with three or four officers, and if one of them came back safely with some useful information they were quite satisfied, thinking the purchase worth the expense. Thus they knew everything about

the French army, while the French knew nothing about them.

The destructive and marauding habits of the French troops are well known. In the war the French villagers said they were often much worse treated by their own soldiers than by the Prussians. The difference between them and the English in this respect particularly struck General Trochu in the Crimea, and when asked how he would propose to correct this license, so common to French soldiers, he answered, "En les faisant vertueux." He had soon the opportunity of showing how far this assertion was neither paradoxical nor pedantic; for in the Italian war his division combined all the military qualities with a regard for the persons and properties of non-combatants hitherto unexampled. He began by degrading a non-commissioned officer to the ranks for insulting a peasant woman, and through the whole line of march the site of his encampment was always distinguishable by the uninjured dwellings and the mulberry trees still clothed with vines green amid the field of desolation. This power of restraining military disorder was, however, given to very few French commanders in recent years. For a long time two causes operated to the damage of the traditionally amiable and friendly character of the French soldier. The first was the prominent position given to the Zouaves, and the infection of their rowdy and violent spirit. The other, and far more serious, was the recruitment of the old soldiers. These are generally men who have failed to establish themselves in civil life, and who re-enter the army with the worst habits and principles. It may have been the hope of the originators of this system that the veterans who returned to the service would infuse into the younger portion of it certain imperial associations of which it was deficient; but the effect is acknowledged on all hands to have been most detrimental to discipline. Indeed the quiet, gay, gentle, and simple *piou-piou* (infantry soldier) of the French line became the exception rather than the rule.

The decline in the *prestige* of the French army is the more surprising from its extreme rapidity. If we only recur to 1854, we find that France then possessed a great many comparatively young officers, who had served in high positions in Africa at the time when there was still some serious fighting there; and that in the Algerian special corps were troops undoubtedly superior



to any other in Europe. The numerous substitutes and re-enlistments (which latter were much encouraged by the emperor), provided a larger number of professional soldiers who had seen service, real veterans, than any other continental power. The one thing necessary was to elevate as much as possible the mass of the troops to the level of the special corps. This was done to a great extent. The *pas gymnastique* (the "double" of the English), hitherto practised by the special corps only, was extended to the whole infantry, and thus a rapidity of manœuvring was obtained previously unknown to armies. The cavalry was mounted, as far as possible, with better horses; the *matériel* of the whole army was looked to and completed; and, finally, the Crimean war was commenced. The organization of the French army showed to great advantage beside that of the English; the numerical proportions of the allied armies naturally gave the principal part of the glory—whatever there was of it—to the French; the character of the war, circling entirely round one grand siege, brought out to the best advantage the peculiarly mathematical genius of the French as applied by their engineers; and altogether the Crimean war again elevated the French army to the rank of the first in Europe.

Under these circumstances the Italian war was undertaken, resulting in additional "glory" and increased territory to France. If after the Crimean war the French *chasseur à pied* had already become the *beau idéal* of a foot soldier, this admiration was now extended to the whole of the French army. Its institutions were studied; its camp became instructing schools for officers of all nations. The invincibility of the French became almost a European article of faith. In the meantime, France rifled all her old muskets, and armed all her artillery with rifled cannon. But the same campaign which elevated the French army to the first rank in Europe, gave rise to efforts which ended in procuring for it, first a rival, then a conqueror. The year 1870 came, and the French army was no longer that of 1859.

In point of armament, the Prussians forestalled the other armies of Europe in the introduction and use of the breech-loading rifle; but this inequality in their favour disappeared after the introduction of the French Chassepot, a weapon which will be better understood from the accompanying illustrations. Fig. 3, Plate 3, is an elevation of this rifle, the

bolt being shown elevated to a vertical position, and the hammer cocked; and fig. 4 is a longitudinal vertical section of the arm, with the hammer in the position it assumes after firing, and the breech closed by the bolt, the handle of which assumes a horizontal position. The breech, *a*, is screwed on to the barrel; it is open on the upper surface, as well as on the right hand side, in order to allow of the working of the bolt, *g*. It is through this lateral opening that the cartridge is introduced. The rear face or end of the barrel serves as a stop to the front, *h*, of the bolt, *g*. The trigger mechanism, for holding the hammer when cocked, consists of two pieces, *c* and *d*, connected by a screw, *e*. The piece, *d*, tends always to project in the interior of the breech by the action of a spring, *b*, which forces upon the trigger the rear end of the piece, *c*, working on a centre at *f*. The pressure exerted upon the trigger is transmitted to the tumbler, *d*, which on being depressed releases the hammer, and allows it to act under the influence of a balance spring, and to strike the priming of the cartridge. The bolt, *g*, serves to open and close the chamber. It carries a piece, *h*, provided with a handle, *i*, for actuating it. Between the end of the bolt, *g*, and a shoulder formed on a movable head, *j*, there is fitted a washer of vulcanized india-rubber, composed of three superposed layers of different degrees of hardness. At the moment of igniting the charge the pressure exerted on the movable head, *j*, of the bolt is transmitted to the washer, which, being thus compressed, forms a perfect packing, and prevents the escape of gas. The portion which terminates the piece, *j*, is intended to form a space behind the cartridge for the expulsion and combustion of the fragments of paper which may remain in the barrel after the charge has been fired. The rear and upper part, as well as the left side of the bolt, *g*, are provided with two longitudinal slots of unequal size; the first acts as a safety notch, and the other forms the working notch. There is between the axle of these two grooves or slots a space of 90° when the breech is open. The cock or hammer is in front of the safety notch, so that if it accidentally becomes released no dangerous result will follow; it only corresponds with the working groove when the bolt closes the breech and is firmly held in its position by the handle, *i*, which will then be in a horizontal position. The bolt is also provided

with a groove or notch opposed to the piece, *h*, the object of which is to permit, when charging, of drawing the bolt back without it being stopped by the trigger piece. A second groove formed on the right-hand side serves as a stop for the bolt, and prevents it leaving the breech when the screw, *r*, is in place. The hammer is composed of four parts, connected together with pins; these are, the hammer proper, *k*, the roller, *l*, the tumbler, *m*, and the spring-bearing spindle, *n*. The gun is cocked, not, as formerly, by causing the hammer to describe an arc of a circle, but by pulling it back longitudinally. The front part of this hammer terminates in an extended portion, *p*, which engages in the upper opening of the breech, and to the end of which is fixed the screw, *q*. It is this screw which, on penetrating one or other of the two grooves before referred to, brings the hammer into the safety notch, or permits it to strike the needle. The sliding of the hammer is facilitated by the roller, *r*.

The helical spring on the rod, *n*, is intended to give the impact of the needle on the priming, and has its bearing at *s*. The striking end of the needle is pointed, whilst the opposite end is fixed in a small holder, *t*. The following are the movements in using this arm, it being held in the left hand, with the butt pressed against the right side:—*First movement*:—Place the forefinger against the trigger guard, and draw back the hammer with the thumb. *Second movement*:—To open the arm, turn the lever from left to right, and draw back the bolt. *Third movement*:—To load, seize the cartridge in the right hand, and insert it into the barrel through the opening made in the right side of the breech. *Fourth movement*:—To close the arm, push the bolt forward, and turn the lever from right to left. *Fifth movement*:—To fire, press upon the trigger. In order to place the arm upon the safety notch after the breech has been closed, the handle of the bolt must be elevated so that the smallest notch in the bolt shall be opposite the hammer, which must be followed up till its screw, *q*, arrives at the bottom of this notch. When it is desired to fire, it is simply necessary to turn the bolt to the side and draw the trigger.

The following is a description of the cartridge intended to be used with the Chassepot arm. Fig. 5 is a longitudinal section of the cartridge. It is composed of six elements, namely, the priming,

ball. The priming consists of a copper cap, *u*, similar to those used in the army, but rather smaller. It is perforated at the bottom with two holes, diametrically opposite to each other, and which are intended for the free passage of the flame. The fulminating powder, *v*, is placed at the bottom of the cap; a small wad, *x*, of cloth or wax covers it in order to preserve it from external shock. The cap thus prepared is fitted with a small washer, *y*, of thin tin; this washer is connected to a paper disc, intended to form the bottom of the cartridge, when the priming will be complete. The powder case consists of a band of paper, *z*, rolled on a mandril, and cemented at the edges. The charge of powder introduced therein, equal to five grammes five decigrammes, is slightly rammed to give rigidity to the cartridge. A wad of card, *b*<sup>1</sup>, is placed on the powder, of about two millimètres in thickness, and having a perforation therein of about six millimètres in size, through which the ends of the case, *z*, are pressed; the excess of paper being removed with a pair of scissors. The ball case consists of a covering of paper, *c*<sup>1</sup>, making two turns round a conical mandril, and cemented at the base only. The ball, the form of which is shown in Fig. 5, weighs 24 grammes 5 decigrammes. After having placed this ball in its case, the cartridge is completed by uniting the ball-case to the powder-case by a ligature in a groove made a short distance in the rear of the cardboard wad. As a final operation, the whole height of the cartridge corresponding to the ball, less the ogive or tapered end of the bullet, is to be greased, when the cartridge will be ready for use. The Chassepot carries a sabre bayonet, and the length of the two is 6 feet 1½ inches.

The Chassepot has a longer range, but less precision, than the Prussian needle-gun. The Chassepot has an incipient velocity of 1328 feet per second, the needle-gun of only 990; but the semi-diameter of the scattering circle at a distance of 300 paces is as much as 13½ inches in the case of the former, and only 7½ inches in that of the latter. This circumstance, coupled with the fact that the range of the needle-gun is quite as far as the eye can aim with anything like accuracy, considerably reduces its inequality as compared with its rival. Under some circumstances, however, the longer range of the Chassepot gives tremendous advantages to the troops who use it, but the experience of the war shows it to have been a superior

weapon badly handled. The Chassepot allows of about ten or eleven, the needle-gun only of seven or eight discharges per minute; but as to fire even seven effective rounds per minute is beyond the capacity of the ordinary soldier, the advantage the Chassepot has in this respect is again imaginary rather than practical. It is, moreover, counterbalanced by a serious drawback; in rapid fire the Chassepot barrel has, after twelve or fourteen rounds, to be cleared of the remnants of cartridges. A really strong point of the Chassepot, the smallness of its calibre, which permits a Frenchman to carry ninety-three cartridges against the seventy-two lodged in the German pouch, has been likewise secured for the needle-gun by the alterations which have been adopted. Besides, the smaller number of cartridges is a disadvantage which tells considerably less against a German soldier than it would against a Frenchman. Far from being taught to blaze away as rapidly as possible, the German soldier is educated not to use his rifle, except when he has a fair aim; and as the instances rarely occur when "quick fire" can be of any good, troops no longer fighting in massed columns, the German soldier, upon the whole, has been found to have enough and to spare in his seventy-two shots. To meet extraordinary exigencies, however, an additional allotment of cartridges is sometimes carried in the knapsacks. The effective range of the Chassepot is 1800 paces, and that of the needle-gun only 600. Such a superiority of range was severely felt on several occasions by the Prussians in charging, when they had to traverse a distance of 1200 paces entirely exposed to a destructive fire to which they were powerless to reply. It is inexplicable, however, why the French did not make use of the boasted long range of their Chassepots to pick off the Prussian gunners on many occasions, especially at the battle of Gravelotte, where the Prussian artillery was extremely destructive.

The campaign of 1870 tried a previously unknown weapon, the mitrailleuse; but the rough verdict of war has been, upon the whole, unfavourable to the novelty. The words *mitraille* and *mitrailleuse* are indifferently employed to denote a class of arm which has imitated but not surpassed the mitraille or case shot fire of our present field pieces. The new mitraille is hurled by engines which avail themselves of rifling, of breech-loading, and of the skill of the mechanical engineer, and seek to pro-

long the scathing effects of the old case, which barely reached to 400 yards, to at least 2000; but they are not so useful as ordinary field-guns in practical war.

The principle of the French mitrailleuse will be seen from the accompanying engravings. Fig. 1, Plate 1, represents the weapon in action; fig. 2 is a sectional elevation of the weapon and carriage; fig. 3 is a section of the breech end; fig. 4 is a section of the breech end, with the block or closer drawn down, leaving the barrels free to be loaded; and fig. 5 is a sectional plan, with the cartridges in the barrels and the closer screwed home. This compound gun is composed of a series of barrels, which are fitted between plates, *A A*, which stretch across from one side to the other so as to firmly unite the two side plates, *B B*, upon which the trunnions are formed for supporting the mitrailleuse upon a carriage, so that it can be removed from place to place and employed in field operations. The rear ends of the side plates, *B B*, are of greater thickness than the other portions, and are slotted so that the guide plates of the closer can work therein. These plates are centred upon pins, which are kept in position without working loose by means of tappets acting upon the nuts on their ends. The breech-closer plates, *G*, extend a distance beyond the rear end of the barrels, and have near their ends long holes, which serve to hold secure a transverse bar, *J*. The central portion of the transverse bar is of larger diameter, or is thicker than the other parts, so that the threaded rod, *L*, which passes through it, may be turned so as to bring the breech-closer nearer to or further from the rear of the barrels. The front of the threaded rod, *L*, is rounded, the rounded portion being fitted between two half plates, *q q*.

The under side of the closer plate has lugs, *v v*, for carrying a pin, *v*, to which the upper end of a link or lever bar, *u*, is jointed. The lower end of the link is pinned to a lever, *o*, so that the closer, when released from the barrels, can be raised and lowered upon their joint pins, *н н*, which are fitted in the side plates, *B B*. The under side of the rear of the side plates has projections for the closer to slide upon as it is being moved, and when it has travelled such a distance as to be tilted, it rests upon a plate, *h*, which forms part of the closer frame, *g g*. The front of the closer or breech block, *o*, has a face plate, *p*, secured thereto. This plate is provided with a series of holes correspond-



ing to the number of barrels fitted in the frames upon the carriage. The holes are threaded for the reception of screw plugs or nipples, through which pins are fitted. The inner ends of these pins rest upon a disc of horn or other yielding material, so that when the explosion takes place the force of the recoil is diminished. The distance the pins may project is regulated by a washer or plug screwed into the back of the plate, *p*. Under the rear of the breech end of the barrels is attached one end of an elevating screw, by which the depression or elevation of the barrels is governed. The lower end of the screw works in a block or socket on the carriage.

The drawing back of the breech-closer is regulated by the hand lever, *q*, and it can be retained at the required point by means of a pawl working in the teeth of a ratchet wheel fitted on the side of the frame. When the barrels are filled or loaded with cartridges, and the breech-closer brought in contact with the rear of the barrels by means of the lever handle, the fire can be communicated by means of a percussion cap or fuse or quickfire at one side of the barrel framing, which fire is instantly forced through a hole, and impinges against the cartridge case with sufficient impulse to break it and explode the powder therein. The explosion in the barrel causes fire to be driven through another hole, which leads from the first barrel to the second, and this causes the second charge to be fired in the same manner as the first and from the second to the third barrel in succession until the whole of the barrels on that level have been discharged. The fire then passes up to a second series of barrels, placed above the lower series in succession, and in a similar manner to a third series of barrels.

The French were foremost in adopting the new weapon, but various other powers now use machine guns of different constructions, mostly embodying the principle of the mitrailleuse. The United States of America, from which, we believe, the original invention came, have adopted one known as the Gatling gun. Russia has been supplied with the same. As the British government has also favoured the Gatling mitrailleuse, we give an illustration of the gun and of its cartridges. (Plate 2, figs. 1, 2, and 3).

It is said by those who have carefully studied the subject, that when war must be undertaken it is practically less destructive to life to employ the

most potent and fatal agent in its prosecution. In this view of the case scarcely any modern implement of war can equal the Gatling battery gun, which, from its wonderful powers of destruction, may be said to take rank as the foremost of philanthropists. To give the reader an idea of the character of this gun, it may be said that it can be fired, when well manned, from 400 to 500 times per minute. Its main features may be briefly summed up as follows:—First, it has as many locks as there are barrels, and all the locks revolve with the barrels. The locks also have, when the gun is in operation, a reciprocating motion. The forward motion of the locks places the cartridges in the rear ends of the barrels, and closes the breech at the time of each discharge, while the return movement extracts the cartridge shells after they have been fired. When the ten-barrel gun is being fired, there are five cartridges at all times in the process of loading and firing; and at the same time, five of the shells, after they have been fired, are in different stages of being extracted. These several operations are continuous when the gun is in operation. In other words, as long as the gun is supplied with cartridges (which is done by means of "feed-cases," in which they are transported), the several operations of loading, firing, and extracting the cartridge shells are carried on automatically, uniformly, and continuously. The locks operate on a line with the axes and barrels, and are not attached to any part of the gun; but as the gun is made to revolve, they play back and forth in the cavities in which they work, like a weaver's shuttle, performing their functions of loading and firing by their impingement on stationary inclined planes or spiral projecting surfaces. Second, it can be loaded or fired only when the barrels are in motion, that is to say, when the barrels, the inner breech, &c., are being revolved. Third, it may justly be termed a compound machine gun; since the ten barrels, each being furnished with its own loading and firing apparatus, form, as it were, ten guns in one. This is a valuable feature, for in the event of one of the locks or barrels becoming impaired, the remaining ones can still be used effectively. The Gatling also has a feeding drum into which 400 cartridges can be poured, materially increasing the rapidity of firing; and an automatic mowing movement, which distributes the fire of the mitrailleuse horizontally, and thus removes the chief fault of the French piece—a too concentrated



delivery. The gun bears the same relation to ordinary fire-arms that the printing press does to the pen, or the railway to the stage coach. It may safely be said that no other gun which can be rapidly fired has so great a range and accuracy as the larger-sized Gatling guns, which have an effective range of 2000 to 3000 yards.

The Prussians, a long time previous to the war with France, tried both the Montigny and Gatling mitrailleuses, but rejected them as useless for field purposes, at the same time admitting their utility for fortresses, ditch defence of intrenchments, and defiles. In the early part of the campaign they were supposed to possess a mysterious weapon, called the *kügelspritzen*, but nothing transpired respecting its special performances. The new weapon will never supersede artillery or small arms, and it is doubtful if it will ever hold an important position as a powerful adjunct to them.

All accounts of the battles during the late campaign concur in ascribing much of the success of the Prussians to their superiority in field artillery. The Chassepot is acknowledged to be a quicker shooting and further ranging rifle than the needle-gun, and more accurate, though the excitability of French troops has apparently prevented them from making the most of their weapons. But, on the other hand, the Prussian artillery fire has almost invariably triumphed over the opposition of the enemy; and it is evident from such descriptions of battles as have reached us, that the German infantry could never have stormed the positions taken up by the enemy in every battle, but for the strong protecting fire of the guns.

The first Napoleon, himself an artillery officer, was deeply impressed with the value of field artillery. No one knew better than he how to prepare the way for the advance of his infantry by concentrating a powerful artillery fire on one portion of the enemy's position; and, what is more, his generals learnt from their great chief the art of using field artillery as a separate arm, and not merely as scattered throughout the divisions of an army. At Eylau and Friedland Senarmont handled his artillery admirably. At Friedland it is related by General Marion—

"That thirty-six pieces of artillery did what Ney and Dupont, with more than 20,000 men, had been unable to do, and what the three reserved divisions of Victor would probably not have done; in view of the steady courage with which the

Russians, when their retreat had been cut off, resisted the attacks of the triumphant army, it may well be assumed that victory would have been impossible to any other arm than artillery; but Senarmont advanced his guns and obtained the most brilliant success."

It is important to understand that, though in this battle Senarmont concentrated thirty-six guns in a small space, it was only when the nature of the ground obliged him to do so. As long as he could, he carried out the great law of distributing the guns but concentrating their fire.

When rifled small-arms came into use, field artillery fell for a short time into the shade; for it became very dangerous to bring the smooth-bore guns into action against infantry at short ranges, and their fire at longer ranges was, comparatively speaking, inefficient. It may almost be said that, if breech-loading rifles had been brought into use before rifled artillery, the employment of field guns would have ceased. But, as the range of the infantry weapon was increased to 600 and 800 yards, the action of the field guns was made available at a distance of 2000 or 3000 yards, while their accuracy was equally improved.

In the campaign of 1859 the French obtained great advantages by the use of their rifled field guns. In 1866 the Austrian rifled field artillery, acting independently, saved the infantry from annihilation after the battle of Königgrätz; and 1870 proved again and again the invaluable services of field artillery, culminating in the grandest achievement of modern times. At Sedan the numerous and gallant army of MacMahon, defended by the ramparts of a fortress, had to lay down its arms, not because of any immediate want of food, not in expectation of the place being stormed, but because the Prussian rifled field guns were disposed upon every hill in the neighbourhood of the fortress, at a distance outside the range of smooth-bore guns, but yet so near that resistance would only have converted the town into a slaughter-house. The battle preceding the capitulation was a great proof of the value of field artillery; for a vital position, rendered almost unassailable by the fire that came from behind its earthworks, was converted from unassailable to indefensible by the enfilade fire of Prussian rifled guns.

Sir Joseph Whitworth sent to the last Paris Exhibition two specimens of his steel field-pieces, the one a ten-pounder, and the other a three-

pounder. These guns, having attracted the notice of the emperor, were sent by his desire in the first instance to Versailles, and afterwards to the camp at Chalons, for exhaustive experiment. The result of repeated trials clearly proved the great inferiority of the field guns, made of bronze, with which the French artillery was equipped in the war with Prussia, at least as compared with English steel guns. This evidence is supplied by a series of tables in the official report, in which the performances of these latter guns are compared with those of the *canon de quatre de campagne*, as regards range, lowness of trajectory, retention of velocity at long distances, and accuracy. In all these particulars the French bronze gun was much inferior to both of the steel guns, and in some respects is so inferior as to bear no reasonable comparison with them. Even at five degrees of elevation, the range of the three-pounder exceeded that of the French ten-pounder by 290 mètres, while the English ten-pounder exceeded the other by 440 mètres. But as the range increased, the inferiority of the French became much more marked. Thus, at ten degrees the French gun ranged 2350 mètres, the English three-pounder 3120, and the English ten-pounder 3320. At twenty degrees the ranges were 3480, 5000, and 5490 mètres respectively; and at thirty degrees, while the range of the French gun was but 4100 mètres, the English three-pounder had a range of 6100, and the ten-pounder 6890 mètres. These inferior ranges of the French gun are associated, as they must be, with correspondingly high flights or trajectories, rendering the aim of the artilleryman very uncertain in the field, where distances have to be judged hastily and by the eye alone. In ranging 2000 mètres the French shell rose to a height of eighty-three mètres, while the highest point of the trajectory of the three-pounder was fifty-four mètres, and of the ten-pounder only fifty-one mètres. At 3000 yards' range the *maximum* ordinate of the trajectory of the last-named gun was 136 mètres, that of the three-pounder 137, and that of the French gun 253 mètres! Those who understand the relation between a low trajectory and good aim in the field will discern the immense disadvantage of the French gun in this comparison. Not less remarkable is its want of *conservation de la vitesse*, or the quality of keeping up the power to hit hard throughout its flight; and as the penetrating effect of a shell depends upon its velocity, it is easy to see how inferior the French

arm must be in this respect likewise. Its inferior accuracy is also very remarkable, especially at long ranges, but we have not space to record all the figures. Those already given are taken without alteration from the official report. It is only necessary to add that bronze is of less than half the strength of good steel, or of Whitworth metal, and that much of the inferiority of the French gun is attributable to its use; it being quite impossible to fire the full charges of powder and length of projectile from a bronze gun of given bore without speedily destroying it.

The Emperor Napoleon, after his terrible experience of the Prussian artillery at Sedan, is said to have remarked that the German victory was due to the "superiority of their artillery, not in numbers, but in weight, range, and precision." His Majesty was, however, mistaken. The Prussian field-pieces were considerably superior in number, which is almost enough in itself to account for their success, supposing them to be even equal in power and equally well handled. The word "weight" in the emperor's dictum, whether it applies to the guns or the shells, is quite incorrect, unless we suppose that the heavier class of the Prussian guns (six-pounders carrying 15 lb. shells) were opposed to the lighter class of the French guns (four-pounders carrying 9 lb. shells), a most improbable supposition, considering the enormous number of guns engaged on either side.

Superiority in range and precision the Prussian guns undoubtedly had; but it must be remembered those of the French were the first rifled guns made, and that other powers, having had the benefit of previous experience, improved upon the French model in establishing their own patterns. The main cause of this inferiority is to be found in the large bore adopted. The French four-pounder (9 lb. shell) has a bore of 3.41 inches in diameter, and the area of the cross section opposed to the resistance of the air is, in round numbers, 9 square inches; the bore of the Prussian four-pounder (9 lb. shell) is 3.089 inches, and the area opposed to the air is 7.5 square inches. Again, the French gun, with a larger relative charge of powder of between one-seventh and one-eighth of the weight of the projectile, has an initial velocity of 1066 feet per second; while the Prussian gun, with a relative charge of one-eighth, has a velocity of 1184 feet per second. We thus see that the French shell starts at a slower rate than the Prussian, and as it opposes a larger area to the resistance of the air in

the ratio of 1.27 to 1 (the shells being of the same weight), it loses its velocity much more quickly. The trajectory, therefore, is more highly curved.

The Prussian artillery has but one explosive projectile, a common shell burst by a concussion fuse. The French have common shells and shrapnel, some three-fourths of the ammunition being of the former nature, both usually exploded by time fuses. Now, all artillerymen know that common shells are most efficient when burst by concussion fuses, because the pieces of the shell are more likely to hit the object fired at when exploded on flat, hard ground, than when the shell bursts in the air by a time fuse, and because, under the former circumstances, the pointsman at the gun can see better whether his shells are bursting correctly, by observing the relative position of the cloud of smoke of the bursting charge and the front of the enemy, than when the cloud is up in the air. In addition, then, to the Prussian guns having greater range and precision, their shells during the late actions, for the reasons adduced, were more correctly burst by their concussion fuses than the French shells by their time fuses.

Another point of difference is that the Prussians fired slowly and the French quickly. The simple consequence was an immense waste of ammunition. Did not common sense show us, *a priori*, how much more efficient and in every way advisable deliberate fire is than quick fire, the English experiments at Shoeburyness have proved the point to a demonstration. The Prussian books giving instructions in laying a gun and correcting the practice are elaborate, and go to the bottom of the question. What is called "the light of nature" is in no wise depended upon. Every gunner is taught what the difference of range will be by the addition or subtraction of one-sixteenth of an inch to or from the height of his tangent scales. Again, he learns what the mean difference of range at any given distance may be expected to be. If his shell falls at an estimated distance from his enemy within double the mean difference of range, he knows that he will not improve matters by altering his elevation, as his error is within that inherent to the gun. If, after two or three shots, he finds they all err in the same way, all being too short or too long, he then alters his elevation, allowing as many sixteenths on his tangent scales as he knows will give an increase

or decrease of range equivalent to the amount of his estimated error. In French drill-books the question of laying a gun is much more generally treated, and no minute instructions for correcting the practice are there to be found.

There is also a great difference in the mobility of the pieces, for the French, like the English, carry the gunners chiefly upon the waggons, and the waggons do not go into action with the guns. The men, therefore, must run on foot if they would keep up with their guns when the latter move with any rapidity. On the other hand, the Prussians have comfortable seats for two gunners above the axle-tree of the gun-carriage. The Austrians and Russians effect the same object by slightly different means. Whatever, therefore, be the speed at which the gun is called upon to move, it always carries with it sufficient men to serve it in action. This is a very considerable advantage. The exigencies of modern warfare require guns to be moved swiftly from one part of the field of battle to another; and of what possible utility are the guns if the men who serve them come up heated, breathless, and well-nigh exhausted with running?

The artillery practice of the war does not seem to have exhibited any very decided advantages to be derived from breech-loading over muzzle-loading guns. Because the Prussians, armed on the breech-loading system, have in two gigantic campaigns beaten their adversaries, armed on the muzzle-loading system, it does not therefore follow that the former system is better than the latter for field-guns. It is easy to see how false such a conclusion is, by applying the argument to the respective merits of the needle-gun and Chassepot. Because the Prussians beat the French, *ergo* the needle-gun is better than the Chassepot. An artillery officer standing ten yards in rear of a Prussian four-pounder battery in action, describes the loading of the guns as anything but easy, inasmuch as after each discharge the gunner had to tug very hard at the breech-closing apparatus to get it open, and that on one occasion a lever had to be used for that purpose. Proof enough and to spare has been found during English experiments, that muzzle-loading guns properly made shoot as rapidly and accurately as breech-loaders; that a stronger powder charge may be used, thereby obtaining higher velocity and lower trajectory; while the simplicity both of gun and



projectiles is greatly increased, and everybody is now familiar with the phrase, "What is not simple in war is impossible."

Although they did so very little with it, the French had the advantage of a navy which, for age, tradition, and size, far exceeded that of Prussia. As in the case of the army, the navy is manned by conscription; but the marine conscription is of much older date than that of the land forces, having been introduced as early as the year 1683. On the navy lists are inscribed the names of all individuals of the "maritime population;" that is, men and youths devoted to a seafaring life, from the eighteenth to the fiftieth year of age. The number of men thus inscribed fluctuates from 150,000 to 180,000. Though all are liable, the administration ordinarily dispenses with the services of men over forty and under twenty, as well as of pilots, captains, fathers of large families, and able seamen who have signed for long voyages. The law of maritime conscription was modified by an imperial decree of October 21, 1863. The decree was intended to give greater encouragement to voluntary enlistments, by allowing youths from sixteen to twenty-one to enlist for four years, in order to make themselves sailors, and those of more than sixteen and less than twenty-three to engage for seven years as apprentice seamen. Every one whose name stands on the maritime inscription continued, as before, to be liable to conscription at the age of twenty, unless he can furnish legal claims to exemption. Formerly the custom was to keep sailors on board for an obligatory period, which was generally three years, after which they returned to their homes. Many, however, finding the advantage of immediately fulfilling their full period of six years, re-engaged, in order that at the expiration of their full term they might be no longer liable to be called upon, unless by an extraordinary decree. This plan was continued, but with the modification that during the six years renewable furloughs were given, with or without pay, according to the occupations in which the men might employ themselves during such leave of absence. They were at liberty to enter into any kind of seafaring pursuit; but those who engaged in coasting or home fishery only received a quarter of the

pay allowed them when on shore by way of pay, *en disponibilité*.

The ordinary number of sailors in the French navy is about 35,000, which, together with officers, navy surgeons, and other *personnel*, brings the grand total of men engaged in the service of the fleet up to 43,000. On the war footing, the number of men is raised to 66,535. From these figures are excluded the marines and coast-guard.

The progress of the French navy in the course of nearly a century is represented by the following figures:—In 1780 the fleet of war consisted of 60 first-class ships, 24 second-class, and 182 smaller vessels: altogether 266 ships, with 13,000 guns and 78,000 sailors. In 1790 the number had decreased to 246 ships, with 51,000 sailors and less than 10,000 guns; while at the battle of Trafalgar, 1805, in which the greater part of the imperial naval force was engaged, there were only 18 French men-of-war, with 1352 guns. In 1844 the navy had increased to 226 sailing vessels, and 47 steamers, with 8639 guns and 24,513 sailors; and this strength was not increased till the year 1855, when the government ordered the entire re-organization of the navy, including a substitution of iron-clads and steamers for wooden and sailing vessels.

The actual strength of the French navy at the commencement of the war was: 59 iron-clads, including 27 floating batteries, carrying a total of 810 guns; 237 unarmoured vessels, including ships of the line, frigates, corvettes, transports, gunboats, &c., mounting 956 guns; 73 paddle steamers, with 208 guns; and 111 sailing vessels, carrying 776 guns. Total: 480 ships and 2750 guns.

The most remarkable among the iron-clads are—the *Magenta*, *Solferino*, *Couronne*, *Normandie*, *Invincible*, and the cupola ship *Taureau*, all heavily plated and armed. The *Taureau* carries a single 20-ton gun, and her deck is covered for its entire length with a cylindrical ball-proof dome, so inclined that it is not practicable to walk on it. Four of the iron-clads are turret ships; another, the *Rochambeau*, formerly the *Donderberg*, was bought from the United States for £480,000. Several are armed with heavy spurs or beaks, and all the first-class vessels can be driven at a high speed.



## CHAPTER VI.

French hopes of support from South Germany—Searching Questions of the French Government for obtaining information on this point—Real State of Feeling seriously misrepresented to them—Germany thoroughly united through the action of France—Enthusiastic Meetings on the subject in various parts of Germany—Concurrence of all Parties for the Defence of Fatherland—Ultimatum of the French Government to the South German States—French Official Repudiation of any desire to make War on Germany—Decisive means adopted to prevent the Enlistment of a Foreign German Legion in France—Hopes in France of an Alliance with Denmark—Position taken by Russia and Austria—State of feeling on the War in England and Ireland—Soreness in France at the want of Sympathy for her in England—Complaints from Prussia as to England's one-sided Neutrality—Important Official Circular by Lord Granville, and correspondence between the two Governments on the Subject—Policy of the French Government towards the Press—Correspondents peremptorily forbidden to accompany the French Armies—Different system pursued by Prussia—Wonderful Organization displayed throughout Germany—The temper of the People—Contrast with the feeling manifested before the War with Austria in 1866—Enthusiasm throughout the whole country—Rapid Mobilization of the Army—Sacrifices made by all Parties—More Volunteers for the Army than could be accepted—Closing of the Universities to enable the Students to join their Regiments—The Enthusiasm spread even among Boys—Societies universally established for the Benefit of the Army and the Relief of the Wounded—Refreshment Associations formed in most towns to supply the Soldiers on their way to the Front—Assistance from Germans in Great Britain and America—No fear of ultimate defeat in Germany, but determination to become thoroughly united whatever might be the result of the struggle—Departure of the King from Berlin—Enthusiastic Demonstration—Proclamation to the Prussian people—Resuscitation of the much-valued Order of the Iron Cross—Departure of the Emperor from Paris for Metz—The young Prince Imperial and his Mother—Proclamation to the French Army—Delusions in France as to the state of preparation of the Army and what it would be able to accomplish—Change of feeling after the Emperor's Proclamation—Recapitulation of what had been accomplished in the fortnight from July 15—Composition, Numbers, and Positions of both Armies on the Frontier—The Address of the Crown Prince on taking the command of the South German Forces—Large number of German Princes in the field against the French.

WHEN contemplating the struggle which the Emperor Napoleon foresaw would be certain to take place sooner or later between France and Prussia, one of his great hopes was to obtain the support of the South German states, or at all events, to insure their isolation from the North German Confederation, and also to take advantage of the disaffection which prevailed in some of the northern provinces acquired after the war in 1866. If either the active or passive support of the southern states could have been insured, the French, by a rapid dash across the Rhine, with as large a force as could be collected, somewhere between Germersheim and Mayence (Mainz), and an advance in the direction of Frankfort and Wurzburg, would have found themselves virtually masters of the situation, and would have compelled Prussia to bring down to the Main, as hastily as possible, all available troops, whether ready or not for a campaign. The whole process of mobilization in Prussia would have been disturbed, and all the chances have been in favour of the invaders being able to defeat the Prussians in detail as they arrived from various parts of the country. With the object of ascertaining the state of feeling in South Germany, and the amount of support to be expected there, the following searching questions were confidentially addressed by the French

minister of foreign affairs to the imperial envoy at Stuttgart, the capital of Würtemberg, some months before the war took place:—

1. What was the state of parties previous to the war of 1866?
2. What changes in the division of parties have been caused by the war of 1866?
3. What is the relative strength of the democratic party? What of the Catholic party, the conservative party, and the Prussian or unity party?
4. What means are employed by the various parties to promote their objects? What are their journals, their leaders, and their most important members?
5. Which party is the most popular, and has the greatest chance of success?
6. What opinions are entertained by the different classes of society?
7. Is the dynasty popular? Has it a party? Would any particular exertions be made to defend it?
8. Which have been the principal political events in Würtemberg since the war?
9. Which are the principal laws enacted since that period?
10. What has been the relative position of parties since the war in the First Chamber? What in the Second?

11. What impression has been produced in the country by the new laws enacted in consequence of the military and financial connection of Würtemberg with the North German Confederacy—viz., the army bill, the introduction of the impost upon tobacco and salt, and the new government loan?

12. Is the new distribution of the franchise in favour? Is universal suffrage liked?

13. What influence on the future of the country can universal suffrage be expected to exercise?

14. Are people satisfied with the re-organization of the army? And has it been successful?

15. How is Würtemberg situated respecting its commerce and industry?

16. What influence have recent events had upon its commerce and industry?

17. Has prosperity increased since 1866?

18. What is the amount of the Würtemberg imports? What of the exports?

19. Have the events of 1866 had any permanent reaction on the state of the money-market?

20. The creation of the Customs' Parliament, being the most important event in the last few years, what is thought of it? What is anticipated concerning its future?

21. Why have the Prussian party been defeated in the late elections to the Customs' Parliament?

22. What prevented the establishment of a South German Confederacy?

23. What are the reasons of the jealousy which keeps the South German states separate?

24. Are there any pecuniary interests opposed to the formation of a South German Confederacy?

25. Are the interests of the South bound up with those of the North? Would it be possible to separate the two?

26. Are there no ties of common interest binding the southern states to Austria?

27. Would it not be possible to create a flourishing commerce between Southern Germany and the Adriatic, and make it a connecting link between the Levant and Western Europe?

28. What is Prussia's policy towards the southern states?

29. Has Prussia abandoned the thought of German unity?

30. How is it that Austria does not seek to regain her former influence over Southern Germany?

31. What are the present politics of the Würtemberg government? What are its relations to

the various political parties in the country. What attitude does it maintain towards Austria and Prussia?

32. Does the Würtemberg government regret the offensive and defensive alliance binding it to Prussia?

33. In the event of war, would the Würtemberg government side with Prussia?

34. In the event of war with Prussia, would France find any allies in Southern Germany?

35. How is the Würtemberg army disposed?

36. Why does the Würtemberg government Prussianize (*prussianiser*) the organization of its army?

37. Does the Würtemberg government intend to join the North German Confederacy?

38. What are the political opinions and tendencies of the leading members of the Würtemberg Cabinet?

39. What influence has Queen Olga on the politics of the kingdom?

40. Does Russia support Würtemberg?

41. Will the present state of things last? And what may one expect in the future?

The replies returned to these questions were generally favourable to France; and the press of the ultra-democratic party in all the southern states tended to foster the delusion by its continual tirades against Prussia. The whole of the extreme Ultramontane party went, of course, in the same direction, and did much to deceive the French government, and involved them in many of their subsequent disasters. In fact, could they have foreseen anything like that which subsequently took place with regard to this particular matter, it is scarcely credible to believe they would have ventured on war at all. It is true that now and then a journal with German affinities, scientific and religious—such as the *Temps*, for example—warned the public not to trust to German quarrels for furnishing French alliances in the hour of need; but the caution thus thrown out was quite powerless to destroy the pleasing delusion that an invading army would be hailed as liberators. In vain it was urged that a few Ultramontanes in South Germany, who hated Prussia, especially as a Protestant power, or a few discontented Hanoverian officers, were all that could be relied upon. France insisted on regarding the South German states as distinct from Prussia, and resolved to declare war against the latter power exclusively.

As soon, however, as matters had begun to assume a really serious aspect—even before the interview between M. Benedetti and the king of Prussia at Ems—Bavaria and Baden tendered an all but unqualified promise to stand by Prussia; and on July 19 the Bavarian Chambers rejected, by a majority of 101 to 47, the proposition for an armed neutrality that had been brought in by some of the Ultramontane members, and at once granted subsidies to the government to carry on the war; Würtemberg almost immediately afterwards gave in her adhesion; and immediately after the declaration of war the Saxon war minister waited upon the king of Prussia, to solicit for the Saxon army the honour of forming the van of the German forces. Only four years before, in the campaign of 1866, the Saxons were the most dangerous of all the enemies of Prussia! A great opportunity for a demonstration of the public feeling was also given at Leipzig by the performance in the new theatre of Schiller's "William Tell." Every line in which an allusion to the then position of the Fatherland could be detected was received with a storm of sympathetic applause. This was especially the case when it came to the Rüttli scene; the words of the sworn liberators:—

One single people will we be of brothers,  
We will not part in any need or danger,

were drowned in the shouts of appreciative patriots, and the public showed equal excitement when Tell exclaimed—

The best of men can never live at peace  
If 'tis not pleasing to his wicked neighbour.

In fact, France found to her cost, when too late, that Germany was thoroughly united, and that her action had at once done more to cement that unity firmly, than ordinary causes could have effected in several years. No sooner was war declared than enthusiastic meetings were held in many parts of Germany, with the view of expressing popular opinion on the subject, and it was unanimously resolved to withstand the aggression of France to the utmost. Some of the largest meetings were held in places in which the anti-unity party were supposed to muster in considerable strength. Thus, for instance, amongst the towns were Hanover, where many of the inhabitants cherished a lingering predilection for the old *regime*; Schleswig, where local interests were ever uppermost in men's mind; and Munich, whose ancient and not unjustifiable pride had revolted at

the idea of being absorbed by a larger state, and of thus being reduced to a provincial town. The more notorious these places had been for the strength of the anti-unity party within their walls, the more anxious they were in the present emergency to testify to their love for the common Fatherland. If there was any town in Germany where a hostile feeling to the Prussian government had been kept up it was Frankfort. Yet this city, where the French hoped to find almost partisans enough to enact the old comedy of liberating one part of Germany from the alleged yoke of another, was among the most forward to show her hatred of the invader. On the Senate of the city asking the town council for 100,000 florins to defray certain local expenses incidental to the war, the council voted twice that sum, and offered to bear any other burdens that might be required. All the officers of the late Frankfort troops, who resigned on the annexation of the city in 1866, asked permission to rejoin the service, and in no town in Germany was more enthusiasm observable. In Munich, the old stronghold of the Ultramontanes, fifteen thousand people—nearly a tenth of the inhabitants—went to the palace and congratulated the king for siding with the North; and so many students in that city volunteered, as to obtain the permission of the military authorities to form a battalion of their own. Similar demonstrations took place at Stuttgart; in Hanover the Guelphian party, called together by their leading paper, passed a vote repudiating the assistance of the foreigner for the attainment of their purposes; in Schleswig the particularists, in Brunswick the socialists, and in Stuttgart the republicans, were likewise prompted to declare that, although opposed to the present political arrangements of Germany, they would not be outdone by any other party in defending its independence against all comers.

It was this marvellous concord between the various local and political parties which constituted the strength of Germany; this political unity, so firmly established, even before the first shot had been fired, which so completely frustrated the calculations of France. Never since the days of the Hohenstaufens had the like been witnessed. National feeling may have been strong enough long after that date, and remained a living force until it evaporated in the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; but apparently there never existed such a willing-



ness to merge local in common interests, and obey the dictates of the leading sovereign, as in the memorable summer of 1870. This intensely unanimous feeling of the people was naturally reflected in the press, and to whatever journal one refers—north or south, democratic or conservative, Prussian or Suabian—the same tone prevails in every article. Intense hatred of the French emperor and his supporters, mingled censure and compassion for the French people, and determination to put an end to a state of things which exposed to the periodical recurrence of massacres a pacific, industrious, and highly cultivated race—such are the contents of the thousands of leading articles that were then composed on the one absorbing topic of the day.

After this outburst of feeling it was of course more as a matter of form than in the hope of its leading to any practical result, that France addressed an ultimatum to the South German states, leaving them the option between neutrality—in which case their territory was not to be touched—or war, when they would be treated with the utmost severity. To the last, however, France maintained that she had not gone to war against Germany, but against Prussia, or rather against Count von Bismarck's policy. This may easily be seen from the following manifesto, published in the *Journal Officiel*:—"It is not with Germany we are at war; it is with Prussia, or, more properly, with the policy of Count von Bismarck. Careful of patriotic sentiments, and respecting the principles of nationality, the emperor and his government have never assumed towards the great German race any but the most friendly attitude. By arresting at Villafranca the victorious march of our troops, his Majesty was influenced by a desire to spare himself the regret of being compelled to fight Germany in order to liberate the peninsula. When in June, 1860, he visited Baden, he there met King William, then prince regent of Prussia, the kings of Bavaria, Würtemberg, Hanover, and Saxony, the grand-dukes of Hesse-Darmstadt, Baden, Saxe-Weimar, and the dukes of Coburg and Nassau, and by tendering them the most cordial assurances he offered loyally to those princes his friendship and that of France. When King William, in 1861, visited Compiègne, he received a cordial and courteous welcome. Previous to Sadowa the emperor wrote to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, at that time his minister for Foreign

Affairs, a letter which sketched out the programme most favourable to the prosperity of the Germanic Confederation and most congenial with the aspirations and the rights of the German nation. To yield to Prussia all the satisfactions that were compatible with the liberty, the independence and the equilibrium of Germany, to maintain Austria in her great position among the Germanic populations, to assure to the minor states a closer union, a more powerful organization, and a more important position—such was the plan proposed by his Majesty. The realization of those ideas, so consistent with the desires and the interests of all the German populations, would have been the triumph of right and of justice; it would have spared Germany the misfortunes of despotism and of war. Let us compare the emperor's programme with the theories which Count von Bismarck has succeeded in carrying out in practice. For many years profound peace had existed among all Germans. For that peace the Prussian minister substituted a war which broke up the Germanic Confederation, and created an abyss between Austria and Prussia. By excluding from Germany a monarchy which was one of its principal sources of strength, Count von Bismarck was a traitor to the common country. In order to augment Prussia he sensibly diminished Germany, and the day is not far distant when all true patriots across the Rhine will reproach him bitterly for it. Not content with destroying the bonds which connected Prussia with the Germanic Confederation, he has not shrunk from brutally despoiling princes whose only crime was their fidelity to federal duties. Let the countries which have been annexed to Prussia compare their present lot with their situation before 1866. Tranquil, rich, honoured, lightly taxed, they presented a pattern of moral and material prosperity. Popular dynasties established an intimate relationship between the people and the government. To-day those countries profoundly regret their princes. Crushed under the weight of excessive taxation, ruined in the manufacturing and commercial life, compelled to leave agricultural work to be done by the women, they are now required to lavish their gold and their blood for a policy whose violence is hateful to them. Hanoverians, Hessians, inhabitants of Nassau and Frankfort, it is not enough that you should be the victims of Count von Bismarck's ambition. The Prussian minister desires that you should become



his accomplices: you were worthy of a better cause. It is lamentable to behold to what lengths a monarch may be led who, instead of listening to the dictates of his heart and mind, places himself under the control of an unscrupulous minister. How far distant is the time when King William said, upon accepting the regency, 'Prussia should make none but moral conquests in Germany.' If that prince, whose intentions were loyal, and who had a respect for right, had then been told that a day would come when, without cause or pretext, he would violently dispossess the most respectable princes of Germany, or that he would seize not only the crown but the private fortune of a sovereign so irreproachable as the king of Hanover, or that in the ancient free city of Frankfort he would give a slap in the face to the long-established glories of Germany, he would never have credited such a prediction. Will he, then, not distrust a minister who only yesterday dared to reproach him for giving a courteous reception to the representative of France, and who maintained to the English ambassador at Berlin that that conduct had provoked general indignation throughout Prussia? If we have witnessed with sorrow the excesses committed against the princes of North Germany, we have not been less grieved at the treatment to which the princes of Southern Germany have been submitted. Can the peoples of Southern Germany have any ground of resentment towards France? Bavaria, immediately after Sadowa, did she not address herself to us to preserve the integrity of her territory? and did we not hasten to respond to her desire? Who was it that demanded for the states of the South an independent national existence? Who was it that desired that the sovereigns of those countries, instead of being transformed into crowned prefects, should preserve all the prerogatives of a real sovereignty, which would have been the guarantee of the independence and liberty of their states. Full of respect for the qualities of those fine populations, honest and laborious, we knew that, ready as they might be to take part in a truly national war, they would be afflicted by being called upon to join in a purely Prussian war. Our traditional sympathies with the states of the South survive even in the present war, and we hope that the hour will come when the people of those states will perceive that we were their real friends. The emperor has said so in his proclamation. He desires that the coun-

tries which compose the great Germanic race should freely dispose of their own destinies. To deliver Germany from Prussian oppression, to reconcile the rights of sovereigns with the legitimate aspirations of the people, to put an end to incessant encroachments which are a perpetual menace to Europe, to preserve the Danish nationality from complete ruin, to conquer an equitable and lasting peace, based upon moderation, justice, and right—such is the general idea which governs the present contest. The war now beginning is not on our part a war of ambition—it is a war of equilibrium. It is the defence of the weak against the strong, the reparation of great iniquities, the chastisement of unjustifiable acts. Far from being influenced by motives of rancour or hatred, we enjoy that calmness which arises from the performance of a duty, and we appeal in full confidence to public opinion, the arbiter of peoples and of kings. We desire that Germany, instead of placing her strength at the disposal of Prussian egotism and ambition, should re-enter the paths of wisdom and of prosperity. The future will prove the elevated views which govern the imperial policy, and the Germans themselves will unite to render justice to the loyalty of France and her sovereign."

This appeal was reprinted in several of the South German journals, and commented on in terms of scorn and derision. The *Darmstadt Gazette*, the official organ of the Hesse government, said that only "a born idiot" (*gimpel*) would trust the emperor. For the authorized organ of a royal government this was certainly strong language, but it only re-echoed public opinion, and was a verdict alike approved by peasant and king.

As soon as war was actually declared, the French ministers to all the minor German courts had their passports delivered to them, and even the French consuls resident in localities where military movements could be advantageously observed were requested to withdraw. At the same time, another more serious measure was taken by the government. Having ascertained that the emperor of the French intended to form a Hanoverian legion, the chancellor of the Confederacy published a decree, commanding all North Germans serving in the French army to return home without delay. Those not obeying the summons, if taken prisoners, were to be shot. The proclamation applied equally to German volunteers in the Algerian force, a class

not very numerous, but which had never been entirely wanting since the first landing of the French in Africa. South Germans were also informed that they would experience the like treatment at the hands of their respective sovereigns.

In addition to their hopes of support from South Germany, the French were exceedingly desirous to enter into an alliance with Denmark—chiefly for the purpose of being able to disembark safely and without molestation a force sufficiently large for the invasion of Northern Prussia; and so far as the majority of the people was concerned such an alliance would at one time have been very agreeable, for the Danes have never forgiven the Prussians for the loss of Schleswig-Holstein. But from the first the king and the government determined on the observance of a strict neutrality, foreseeing doubtless that if Germany were victorious their country would be annexed to Prussia, and that even if victory remained with France the lost provinces could never be regained. As the news of the successive French reverses reached them a re-action set in on the part of the people, who then saw reason to be thankful to their government for not having thrown their fortunes and hopes into the same scale with France, and thus have saved them from a complete overthrow in her downfall.

Immediately after the declaration of war Count Beust issued a circular stating that, like England, Austria had not attempted to pass judgment on the question in dispute between France and Prussia, but had confined herself to recommending the withdrawal of the prince of Hohenzollern's candidature. Now that war had been declared, it was her wish to moderate its intensity, and in order to arrive at that result she would maintain a passive and consequently neutral attitude. That attitude did not, however, exclude the duty of the government "to watch over the safety of the monarchy, and protect its interests by placing it in a position to defend it against all possible dangers," and accordingly a loan of 12,000,000 florins was immediately raised to increase the army to the ordinary peace establishment.

These military preparations in Austria drew Russia into the field. For a short time it seemed uncertain whether the Emperor Alexander would be prevailed upon to side with his old ally of Berlin, or whether, in return for French connivance in the East, he would leave Prussia to fight it out single-handed, even against more than one adver-

sary. It soon became evident, however, that if Austria came forward as an ally of France (as was thought highly probable before the publication of the proposals made to Prussia by France with regard to Austria in 1866, Russia would join Prussia and Germany. The official journal of the Russian government said, "The Czar is determined to observe neutrality towards both belligerent powers, as long as the interests of Russia remain unaffected by the eventualities of the war." The meaning of this announcement was plain. As Russia's interests in the war could be touched much more easily by Austria and France, her competitors in the East, than by Prussia, who had always been comparatively indifferent to the affairs of the Levant, it was evident that the victory of the two former powers would have been more prejudicial to her than the triumph of the latter. Such an interpretation of the official language, conclusive enough in itself, was moreover supported by direct intelligence from the Russian metropolis, and was gladdening news indeed to the Prussians, as it freed them from danger in the rear, and left them at full liberty to ward off the attack in front. To prepare for all eventualities Russian troops were concentrated on the southern confines of Poland.

At the commencement of the quarrel nearly the whole of the English press sided with Prussia. One strong reason for this was the general reprobation always felt in England towards the aggressor in a quarrel; towards him who strikes the first blow, especially when he can show no other reason for doing so than is involved in a long argumentative recrimination. It was felt, too, that with France on the Rhine and in Belgium, and with no hope of reversing the issue, England's influence as a European power would be curtailed; while a German coalition dictating terms of peace at Paris could scarcely by possibility have any demands to make incompatible with the honour and advantage of England.

There were, however, many well wishers to France, and many whose reasons for being so, as well as their openness in avowing them, were very honourable. Many, for instance, could not overcome their hostility to Prussia as the originator of the complications which indirectly led to the war of 1870, by her, in their opinion, overbearing injustice to Denmark and her well-timed assault on Austria. Many, too, were influenced by a strong sense of the

loyal friendliness of France towards England for many years previously, and on them the memories of the joint contest in the Crimea acted more forcibly than the fears or jealousies of the present. And there were more than might have been at first supposed, belonging at least to the higher, if not the more powerful classes, in whose eyes the quarrel assumed something of a religious complexion. The French Roman Catholic journal, the *Monde*, assured the public the war was to be regarded as a crusade; that it was imperatively necessary, in order to check the progress of German Protestantism and infidelity. Strange as such an appeal to the God of battles in such a cause may have been, it undoubtedly struck an answering chord in many hearts in England. Such sentiments, more or less pronounced, were not confined to Romanists, but were shared by the section of the English upper classes whose feelings lead them into the nearest approximation to Rome, and whose favourite object of aversion is crude Calvinistic Protestantism. In Ireland, also, the feeling was enthusiastically on the side of the French amongst the Catholic portion of the population, but the Protestants were generally in favour of Prussia.

The fact of nearly the whole of the English press siding with Prussia created a feeling of soreness and disappointment in France, where it was said, and doubtless believed, that all the faults were on the side of Prussia; and even if it were admitted that they were equally divided, and that both sides were bent on a fight and took the first opportunity of engaging in it, the French people could not understand why England should not wish them success. They seemed to forget the great efforts she had made to preserve peace, at the request of France, which efforts were rendered of no avail, through what was generally believed in England to have been her too precipitate action, and they also appeared to lose sight of the obligations of a neutral power. The English had, however, so long been on the most friendly terms with France, that the latter could scarcely, perhaps, feel otherwise than pained and aggrieved at not enjoying their full moral support.

On the other hand, notwithstanding this general feeling in favour of Prussia, and of the issue of the proclamation of neutrality and the passing of the Foreign Enlistment Act described in a previous chapter, scarcely had war been declared than the Prussian official newspapers commenced making

accusations against the good faith of England and its one-sided neutrality, accusations which soon bore their intended fruit in the shape of a marked soreness on the part of the Prussian people. The chief charges made against England were that she allowed the export of coal, arms, and ammunition to France, and thus benefited her at the expense of Germany. It was afterwards shown from official statistics, that the reports of the exportations had been enormously exaggerated, and that in reality unusually small quantities of the articles named had been sent from this country; and with the view of setting the whole matter right, a diplomatic circular on the subject was written by Lord Granville, stating that the English government had learnt with much regret that an impression existed in Germany that Great Britain was deviating from the attitude of neutrality which she had announced her resolution to observe, by giving France facilities for obtaining certain articles useful to her for war purposes, such as munitions of war, horses, and coal, while such facilities were not accorded in an equal degree to the allied German states. It was not unnatural that, in a moment of excitement like the present, the German people should be more than ordinarily sensitive in watching the attitude of nations which were taking no part in the struggle; and it could not be wondered at that they should for a time accept as facts unfounded rumours, and that they should somewhat hastily condemn as breaches of neutrality proceedings which, at a calmer season, they would not hesitate to pronounce, with that impartiality of judgment for which they were distinguished, to be strictly in accordance with the usages of international law and comity. Her Majesty's government lost no time, after the declarations of war had been exchanged, in announcing the determination of Great Britain to maintain a position of neutrality between the contending parties; and that position had been faithfully observed. It was not true that any facilities had been given, or any restrictions imposed, which were not equally applicable to both belligerents. The steps taken by her Majesty's government had been strictly in accordance with precedent, and with the principles by which neutral nations, including Prussia herself, had been guided in recent wars. But it now appeared to be wished that Great Britain should go further; and that she should not only enjoin upon British subjects the obligations of neutrality, but that she should take



it upon herself to enforce those obligations in a manner and to an extent wholly unusual. It was demanded that she should not only forbid, but absolutely prevent, the exportation of articles contraband of war; that is to say, that she should decide herself what articles were to be considered as contraband of war, and that she should keep such a watch upon her ports as to make it impossible for such articles to be exported from them. It required but little consideration to be convinced that this was a task which a neutral power could hardly be called upon to perform. Different nations take different views at different times as to what articles are to be ranked as contraband of war, and no general decision had been come to on the subject. Strong remonstrances, for instance, were made against the export of coal to France; but it had been held by Prussian authors of high reputation that coal was not contraband, and that no one power, either neutral or belligerent, could pronounce it to be so. But even if this point were clearly defined, it was beyond dispute that the contraband character would depend upon the destination; the neutral power could hardly be called upon to prevent the exportation of such cargoes to a neutral port; and if this were the case, how could it be decided, at the time of departure of a vessel, whether the alleged neutral destination were real or colourable? The question of the destination of the cargo must be decided in the prize court of a belligerent, and Prussia could hardly seriously propose to hold the British government responsible whenever a British ship carrying a contraband cargo should be captured while attempting to enter a French port. Her Majesty's government did not doubt that, when the present excitement had subsided, the German nation would give them credit for having honestly acted up to the duties of neutrality to the best of their power; and they were confirmed in that conviction by the recollection that, when Prussia was in the same position as that in which Great Britain now found herself, her line of conduct was similar, and she found herself equally unable to enforce upon her subjects stringent obligations against the exportation even of unquestionable munitions of war. During the Crimean war, arms and munitions were freely exported from Prussia to Russia, and arms of Belgian manufacture found their way to the same quarter through Prussian territory, in spite of a decree issued by the Prussian govern-

ment prohibiting the transport of arms coming from foreign states. Reflection upon these points would doubtless make the German nation inclined to take a juster view of the position occupied by her Majesty's government.

Some further important correspondence on the subject took place between the two governments; and although it will slightly anticipate its proper position, according to the chronological order of events, which we wish to maintain as far as practicable, we give the substance of it here, so that there may be no necessity to refer to the matter again. On August 30, the North German ambassador at London, in a despatch marked "confidential," reminded Lord Granville that English public opinion, as well as English statesmen, had unanimously pronounced the war on the part of France "a most flagitious breach of the peace." The right of Germany, on the other hand, to enter upon a defensive war was freely admitted. Germany was therefore led to expect, that the neutrality of Great Britain, her former ally against Napoleonic aggression, however strict in form, would at least be benevolent in spirit to Germany, for it was impossible for the human mind not to side with one or the other party in a conflict like the present. But in what way had England shown the practical benevolence Germany had a right to expect? It was best to reverse the question, and to put it in this shape:—If Germany had been the aggressor, and consequently condemned by public opinion, in what way could the government and the people of the United Kingdom have been able to avoid taking an active part in the struggle, and, at the same time, to prove to France their benevolent intentions? Being short of coal, the French would have been allowed to find here all they needed for their naval expeditions. Their preparations for war not being so far advanced, and not so complete as they first thought, the French would have found the manufacturers of arms and ammunition in this country ready to supply them with, and the British government willing not to prevent their obtaining here, all the material they wanted. This, Count Bernstorff thought, would have been the utmost aid which Great Britain could have granted to France, without transgressing the letter of the existing neutrality laws, had the parts of aggressor and attacked, of right and wrong, been the reverse of the present condition. Facts, however, openly



boasted of by the French minister of war, and not denied by the British government—the continuous export of arms, ammunition, coal, and other war material to France—proved that the neutrality of Great Britain, far from being impartial towards that party which had been pronounced to be in the right, was, on the contrary, such as it might possibly have been if that party had been wrong in the eyes of the British people and government. Count Bernstorff did not admit that there was any necessity, in order to carry out such a neutrality as he conceived ought to have been maintained, to hamper the trade with neutral countries. Had the government declared such exportation to the belligerents to be illegal, it would have remained an exception, subject to penalty if detected. The *bona fide* trade with neutrals would not in the least have been affected thereby. But the government, far from doing this, refused even to accept such propositions as might have prevented direct or clandestine exportation of contraband of war to France; besides, it could not be admitted that such prohibitive measures could in reality damage the regular and lawful trade of the English people at large. They would merely prevent some rapacious individuals from disregarding the verdict of the nation, and realizing enormous profits, which never would have legitimately been made under ordinary circumstances. The rapid increase of the private fortunes of a few tradesmen by such ventures, could not appreciably add to the national wealth of the country. But, on the other hand, the nation could be held morally responsible for the blood which was being shed through the agency of those individuals. It would be said that the war would have ended sooner, and that fewer German soldiers would have been killed and wounded, had not the people and government of England permitted such abuses. It hardly could be seriously meant to say that the Germans were at liberty to bring each case before their prize courts, for it would be out of place thus to taunt Germany with not being mistress of the seas. . . . The policy of the British government, notwithstanding the verdict of public opinion in this country in favour of the German cause, was, if not intentionally, at least practically, benevolent to France, without there being any real foundation for the excuse that the commercial interests of the country would be seriously affected by a different course. The allusion which had been made in England to

Prussian neutrality during the Crimean war was disposed of by Count Bernstorff by the remark, first that the cases were in no way parallel: but even if they were, Great Britain remonstrated at the time against the alleged wrong of Prussia. There was (Count Bernstorff proceeded) but one possible alternative. Either the complaints of the British government were well founded, or they were not. If they really were, how could it be maintained at present that the complaints of Germany were unfounded, should even the great difference of the two cases be entirely disregarded? By declaring the present grievances of Germany devoid of foundation, the British government disavowed implicitly the bitter charges they preferred at the time, and condemned the ill-feeling created by them, and partly entertained ever since in England against Prussia.

Count Bernstorff concluded by remarking, that should the position occupied by the British government in regard to Germany, notwithstanding the admitted justice of her cause, continue to be maintained, it would be difficult even for the staunchest advocate of friendship between England and Germany to persuade the German nation that they had been fairly dealt by.

Earl Granville's reply, which is dated the 15th of September, extended to twice the length of the ambassador's remonstrance. The foreign secretary pointed out that the demand for "benevolent," as distinct from impartial neutrality, was something new, and therefore it was necessary at the outset to consider what it meant and what would be its practical effect. The new principle, if accepted, could only be accepted as a principle of international law, and as such susceptible of general application. Thus applied, then, its effect would be as follows: that on the outbreak of a war between two nations, it would be the duty of each neutral to ascertain which belligerent was favoured by the public opinion of its subjects, and to assume an attitude of neutrality benevolent towards that belligerent. But such neutrality should not, as he gathered from his Excellency's memorandum, be confined to sympathy, but should be exhibited in practice; that is to say, the measures adopted by each neutral should be favourable to one belligerent, and proportionately unfavourable to the other. It seemed hardly possible to push the examination further without being met by insuperable difficulties. Where could the line be drawn

between a departure from the usual practice in order to confer material advantages on one belligerent state to the exclusion of the other, and a participation in hostilities? The sympathies of nations, as of individuals, were not invariably influenced by abstract considerations of right or wrong, but swayed by material interests and other causes. Neutrals would probably, therefore, be found ranged on different sides. What would be the material relations of such neutrals? What their relations with the belligerent to whom they were opposed? It seemed hardly to admit of doubt that neutrality, when it once departed from strict impartiality, ran the risk of altering its essence; and that the moment a neutral allowed his proceedings to be biassed by predilection for one of two belligerents, he ceased to be a neutral. The idea therefore of benevolent neutrality could mean little less than the extinction of neutrality.

Earl Granville examined at length Count Bernstorff's two propositions, that the conduct of Prussia during the Crimean war was not applicable in the present argument because the cases were not parallel, and that, whether the cases were parallel or not, England remonstrated with Prussia. The foreign secretary insisted that the cases were parallel, and then proceeded to deal with the dilemma in which it was sought to place her Majesty's government. "You observe," he says, "that Great Britain remonstrated strongly against the state of things above described, and you add that either those remonstrances were founded, or they were not. If founded, how, you ask, can the present complaints of Germany be held to be unfounded?"

Her Majesty's government do not complain, continued Earl Granville, of the Prussian government making an effort to alter a state of things which they conceive to be at this moment disadvantageous to them; but her Majesty's government are of opinion that the answers which the Prussian government made during the Crimean war more than justify the reply which, to my great regret, I have been obliged on several occasions to make, and now again to repeat, to your Excellency. The nature of those answers will be seen on referring to the correspondence which passed at the time between the two governments, which shows also the nature of the remonstrances addressed to Prussia by Great Britain. On ascertaining that the Prussian government did

not mean to restrict the export of arms or contraband of war of native origin, but intended to prohibit the transit of such articles, her Majesty's government consulted the legal advisers of the Crown as to the extent to which they would be justified in making representations founded on their rights as belligerents. The answer was clear, that her Majesty's government would be entitled to remonstrate only in the event of violation of Prussian law; and it will be found, on reference to the correspondence, that though the large direct exportations from the states of the Zollverein certainly formed occasionally the subject of representations and discussions, the strong remonstrances to which your Excellency alludes were, with few exceptions, made on the subject of the continuous violation of the injunctions of the decrees forbidding the transit of arms, which violation was so systematic that, in only one case, of the stoppage at Aix-la-Chapelle of some revolvers concealed in bales of cotton, were the customs authorities successful in interposing a check on it.

Pointing out that what Prussia seemed to require was alterations of practice and the creation of restrictions on trade in a sense favourable to Prussian interests, Earl Granville went on to dispute the statement that the policy of her Majesty's government had been practically benevolent to France, and that the British nation, which had not prevented the export to France of contraband of war and supplies useful for warlike purposes, would be held morally responsible for the blood which was being shed. Admitting to the fullest extent the difficulty of defining the rights of belligerents and the duties of neutrals, and fully recognizing that the present feeling of the German nation was under the circumstances not unnatural, Earl Granville said both belligerents entered on the war with a full knowledge of the rules of international law, and of what had been the almost uniform practice of neutrals; and each belligerent had consequently a right to expect that the existing rules and former practice would be maintained, and might with reason have complained if any change had been made. It must be remembered that obligations upon neutrals had become more strict with the progress of civilization; but the present question was one which was not raised or discussed at the Congress of Paris in 1856; and the Royal Commission, composed of some of the most eminent juriconsults in England, who inquired into the neutrality laws in

1867, decided that to prohibit the export of munitions of war was impracticable and impolitic.

Turning next to the German specific demand that the export to France of arms, ammunition, coal, and other contraband of war should be prevented, the foreign secretary said there was no doubt that the executive had, under the Customs Consolidation Act of 1853, the legal power to prohibit the export of contraband of war; but the highest authority could be adduced to show that such exportation was not forbidden by English municipal law, and it had not been the practice to prohibit it except when the interests of Great Britain, as in the case of self-defence, were directly and immediately concerned in the prohibition: and even in some of these cases, such as the Crimean war, considerable doubts arose during its continuance whether the prohibition, when actually attempted to be enforced, was as disadvantageous to the enemy as it was inconvenient to ourselves.

Earl Granville argued that if the export of arms were prohibited a clandestine traffic would be carried on, in order to prevent which the most vexatious interference with neutral vessels would be necessary, and, with regard to coal, observed:—"Your Excellency includes coal among the articles to be prohibited, on the ground that coal is more useful to France than to Germany during the present war. This raises the question of the prohibition of all articles, not contraband of war, which might be of service to a belligerent. But if this principle were admitted, where is it to stop? In the American war no cargoes would have been more useful to the Southern states than cloth, leather, and quinine. It would be difficult for a neutral, and obviously inadmissible for a belligerent, to draw the line. It must be remembered, too, that the features of a war may change. Articles invaluable to a belligerent at one period may be valueless at another, and *vice versa*. Is the neutral to watch the shifting phases, and vary his restrictions in accordance with them? Again, the XIth Article of the Treaty of Commerce between this country and France expressly provides that the contracting parties shall not prohibit the exportation of coal. Can this solemn treaty stipulation be lightly disregarded, as long as we remain neutral!"

In conclusion, Lord Granville said that her Majesty's government feared that no means could

be devised for securing, at that moment, a calm discussion of the subject. "They by no means desire to claim exceptional rights for this country. They would be prepared to enter into consultation with other nations as to the possibility of adopting in common a stricter rule, although their expectations of a practical result in the sense indicated by the North German government are not sanguine. We took the course which appeared to be according to the dictates of practice and precedent, at a time when it was impossible to know how the fortune of war would turn. Since then France, notwithstanding the display of her usual courage and gallantry, has met with nothing but reverses. Germany has, on the other hand, given extraordinary proofs of her military ability and power, accompanied, as it has been, by continuous success. Your Excellency, as the representative of a great and chivalrous nation, must agree with me that it would not be possible that we should now change the policy which we declared to our Parliament to be usual, just, and expedient, because it was stated by the victorious belligerent to be in some degree favourable to the defeated enemy."

In his reply, dated October 8, Count Bernstorff, the North German ambassador, informed Lord Granville that he delayed answering him because he hoped the conclusion of peace might have rendered an answer unnecessary, as he would have much preferred to discontinue the controversy. As, however, that hope had disappeared for the present, he felt bound to reply. The answer which he made divided itself into two parts: a complaint that the attitude of the British government in the dispute had changed, and an endeavour to prove that the new attitude it had taken up was unjustifiable either by English municipal or by international law. What Count Bernstorff said in effect was, that up to the 13th of September Earl Granville had never questioned the German position, that the government ought to prevent the export of articles contraband of war. In answer to numerous complaints the foreign minister had asked for proofs, but none of his replies contained a positive statement to the effect that her Britannic Majesty's government regarded the traffic in contraband of war compatible with their neutrality, and that they could not interfere. On the contrary, said Count Bernstorff, it had been repeatedly left to him to search after particular cases with the means at his disposal, in order to bring them under



the notice of her Majesty's government. He proceeded to say:—"After I had succeeded by my notes of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th ult., in bringing a series of irrefutable facts before her Britannic Majesty's government, a sudden change took place. In your note of the 13th ult., while acknowledging the correctness of a large number of cases pointed out by me, your Excellency declared that the traffic, which had been quite openly carried on, was legitimate, and that the customs authorities had no power to stop it. Had her Majesty's government from the commencement of the discussion taken this standing point, they would certainly not have induced me to institute the above inquiries; and far less would they have had reason to subject the correctness of my information to a practical test. I therefore consider myself justified in concluding, that her Britannic Majesty's government, since the receipt of my memorandum, has materially changed the position previously occupied in regard to our complaints. It was unavoidable that this change should be reflected in the answer to my memorandum penned under different conditions; for I had started with the supposition that the legal means at the disposal of the executive had hitherto not been applied simply from motives of convenience. I had been under the impression that it would only be necessary to prove the serious extent of the supply of France with arms and ammunition on the part of England, in order to convince the British government that the time had arrived to make use of their powers. I had therefore not entered upon a judicial examination of the question of English neutrality, not because I had reason to shun its discussion, but merely because I had hoped that by abstaining from it I should be bringing about a more rapid practical decision, and therefore considered it sufficient to restrict myself to the practical and political aspect of the question."

In answering Lord Granville's arguments contained in his lordship's despatch of the 15th of September, Count Bernstorff commenced by denying that he ever asked from England "a benevolent neutrality." On the contrary, he said, "I have on the one hand merely given expression to my satisfaction that the public opinion had ranged itself on our side in this war wantonly thrust upon us, and had on the other hand combined with it the reflection, how difficult it is to reconcile the faith in the practical value of public opinion with the neutrality

policy actually pursued by her Britannic Majesty's government." He had only wished a return from a lax neutrality, whereby one party was benefited, to a strict and really impartial neutrality. "For I am unable to admit that it is compatible with strict neutrality that French agents should be permitted to buy up in this country, under the eyes and with the cognizance of her Britannic Majesty's government, many thousands of breech-loaders, revolvers, and pistols, with the requisite ammunition, in order to arm therewith the French people, and make the formation of fresh army corps possible, after the regular armies of France have been defeated and surrounded."

Before proceeding to his main argument Count Bernstorff drew Earl Granville's attention to the extent to which arms and ammunition were being exported from England to France. According to his information, which could be partly tested upon oath if that should appear desirable, the number of fire-arms shipped from England to France since his memorandum of the 30th September was treble and fourfold the number of 40,000 announced by Count Palikao; and a number of manufactories, especially in Birmingham and London, were working day and night for French agents and their men of straw. He was in possession of authenticated copies of contracts concluded between the French government and English contractors. The events of the war had quite recently delivered into the German hands an official letter of the French minister of War, dated the 18th September, to a French officer at the French embassy in London, and in which the then expected despatch of 25,000 Snider rifles was mentioned, and reference was made for the payment to the funds at the disposal of the French chargé d'affaires for the purchase of arms in general. In like manner authentic proofs were before him that the export of fire-arms and ammunition to France has been thoroughly organized in some British ports.

Taking advantage of Lord Granville's own admission, that the executive had the power to prohibit the export of contraband of war, but that the practice was to make use of this right only in the interests of England, as in the case of self-defence, Count Bernstorff quoted a letter of the duke of Wellington to Mr. Canning, dated the 30th of August, 1825, and reprinted in a London newspaper immediately "after the indiscretion of Count Palikao," which, he said, refuted this assump-



tion, proving that England, as a neutral, had repeatedly prohibited the export of arms by an "Order in Council." In one part of the duke's letter the words occur, "I am afraid, then, that the world will not entirely acquit us of at least not doing our utmost to prevent this breach of neutrality of which the Porte will accuse us."

Count Bernstorff quoted the Customs Consolidation Act, 1853, cap. 107, sec. 150, to prove that her Britannic Majesty's government had at their disposal the means to put a stop to the traffic objected to, without the necessity of introducing a new machinery of officials for the purpose. Some other sections of the same Act were referred to, and were held by the ambassador to prove that only the right intention of her Majesty's government was required. That British action in such matters varied from time to time was proved, he thought, by the different language of two instructions issued to the customs authorities of the United Kingdom on the 2nd of June, 1848, and the 8th of September, 1870, respectively. In the first, which originated at the time of the Danish-German complications, Sir Charles Trevelyan, one of the secretaries to the lords commissioners of her Majesty's Treasury, informed the commissioners of customs in a Treasury minute, that if they should be satisfied that any arms or warlike stores were embarked to be sent from the United Kingdom for the purpose of being employed in hostilities against the Danish government, they were to give instructions to prevent the exportation. On the other hand, the instructions dated September 8, 1870, were as follows:—"The board directs you, when it is supposed that arms and ammunition are being exported, to ascertain the fact, and, if so, what is the nature of the arms and ammunitions, and in what quantities, by whom, and to what destination they are to be shipped; but you are not in any case to delay the shipment longer than is sufficient to obtain the above particulars."

After quoting from the French law for the sake of proving that it was not impossible for a government to secure that articles cleared for a neutral port should really be delivered there, Count Bernstorff went on to the behaviour of Prussia in the Crimean war, respecting which he still held that, if the complaints of England against Prussia at the time of the Crimean war were warranted, those of Germany against England at the present time were at least equally well founded.

In the course of his arguments on the international aspects of the question, the North German ambassador said, "The present controversy simply centres in the question whether the refusal of her Majesty's government to prohibit the export of arms is not at variance with the still unaltered general rules of international law regarding the duties of neutrals towards belligerents, and with the laws of this country not yet repealed by the legislature for the better fulfilment of these duties. That such is the case I believe I have proved by the existing facts and the laws themselves."

The ambassador thus concluded, "As for the hope expressed by your Excellency, that the German people will in a cooler moment judge less severely the attitude of the government of Great Britain in this question than now in the heat of action, I regret that, in consequence of your Excellency's note of the 15th ultimo, added to the knowledge that our enemy is being daily equipped with British arms, I cannot share it. Should this state of things continue, I could only look forward to the soothing influence which the numerous and actual proofs of sympathy given by the English people, and the manifold testimonies of public opinion in favour of Germany and its good right, may have upon the feelings of the German nation."

In his reply to this note of Count Bernstorff, dated October 21, Lord Granville expressed a hope, that the calm discussion of the subject would not only remove present misunderstandings, but pave the way for an eventual solution. He denied that there had been since the beginning of the war a change in the policy of the British government, as alleged by the Count. "From the date of the outbreak of the war the cabinet has never hesitated as to the course which should be pursued. The views of the House of Commons were clearly manifested when, on the 4th of August, an amendment, by which it was proposed to insert in the Foreign Enlistment Act, then under discussion, a clause prohibiting the exportation to belligerents of arms or munitions of war, was rejected by a large majority; and the same opinions were shown to be held in the House of Lords in the debate of August 8, on the same bill, in which the lord chancellor, the lord privy seal, and Lord Cairns took part. I myself, in answer to a question addressed to me in the House of Lords by the marquis of Clanricarde on the 22nd of July, went so far as to express some doubts whether a policy

of prohibition was advisable even in self-defence ; and in the constant conversations on the subject which I have had with your Excellency since the commencement of the war, I have invariably explained to you that the new Foreign Enlistment Act neither diminished nor added to the powers of the government as regarded the exportation of munitions of war, and that it was our intention to adhere, on that point, to the usual practice of this country, which practice we believe to be in conformity with the established principles of public law."

The foreign secretary further pointed out that the mere fact of the English government having instituted inquiries into the truth of certain alleged exportations did not imply an acknowledgment that such exportations, if they had actually taken place, constituted an offence on the part of England. These inquiries were called for by the "wild rumours" which were in circulation, and by the anxiety of the government to make sure that the shipments of arms were not of such a nature as to bring them within the operation of the clauses of the Foreign Enlistment Act, forbidding the despatch of store-ships or the fitting out of military or naval expeditions. Independent information from the customs officials, from the Board of Trade, from the police, and from the small-arms department of the War office, must, of course, be more trustworthy than information from the sources to which the German government had access, and Lord Granville could not, of course, suppose that any importance would be attached by his Excellency to reports given in return for pecuniary rewards.

After reminding the Count that his former "series of irrefutable facts," as he called them, had nearly all been shown to be quite unfounded, Lord Granville proceeded to demolish his fresh accusations. Count Palikao's statement, as reported in the *Journal Officiel*, was merely that arms had been ordered à l'étranger, not in England ; no trace could be discovered of the order ever having been received in this country, and it was certain that if it was received it was not executed. Again, full returns showed that the supplies of arms drawn by France from the United Kingdom, between the two specified dates, were less than those drawn by her from the United States. This reference to the United States suggested an expression of surprise that a monopoly of the German complaints have been reserved for Great Britain, while the exports

from the United States and the positive assertion of the president of the privileges of neutrals had elicited no remark from the North German government. In conclusion, Lord Granville congratulated his Excellency on having withdrawn from the untenable doctrine of "benevolent neutrality," for though "good offices may be benevolent, neutrality, like arbitration, cannot be so ;" and, repudiating all jealousy of German unity, repeated his assurance of the friendly and sympathetic feelings of Great Britain towards Germany.

From the first the French government adopted the policy of keeping the public as much in the dark as possible with regard to the progress of events, and an Act was passed inflicting heavy fines and suspension on any newspaper which published war news other than that supplied officially. This measure raised such a protest from the journals of all parties, that the government were obliged to give way to the extent of allowing them to deal with all the past events and accomplished facts of the war, and only to abstain from revelations which might possibly be useful to the enemy. Nothing, in fact, was to be said of "operations and movements in course of execution," but as regarded other matters the papers were free to discuss and publish them. Formal orders were, however, issued by the emperor that no journalist whatever, French or foreign, was to be permitted to accompany the army, and very many who attempted to do so were arrested as spies, and in some cases treated with considerable severity. His Majesty's feeling was that the encounter would be so severe, that he could not afford to give the enemy even the slightest, and, apparently, most superficial advantage ; and he believed that assistance furnished to the opposite side by a band of correspondents in the French camp, eagerly reporting whatever news they could pick up, would be by no means slight. However much this might have been the case with some of the less thoughtful of the French writers, the experience obtained in all previous wars in which duly authorized English correspondents had been permitted, might have convinced him that his fears were groundless so far as they were concerned ; and it is undeniable that the belligerent from whose camp the most minute and well-written intelligence is forwarded, is sure to obtain the greatest amount of sympathy as regards neutral nations. In the present instance the exclusion of impartial and friendly representatives of the press

from the French armies is to be especially regretted, as it prevented that full record of their gallant conduct from being given to the world which would otherwise have been obtained, whilst shortcomings would have been more fairly extenuated, and the blame of disasters would have been more conclusively laid where it was to a great extent due—not on the brave soldier, whose conduct in most of the earlier battles at least was beyond all praise, but on the incapacity of those in supreme command.

Before the actual outbreak of hostilities, the Prussian government felt it necessary to warn the press of their country against publishing matters which would not only be likely to direct the enemy's attention to supposed weak points in their line of defence, but which might show him the ways and means by which he could best profit by this information. They, however, as in the war of 1866, freely permitted duly authorized representatives of the press, both English and German, to accompany the armies, relying on their good judgment for suppressing anything which was likely to prove of service to the enemy; and as a natural consequence, we have such a true and faithful record of the war, as could not possibly have been obtained by any other means.

The wonderful combination of activity and quiet which characterizes Prussian institutions, were peculiarly remarkable during the days occupied in sending the troops to the front; and nothing could possibly have been more admirable than the manner in which the railway transport was worked.

On July 17 orders for the mobilization of the army were issued from Berlin, and within a fortnight there stood massed on the French frontier upwards of half a million of men, with all the supplies and provisions needful for such a host. Incessantly, by day and by night, hourly, and in some instances half-hourly, trains filled with soldiers, horses, and artillery ran on the three main arteries of railway communication that converge on the Rhine district. From every part of Germany the available rolling stock was impressed into the service of transport, and with a regularity and punctuality which amounted almost to perpetual motion, at identical intervals, long trains laden with men and stores hurried along the lines towards the central stations which constituted the points of disembarkation, in a curve extending from Bingerbrück to Rastadt. But if the celerity and perfect

system exhibited by so rapid a concentration were astounding, there was something yet more deserving of admiration, and something yet more significant of the temper in which the struggle was being entered upon, in the frame of mind universally exhibited by the soldiers and the population. What made this especially noteworthy was its contrast with the disposition exhibited in 1866 on the outbreak of the war against Austria. On that occasion demonstrations were made against the war by corporations, by mercantile communities, and, in more than one instance, by the landwehr regiments summoned from their avocations of peaceful industry by a then unpopular minister, to fight for his ambitious aims against an empire of German affinities and German relations. But now from one end of the country to the other the movement was one of spontaneous, heartfelt, undeviating, and unlimited enthusiasm, but an enthusiasm manifested in a calm, collected, and earnest way, which had in it no swagger and no levity. In fact, although the excitement among such usually quiet persons was wonderful, what Macaulay said of the Prussians fighting at Leuthen was equally true now—their excitement was shown after the fashion of a grave and earnest people. The sternness of their military organization, which inflicts death for desertion or disobedience, was not needed, for all were willing; but the sternness made men prompt, and in all parts of the country the same spectacle was presented; the announcement of war arrived at noon, at night came the summons to all enrolled citizens, and the next day all those of the youth who were liable, ready as veterans, and as skilled, were on their way to the headquarters of their divisions. Entering at one gate of the barracks, clothed in every variety of mufti, they emerged in a few moments from the opposite entrance in complete uniform, with their trusty needle-gun in hand, ready, without the least confusion, to take the place in the ranks they had occupied during their period of training. Never, probably, in the history of the world had anything more striking been observed than this great military exodus; for it was literally the exodus of a people going forth to do battle in defence of their own, and in what they believed to be a holy cause. To show, however, how grossly the French people were deceived on this, as on most other points, at this time, it may be as well to quote a despatch sent from Metz to the *Gaulois*, a very widely circulated

Paris newspaper, on July 21st:—"Calling out of the landwehr difficult; conscripts weep; great fear of the French, especially of the Turcos; they are carried off by force in waggons."

To those not specially conversant with the social condition of Prussia, it would be difficult to realize the intense personal sacrifices of such a mobilization as that of 1870, which invaded almost every household that comprised male members in the bloom of life, and brought under arms a million subjects of the North German Confederation. It was needful to be on the spot to have brought home to your mind in all its force the full practical working of such a system that so sharply, and without distinction of persons, gathers in all liable to service, whatever might be their social position. Of course such a summoning to arms strikes heavily, not merely individual existences, but also the country, through the disturbance it creates in many industrial establishments. By way of exemplifying the public loss, it is known to every one what an enormous foundry is that of M. Krupp, at Essen, in Rhenish Prussia. Nearly 8000 workmen are employed in it, and of these on the present occasion no fewer than 1500 had to join their colours, to the great loss of the foundry, as they were the skilled and absolutely indispensable artizans. Yet nowhere did the least murmuring arise among the population at the calls imposed on them. Nobles and peasants, men and women, were all equally determined, and ready to make the greatest sacrifices. Those amongst the male population of the proper age, who found themselves forcibly exempted from service for infirmity, frequently had recourse to various devices to obtain admission into the ranks, and those only were disheartened who were doomed to remain in fortresses, without any prospect of facing the enemy.

Volunteers flocked to the army in thousands, but most of them were not accepted, as there was no need for more than those who could be legally called upon. No less than 400 young men, all just below the regulation age, asked permission to volunteer into one regiment at Berlin—the 1st Dragoons. Several of the universities had to close on account of the students leaving to join the army in such large numbers; in fact, the movement which converted incipient scholars into warriors extended even to the first form of the grammar schools. In Glogau alone fifty "Gymnasiasten" left

Sophocles for the stern realities of life; at Berlin, Treves, Cologne, &c., many more flung Cicero into the corner and put on the spiked helmet, in proof that the lessons of civic virtue inculcated into their ripening minds by the classics had not been thrown away upon them. The enthusiasm even caught boys (as in the time of the Crusades), and on one occasion seventy-two of them concealed themselves under the seats of the railway carriages going from Berlin to the Rhine. The boys, from ten to fourteen years of age, wanted to enlist, and cried with vexation when they were discovered and pulled out of their hiding places.

For that part of the population physically incapacitated from taking the field, but financially able to contribute to the expenses, the establishment and support of relieving societies became an earnest and well-observed duty. In every town, and almost in every street, offices were opened for the reception of subscriptions and of the thousand-and-one articles which an army in the field or a soldier in the hospital stand most in need of. Wine, coffee, extract of meat, lint, linen, stockings, and cigars, were the principal commodities brought forward; and to regulate and control the action of the many local societies established for this purpose, some central committees, all co-operating with each other, were set afoot in Berlin. To give a tangible reward to courage, at least fifty gentlemen offered prizes to soldiers who might capture French flags and cannon. In most towns refreshment committees and associations were established for the purpose of providing refreshments for the soldiers as they passed through, and it was a very touching sight to see the little maidens, and boys and old men with red and white rosettes and ribands, with their baskets and trays, distributing the supplies.

Congratulatory telegrams and promises of assistance were also received in large numbers from Germans in America; those resident in St. Louis alone telegraphed to the speaker of the Federal Parliament that they would send him a million dollars as their contribution to the expenses of the war. In many parts of the United Kingdom, too, enthusiastic meetings were held and large sums subscribed, and most of those residing in this country who were liable to serve in the army, left to join it of their own accord, and before the notices from their government could possibly have reached them.



Throughout the whole of Germany the idea of defeat—ultimate defeat—seemed out of the question. Whatever happened, people said, they must ultimately be the gainers. Whatever success might attend the French arms, it was utterly impossible that France could retain possession of an inch of German soil. Were the whole country to be overrun and the nation paralyzed for a time, the struggle would be renewed again and again until Germany was free once more. Should, on the other hand, their efforts be crowned with that success which a just cause merited, and which they confidently believed would attend them, then would victory over a common foe be the keystone of German unity, binding all the Fatherland into one whole and undivided nation. But even if the fortune of war were against them, if reverses followed and the blood of thousands of their countrymen were poured out for hearth and home—still would their newborn unity, baptized in that blood, bound and sanctified by the bond of common suffering, rise triumphant at the last, so firm, so fixed, that no petty jealousy, no internal quarrels, could ever again cause dissension among them.

The king of Prussia left Berlin for his headquarters at Mayence on the evening of 31st July, his departure being made the occasion of a most moving popular demonstration. The way to the station was lined with a dense crowd of enthusiastic subjects, who gave vent to their feelings in the most unmistakable manner. His Majesty was accompanied to the station by the queen, who graciously responded to the cheers of the public, but was unable to repress her tears at the thought of the perils her husband was about to encounter. At the terminus, which was decorated with flowers, and occupied by an immense multitude, the king was received by General von Moltke and Count von Bismarck, his military and diplomatic premiers. As on a preceding occasion of a similar nature, the well-matched couple were to be his companions in the coming eventful journey. It was a moving scene when the king embraced his queen, when all voices were hushed while the two were shaking hands for the last time, and when the hurrahs which had momentarily ceased thundered forth again directly his Majesty had taken his seat in the carriage. His Majesty evidently suffered from feelings of deep emotion, which he could with difficulty restrain. For some days previous—in fact, since the declaration of war—it was noticed

that he was not in his usual joyous spirits. He spoke with devout confidence, and trusted in the justice of his quarrel, but nevertheless appeared unusually grave. Count von Bismarck and General von Moltke, as well as the king, became the heroes of a perfect ovation before they could enter their carriage.

Before his departure the king issued the following proclamation:—

“To my People!—On my departure to-day for the army, to fight with it for Germany’s honour and the preservation of our most precious possessions, I wish to grant an amnesty for all political crimes and offences, in recognition of the unanimous uprising of my people at this crisis.

“I have instructed the minister of state to submit a decree to me to this effect.

“My people know, with me, that the rupture of the peace and the provocation of war did not emanate from our side. But being challenged, we are resolved, like our forefathers, placing full trust in God, to accept the battle for the defence of the Fatherland.

“WILLIAM.”

How much in earnest the Prussians were in all military matters was proved by his Majesty on his journey, which occupied thirty-six hours from Berlin to Cologne. The distance in ordinary times occupied only twelve hours; but though the king was the passenger, and was an aged gentleman to boot, who must suffer severely from the fatigue of a long journey, the arrangements for the transport of the troops occasioning the delay were not in the least interfered with. Before military law all Prussians are equal, the king not excepted.

His Majesty arrived at Mayence on August 2, and at once issued the following proclamation to his army:—

“All Germany stands unanimously in arms against a neighbouring state, who has surprised us by declaring a war against us without any motive. The defence of the threatened Fatherland, of our honour and our hearths, is at stake. To-day I undertake the command of the whole army, and I advance cheerfully to a contest which in former times our fathers, similarly situated, fought gloriously. The whole Fatherland, as well as myself, trusts confidently in you. The Lord God will be with our righteous cause.”

His Majesty also revived the Order of the Iron Cross, than which, among all the orders and medals of honour known to history, none have ever shown more brightly or decorated its bearers more gloriously. It was first instituted on March 10, 1813, by Frederick William III., and was conferred only for gallantry against the French. Its very simplicity and lack of intrinsic value were intended to bring back to memory the hard iron times by which it was called into existence, the terrible hand-to-hand fight with an over powerful enemy, and the noblest treasures of a nation that were to be regained by the war: freedom and independence of the Fatherland, moral and political honour, security of the fireside, of the family, of law, and of religion. Thousands of these iron crosses were distributed among the patriots who, fired with the love of country, and full of indignation against the foreign usurper, performed deeds of intrepid valour and noble self-sacrifice. The cross insured its wearer a small pension, but especially the grateful esteem and reverence of his countrymen. Fifty-five years, however, had elapsed since the close of the war which called it into existence, and the large number of knights of the iron cross had consequently dwindled down to a small handful, while the comparatively small number of iron crosses transmitted to the present generation were beginning to be looked upon as relics of a great and glorious age, and the time did not seem to be far distant when the only iron cross on exhibition would be that of Blücher, which is preserved in the historical museum in Berlin. The few survivors who were entitled to wear them were, in late years, on all public occasions treated with the honours accorded to the high dignitaries of state.

The only difference between the old and the new cross of iron is in the initials of the king, and the number of the year, 1870, being used instead of 1813-14; in all other respects, and also in the classes of the order, the new order is exactly like the old. The form of the cross is the same as that of the order of the Teutonic knights, the founders of old Prussia. It is made of black cast-iron with silver borders. As when first instituted, the order included two classes, with a grand cross as a third; but the latter could only be conferred on a general in command for gaining a battle, capturing a fortress, or some such decisive exploit. Had anything in the world been possible to have increased the enthusiasm and valour of the Prussian soldiers

of all ranks during the forthcoming campaign, it would certainly have been the resuscitation of this much-coveted order of the iron cross.

On Wednesday, July 27, a decree was published appointing the empress regent during the absence of the emperor, and on the following day his majesty left Paris for Metz, for the purpose of assuming the command. Instead of proceeding publicly through the city, as was at one time intended, his departure was conducted as privately as possible, which proceeding had a bad effect on the lower orders, who inferred from it that he did not go willingly, or that his health was bad, and also indulged in some other unfavourable suppositions. He was accompanied by his only child, the Prince Imperial, only fourteen years of age. The latter had previously worn his hair rather long and curling, but just before his departure he had it cut to the French military regulations, which was not quite so becoming, but which his mother thought suited him extremely well. Before leaving he gave a lock of his hair to all the ladies of the palace. The empress superintended the preparation of the young soldier's "kit," and packed his trunk with her own hands. As usual on occasions when firmness and energy were required, she showed to great advantage—bearing the parting with much fortitude, and replying cheerfully to those who condoled with her on the separation. It was right, she said, that the prince should thus early begin his apprenticeship to the noble profession of arms, and prove himself worthy of France, of the name of Napoleon, and of that of the valiant race of Guzman, from which, on her side, he sprang.

The emperor was enthusiastically received on his arrival at Metz, and immediately issued the following proclamation to the army:—

"Soldiers,—I am about to place myself at your head, to defend the honour and the soil of the country. You go to fight against one of the best armies in Europe, but others which were quite as worthy have been unable to resist your bravery. The same thing will occur again at the present time. The war which is now commencing will be a long and severe one, since it will have for the scene of its operations places teeming with fortresses and obstacles; but nothing is too difficult for the soldiers of Africa, the Crimea, China, Italy, and Mexico. You will again prove what the French army, animated by the sentiment of duty,

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